



## AGENDA

### CHIEF CONSTABLES' COUNCIL

Date: 23-24 March 2022

**\*\*S31\*\***

Day 1 – 23 March 2022

Session	Topics	Lead
<b>Session 1</b> 09:00 – 10:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Minutes for approval – January 2022 and February 2022</b></li> </ul>	Martin Hewitt
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Action Log</b></li> </ul>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Chair's Update</b></li> </ul>	Martin Hewitt
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Covid-19 Update</li> <li>- Ukraine Situation</li> <li>- Protest Planning</li> <li>- NPCC Vice Chair Vacancy</li> <li>- UCPI Update</li> <li>- Hub Survey</li> <li>- Commonwealth Games</li> </ul>	David Thompson
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- NPCC Comms Service Level Agreement</li> </ul>	Nicola Growcott
	<b>Critical Incident Reporting Framework</b>	Martin Hewitt
	<b>ESN Update</b>	Kier Pritchard
	<b>Aviation and NPAS Update</b>	Rod Hansen
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Regional Papers:</b></li> <li>- UCPI Financial Business Case</li> <li>- NP2IRM Budget Bid</li> <li>- NP2IRM Strategic Outline Case</li> <li>- National Mobilisation Tier 3 Mutual Aid Framework of Principles</li> <li>- National Mobilisation Plan Protestor Removal Proposal</li> </ul>	

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Break</b></li> </ul>	30 Minutes
<b>Session 2</b> 11:00-13:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <b>Performance Management Coordination Committee Session</b></li> <li>- Beating Crime Plan Discussion</li> <li>- Relationships with HMI in respect of PEEL</li> <li>- Crime Recording</li> <li>- Annual Data Returns</li> <li>- Research and Innovation</li> <li>- Leadership of the wider performance and analysts across all forces and development of capabilities</li> <li>- CPPB and Data Tool.</li> <li>- <b>999 League Tables Discussion</b></li> </ul>	Shaun Sawyer  Serena Kennedy Chris Rowley Gillian Routledge Karen Mellodew Peter Langmead-Jones,  Jon Bancroft Olivia Pinkney
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Lunch Break</b></li> </ul>	1 Hour
<b>Session 3</b> 14:00-15:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Police Science and Technology Strategy Session</b></li> </ul>	Paul Taylor
<b>Session 4</b> 15:00 – 16:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>College of Policing Update</b></li> <li>- College of Policing Review of Police Promotion and Progression</li> </ul>	Andy Marsh  Jo Noakes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Break</b></li> </ul>	30 Minutes
<b>Session 5</b> 16:30 – 17:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Police Uplift Programme – Year 3 Planning and Police Staff Pay Updates</b></li> </ul>	Pam Kelly and Janette McCormick

## Day 2 - 24 March 2022

Session	Topics	Leads
<b>Session 6</b> 09:00 – 10:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>NLEDS Input and IMORCC Overview Update</b></li> </ul>	Jo Farrell, Nav Malik and Mike Hill
<b>Session 7</b> 10:00 – 10:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Police Foundation: Strategic Review of Policing Discussion</b></li> </ul>	Martin Hewitt
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Break</b></li> </ul>	30 Minutes
<b>Session 8</b> 11:00 – 12:00	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Policing Minister</b></li> </ul>	Rt Hon Kit Malthouse
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Lunch Break</b></li> </ul>	1 Hour

<b>Session 9</b> 13:00 – 14:25	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>NPCC Inclusion and Race Equality Programme Revised Plan</b></li> <li>- <b>Discussion on HMG Response to CRED Report</b></li> </ul>	David Thompson and Amanda Pearson
<b>Session 10</b> 14:25 – 14:55	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Sir Tom Winsor - HMICFRS</b></li> </ul>	Sir Tom Winsor
14:55 – 15:10	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Wrap up and AOB</b></li> </ul>	

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- Use the 'hands up' feature if you would like to ask a question. (it is on the main task bar as an image of a hand)
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- If you have your video on remember that nine screens show to the rest of the meeting. Therefore, if you need to discuss other matters with staff, or get changed for your next meeting it may be worth turning video off for that time.
- If on video, check your background and remember that you can use one of the Teams virtual backgrounds if you wish.
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- Video recording will be saved and used for purpose of minutes, the recording will then be deleted and not retained.
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## Reference

Previous / New Decisions & Actions  
Chief Constables Council 8-9/12/2021

## Session 1

Minutes

1.1 Decision: 8-9 December 2021 – Agreed

Action Log

**Session 6 (October 2021 Extraordinary CCC) – NPCC Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensic Capability Network - FCN Refocused and Next Generation Procurement (Action Owners: Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean): (Action 1) Governance hosting arrangements and funding review for all national units is being reviewed by the NPCC Strategic Hub and a paper will be shared with chiefs going forward.**

**(Action 2) Paper with the decisions and update on outline of contractual landscape across forces mapped to provide overview working towards a singular process going forwards.**

1.2 **Response** – Discussion in session 9 on the agenda - Action Open

**Session 1 (December 2021) – College of Policing Update (Action Owner: Andy Marsh): Agreed to complete stock take of misogyny recordings from forces and will write out to all chiefs.**

1.3 **Response** – Letter will be circulated to all forces from the College – Action Open



Reference	Previous / New Decisions & Actions Chief Constables Council 8-9/12/2021
Session 1	<p><b><u>Action Log (Cont)</u></b></p> <p><b>Session 1 (December 2021) – Chair’s Update – Op Talla National Awards (Action Owners: Owen Weatherill):</b> NPoCC Op Talla team would update chiefs on the logistics and venue for the awards so they can plan now.</p> <p><b>1.4 Response</b> – For a number of reasons the date of the Awards has been rescheduled and we are looking at June 2022, however we are just waiting to confirm the actual date with the venue. We are currently pulling together comms to go out to those who nominated individuals/teams to advise whether their nomination was successful or not. Action Open</p> <p><b>Session 7 (December 2021) – Creation of Prevention Coordination Committee – Options Paper (Action Owners: Stephen Watson):</b> Crime Prevention team would work with the NPCC Strategic Hub to come back to chiefs on detailed proposal of agreed creation of the committee building in resilience and capability points including roles and responsibilities (strategic and operational), how this links in with the <b>**S23**</b>, outputs being made clearer and how the committee would coordinate across all NPCC committees/portfolios interlinked into this area of work to avoid overlap.</p> <p><b>1.5 Response</b> – Advert for the Chair position has been published to all chiefs and x2 candidates have put themselves forward for the role. Await outcome of ballot – Action Open.</p> <p><b>Session 4 (January 2022 Extraordinary) – <b>**S23**</b></b></p> <p><b>1.6 Response</b> – Ongoing action until pilot has been completed and overview can be worked up and presented back to Chiefs at a future Council meeting. Action Open</p>



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions

Chief Constables Council 02/02/2022

## Session 1

Chair's Update**NPCC Vice Chair Vacancy**

1.7 **Decision:** NPCC Chair encouraged chiefs to considering applying for the role.

**Legitimacy and Confidence in Policing Conference 17-19 June 2022**

1.8 **Decision:** Chiefs were encouraged to attend the above event.

**Covid-19 Update**

1.9 **Decision:** Chiefs noted the update

**Performance Update**

1.10 **Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and this would be discussed in session 5 of the agenda.

**PCSC Bill update**

1.11 **Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and looked forward to seeing the final version of the bill once it's been through Parliament.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions

Chief Constables Council 02/02/2022

## Session 1

**Chair's Update (Cont)****NPCC Estates Move**

1.12 **Decision:** Proposal will be brought back to CCC once approved by September 2022.

**HMICFRS Emerging theme: Reverse Workforce Modernisation**

1.13 **Decision:** Chiefs noted the update

**Roads Policing Strategy 2022-25 Update**

1.14 **Decision:** Chiefs supported the framework and strategy which will be published on ChiefsNet.

1.15 **Action:** NPCC Hub would incorporate review of strategy commissioning sign off routes into work plan going forward.

**NPCC Comms Advisory Group Update**

1.16 **Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and encouraged all chiefs to review principals and current Authorised Professional Practice (APP) – relationships with the Media going forward.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions

Chief Constables Council 02/02/2022

## Session 1

Chair's Update (Cont)**College of Policing Update**

**1.16 Action:** Letter detailing an increase in charging for College services will be sent to all Chiefs.

**1.17 Action:** Fundamental Review of the College out next week and will be published to all chiefs via ChiefsNet.

**Performance Sub Committee Update – NPCC Chair Role profile sign off**

**1.18 Decisions:** Chiefs agreed the following recommendations from the paper:

- The term for the office of NPCC Chair is increased to a 5 year tenure, embedding a 3 year contingency review for relinquishing the chair prior to the contractual 5 years (3+2).
- Future eligibility for the role of NPCC Chair is defined as a serving Chief Constable or Assistant Commissioner within a UK police force or to have recent experience at this level substantively. Independent scrutiny will be included should non-serving candidates express an interest.
- The revised NPCC Chair Role Profile is agreed.
- The existing *S22A National Police Collaboration Agreement in relation to the co-coordinating body known as the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Pursuant to S.22A of the Police Act 1996* is revised to account for the term of office changes, eligibility criteria and proposed job description. This revision will be incorporated into existing work owned by the NPCC Strategic Hub.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions

Chief Constables Council 08/12/2021

## Session 1

**Police Uniform Update****1.19 Decision:** Chiefs supported the following actions from the paper:

- Review of force strategy, governance of uniform to have clear local priorities
- Are forces well sighted and integrated into force and national actions and decisions re uniform.
- Consider your forces involvement at NUWG and ensure representatives have the right skills and knowledge to develop key areas of uniform related work.
- Ensure that NUWG are consulted when procuring any uniform items.
- Encourage representatives to provide consistent two-way feedback and updates from all uniform activities.
- Ensure that feedback re uniform is provided via the NUWG rather than approaching Blue Light Commercial (BLC) directly to commence separate procurements.

**Regional Papers****1.20 Decision:** All decisions and actions from the regional papers are listed in the circulated slides contained within the Council pack and will be captured in the minutes for this meeting. (Additional actions/decisions from the meeting noted below):**National Standards for Special Constabulary Recruitment****1.21 Decision:** Following discussion and response from the author to the regions on the feedback provided this paper was agreed by Chiefs.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions

Chief Constables Council 08/12/2021

## Session 1

Regional Papers (Cont)**National Safeguarding Management and VPC Standards**

**1.22 Decision:** Option 3 was supported from the paper – see agreed decision on funding within session 2.

**College of Policing Review of Police Promotion and Progression**

**1.23 Decision:** Following regional feedback and discussion in the meeting a paper will be brought back to the March CCC meeting to address all the issues raised from chiefs.

**1.24 Action:** College will liaise with regions on the feedback provided.

**National Ballistics Intelligence Service Funding Bid 2022-23 to 2024-25**

**1.25 Decision:** Paper would be covered in session 2.

**NPCC Less Lethal Weapons Staff Resource Business Case**

**1.26 Decision:** Chiefs supported the principle of the paper following review and discussion of responses to the regional feedback. See session 2 for decision on funding.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 2

**National Operating Budget Proposal and Budget Papers (2022-2023)****National Operating Budget Proposal**

**2.1 Decisions:** Chiefs agreed upon a 0.13% contribution for 2022/23 as per point 3.1 in the paper.

**2.2 Decision:** National Programmes host will continue to send invoices to forces. NPCC budgets will be collected via a single invoice from forces outlined in the NPCC Budget Proposal Paper.

**2.3 Decision:** Chiefs agreed in point 3.3 of the paper for the NPCC hubs finance coordinator to look at NPCC Budgets for 2023/24 & 2024/25 to identify and update where efficiency can be made and when programmes end which will give financial flexibility in the coming years.

**2.4 Action:** Finance committee to set up group to review underspend and reserve strategy.

**Budgets****ACRO**

**2.5 Decision:** Chiefs approved the contribution of £3.0m from the Police Service.





## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 2

**National Operating Budget Proposal and Budget Papers (2022-2023) – (Cont)****National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit**

**2.6 Decision:** Chiefs endorsed the recommendation for funding of:

- i. 2022/23 - £484k
- ii. 2023/24 - £484k

**NPCC Central Office**

**2.7 Decision:** Chiefs agreed the contribution of £2,233k sought from PCC's for the NPCC Central Office annual budget for FY 2022-23 comprised of £2.1m operating revenue offset by other additional income (£39k) along with contribution towards reserves of £76k. (See action above on reserves strategy review)

**NPoCC Strategic Intelligence and Briefing (SIB) Team**

**2.8 Decision:** Chiefs agreed the contribution of £941k sought from PCC's for the NPoCC SIB annual budget for FY 2022-23.

**NPoCC Operations**

**2.9 Decision: Chiefs agreed the** contribution of £2,691k sought from PCC's + other signatories for the NPoCC Ops annual budget for FY 2022-23.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 2

**National Operating Budget Proposal and Budget Papers (2022-2023) – (Cont)****NPCC Pension and Reward**

**2.10 Decision:** Chiefs agreed the contribution of £500k sought from PCC's for the NPCC Pensions Team annual budget for FY 2022-23.

**Funding Bid to Forces – National Police MAPPA Policy Lead with HMPPS**

**2.11 Decision:** Chiefs agreed to fund 50% of the cost of the post for 3 years. 2022-2023 is £44,000, 2023-2024 is £45,000 and 2024-2025 is £46,000 (based on an assumed 2.5% pay award each year). The total cost over 3 years amounts to £135,000. HMPPS will pay 50% of pay and allowance which amounts to £135,000 for 3 years.

**National Wildlife Crime Unit**

**2.12 Decision:** Chiefs agreed to consider and approve the funding contribution of £232,580 from NPCC Forces for 2022/23 financial year.

**Funding updates for NP2IRM, UCPI and HOLMES**

**2.13 Decision:** NP2IRM, UCPI and HOLMES funding business case proposals to come back to the March CCC meeting.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 2

**National Operating Budget Proposal and Budget Papers (2022-2023) – (Cont)**

**National Ballistics Intelligence Service Funding Bid 2022-23 to 2024-25**

**2.14 Decision:** After discussion from responses to the regional feedback provided Chiefs agreed to approve the funding contribution from NPCC Forces of £3,630,684 for 2022-23, £3,663,695 for 2023-24 and £3,697,036 for 2024-25.

**NABIS Funding Formula**

**2.15 Decision:** Chiefs approved Option 4, Banding of 3 years ONS data to calculate Forensic Usage and National NABIS Services, as the new NABIS Funding Formula.

**2.16 Decision:** Chiefs approved the implementation from financial year 2022-23 to coincide with the next three-year NABIS funding cycle being presented to Chiefs Constables' Council in February 2022.

**National Safeguarding Management and VPC Standards**

**2.17 Decision:** Chiefs agreed to fund the National Safeguarding and Standards function which would be covered by the National Operating Budget Proposal of 0.13% contribution for 2022/23.

**NPCC Less Lethal Weapons Staff Resource Business Case**

**2.18 Decision:** Chiefs agreed to fund the Less Lethal Weapons Staff Resource business case which would be covered by the National Operating Budget Proposal of 0.13% contribution for 2022/23.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

**Parole Board for England and Wales**

**3.1 Decisions:** Chiefs noted the update and agreed to create a group to share information more broadly with the Parole Board with a focus on SOC and CT cases. Group should include the **\*\*S23\*\***.

**Session 3**



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 4

**CT Policing Update****Op Bridger and MP Security**

**4.1 Decision:** Chiefs supported the three recommendations as follows:

- To develop a common risk assessment framework
- To design and Implement a multi-agency hub for MP security.
- To define future operating structures, roles and responsibilities.

**4.2 Decision:** Chiefs approved the request for two CT funded secondments to be advertised to support the detailed design phase of the project.

**Manchester Bombing Inquiry Part 2**

**4.3 Decision:** Chiefs noted the publication of Volume 2 on Emergency Response is expected around May. Volume 3 on Preventability is expected in the summer.

**4.4 Decision:** Chiefs agreed the recommendations from the paper as follows:

- The group is expanded as needed to include other interested parties / relevant leads
- C&C working group continues to develop these ideas and provide a more substantive response to CCC in due course
- An assessment of JESIP and the currency of plans and training 'post pandemic', is put onto LRF agendas, and consideration given to what testing and exercising is now feasible



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 4

**CT Policing Update****PLATO Assurance Process**

**4.5 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and were invited to ensure they are confident in their force's ability to respond effectively in the event of an attack.

**CT Recruitment, Resourcing and Finance**

**4.6 Decision:** Chiefs noted the position on the 22/23 budget and on recruitment, and support the developing programme of work on CTP recruitment.



Reference	Decisions & Actions 02/02/2022
Session 5	<p><b><u>National Crime Committee Session</u></b></p> <p><b>Undercover Policing Inquiry/Criminal Conduct Act Update</b></p> <p><b>5.1 Decision:</b> Further update to come back to CCC once response is received from the letter sent to the inquiry and Home Secretary on timelines and next steps.</p> <p><b>Relevant Source UCO and CHIS</b></p> <p><b>5.2 Decision:</b> Chiefs noted the update to remind AOs of their Section 29 (Use &amp; Conduct) considerations when authorising Relevant Source (UCO) activity and the overview of the Criminal Conduct Act (CCA) 2021.</p> <p><b>VPP/Child Safeguarding</b></p> <p><b>5.3 Decision:</b> Chiefs noted the update on the inquiry findings report into child sexual abuse and agreed to take the priority areas for focus back into forces and supported the following next steps:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Publication of the national review regarding Arthur Labinjo-Hughes</li> <li>• Proposed revision of the Voice of Policing mission statement &amp; developing police resources re local children safeguarding partnerships</li> <li>• Working Together 2018 rewrite / SV duty to cooperate</li> <li>• JTAI report – multi agency response to identification of initial need and risk</li> <li>• IICSA and completion of independent review into children’s social care.</li> <li>• HMG TCSA strategy – overview of progress one year on.</li> </ul>



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 5

**National Crime Committee Session (Cont)****Drugs 10 Year Strategy Update**

**5.4 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

**Homicide Prevention Update.**

**5.5 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and supported the following next steps:

- T/ACC Simon Wilson, seconded as a dedicated homicide prevention lead to develop a NPCC homicide prevention strategy.
- College of Policing and NPCC to develop updated homicide problem profile.
- Working with forces who record highest volumes of homicides.
- NPCC to negotiate access to Homicide Index.
- Creation of NPCC led Homicide Summits with support of College of Policing and HMICFRS
- Ongoing focus on homicide and serious violence prevention.





## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 6

Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Committee SessionGender Update

**6.1 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

Wider DEI Strategy

**6.2 Decision:** Chiefs supported the development and delivery of the strategy and agreed the following steps:

- Strategy - mid term refresh
- Development of Outcomes Framework
- Developing performance measures

**6.3 Decision:** Once strategy has been refreshed and re-developed this should come back to CCC for agreement.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 6

**Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Committee Session (Cont)****GRT – Encampment Guidance**

**6.4 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on proposed powers in respect of unauthorised encampments and supported the following next steps:

- Ongoing working group to understand the impact, which should include Force leads, GRTPA, APCC, NFU, Home Office.
- Ongoing stakeholder engagement with key community groups.
- Revision of the NPCC Unauthorised Encampment Guidance and implementation to all forces with guidance to all officers how to implement the guidance.
- Awareness pack to support forces to be developed.
- EIA development to agree measures and data to enable force / national evaluation.

**Uplift Programme Update**

**6.5 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

**6.6 Action:** Uplift team to send out letter to all chiefs on current position with data standards for protected data characteristics.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 02/02/2022

## Session 6

Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Committee Session (Cont)Human Rights Legislation Review

**6.7 Action:** Chiefs were requested to send in there submissions to the DEI committee to form a collated view for policing on the human rights legislation review – deadline to submit police response to the review is the 8 March.

Staff Networks Update

**6.8 Decision:** An MoU is being developed and the proposal would come back to CCC for sign off with chiefs.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 03/02/2022

## Session 7

**SOC (Chief Constable) Lead Role (Remuneration and Recruitment)**

**7.1 Decision:** Chiefs supported the proposal in point 4.6 that the place of work is negotiable at a London based office, or any of the Regional Organised Crime Unit offices. Chiefs agreed this would allow for broadening out the potential pool for recruitment.

**7.2 Decision:** Chiefs supported the appointments process in point 5.1 of the paper.

**7.3 Decision:** Chiefs agreed in relation to point 5.2 of the paper (*agree to the proposed terms and conditions of appointment and decide upon the salary band for advertisement*) – this needs an external input with the creation of a broader group to allow greater scrutiny and transparency. This group should include PCCs and the total remuneration package set at a £170k threshold.

**7.4 Action:** Once proposal is complete re the above decision – Gavin Stephens to write out to all chiefs to get further feedback.

**7.5 Action:** As part of review by the external group (as per above decision) a review of gender disparity pay gap should be looked at.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 03/02/2022

## Session 8

**Forensic Science Regulator – Forensic Science Regulator Act and the progress towards Commencement**

**8.1 Decision:** Gary Pugh will formally write on to all chiefs and forensic leads on engagement for feedback on the FSR statutory code in advance of starting the formal consultation process with forces.

**8.2 Decision:** Senior police forensics quality managers will be part of the FSR scrutiny group to consider the draft statutory code in advance of formal consultation.

**8.3 Decision:** Whilst developing the new codes – opportunity should be taken to review existing codes through the scrutiny group to see which parts should or should not be encapsulated into the new codes.

**8.4 Decision:** Once first report is published after engagement as outlined above, an update will come back to a future CCC meeting for further review and decision.

**8.5 Action:** Paul Taylor to link in with Gary Pugh in relation to the Sir Patrick Vallance strategy review.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 03/02/2022

## Session 9

**Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensics Capability Network**

**9.1 Decision:** Chiefs noted the Market update and supported the next steps from Bluelight Commercial (BLC) as follows:

- Commercial Strategy should be drafted including a ten year vision, reflecting the full commercial lifecycle approach and agreed with a clear plan for convergence. Structured plans for Strategic Supplier Relationship Management and supplier development and innovation.
- Revised governance linked to overarching forensic strategy and connection to the forensic community. The Board structure should be reviewed to ensure an appropriate level of membership to support commercial decision making.
- Communication strategy to be developed to capture varying routes to market and force requirements. Needs to be clear ongoing engagement with market to allay concerns and find mutually acceptable position regarding resource for differing procurement processes.
- Must build closer working relationship with WSCC as per previous CCC meetings agreements.
- BLC to start engagement with Metropolitan Police and North Eastern Forces for managed service provision

**9.2 Action:** BLC will meet with key suppliers next week who have raised concerns regarding resourcing and capacity issues and will update chiefs following this.



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 03/02/2022

## Session 9

**Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensics Capability Network (Cont)**

**9.3 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on the strategic review including the re-cap on the 4 workstreams and the proposed way forward for the Digital Forensic Science Strategy. Chiefs supported the next steps as follows:

- Initial planning with the Police Digital Service (PDS).
- Strategic briefing held with key chief officer leads from portfolio and gateway group 18<sup>th</sup> Jan 2022 - agreement reached on direction of travel
- A mobilised joint DF/PDS programme
- Detailed planning workshop held 31<sup>st</sup> Jan 2022 – findings to be shared with chiefs.
- Products being developed:
  - Deliverables & activities roadmap for Jan – March
  - Governance proposal
  - Integrated delivery plan (Strategic & benefits case)
  - Community engagement plan

***Ongoing actions in connection with the above can be viewed via the 20 October 2021 CCC meeting decisions log.***



## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 03/02/2022

APCC Chair Update

**10.1 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on key developments from the APCC Chair and welcomed the discussion.

## Session 10





## Reference

## Decisions &amp; Actions 03/02/2022

## Session 11

**Inclusion and Race Equality Programme Revised Plan**

**11.1 Decision:** All views and discussions from the session will be considered and then the Inclusion and Race team will finalise the final plan and its introduction which will return to CCC for decision in March.

**11.2 Decision:** The Inclusion and Race Team will provide more guidance to chiefs and forces in due course on how to engage and consult on the development plan from the 23 February.

**11.3 Decision:** All chiefs were encouraged to take the IOSB chair up on the offer of visiting and speaking with forces.

**11.4 Decision:** All chiefs were encouraged to put forward applicants for the National Programme Director role.

**Any other Business**

No AOBs recorded.

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<b>Portfolio:</b>	N/A
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	N/A
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

## Chief Constables' Council Minutes

12 January 2022

### Attendees

CC Michelle Skeer  
T/DCC Nikki Watson  
CC Garry Forsyth  
CC Nick Dean  
CC Mark Roberts

Cumbria – Meeting Chair  
Avon and Somerset  
Bedfordshire  
Cambridgeshire  
Cheshire

Cmsr Angela McLaren	City of London
DCC Helen McMillan	Cleveland
CC Rachel Swann	Derbyshire Constabulary
CC Shaun Sawyer	Devon and Cornwall
CC Jo Farrell	Durham
CC Richard Lewis	Dyfed-Powys
CC Ben-Julian Harrington	Essex
CC Rod Hansen	Gloucestershire
CC Stephen Watson	Greater Manchester
CC Pam Kelly	Gwent
CC Olivia Pinkney	Hampshire
CC Charlie Hall	Hertfordshire
CC Lee Freeman	Humberside
CC Chris Rowley	Lancashire
CC Simon Cole	Leicestershire
T/ACC Chris Davison	Lincolnshire
CC Serena Kennedy	Merseyside
Dep Cmsr Sir Stephen House	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Helen Ball	Metropolitan Police Service
DAC Amanda Pearson	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Louisa Rolfe	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Matt Jukes	Metropolitan Police Service
CC Andy Adams	Ministry of Defence Police
CC Carl Foulkes	North Wales
CC Paul Sanford	Norfolk Constabulary
DCC Simon Nickless	Northamptonshire
CC Craig Guildford	Nottinghamshire
CC Winton Keenan	Northumbria
DCC Mabs Hussain	North Yorkshire
CC Iain Livingstone	Police Scotland
CC James Vaughan	South Wales
T/CC Lauren Poultney	South Yorkshire
CC Chris Noble	Staffordshire
CC Stephen Jupp	Suffolk
CC Gavin Stephens	Surrey
CC Jo Shiner	Sussex
CC Debra Tedds	Warwickshire
CC Pippa Mills	West Mercia
CC Sir David Thompson	West Midlands
CC John Robins	West Yorkshire
CC Kier Pritchard	Wiltshire
DCC Alistair Sutherland	British Transport Police

CC Simon Chesterman  
CEO Andy Marsh

**\*\*S23\*\***

Col Mark John  
CO Ruari Hardy  
CO Robin Smith  
A/DCC Stewart Gull  
CO Gary Roberts  
Cmsr Richard Ullger

#### **In attendance**

ACC Owen Weatherill  
AC Robert Beckley  
DCC Janette McCormick  
Robin Wilkinson  
Gemma Stannard  
Angela Connolly  
T/Ch Insp Wayne Nash  
Richard Hampson  
Cathy Willis  
Mark Farey  
David Paul  
John Bragaglia  
Fi Greenlees

**\*\*S23\*\***

**\*\*S23\*\***

**\*\*S23\*\***

**\*\*S23\*\***

Nicola Growcott

Civil Nuclear Constabulary  
College of Policing

**\*\*S23\*\***

Royal Military Police  
Guernsey Police  
States of Jersey Police  
States of Jersey Police  
Isle of Man Police  
Royal Gibraltar Police

NPoCC

Assistant Commissioner – Op Resolve  
Operation Uplift

Metropolitan Police Service

NPCC Strategic Hub Lead

NPCC Business Support Lead

NPCC Staff Officer

NPCC Senior Business Officer

NPCC Executive Assistant

NPCC Business Support

NPCC Workforce Committee Support

NPCC SOC Portfolio Director/National ROCU Coordinator

NPCC FOIA

**\*\*S23\*\*** CO

**\*\*S23\*\*** Director

**\*\*S23\*\*** SRO

**\*\*S23\*\***

NPCC Head of Communications

#### **SESSION 1:**

##### **NPCC Chair's Update**

The Chair welcomed those present to this virtual Chiefs' Council meeting. The following tendered their apologies for the meeting.

AC Martin Hewitt – NPCC Chair

Chief Constable Nick Adderley – Northamptonshire Police

Chief Constable Sarah Crew – Avon and Somerset Constabulary

Chief Constable Alan Pughsley – Kent Police

## **Op Talla Covid-19 Update**

The latest absence rate is 8.6% which has decreased from previous week rate of 9.5% which is first fall in a month. There is disparity in absence rates across the county with 18 forces still over 10% but while this is uncomfortable none are reporting a critical issue at this stage.

There is still an issue with LFT supply and Dr Jenny Harries has written to all LAs and LRF chairs reminding them to share available existing stocks with emergency services. An additional 12,000 LFTs will be distributed to forces and targeted at Control Rooms with rationale being to avoid the difficulty of having to backfill that function. This will provide 5 weeks supply for each staff member. The distribution to forces will be based on numbers returned recently, and it is expected to take place week commencing 17 January.

There is no change on testing regulations at present.

The second tranche of the Disproportionality Report for Fixed Penalty Notices has now been completed. The University of Edinburgh will distribute this to forces next week for quality assurance, after this it will need to be peer reviewed. As there is not a clamour for the report at present there will probably not be publication until the third tranche is completed. This should be much faster than previous tranches and then reporting will cover the period to summer of 2020 which is where the bulk of enforcement took place. This would give a fuller picture of the enforcement activity rather than just releasing the report on the second tranche.

Most forces received a letter from an anti-vax group before Christmas. A crime report was made to the Met and the final assessment should be complete next week when a clearer steer can be communicated. Some forces have been asked for an update on actions they are taking by a variety of people, and it looks as if some groups are connecting to promote their agenda. This is all being passed to the government anti covid misinformation group so themes can be identified and options explored. To help with this a request for information was sent by AMA group to all forces and responses would be appreciated.

## **Homicide Prevention and Beating Crime Plan**

Recent meeting with the Policing Minister focused more on Homicide Prevention than the Beating Crime Plan. The Minister has a strong interest in how police can use data to predict where homicides are likely to take place. While this focus is welcome the need to work with other partner agencies must also be highlighted. Data should be collected on what is required from partners in order to have better outcomes – e.g. education, housing etc.

A national homicide suppression strategy needs to be developed along with partner agencies. Data such as markers for knife crime and data from child services should be used to identify those at risk. For example recent data on teen murder and exclusion from school shows that 60% had been excluded from school. Up to 85% of young people murdered are BAME and in conjunction with other high risk indicators (50% had previous CJS contact) a cohort of young men can be identified,

the most appropriate interventions should be identified – whether this be police focus or other partner agencies taking lead.

Concerns about Domestic abuse act were also raised – levels of domestic homicide have not decreased in line with other types. There is a need to be very clear about evidence and data and how it may be used as a predictor for crimes. Greatest opportunities are with education, housing and health for reduction and prevention of crime rather than with the police.

Ten forces are to build a small hub with CoP access. This would collect data and look at perpetrator and victim profiles. This will help to identify which interactions with other agencies would be best to focus on. Noted that not all areas can have the same models, what works for Thames Valley may not be the best sustainable option for London or West Midlands.

### **Op Talla – Covid-19 Update**

**1.1 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update

**1.2 Action:** Op Talla team to share the work created in conjunction with Edinburgh University around disproportionately of fixed penalty notices to chiefs for quality assurance.

**1.3 Action:** Op Talla team to share the results of the peer review assessment relating to the Crime Report submitted to the Met Police in relation to Anti-Vaccinations with all chiefs.

### **Homicide Prevention and Beating Crime Plan Update**

**1.4 Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

**1.5 Action:** Homicide prevention to be included in the agenda during crime session at February CCC.

**1.6 Action:** Beating crime plan following the systems leaders meeting to be included in the agenda during the Performance Management session at the March CCC. The Policing Minister will be invited to attend the March meeting to discuss.

### **SESSION 2:**

#### **NPCC Pay and Conditions Update**

**\*\*S31\*\***

### **SESSION 3:**

#### **Inclusion and Race Programme**

Reminder that full and frank discussions are best supported if Chatham House rules are observed.

Draft of introduction to plan has been circulated and it is acknowledged that this a difficult discussion and there are a range of opinions over the most appropriate language to use, although all

agree that it is important that actions are seen to be taken. It may be difficult to build consensus across policing and different communities on the best phrasing to use, however a consistent position should be agreed as this is an issue which needs to be addressed.

The label of Institutional Racism could be seen as unhelpful and there are concerns as to what the media reaction and impact on staff morale would be. It is recognised that Chiefs Constables are not a diverse group and it was decided to bring Black voices in to hear from those with lived experience, and they do believe police are institutionally racist.

It was suggested that it may be worth investigating how other public sector organisations, such as NHS, have defined issues along with the wider societal and historical context. The actions already taken and progress made should be highlighted in the plan.

### **Inclusion and Race Programme Plan Discussion**

**3.1 Decisions:** Chiefs agreed to provide feedback and proposed alternative wording to the proposed foreword (statement) within ten days, for incorporation into the revised plan in time for the February Chiefs' Council meeting.

**3.2 Action:** NPCC Comms to provide a form of words following the outcome of the Race & inclusion discussion.

### **SESSION 4:**

**\*\*S23\*\***

### **SESSION 5:**

### **SOC PUP Uplift and Forward Plan**

**\*\*S31 & S24\*\***

**5.1 Decision:** Chiefs' endorsed the proposals and direction of travel set out in the paper including:

- NPCC SOC Portfolio will commence work with NPCC Portfolio leads, regional SOC Chief Officer leads and partners on the 23/24 allocation, as soon as the full funding settlement is known.

• **\*\*S23\*\***

- Aim to complete the document before the end of the financial year, subject to confirmation of funding settlements. **\*\*S23\*\*** Document will be

signed off by NPCC SOC Programme Board and National Crime Coordination Committee, before being submitted to the Home Office.

- When agreed, implementation will be overseen by National ROCU Executive Board, comprising regional SOC Chief Officer leads and partners.



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<b>Author and Contributors:</b>	Cathy Willis, Emily Colwill, Vicky Reay and Mark Farey
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	2 February 2022
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<b>Portfolio:</b>	N/A
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	N/A
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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## Chief Constables' Council Minutes

2-3 February 2022, Virtual Meeting

### Attendees

AC Martin Hewitt	NPCC Chair
CC Sarah Crew	Avon and Somerset
CC Garry Forsyth	Bedfordshire
CC Nick Dean	Cambridgeshire
CC Mark Roberts	Cheshire
DCC Chris Armitt	Cheshire
Cmsr Angela McLaren	City of London
AC Peter O'Dorothy	City of London
A/CC Helen McMillan	Cleveland
CC Michelle Skeer	Cumbria
CC Rachel Swann	Derbyshire Constabulary
CC Shaun Sawyer	Devon and Cornwall
CC Scott Chilton	Dorset
CC Jo Farrell	Durham
CC Claire Parmenter	Dyfed-Powys

CC Ben-Julian Harrington	Essex
DCC Andy Prophet	Essex
CC Rod Hansen	Gloucestershire
CC Stephen Watson	Greater Manchester
DCC Mabs Hussain	North Yorkshire Police
CC Pam Kelly	Gwent
CC Olivia Pinkney	Hampshire
CC Charlie Hall	Hertfordshire
CC Lee Freeman	Humberside
CC Alan Pughsley	Kent
DCC Tim Smith	Kent
CC Chris Rowley	Lancashire
CC Simon Cole	Leicestershire
DCC Rob Nixon	Leicestershire
DCC Paul Gibson	Leicestershire
CC Chris Haward	Lincolnshire
CC Serena Kennedy	Merseyside
Commissioner Cressida Dick	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Helen Ball	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Louisa Rolfe	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Nick Ephgrave	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Neil Basu	Metropolitan Police Service
AC Matt Jukes	Metropolitan Police Service
CC Andy Adams	Ministry of Defence Police
ACC Andrea Bishop	Ministry of Defence Police
CC Carl Foulkes	North Wales
CC Paul Sanford	Norfolk Constabulary
CC Nick Adderley	Northamptonshire
CC Craig Guildford	Nottinghamshire
CC Winton Keenan	Northumbria
ACC Scott Hall	Northumbria
CC Lisa Winward	North Yorkshire
CC Iain Livingstone	Police Scotland
DCC Mark Hamilton	Police Service for Northern Ireland
CC James Vaughan	South Wales
ACC David Thorne	South Wales
T/CC Lauren Poultney	South Yorkshire
DCC Tim Forber	South Yorkshire
DCC Emma Barnett	Staffordshire
CC Stephen Jupp	Suffolk
CC Gavin Stephens	Surrey
CC Jo Shiner	Sussex

CC John Campbell  
CC Debra Tedds  
CC Pippa Mills  
CC Sir David Thompson  
CC John Robins  
CC Keir Prichard  
ACC Charlie Doyle  
CC Simon Chesterman  
CEO Andy Marsh

**\*\*S23\*\***

**\*\*S23\*\***

Dep Brig Sarah Pringle-Smith  
Col Mark John  
Wg Cmdr Mike Dixon  
Wg Cmdr Nicholas Card  
Brig Vivienne Buck  
Cmdr Dean Oakley  
CO Ruari Hardy  
CO Robin Smith  
CO Gary Roberts  
CC Chris Eyre  
Cmsr Ian McGrail

#### **In attendance**

Abimbola Johnson  
Andrew George  
DCC Janette McCormick  
DCC Maggie Blyth  
DAC Amanda Pearson  
AC Rob Beckley  
Professor Paul Taylor  
Lianne Deeming  
Joanne Ashworth  
Ch Supt Mel Jones  
Vernal Scott  
Cmdr Ade Adelekan  
Cmdr Alison Heydari  
Ch Supt Jenny Barnett  
ACC Tyron Joyce  
ACC Osman Khan  
DCC Julia Chapman  
Supt Naomi Edwards

Thames Valley  
Warwickshire  
West Mercia  
West Midlands  
West Yorkshire  
Wiltshire  
British Transport Police  
Civil Nuclear Constabulary  
College of Policing  
**\*\*S23\*\***  
**\*\*S23\*\***  
Royal Military Police  
Royal Military Police  
Royal Airforce Police  
Royal Airforce Police  
Royal Military Police  
Royal Navy Police  
Guernsey Police  
States of Jersey Police  
Isle of Man Police  
Sovereign bases of Royal Cyprus Police  
Royal Gibraltar Police

ISOB Chair  
President for the NBPA  
Operation Uplift  
NPCC VAWG Lead  
NPCC Inclusion and Race Programme  
Assistant Commissioner – Operation Resolve  
NPCC Chief Scientific Officer Policing  
CEO Bluelight Commercial  
CEO, Forensic Capability Network  
PSNI  
Essex Police  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Metropolitan Police Service  
Essex Police  
West Yorkshire Police  
West Yorkshire Police  
Sussex Police  
Essex Police

Gemma Stannard	NPCC Strategic Hub Lead
Tracy Holyer	NPCC Reform Lead
Hannah Hart	NPCC Strategy, Planning and Performance (SPP) Lead
Angela Connolly	NPCC Business Support Lead
Kelly Navarra-Lee	NPCC Deputy Business Support Lead
Lee Milton	NPCC Strategic Planning and Risk Manager
Richard Hampson	NPCC Business Support Manager
Justine Brisley	NPCC FOIA
Fi Greenlees	NPCC FOIA
Nicola Growcott	NPCC Head of Communications
Natasha Bolton	NPCC Communications
Glenn Sebright	NPCC Deputy Head of Communications
Andy Begent	NPCC Data Protection Manager
Tom Keating	NPCC Communications Officer
Vicky Reay	NPCC Business Support Officer
Emily Colwill	NPCC Business Support Officer
Mark Farey	NPCC Business Support Officer
Cathy Willis	NPCC Executive Assistant to NPCC Chair

## **SESSION 1:**

### **MINUTES AND ACTIONS FROM PREVIOUS MEETING**

The minutes for the previous meetings held were agreed:

1. 8-9 December 2021 – Agreed

#### **Action Log**

**Session 6 (October 2021 Extraordinary CCC) – NPCC Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensic Capability Network - FCN Refocused and Next Generation Procurement (Action Owners: Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean): (Action 1) Governance hosting arrangements and funding review for all national units is being reviewed by the NPCC Strategic Hub and a paper will be shared with chiefs going forward.**

**(Action 2)** Paper with the decisions and update on outline of contractual landscape across forces mapped to provide overview working towards a singular process going forwards.

**1.2 Response** – Discussion in session 9 on the agenda - Action Open

**Session 1 (December 2021) – College of Policing Update (Action Owner: Andy Marsh): Agreed to complete stock take of misogyny recordings from forces and will write out to all chiefs.**

**1.3 Response** – Letter will be circulated to all forces from the College – Action Open

**Session 1 (December 2021) – Chair’s Update – Op Talla National Awards (Action Owners: Owen Weatherill):** NPoCC Op Talla team would update chiefs on the logistics and venue for the awards so they can plan now.

**1.4 Response** – For a number of reasons the date of the Awards has been rescheduled and we are looking at June 2022, however we are just waiting to confirm the actual date with the venue. We are currently pulling together comms to go out to those who nominated individuals/teams to advise whether their nomination was successful or not. Action Open

**Session 7 (December 2021) – Creation of Prevention Coordination Committee – Options Paper (Action Owners: Stephen Watson):** Crime Prevention team would work with the NPCC Strategic Hub to come back to chiefs on detailed proposal of agreed creation of the committee building in resilience and capability points including roles and responsibilities (strategic and operational), how this links in with the **\*\*S23\*\***, outputs being made clearer and how the committee would coordinate across all NPCC committees/portfolios interlinked into this area of work to avoid overlap.

**1.5 Response** – Advert for the Chair position has been published to all chiefs and x2 candidates have put themselves forward for the role. Await outcome of ballot – Action Open.

**Session 4 (January 2022 Extraordinary) – **\*\*S23\*\*****

**1.6 Response** – Ongoing action until pilot has been completed and overview can be worked up and presented back to Chiefs at a future Council meeting. Action Open

### **CHAIRS UPDATE**

The chair welcomed attendees to Council. The following new appointments were welcomed to the meeting:

- Angela McLaren is the new Commissioner for the City of London Police
- Richard Lewis is now Chief Constable for Dyfed-Powys Police

The Chair congratulated the following QPM Honours recipients:

1. Ben-Julian HARRINGTON, Chief Constable, Essex Police.
2. Winton Laurence KEENEN, Chief Constable, Northumbria Police.

The Chair thanked CC Simon Cole for the support and contributions he has made to policing as this was his last Council meeting. All chiefs wished CC Cole well for the future.

### **Policing and Legitimacy**

The Chair updated chiefs on the current commentary and landscape impacting on policing and its legitimacy whilst urging colleagues to consider how Council can collectively impact on this narrative

and ensure there is a balanced policing response which ensures that we hear the views of others outside of policing.

#### **NPCC Vice Chair Vacancy**

The Chair highlighted that the NPCC vice chair vacancy was advertised and asked colleagues to consider an application and, if interested, to approach either of the vice chairs or himself for further information.

**Decision:** NPCC Chair encouraged chiefs to considering applying for the role.

#### **Legitimacy and Confidence in Policing Conference 17-19 June 2022**

**Decision:** Chiefs were encouraged to attend the above event.

#### **Covid-19 Update**

The Chair reported that the rate of police absence had improved and stabilized. Absence reporting timelines would now be scaled back. From a regulatory point of view the majority of COVID regulations across the nations had lifted. The MPS Deputy Commissioner had recently issued an update on position with the MPS investigation into alleged Downing Street events. It was anticipated that an inquiry is likely to be launched into the response to COVID and this is expected sometime this year.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update

#### **Performance Update**

The Chair updated on work that the Performance Management Coordination Committee (PMCC) was leading on including engagement with HMG around management of performance requirements including some perception issues. The PMCC were also working closely to manage requirements arising from the Crime Policing and Performance Board to ensure that the Boards direction of travel continued in the right direction. The Chair commented on the opportunity to review performance issues with the forthcoming appointment of a new HMI and the College of Policing review to ensure that the NPCC, HMICFRS and College of Policing worked together to address performance management and the associated challenges.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and this would be discussed in session 5 of the agenda.

#### **PCSC Bill update**

The Chair updated that the House of Lord debate had been held with a number of amendments suggested to the Bill which HMG were assessing. There had been some suggested rejections made by the Lords around public order and stop and search as well as some additions around duty of candour, drink spiking, vagrancy and misogyny.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and looked forward to seeing the final version of the Bill once it's passed through Parliament.

#### **NPCC Estates Move**

The Chair advised that the NPCC/NPoCC had to vacate the Victoria Street building by March 2023 and work was ongoing with MPS Estates to work through issues including identifying accommodation demand levels and potential site locations.

**Decision:** Proposal will be brought back to CCC once approved by September 2022.

#### **HMICFRS Emerging theme: Reverse Workforce Modernisation**

The Chair highlighted an issue raised by HMICFRS around the police uplift programme and an emerging theme regarding reverse civilianisation and this was highlighted for Chief Constables to be aware of.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update

#### **Roads Policing Strategy 2022-25 Update**

CC Jo Farrell provided an update on the Roads Policing Strategy that was being developed for 2022 – 2025. CC Farrell thanked colleagues for the support of Chief Officers who lead the 8 sub portfolios that made up the Roads Policing Portfolio. Work was ongoing with Highways England, the Home Office and the Department of Transport to develop the Roads Policing Strategy and there was an increase in focus on the roads policing agenda. A roads safety strategic framework has been developed and a Roads Risk Strategy Board chaired at ministerial level will be held at which policing will be represented. The strategy has been developed in parallel with this work and has four overarching pillars: preventing harm and saving lives, tackling crime, driving technology and innovation and changing minds. The strategy will be underpinned by a supporting delivery plan and work is ongoing to obtain consistent data and analysis regarding the roads policing landscape.

Chiefs were supportive of the strategy and following discussion it was agreed that a review of the strategy commissioning process would be led on by the NPCC Hub and brought to a future Strategy, Planning and Coordination Board meeting.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the framework and strategy which will be published on ChiefsNet.

**Action:** NPCC Hub would incorporate review of strategy commissioning sign off routes into work plan going forward.

#### **NPCC Comms Advisory Group Update**

CC Stephens provided an update on work ongoing within the Communications Advisory Group to review and develop its workplan and to engage and in some cases rebuild, relationships with key stakeholders including the Crime Reporters Association, Society of Editors etc. Feedback would also be given to stakeholders on the style and tone of current reporting around policing in the media. CC Stephens reminded colleagues of the source documents around engagement with the media including

the Leveson Report and HMIC Without fear or favour report and the College of Policing APP guidance. Following discussion, it was reiterated that the discussions at Chief Constables Council were subject to 'Chatham House Rules' to enable open and honest debate.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and encouraged all chiefs to review principals and current Authorised Professional Practice (APP) – relationships with the Media going forward.

### **College of Policing Update**

CC Andy Marsh provided an update on behalf of the College of Policing and covered the following areas:

1. PEQF: an overview of the outcome of the evidence-based review of the training including feedback that officers felt a better preparedness to perform their role, better understanding of communities and a higher proportion of staff wanting to make a career within policing. CC Marsh advised that the College would focus on improving some of the areas of concern and stressed the need for Chiefs to actively support these new routes for policing. CC Marsh advised that the IPLDP was due to end on 1 June 2022 however following concerns raised by the MPS on achieving the uplift requirements - this had been extended to 31 March 2023
2. The College of Policing Budget for 2022/23 had been cut by 5% and whilst efficiencies were being driven out this will mean a review of the Colleges charging costs and a letter will be sent to Chief Constables around increases to the sergeant and inspectors' exams and the impact of PUP funding
3. The fundamental review of the College of Policing is due for publication next week and more communications will be issued in due course

**Action:** Letter detailing an increase in charging for College services will be sent to all Chiefs.

**Action:** Fundamental Review of the College out next week and will be published to all chiefs via ChiefsNet.

### **Performance Sub Committee Update – NPCC Chair Role profile sign off**

CC Olivia Pinkney updated on work that the NPCC sub performance committee had undertaken around changes to the NPCC chair role profile and the associated career pathways. Feedback from colleagues including CPOSA and the Audit and Assurance Board had been incorporated into proposals. The recommendations of the paper were approved however it was noted that there was some disagreement expressed around the increase to the Chairs tenure period however the recommendations were approved as this represented the view of the majority.

**Decisions:** Chiefs agreed the following recommendations from the paper:

1. The term for the office of NPCC Chair is increased to a 5 year tenure, embedding a 3 year contingency review for relinquishing the chair prior to the contractual 5 years (3+2).
2. Future eligibility for the role of NPCC Chair is defined as a serving Chief Constable or Assistant Commissioner within a UK police force or to have recent experience at this level



substantively. Independent scrutiny will be included should non-serving candidates express an interest.

3. The revised NPCC Chair Role Profile is agreed.
4. The existing S22A *National Police Collaboration Agreement in relation to the co-coordinating body known as the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Pursuant to S.22A of the Police Act 1996* is revised to account for the term of office changes, eligibility criteria and proposed job description. This revision will be incorporated into existing work owned by the NPCC Strategic Hub.

### **Police Uniform Update**

CC Simon Cole highlighted some of the challenges that exist around the use of different procurement routes which impact on policing's efficiency when it goes out to market to procure items of uniform and kit. A working group and strategic board are in place to address these issues and a review of the working group membership will be undertaken to ensure it is representative of all forces. CC Cole highlighted the potential opportunities to look ahead around uniform/kit refreshes and how they are procured, and work was ongoing with blue light commercial to explore the possibility of an aligned process that meet the needs of all forces when procuring uniform in the future. The issue of sustainability and recycling was discussed, and it was noted that whilst there was an element of this, more activity was needed whilst also considering security issues when disposing of uniform.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the following actions from the paper:

1. Review of force strategy, governance of uniform to have clear local priorities
2. Are forces well sighted and integrated into force and national actions and decisions re uniform.
3. Consider your forces involvement at NUWG and ensure representatives have the right skills and knowledge to develop key areas of uniform related work.
4. Ensure that NUWG are consulted when procuring any uniform items.
5. Encourage representatives to provide consistent two-way feedback and updates from all uniform activities.
6. Ensure that feedback re uniform is provided via the NUWG rather than approaching Blue Light Commercial (BLC) directly to commence separate procurements.

### **REGIONAL PAPERS**

#### **NPCC Audit and Assurance Board (AAB) Annual Report 20-21**

**Summary:** The purpose of this report is to report formally on the activity of the Audit and Assurance Board (AAB) during the period 1st August 2020 to 31st July 2021 and to set out how the AAB has met its responsibilities in relation to its terms of reference and key priorities.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

#### **Special Branch Funding Transfer – National Memorandum of Understanding**

**Summary:** The purpose of this submission is to request Chief Officer endorsement of the final draft of the national MoU which can be found attached. The national MoU will then come into effect on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2022.

**Decision:** Chiefs endorsed the final draft of the national MoU.

#### **NPCC Strategy and Business Plan Update**

**Summary:** In preparation for 2022/23, the Strategy, Planning and Performance (SPP) Team within the Strategic Hub are reviewing the NPCC strategy and business plan and this is an update on progress to all chiefs.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the paper.

#### **Body Worn Video for Specially Trained Officers**

**Summary:** The purpose of this report is to seek a decision from Chief Constables to mandate equipping Specially Trained Officers with Body Worn Video (BWV).

**Action:** Author to liaise with the East Midlands and Eastern Region on feedback provided. The Eastern region provided qualified support for recommendation 3 in principle for ensuring STOs are trained to ensure BWV is used during Taser use. However, the paper does not deal with the critical issue of the recording and retention of recordings from training records in enquiries or legal proceedings. This would need to be clarified before full support can be given.

**Decision:** Overall chiefs supported recommendations 1 and 2 for the mandating of use of BWV for STOs. Recommendation 3 would be discussed in session 1 at Chiefs' Council before a final decision is made.

#### **National Standards for Special Constabulary Recruitment**

**Summary:** This paper sets out a planned national assessment process for the recruitment of Special Constables (SCs), and details the consultation and support received for the proposal to date. It does so in the context of the overall ambition to have a national and consistent 'end to end' officer recruitment process and the accompanying benefits. It outlines the current and varied practices across forces and the potential adverse impact this may have on candidates, specifically those from ethnic minority groups.

DCC McCormick confirmed that liaison had been undertaken with regions around issues raised and these would be addressed.

**Action:** Author of the paper to respond to the East Midlands and Eastern regions on the following feedback:

1. Agreed adoption of sifting interviews but would want some local involvement around force values. Concerns not sure what sift programme looks like. Some recommendations vague.
2. Concerns about the additional resourcing requirements, Cost and classroom time of these proposals and the impact this will have on attracting and delivering competent special constables.
3. Number of implications for forces and members of the special constabulary, summarised as: (1) putting in place the required content of the SCLP and the timeframes involved; and (2) addressing the question of how many people would want to put themselves through the PEQF process.

**Decision:** Following discussion and response from the author to the regions on the feedback provided this paper was agreed by Chiefs.

### **National Safeguarding Management and VPC Standards**

**Summary:** The purpose of this paper is to provide details of relevant background to safeguarding and standards within the VPC, the current governance and to make proposals for future arrangements as regards a national Safeguarding and Standards function.

CC Sawyer advised that this was the most cost-effective option available and would use a model which allowed 43 ways of managing police cadets to a recognised standard level. This would require sign off from the safeguarding minister. The Chair sought clarification on the proposed funding and it was stressed that funding did not exist within the Hub – it was noted that funding could be picked up by other portfolios and this would be explored further within session 2.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the East Midlands, North East, London Regions and CTP on feedback provided. Overall the regions noted that a force must be fit to operate when they have young people/cadets in their care. The regions agreed funding needs to be done collectively from the Strategic Hub. There needs to be understanding of what the funding model of this will be before supporting.

**Decision:** Chief supported overall recommended Option 3. See session 2 for funding agreement.

### **College of Policing Review of Police Promotion and Progression**

**Summary:** This paper introduces the report on the findings from that review. The report sets out principles for reform of promotion and progression and makes specific recommendations in the paper.

CC Andy Marsh highlighted the significance of this issue and whilst a good level of support and feedback had been received from the regions, a further debate would be useful at the March CCC.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the East Midlands, South West, Eastern and London Regions on feedback – outline only provided below as follows (For all feedback see full returns document in pack):

1. interim solution at 4 seems extensive and perhaps might be better dealt with by going to a longer term solution given its scale.
2. There needs to be flexibility with future promotion processes. Is this the right tool – competency frameworks may favour certain groups of people.
3. With the Eastern region forces wishes to retain the autonomy to run its own processes in line with specific objectives, requirements and culture of the force.
4. Forces suggested they wish to retain autonomy to compliment this via appropriate Positive Action to address any local gaps and support the progression of under – represented groups.
5. Forces in the Eastern region not support the mandating of national promotion processes as at recommendation 1.
6. Forces in the Eastern region does not however agree to any additional mandating of promotion processes / standards beyond the current NPPF Sgt / Insp processes.

**Decision:** Following regional feedback and discussion in the meeting a paper will be brought back to the March CCC meeting to address all the issues raised from chiefs.

**Action:** College will liaise with regions on the feedback provided.

### **National Ballistics Intelligence Service Funding Bid 2022-23 to 2024-25**

**Summary:** Chiefs are asked to note the 2021-22 forecasted outturn position of underspends of £147k resulting in Reserves of £612k and Capital Reserves of £886k, which will be used to progress NABIS transformational activity detailed in the NABIS Strategy 2020-25 and to fund the capital replacement programme.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the East Midlands, South West and North East regions on feedback provided. Outline as follows:

1. Some forces get significant increases in costs and worth simpler options based on the current model.
2. Consensus that any underspends/reserves in the NABIS budget should be fully utilised before asking forces for increased contributions.

**Decision:** Overall the regions gave support for Option 4 funding formula and supported the implementation of this funding option from financial year 2022-2023. See session 2 for funding agreement.

### **NPCC Less Lethal Weapons Staff Resource Business Case**

**Summary:** The purpose of this report is to seek a decision from Chief Constables to authorise an uplift in staff for the Less Lethal Weapons secretariat. There are two accompanying reports detailing the rationale; The Business case and the staff resource business case excel spreadsheet.

CC D’Orsi reminded colleagues of the polarised views around policing’s use of taser and the impact on issues around legitimacy and proportionality. There had been a growth in the number of officers who use taser which impacted on growth in demand/resources required in other areas. The Chair reminded colleagues that there wasn’t available funding with the Strategic Hub to fund such business cases.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the East Midlands, North East, London Regions and CTP on feedback provided. Overview below:

1. previous meeting agreed central costs for NPCC functions and needs prioritisation decisions required.
2. growing trend of leads seeking funding for NPCC roles which was always absorbed by forces
3. query on whether there are benefits by making the 3 roles permanent growth on BTP establishment rather than as temporary establishment growth, and if agreed for 12 months consideration could be given to the role of the NPCC hub, BLC role in managing suppliers as this is a significant cost and resource when compared to other areas.
4. Overall the regions agreed that given the NPCC has a Strategic Hub and a new funding model which was agreed at September 2021 CCC, then the funding to support this Business Case should come from the NPCC Strategic Hub and not from Force NRE contributions.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the principle of the paper following review and discussion of responses to the regional feedback. See session 2 for decision on funding.

## **Session 2 - National Operating Budget Proposal and Budget Papers (2022-2023)**

The Chair opened the discussion on the creation of the National Operating Budget to allow for a more disciplined and structured approach to dealing with bids.

There is still ongoing talks with the Home Office regarding VAWG and Race and Inclusion to see if there is the opportunity to get additional funding directly from them from the allocations pot. Martin Hewitt commented that he was meeting with the DG next week in respect of VAWG.

Gavin Stephens provided an overview of the operating budget.

The session lead thanked colleagues for supporting in principle to work together on an operating budget. He commented that back in December, it was agreed that there would be a percentage contribution from NRE towards all of the national functions. There was a discussion as to what the level should be – whether it should be set at 0.125% of NRE which would leave an operating budget of around £17.6 million. Since that discussion, there have been some additions and revisions. The Under Cover Policing enquiry was overlooked (1.1 million), additional papers have come in including support to Voluntary Police Cadets (160k), less lethal (260k) – SOC Chief Constable (300k.) All of those when added together amounted to a growth of 1.9 million additional. The importance of looking for efficiencies and savings was stressed.

It was reported that there is a 2.4 million pound growth in existing bids and only £768,000 in efficiencies and ACRO and NPCC were thanked for their help in finding some of those efficiencies. It was commented on that there is still the challenge of finding £19.8 million depending on confirmation from the Home Office on the bids which have already been mentioned. It was proposed that there should be a minimum of 0.125 percent contribution with the higher level of 0.13 percent of NRE being proposed as the best option to enable more flexibility. Once the overall budget is set, there will be a finance committee sub group who will actively look for efficiencies.

Although there was consensus and agreement to go for the 0.13% contribution, the point was raised that where there has been ongoing funding for some time, there must be assurances that efficiencies would continue to be looked for and there would be thorough financial scrutiny on this. There was also the point raised that the budget cannot be inflated each time to meet the requirements coming in and that there needs to be some critical decision making and some prioritisation going forward. There was the view that the reserves should also be looked at so, where possible, some efficiencies could be taken back. Finally, It was suggested that if they go to 0.13 contribution, they would want to be assured that the pro active looking for efficiencies would continue as they may be able to give some money back or, if they had a reserve, they could use this should other commitments in terms of funding come up throughout the year and could fund from this rather than having to go back to forces.

The session lead commented that they are hoping to get to something akin to a medium term financial plan for the national operating budget which will help to identify unspent monies and look for efficiencies. In finance there is the plan to get an active sub group to then bring those findings and proposals back to Council. For example, a rebate could be issued or there could be an agreement to hold some of the money in the centre for things that come in throughout the year. The APCC are supportive of the new budget – they did raise the issue that now this is done on a percentage basis, there may be issues with delegated authorities for some colleagues so it may be worth doing a local consultation on the overall amount for the force.

It was commented that NABIS is not NRE based and has a well thought out and thorough funding approach but most things will be funded through the NRE process.

**Decisions:** Chiefs agreed upon a 0.13% contribution for 2022/23 as per point 3.1 in the paper.

**Decision:** National Programmes host will continue to send invoices to forces. NPCC budgets will be collected via a single invoice from forces outlined in the NPCC Budget Proposal Paper.

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed in point 3.3 of the paper for the NPCC hubs finance coordinator to look at NPCC Budgets for 2023/24 & 2024/25 to identify and update where efficiency can be made and when programmes end which will give financial flexibility in the coming years.

**Action:** Finance committee to set up group to review underspend and reserve strategy.

## **Budgets**

### **ACRO**

ACRO is asking for 0.5 million less than previous year. The drop is from 3.5 million to 3 million with 7.2 million in reserves. There was a discussion on whether given the large amount of reserves , they could drop to 2.5 million.

7.2 million reserve is more of a balance and there is some volatility within ACRO balances. 18 months ago ACRO were virtually out of money because of the income generation they require around national travel. They are anticipating that they will spend the 3million if granted and it will go down to 3.9 million at the end of the next fiscal year. They need to get set up on the cloud which will cost 1.6 million and there are other developments. All of their finances are managed through a governance board so there is scrutiny and accountability.

**Decision:** Chiefs approved the contribution of £3.0m from the Police Service.

## **National Police Freedom of Information and Data Protection Unit**

**Decision:** Chiefs endorsed the recommendation for funding of:

- i. 2022/23 - £484k
- ii. 2023/24 - £484k

## **NPCC Central Office**

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed the contribution of £2,233k sought from PCC's for the NPCC Central Office annual budget for FY 2022-23 comprised of £2.1m operating revenue offset by other additional income (£39k) along with contribution towards reserves of £76k. (See action above on reserves strategy review)

## **NPoCC Strategic Intelligence and Briefing (SIB) Team**

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed the contribution of £941k sought from PCC's for the NPoCC SIB annual budget for FY 2022-23.

## **NPoCC Operations**

**Decision: Chiefs agreed the** contribution of £2,691k sought from PCC's + other signatories for the NPoCC Ops annual budget for FY 2022-23.

## **NPCC Pension and Reward**

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed the contribution of £500k sought from PCC's for the NPCC Pensions Team annual budget for FY 2022-23.

## **Funding Bid to Forces – National Police MAPPA Policy Lead with HMPPS**

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed to fund 50% of the cost of the post for 3 years. 2022-2023 is £44,000, 2023-2024 is £45,000 and 2024-2025 is £46,000 (based on an assumed 2.5% pay award each year). The total cost over 3 years amounts to £135,000. HMPPS will pay 50% of pay and allowance which amounts to £135,000 for 3 years.

## **National Wildlife Crime Unit**

Discussions took place about the reserves -Paul Sanford and Gavin Stephens to speak with CC Debbie Ford.

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed to consider and approve the funding contribution of £232,580 from NPCC Forces for 2022/23 financial year.

## **Funding updates for NP2IRM, UCPI and HOLMES**

**Decision:** NP2IRM, UCPI and HOLMES funding business case proposals to come back to the March CCC meeting.

### **National Ballistics Intelligence Service Funding Bid 2022-23 to 2024-25**

It was commented that NABIS had been underinvested in – so much so that it is becoming inefficient and not equipped for the firearms threat for the future. The funding proposal has had full support at SOC board.

It was reported that there are two requests.

- 1) Top Level funding
- 2) Once the funding has been agreed, how can it be split across the different forces in terms of payments.

In terms of the regional feedback some of the areas raised were around the vacancy factor, questions around reserves, questions around contributions from STA, PSNI and **\*\*S23\*\*** colleagues.

In terms of the Uplift that they are asking for, it is around £371,000. The last time the bid came it was strength and not establishment plus elements of social care levy and pay and conditions review taking place within WMP. Normally, the governance board would agree the budget within the funding on the note which has been agreed at CCC which deducts the vacancies that they have. For the next financial year they predict that it is in the region of £240,000 which will be deducted from topline funding.

There are some significant reserves. There are capital reserves which are just under £887,000. They are holding reserves to be self sufficient around capital replacement programme.

The equipment used, integrated risk identification system costs 2.6 million over 10 years to replace which covers the three hubs -2 NABIS hubs and one in MPS.

There are Revenue reserves of £612,000 which was discussed at NGB - £300,00 for scoping new database which they didn't have to use it as the Home Office paid for the scoping. They are awaiting the SR outcome in relation to the new build system to replace NABIS and National Firearms Licensing Management System– they are optimistic that they will receive that funding through the spending review. There is the element of IT transformation required within NABIS – as a result of investments not come through in previous years and an element of contingency. A number of options have been prepared and it was decided that revenue reserves need to be reduced ranging from total removal of reserves to one that leaves a contingency element.

They were asked to review the funding formula. The MPS contribution had been fixed since 2008 at a rate of 100,000. The way funding had previously been allocated meant that the funding didn't represent the cost of each of the different elements of Nabis delivery- on the one side there is Forensic Services and the other side is the National Intelligence element so the proposals are to try and resolve that issue to align costs with Forensic usage or National Nabis Services. They have provided a number of options based on demands into the hub through looking at evidence firearms data either on a 1 year or 3 year basis providing some banding at natural break points with weighting – options include the NRE function as well. The preferred option is option 4. In terms of feedback there was a productive meeting with EM region on Friday. They are also looking at trying to cost the amount of NABIS services that PSA, PSNI and **\*\*S23\*\*** use that will align costs to their engagement.

**Decision:** After discussion from responses to the regional feedback provided Chiefs agreed to approve the funding contribution from NPCC Forces of £3,630,684 for 2022-23, £3,663,695 for 2023-24 and £3,697,036 for 2024-25.



## **NABIS Funding Formula**

Funding Formula decisions that were agreed:

**Decision:** Chiefs approved Option 4, Banding of 3 years ONS data to calculate Forensic Usage and National NABIS Services, as the new NABIS Funding Formula.

**Decision:** Chiefs approved the implementation from financial year 2022-23 to coincide with the next three-year NABIS funding cycle being presented to Chiefs Constables' Council in February 2022.

## **National Safeguarding Management and VPC Standards**

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed to fund the National Safeguarding and Standards function which would be covered by the National Operating Budget Proposal of 0.13% contribution for 2022/23.

## **NPCC Less Lethal Weapons Staff Resource Business Case**

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed to fund the Less Lethal Weapons Staff Resource business case which would be covered by the National Operating Budget Proposal of 0.13% contribution for 2022/23.

**Race and Inclusion** – Chief Constable Dave Thompson provided an update. Money was allocated against this last year and it is a 3 year programme. There is some growth in the programme and there have been some underspends which reflects the mobilisation problems. Programme Management Support for example only really started in the Summer and Communications support started later. ISop not fully recruited. In terms of the employee costs the programme has got a workstream lead for each of the 4 workstreams agreed, it has got Amanda's post which is out for advert, it has Programme Support and some Communications support in the staff revenue. The team do need some money to put against programmes. They have been fortunate with work that Janette has done with Uplift and it has been easier to get things done via Uplift so they have been leaning on this. They have been making sure there is no duplication with work being undertaken by the College. This is the larger year on the programme - the cost of the budget should come down from next year. This is a slightly harder discussion with Home Office than VAWG. Liz Unwin talked about the action plan coming back tomorrow. It is currently a consultation document. Once they have got agreement from Council and other consultees, they will be scoping specific items of work. Most of the budget is in the new plan. They have tried to estimate on the cost of where the delivery will be. They may have to move budget around within the programme.

## **Session 3 - Parole Board for England and Wales**

Chair of The Parole Board Caroline Corby introduced the Parole Board presentation to all attendees. Martin Jones CBE, CEO of the Parole Board stated the Parole Board evolved in 1967 and therefore has been operating for over 50 years. Around 90% - 95% of the prison population are released automatically without any Parole Board involvement. The Parole Board largely focus on those convicted of the most serious offences. The parole process is focussed solely on risk and public protection is the key consideration. The Board only considers release after the prisoner has served the period set for punishment, which is decided by the Judge.

Less than one in four prisoners meet the stringent statutory release test, which is set out by Parliament. The data shows the serious offending rate of individuals released by the Parole Board, in terms of proven reoffending, is around 0.5%

Victims are crucial to the Parole Board, personal statements and reconsideration requests can be submitted and decision summaries can be requested.

The Parole Board review prisoners who have committed the most serious offences and it is a legal requirement, if there is not an independent body to review if individuals remain at risk to the public they would be released.

The sole focus is not to release offenders, it is to keep the offenders in custody who remain at risk to the public.

The decisions are based on evidence and the hearings are now court hearings. When the Parole Board evolved in 1967 the purpose was to provide advice to Ministers who would have the final decision, however now the Parole Board decisions are final.

When the Parole Board evolved in 1967, the decisions were made from reviewing paperwork and the prisoner was not seen. However, in 2020/21 the Parole Board held 9022 oral hearings. The Parole Board consists of 350 members, in comparison to 17 members when the Board evolved.

Caroline stated over the last 3-4 years there have been very positive changes to reforms.

Before May 2018, by law the Parole Board were not allowed to release summaries to victims, media and members of the public. Since this change, the Parole Board have release over 7,000 decision summaries to victims, media and member of the public.

In July 2019 the reconsideration mechanism was introduced, this is an internal appeals process. Since this has been introduced, it has been used approximately 350 times and approximately 15% of these requests have been granted.

An upcoming change is the Parole Board are expecting an allowance for public hearings within the coming months. If a request is made that it is in the interest of justice for a Parole hearing to be public, the Chair will make the decision.

The Parole Board are also looking at victims being able to apply to observe a parole hearing.

The Parole Board are currently subject to a Root and Branch review which was a Government commitment made in the 2019 manifesto to review the Parole system. This is welcomed by the Board as there is improvements that can be made regarding transparency and building confidence in the system.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill, introduced in February 2022 ended the automatic release at the halfway point for individuals convicted under the Terrorism Act, all of those cases are instead subject to a Parole Board review. As a result of this, the Parole Board set up a dedicated team of specialist panel members to deal with terrorist cases. The team of experienced panel members go through ongoing intensive training specific to terrorist cases and includes members with background such as former and serving Judges, Chief Constables, Prison Governors, Prosecutors, Psychologists and Psychiatrists. The member require top-level security clearance to ensure effective information sharing between the Board, **\*\*S23\*\***, counter-terror police and probation to equip the Board with all evidence relating to the risk posed by an offender. Terrorist cases equate to less than 200 of the approximately 16,000 cases dealt with by the Parole Board annually. However, due to the critical public protection nature of these cases the Parole Board are in the process of adding to the specialist cohort with further expertise and aim to have approximately 70 members handling such cases by early 2023.

The Parole Board is very aware of the trauma experienced by victims and the strong willing of the prisoner to not be released. Victims are at the heart of the Criminal Justice System and it is vital their voice is heard through the Parole Board process. Victims who sign up to the Victim Contact Scheme are updated on the progress of their case. They have the right to submit a Victim Personal Statement to the oral hearing and can request licence conditions. Victims will receive a summary of the Parole Board decision when requested, until 2018 the reasoning was kept a secret as a matter of law. Since 2019, victims can make representations to the Secretary of State regarding reconsideration. Julie stated the Parole Board membership consists of 169 independent members, 61 judicial members, 68 psychologist members and 35 psychiatrist members.

The Parole Board member conducts and risk assessment and reviews the evidence. The evidence starting point is the Dossier which contains hundreds of pages of evidence from courts, police, probation and prison. Prior to the hearing, the Chair reviews the Dossier and provides directions for further information or for witnesses to attend. At the hearing the prisoner will give evidence, and the content of the dossier is robustly tested by asking the witness/es and offender questions. This gives the Parole Board a unique picture of how an offender's risk has evolved from the point of sentence.

Martin presented how the Parole Board make their decisions:

1. The past- offender history, offending history
2. The present- behaviour, attitudes, assessments
3. The future- internal controls, external controls, reintegration

Information sharing between agencies such as the police and the Board is crucial to allow panels to gather all evidence relating to risk prior to the hearing. The Parole process is inquisitorial therefore the Board are there to ask questions and seek further evidence. Panels will sometimes direct police reports regarding ongoing investigation, alleged offences in which no further action was taken, or on rare occasions direct officers to attend to give evidence.

A direction to attend a parole hearing is equivalent to a direction to a court hearing, there are few officers who will be asked to provide reports and attend hearings, however, if and when they are, the evidence they provide can be extremely important to a decision.

The Parole Board is working with the NPCC and individual forces to improve third party directions compliance and memorandum of understanding has been created to ensure continuity in process among all forces.

The parole process is an opportunity to keep dangerous offenders in custody where there is evidence they remain a risk to the public.

Under the Parole Board Rules there is a provision to apply to the Board to withhold information from the prisoner if it is disclosure would affect national security, prevention of disorder or crime, or the health and welfare of individuals. This is an unusual provision and it is tightly managed but can be a useful way to manage sensitive information.

Chiefs stated the offer of support from The Parole Board is extremely useful.

**Decisions:** Chiefs noted the update and agreed to create a group to share information more broadly with the Parole Board with a focus on SOC and CT cases. Group should include the **\*\*S23\*\***.

#### **Session 4 - CT Policing Update**

##### **Op Bridger and MP Security**

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the three recommendations as follows:

1. To develop a common risk assessment framework
2. To design and Implement a multi-agency hub for MP security.
3. To define future operating structures, roles and responsibilities.

**Decision:** Chiefs approved the request for two CT funded secondments to be advertised to support the detailed design phase of the project.

##### **Manchester Bombing Inquiry Part 2**

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the publication of Volume 2 on Emergency Response is expected around May. Volume 3 on Preventability is expected in the summer.

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed the recommendations from the paper as follows:

1. The group is expanded as needed to include other interested parties / relevant leads
2. C&C working group continues to develop these ideas and provide a more substantive response to CCC in due course
3. An assessment of JESIP and the currency of plans and training 'post pandemic', is put onto LRF agendas, and consideration given to what testing and exercising is now feasible

##### **PLATO Assurance Process**

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and were invited to ensure they are confident in their force's ability to respond effectively in the event of an attack.

##### **CT Recruitment, Resourcing and Finance**

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the position on the 22/23 budget and on recruitment, and support the developing programme of work on CTP recruitment.

#### **Session 5 - National Crime Committee Session**

CC Alan Pughsley introduced the session and advised that it would cover updates on key issues within the National Crime Committee that impacted on matters of trust and scrutiny and he passed on his thanks to staff who contributed to the work of the crime committee.

##### **Undercover Policing Inquiry/Criminal Conduct Act Update**

CC Pughsley advised that a fuller update would be provided to the March Council meeting regarding the undercover policing Inquiry led by Andy Ward who represented the NPCC and forces on the

inquiry. CC Pughsley provided a brief update from the last UCPI Gold Group meeting (chaired by Martin Hewitt) where it was agreed that a letter would be sent to the Inquiry chair and the Home Secretary regarding the increasing timescales and ongoing costs of the undercover policing inquiry as well as the impact on elderly witnesses.

**Decision:** Further update to come back to CCC once response is received from the letter sent to the inquiry and Home Secretary on timelines and next steps.

### **Relevant Source UCO and CHIS**

Frankie Flood introduced the item and advised that he would provide an overview of the section 29 considerations when authorising relevant source (UCO) activity and also cover some of the arising learning from cases heard by the investigatory powers tribunal. The following areas were highlighted from the presentation:

1. Differences between considerations around private information and the broader information held by a public authority
2. Areas of learning around Article 8 and the necessity issues to consider
3. Overview of the areas of proportionality and consideration of the elements for proportionality
4. Revision of collateral inclusion considerations and the three categories as defined by the HMICFRS
5. Overview of the risk assessment process
6. Summary of relevant sources order, authorisation levels and oversight by the IPCO
7. Overview of the Criminal Conduct Act (CCA) including authorisation levels, considerations to be undertaken by the authorising officer and implications on cross border operations
8. Collateral intrusion overview
9. An overview of the authorising officer considerations at the renew stage
10. Overview of the additional safeguards in place for juvenile and vulnerable CHIS'

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update to remind AOs of their Section 29 (Use & Conduct) considerations when authorising Relevant Source (UCO) activity and the overview of the Criminal Conduct Act (CCA) 2021.

### **VPP/Child Safeguarding**

AC Louisa Rolfe introduced the session and updated on funding that had been allocated within the spending review to the coordination centre for county lines - this funding was provided with clear expectations around line closures which had been apportioned nationally.

The lead updated on Domestic Abuse Act and associated deep dives and reviews and the impact of the significant inspection regime. AC Rolfe provided an update on related super complaints, the majority of which fell within the domestic abuse and wider VAWG portfolio and an associated letter which had been sent from AC Hewitt and CC Sawyer around information sharing issues.

The lead highlighted the work being undertaken by Simon Bailey for the Home Office on issues around Operation Hydrant, vulnerability knowledge professional practice programme and TOWEX.

DCC Ian Critchley provided a presentation to give an overview of the critical elements of the child protection portfolio and the following areas were highlighted from the presentation:

1. An overview of some of the historical child protection cases and the positive impact made by policing/child protection and safeguarding partnership teams
2. An overview of the various portfolios that support the work of the child protection portfolio including MASH, child death working group, children and young people and VAWG portfolios
3. The communications strategy which is supported by the NPCC and Op Hydrant comms
4. An overview of CSE demand levels and the changing context landscape
5. Work ongoing to identify key threat areas including online harm and group based CSE and the resources being put in place to tackle these areas
6. Update on online safety bill and the issue of 'end to end encryption' and its associated risks
7. An overview of group based CSE and associated complexities and the recent IICSA report on organised networks and its findings around policing keeping pace with the changing nature of CSE
8. An overview of recent serious safeguarding and neglect cases including some cases which had resulted in the homicide of victims and the work ongoing to identify key learning and persistent themes from these cases
9. Summary of the local child safeguarding partnerships and priority areas for focus
10. Look ahead at key forthcoming reviews etc and a summary of the support available to forces

DCC Critchley closed the session by asking forces to consider if they were content with the effectiveness of their safeguarding partnerships, do staff and leaders have access to continuous professional development in order to consider the voice of the child, are forces content with the demand and risks being managed and is the wellbeing of staff managing these challenging issues being considered.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on the inquiry findings report into child sexual abuse and agreed to take the priority areas for focus back into forces and supported the following next steps:

1. Publication of the national review regarding Arthur Labinjo-Hughes
2. Proposed revision of the Voice of Policing mission statement & developing police resources re local children safeguarding partnerships
3. Working Together 2018 rewrite / SV duty to cooperate
4. JTAI report – multi agency response to identification of initial need and risk
5. IICSA and completion of independent review into children's social care.
6. HMG TCSA strategy – overview of progress one year on.

### **Drugs 10 Year Strategy Update**

DCC Jason Harwin provided an update on the 10 year Drugs Strategy and highlighted this built on recent updates that have been provided to Chief Constables. The following areas were highlighted from the presentation.

1. A high level summary of the 10 year strategy including its focus on three key priorities; to break the drug supply chain, deliver world class treatment and recovery services and achieving a generational shift in the demand for drugs
2. An overview of the desired outcomes of the Strategy by the end of 2024/25 - including reducing the number of deaths, expansion of treatment capacity, contribute to the prevention of crime and increasing denial of criminal assets

3. An overview of the policing response including the development of an accountability and delivery framework; making use of established local partnerships and the existing governance landscape, working with the College of Policing to understand and develop a 'what works' blueprint and an evidence base of effective practice, expanding and targeting the middle market supply

An overview of the resource and funding allocation

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

#### **Homicide Prevention Update.**

DAC Stuart Cundy provided an update on behalf of the homicide working group and the next steps of activity for the working group. The following areas were highlighted from the presentation:

1. An overview of homicide data in England and Wales and the recent increase seen in the last year
2. A summary of some of the consistent contributory factors to the increase in homicide numbers and what policing can do to reduce these numbers
3. An overview of the ministerial focus on homicide including at CPPB meetings, summits, the beating crime plan and the recent systems leaders meeting which had a core focus on homicide
4. An overview of the variety of portfolio activities that feed into the homicide working group including VAWG, knife crime, county lines, domestic abuse, mental health and serious violence
5. A summary of ongoing work with the Home Office to improve the accuracy of data that is provided to the national homicide index
6. A summary of the next steps of homicide prevention activity which will be led by ACC Simon Wilson who will develop the NPCC homicide prevention strategy alongside engagement with forces and the college of policing around what works and best practice

ACC Simon Wilson provided a detailed summary of the work he will lead on to develop a homicide prevention framework that forces can use to develop their strategies. This work will be developed over 5 phases and the activity within these phases included understanding the current landscape, problem identification, establishing the policing requirement, activity and gaps and assessing accountability and oversight.

Following discussion, Chief Constables raised the following points:

1. How will the NPCC avoid 'prevention by crime type' and ensure that wider prevention work feeds in
2. How to address the issue of national requirements and local accountability
3. Partnership issue is crucial to develop the prevention piece including the impact of mental health on homicide
4. The need for a collective evidence based view that can be provided on what policing needs from partners and other agencies
5. The need to demonstrate that policing is working as one system

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update and supported the following next steps:

1. T/ACC Simon Wilson, seconded as a dedicated homicide prevention lead to develop a NPCC homicide prevention strategy.
2. College of Policing and NPCC to develop updated homicide problem profile.
3. Working with forces who record highest volumes of homicides.
4. NPCC to negotiate access to Homicide Index.
5. Creation of NPCC led Homicide Summits with support of College of Policing and HMICFRS
6. Ongoing focus on homicide and serious violence prevention.

## **Session 6 - Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Committee Session**

### **Gender Update**

CoP have completed work around gender and retention. While there were no great surprises one issue that stood out was the lack of a standard exit interview. The first national gender pay report is due out this year. Womens health work team pulling all strands together into one area and would welcome any feedback on this.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

### **Wider DEI Strategy**

Strategy developed in 2016 under police diversity work. Race report was set in 2017. Grant was signed off in 2018 and there is a need for strategy to be updated to reflect changes. Vision and outcome framework need to be developed. This should include supervision and wider culture- the aim should be more than anti racist, the force must move to be anti discriminatory.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the development and delivery of the strategy and agreed the following steps:

1. Strategy - mid term refresh
2. Development of Outcomes Framework
3. Developing performance measures

**Decision:** Once strategy has been refreshed and re-developed this should come back to CCC for agreement.

### **GRT – Encampment Guidance**

Forces need to be aware of upcoming changes in legislation with regards to Travellers.

It will be a criminal offence for anyone over 18 to be residing in a vehicle on private land without permission. Position has been that this is a planning issue and civil rather than criminal issue. NPCC is updating guidance for forces, with additional input from Home Office. The decision on which action to take will be placed on the officer. It is expected that there will be legal challenge to any criminal action taken. NPCC are working with GRT groups and NFU to draft guidance – this should be available in a few months. There is also contact with APCCs to explain options open for police to enforce the new legislation.

### **Police Uplift Programme and Police Education Qualifications Framework**



Need to reiterate that the increase in numbers is because of new officers and due to length of training this has not yet mean more officers are deployable to CTP etc yet. National Audit Office will be asking what 'bang for the buck' we have got from PUP and will need to demonstrate that the impact will take time to be fully implemented.

All CCs have been written to by the Lord Chancellor for views on Human Rights changes. Feedback has been sought before but this is a new request and feedback should be given again to influence legislation.

Staff Networks funding has been signed off, but MOU not yet signed off. There is a mix of staff networks in terms of size and needs. The largest issue is usually time requirements for supporting different roles and networks. There is a move to a more matrixed form with an aim is to bring paper to next CCC and then trial approach, probably with National Black Police Association.

Updated guidance from Home Office on Hate Crime should be released in April. It is suggested that NPCC wait for this to be released before issuing any statements.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on proposed powers in respect of unauthorised encampments and supported the following next steps:

1. Ongoing working group to understand the impact, which should include Force leads, GRTPA, APCC, NFU, Home Office.
2. Ongoing stakeholder engagement with key community groups.
3. Revision of the NPCC Unauthorised Encampment Guidance and implementation to all forces with guidance to all officers how to implement the guidance.
4. Awareness pack to support forces to be developed.
5. EIA development to agree measures and data to enable force / national evaluation.

### **Uplift Programme Update**

Letter is going to forces – the standards for requesting diversity information agreed last year. Staff associations have been asking for data and while some forces are recording data well others are not. All forces will be sent details of their current recording status and will be asked to improve recording rates. Network leads have offered to help with encouraging officers to complete their details in return for access to diversity data.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update.

**Action:** Uplift team to send out letter to all chiefs on current position with data standards for protected data characteristics.

### **Human Rights Legislation Review**

**Action:** Chiefs were requested to send in there submissions to the DEI committee to form a collated view for policing on the human rights legislation review – deadline to submit police response to the review is the 8 March.

### **Staff Networks Update**

**Decision:** An MoU is being developed and the proposal would come back to CCC for sign off with chiefs.

## **Day 2**

### **Session 7 - SOC (Chief Constable) Lead Role (Remuneration and Recruitment)**

CC Alan Pughsley introduced the Serious and Organised Crime Lead Role and stated the paper is attached.

CC Gavin Stephens stated the recommendations are the approval of the appointment process and the terms and conditions. An initial term of two years was agreed with a review, and the eligibility criteria is the same as the College of Policing and new Chair roles.

Appendix 4.6 references the place of work is suggested as London, however, could alternative suitable Police HQ be considered. A vehicle allowance and accommodation allowance have been included.

The remaining terms and conditions will be similarly aligned to previous appointments under the AC process within the Metropolitan Police.

Annex A references the range of Chief Constable salaries, however advise was received for this role to be in the centre at approximately £170,000 per annum.

All Chiefs supported the terms and conditions.

In reference to the salary, the proposed salary is higher than approximately three quarters of Chief colleagues present, and therefore the salary seems too high as it poses the question of accountability. Recognised the skill required in terms of negotiation and influencing however the idea of it not attracted interest has not been tested on the market.

This role will be a representative at high level and therefore the correct representation must be appointed.

A package of £170,000 was further supported rather than a salary of £170,000.

Chiefs stated the decision may require remitting from Chiefs to a group, including PCC's. Chiefs will therefore need to agree a delegated authority for this which includes PCC's, in order to keep the independence.

CC Alan Pughsley proposed further work to be undertaken on the package.

Chair stated there is general support for the whole package to total £170,000. A large proportion of work has been undertaken; however it may be useful to gather a broader group and obtain satisfaction.

Chair highlighted the potential use of the Audit and Assurance board to provide independent scrutiny.

Chiefs agreed for the conclusion to be in distributed writing rather than returning to Council and delaying the process further.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the proposal in point 4.6 that the place of work is negotiable at a London based office, or any of the Regional Organised Crime Unit offices. Chiefs agreed this would allow for broadening out the potential pool for recruitment.

**Decision:** Chiefs supported the appointments process in point 5.1 of the paper.

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed in relation to point 5.2 of the paper (*agree to the proposed terms and conditions of appointment and decide upon the salary band for advertisement*) – this needs an external input with the creation of a broader group to allow greater scrutiny and transparency. This group should include PCCs and the total remuneration package set at a £170k threshold.

**Action:** Once proposal is complete re the above decision – Gavin Stephens to write out to all chiefs to get further feedback.

**Action:** As part of review by the external group (as per above decision) a review of gender disparity pay gap should be looked at.

#### **Session 8 - Forensic Science Regulator – Forensic Science Regulator Act and the progress towards Commencement**

Martin Hewitt introduced Gary Pugh in his new role to talk about the forthcoming Forensic Science Regulator Act to be followed by a Q&A session.

Gary Pugh commented that he wanted to provide a brief overview of the current regulatory model which has been around for about 10 years and that it will follow through into the statutory basis for Forensic Science Regulation. There will be little change in the way Forensic Science is regulated.

He said that he would talk about the act and how it will work in practice but will also go through some of the provisions of the act, the commencement process and the engagement he has had with the police to help support the commencement. In his experience, this is the most significant change in the oversight of Forensic Science.

The session lead talked through his first slide emphasising the importance of Forensic Science not just to investigate crime and to identify offenders but also how it is one of the strongest safeguards against false allegations and wrongful conviction.

Forensic Science examinations carry significant risks particularly when there is a system as opposed to an individual failure. For example, drugs driving.

The aim is to minimise the risk of a quality failure and ensure that accurate and reliable evidence is put before the courts.

There is a high profile to Forensic Science with a high level of public interest. The Act aims to help increase public confidence in Forensic Science which will hopefully also help contribute to that broader public confidence in policing and the criminal justice system.

He then moved on to his second slide looking at the current regulatory model and stressed the importance of an effective accredited quality management system that ensure the quality, confidence, competence and technical validity of its operations and meets the requirements set out in the Forensic Science Regulator's Codes of Practice and Conduct. For example:

- Validation – understanding uncertainty of measurements and error rates.
- Defining and demonstrating the competence of forensic practitioners involved– by actually seeing people doing things and in a competent way.
- Documented and controlled procedures
- Internal audit and assurance processes

An effective quality management system should enable Senior Leaders to understand and manage the risk of a quality failure.

Organisational competence in the operation of quality management systems in forensic units in the UK is assessed by the United Kingdom Accreditation Service against international standards and guidance.

The third slide looked at the main provision of the act, the consultation process, and the status of the code. As expected with an act creating a statutory regulator, it is predictable that a code will need to be prepared and published.

The regulator must prepare and publish a code of practice about Forensic Science activities in England and Wales. As there is such a wide range of science and technology within Forensic Science, there is the need to create legal definitions to compartmentalise Forensic Science in a sensible way. For example, there is Crime Scene Examination/fingerprints and DNA profiling and it will need to be clear what the activities are and what they are not and create a definition which forms part of the code.

Before publishing the code, there is a clear requirement for consultation with appropriate people including persons who are representative or are likely to be carrying on activities to which the proposed code will apply and Gary Pugh confirmed that there will be statutory consultation.

Section 4 of the Act deals with the status of the code and a couple of the clauses will link the code and the regulation of Forensic Science into the Criminal Justice process:

This is by making the code admissible in evidence in criminal and civil proceedings in England and Wales but also a court may take into account a failure of a person to act in accordance with the code in determining a question in any such proceedings.

The session lead is having ongoing discussions with CPS, the Judiciary and the Barr on how this will all play out on a practical level. The responses and discussions he has had so far show that lack of

compliance with the code will open up the opportunity for a challenge to the admissibility of evidence from the outset. The judiciary are asking that in the absence of compliance with the code, what would organisations put forward as the basis for accuracy of their results? He will be working with colleagues in COP to try and manage the risks around this. There needs to be a clear policy from the CPS on how they will deal with this provision in the act. These discussions are ongoing.

The next slide looked at the part of the act that deals with the Enforcement process.

The trigger for the enforcement process is based on the regulator having reason to believe that a person may be carrying on a forensic science activity to which the code applies in a way which creates a substantial risk of adversely affecting any investigation or impeding or prejudicing the court of justice in any proceedings.

The regulator may require the person to provide copies of documents and information in their possession or within their control or require information to be provided orally.

The regulator may issue a compliance notice requiring the person to take steps within a given period or by the date of the notice. A compliance notice may in extreme cases prohibit whoever is served the notice in carrying out forensic science activity.

If the regulator is satisfied that the steps have been undertaken, the regulator must issue a completion certificate.

The next slide looked at the approach to ensure compliance with the Statutory code.

There are established risk notification mechanisms including referrals from forensic science providers.

There is a strong and healthy culture of self- referrals and near miss notifications.

There needs to be strong Leadership of forensic quality and understanding risk which is critical to ensuring compatibility with the code and there is the Requirement for a Senior Accountable individual at Chief Officer or director level.

The process for investigation and enforcement will be proportionate and based on an escalation process but with the full enforcement powers of the Act being used as a last resort.

The next slide then looked at Implementation.

To prepare the Statutory code, there will be a singular code involving three main elements:

- Production of a core code based on the current codes of practice and conduct
- Defining forensic science activities
- Incorporating the appendices to the current codes of practice and conduct

The session lead will formally consult on the draft of the code but he has already circulated a draft of the core code amongst the Forensic Science community and invited feedback already. There will be a lot of feedback sought before formal consultation.

There is the need to develop processes to identify risk and enforcement processes for issuing compliance notices and completion certificates.

The Secretary of State will commence the act and done in a way that will be staged.

Ministers have said that they want the act within 18 months from royal assent which means October 2022 which will be a challenging timescale.

The draft code is sent to the Home Secretary who has to approve it and then it is laid before Parliament. It will need to go through both houses of Parliament to then become law.

The last slide looked at Engagement

Gary Pugh said he will be interacting extensively with the NPCC Forensics Portfolio Board.

He has been working with Chris Porter, NPCC Quality Standards lead to establish current levels of compliance using FCN quality team resources.

The Senior Police quality managers are to be part of FSR Scrutiny groups and will get an input to help shape the code.

There is direct involvement with areas of current development of quality standards and accreditation processes including collision investigation, cell site analysis etc. He is reaching out to NPCC leads in those areas.

**Decision:** Gary Pugh will formally write on to all chiefs and forensic leads on engagement for feedback on the FSR statutory code in advance of starting the formal consultation process with forces.

**Decision:** Senior police forensics quality managers will be part of the FSR scrutiny group to consider the draft statutory code in advance of formal consultation.

**Decision:** Whilst developing the new codes – opportunity should be taken to review existing codes through the scrutiny group to see which parts should or should not be encapsulated into the new codes.

**Decision:** Once first report is published after engagement as outlined above, an update will come back to a future CCC meeting for further review and decision.

**Action:** Paul Taylor to link in with Gary Pugh in relation to the Sir Patrick Vallance strategy review.

## **Session 9 - Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensics Capability Network**

CC Nick Dean introduced the agenda item and summarised some of the work that had been ongoing around engagement with the market place and the work of Blue Light Commercial to navigate the two routes to market. CC Nick Dean updated on the gateway group that had been established under the Crime Coordination Committee and asked Chief Constables to continue engagement with this group going forward.

Lianne Deeming provided a presentation to update on activity following the last Chiefs' Constables Council – the following areas were highlighted from the presentation:

- Overview of the options considered at Chiefs Council and subsequent liaison with WSCC to get to a position of potential convergence at different stages – following this it was agreed that there would be two tender processes with a process to enable convergence at the earliest opportunity going forward
- The DPS was concluded on 23 December and seven supplier submitted applications, with five ultimately awarded onto the framework. Processes were ongoing to assist the remaining two suppliers to address the gaps in standards
- Fifteen early adopter forces had been agreed
- Meetings have been held to assist with the issue of convergence to ensure a single point to the market for the two processes
- Overview of the market position and the concerns expressed by the market around running two processes and engagement is ongoing to deliver the best outcome for policing
- An overview of the activity linked to the commercial lifecycle which will include engagement with the WSCC and MPS commercial
- Overview of the next steps including developing of the commercial strategy, the governance landscape and forthcoming communication and consultation

Chief Constables welcomed the direction of travel and the update provided and provided the following feedback/comments

- It would be helpful to understand how innovation will be built into the framework
- The number of suppliers on the framework should not be restricted
- Need to ensure the learning from both routes to market are noted and shared

CC Nick Dean provided a presentation which updated on the strategic recommendations resulting from the Mackey review, the workstreams and the associated funding picture. CC Dean also updated on the emerging theme regarding the involvement of the scientific community with a community reference group – there were no expressions of interest from Chief Officers to lead this group, however several senior police staff had expressed interest in the role and a selection process would be held. The following areas were highlighted from CC Dean's presentation:

- Update on workstream 1 (TF completion) and the links between work of the FCN/TF in delivering some of the scientific capabilities across forces
- Funding agreed by the CSR was £5.4m for projects under workstream 1 and an overview was provided on some of these projects
- Update on workstream 2 (Technical Services Transition) and the establishment of a Transition of Technical Services Board supported by an agreed terms of reference
- Update on workstream 3 (FCN re-focused including restructure) with a gateway group established under the lead of CC Thompson and a new remit for the FCN which will be developed by

forensic leaders under a review group. Any restructure process will be developed by Dorset as the employer

- An overview of the FCN new remit landscape which will be built and cross checked against the FCN structure
- Update on workstream 4 (focus on digital forensics) with gateway groups lead by CC Foulkes and CC Kennedy
- Update on the proposed way forward for Digital Forensics including the current status and progression of thinking and some of the concerns raised by the Home Office around strategic/ministerial positioning
- Overview of proposed joint delivery with PDS with the focus on the creation of two pillars on which policing can build its digital forensics capability (pillar 1: coordinating subject expertise, support and capability, pillar 2: technical delivery). The Home Office have given broad approval to move forward on the joint proposal with PDS which is dependent on agreement of governance arrangements, articulation of benefits, integrated delivery plan and community buy in
- Summary of next steps including planning activity with PDS, and strategic briefings/planning workshops held with chief officers and leads

Chief Constables noted the update and provided the following comments:

- Need to ensure there is appropriate visibility of the detailed prioritisation of projects against the agreed funding from the CSR
- Where are the links between digital forensics and digital investigation and what is the oversight?
- Recognition that the DF approach and model will be a fundamentally different way of business and delivery and therefore involvement and engagement in this area is crucial
- Need to consider the Section 22a agreement and how this will be re-presented around finance and legal considerations

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the Market update and supported the next steps from Bluelight Commercial (BLC) as follows:

1. Commercial Strategy should be drafted including a ten year vision, reflecting the full commercial lifecycle approach and agreed with a clear plan for convergence. Structured plans for Strategic Supplier Relationship Management and supplier development and innovation.
2. Revised governance linked to overarching forensic strategy and connection to the forensic community. The Board structure should be reviewed to ensure an appropriate level of membership to support commercial decision making.
3. Communication strategy to be developed to capture varying routes to market and force requirements. Needs to be clear ongoing engagement with market to allay concerns and find mutually acceptable position regarding resource for differing procurement processes.
4. Must build closer working relationship with WSCC as per previous CCC meetings agreements.
5. BLC to start engagement with Metropolitan Police and North Eastern Forces for managed service provision

**Action:** BLC will meet with key suppliers next week who have raised concerns regarding resourcing and capacity issues and will update chiefs following this.



**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on the strategic review including the re-cap on the 4 workstreams and the proposed way forward for the Digital Forensic Science Strategy. Chiefs supported the next steps as follows:

1. Initial planning with the Police Digital Service (PDS).
2. Strategic briefing held with key chief officer leads from portfolio and gateway group 18<sup>th</sup> Jan 2022 - agreement reached on direction of travel
3. A mobilised joint DF/PDS programme
4. Detailed planning workshop held 31<sup>st</sup> Jan 2022 – findings to be shared with chiefs.

Products being developed:

1. Deliverables & activities roadmap for Jan – March
2. Governance proposal
3. Integrated delivery plan (Strategic & benefits case)
4. Community engagement plan

***Ongoing actions in connection with the above can be viewed via the 20 October 2021 CCC meeting decisions log.***

#### **Session 10 - APCC Chair Update**

PCC Marc Jones stated the recommendations for part two of the PCC review are expected soon. PCC Jones highlighted the commitment to building and strengthening collaboration and relationships with partners. The collaboration allows the APCC to highlight challenges and understand what is going on within partners.

The APCC/NPCC summit held in November 2021 was set to look forward and face challenges productively, positively and collaboratively. The APCC and NPCC have also led together on the spending review (SR) and the outcome would not have been as achievable if there was little collaboration.

New forums and resources are being developed to support partnership working, the new Strategic Policing Partnership Board (SPPB) has been launched in order to bring together various elements of the policing sector.

Prevention is linked in many ways and the focus on partnership is vital to this, an example of this is the PCC lead violence reduction unit. The APCC want to work closely with the prevention coordination committee through the APCC prevention portfolio.

The APCC/NPCC had a focus on two issues which are fundamental to the public trust and confidence in policing, both the Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) and the challenges around racial disparity for policing. There is further work to do to tackle the crimes disproportionately affecting women and girls every year.

The APCC had a successful summit for PCC's on VAWG, which DCC Maggie Blyth was a key part of.

The public voice is fundamental to PCC's, therefore discussions are taking place for the potential of a national survey of victims experiences of the criminal justice system, especially victims of VAWG.

Neighbourhood policing is one of the core issues within policing, PCC's are aware that the confidence of our communities is shaped by policing at a neighbourhood level. Equally PCC's understand those challenges get challenged but are unable to solve all aspect of.

The Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) area has developed and Steve Jupp invited Donna Jones (APCC lead for SOC) to speak at the recent SOC conference in December 2021.

Drugs is another issue for APCC, and appreciate the support and collaboration between the crime coordination committee.

In reference to the APCC vision for policing and governance, the APCC believe the role of PCC's as the public voice in policing is now is well established. The APCC want to see the PCC role further developed in the criminal justice system, many PCC's already chair their local criminal justice board and would like to see these boards put on a statutory footing.

It is important to consider the role as being one of a partnership, it is critical to PCC's to be able to support policing in order to deliver better outcomes. The role is being developed nationally and developing the relationship with the Local Government Association with a focus on crime issues.

The APCC also has a focus to widen the APCC remit to provide a national representation for policing and governance. There is already four Fire, Police and Crime Commissioners and the APCC are anticipating the publication of the 'White Paper' on fire governance imminently.

Police Scotland will be joining the APCC as an associate member from April 2022. British Transport Police (BTP), City of London Police and Ministry of Defence (MOD) are also members, and currently working on obtaining more members.

It has been 10 years since the formation of the PCC role and the APCC is working to develop a formation strategy to celebrate this and highlight what the role has achieved. It will have a focus on different topics throughout the months.

The APCC in the process of developing the new Strategic Plan for 2022/2024, which will be shared with policing colleagues before it is launched. This will set out a focus on the core issues but equally make clear the APCC role is to support policing and the ultimate aim is to drive down the number of victims in our communities.

Chiefs stated there is a difficult relationship between HMICFRS and PCC's for various reasons. However going forward, there is a lot that should be scrutiny rather than inspection.

**Decision:** Chiefs noted the update on key developments from the APCC Chair and welcomed the discussion.

### **Session 11 - Inclusion and Race Equality Programme Revised Plan**

Guests were welcomed to the session. It was recognised that this would be the last session Amanda Pearson would attend in her current role and she was thanked for her contribution to this programme.

The background to the session was outlined. It is recognised that the group is not hugely diverse, so it is important to listen to representatives of staff networks although there is not an expectation for them to provide answers.

The composition of this group and the speed with which that is progressing were compared to the VAWG to illustrate how this may affect the perception of progress, along with reservations from staff networks about whether decisions have already been made.

While it is difficult to express a consistent vision across all forces it would be helpful, this must also be balanced with flexibility to implement in the way that is most effective in their own area with regards to their own demographics. The difficulty of finding the correct wording to reflect the current position and ambition was discussed and there were mixed views on what is most appropriate. Actions must be visible, and the roadmap and outcomes must be clearly set out. This is important to regain and retain the confidence and support of all communities.

Lived experience on the immediate and ongoing impact that racism has on people was shared. The similarity of previous conversations and previous action plans at different points in participant's careers were brought up to express the view that there is still a need to change the culture.

The composition of this group and the speed with which that is progressing were compared to the VAWG to illustrate how this may affect the perception of progress, along with reservations from staff networks about whether decisions have already been made.

The role of the Independent Scrutiny Oversight Board was covered. Applications have now closed for membership of the ISOB board with over 100 very high calibre candidates. There is a very strong shortlisting panel and interviews will take place soon.

**Decision:** All views and discussions from the session will be considered and then the Inclusion and Race team will finalise the final plan and its introduction which will return to CCC for decision in March.

**Decision:** The Inclusion and Race Team will provide more guidance to chiefs and forces in due course on how to engage and consult on the development plan from the 23 February.

**Decision:** All chiefs were encouraged to take the IOSB chair up on the offer of visiting and speaking with forces.

**Decision:** All chiefs were encouraged to put forward applicants for the National Programme Director role.

## **ANY OTHER BUSINESS AND WRAP OF DECISIONS**

No AOBs recorded.

## **DATE OF NEXT MEETING**

The next full Chiefs' Council meeting will be held on **23-24 March 2022**.

## ACTION LOG – ONGOING ACTIONS

**Session 6 (October 2021 Extraordinary CCC) – NPCC Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensic Capability Network - FCN Refocused and Next Generation Procurement (Action Owners: Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean):** (Action 1) Governance hosting arrangements and funding review for all national units is being reviewed by the NPCC Strategic Hub and a paper will be shared with chiefs going forward.

(Action 2) Paper with the decisions and update on outline of contractual landscape across forces mapped to provide overview working towards a singular process going forwards.

**Response** – A further update will be presented at the May CCC meeting.

## ACTION LOG – ONGOING ACTIONS

**Session 2 (February 2022) – National Operating Budget Proposal – (Action Owners: Gavin Stephens):** Finance committee to set up group to review underspend and reserve strategy.

**Response** – Discussing this at the next Finance Coordination Committee on 9 March 2022. To set up a working group to review funding of NPCC Programmes. Further update will be given to Chiefs at the March CCC meeting.

## ACTION LOG – ONGOING ACTIONS

**Session 9 (February 2022) – Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensics Capability Network (Action Owner: Nick Dean and Lianne Deeming):** BLC will meet with key suppliers next week who have raised concerns regarding resourcing and capacity issues and will update chiefs following this.

**Response** – Meeting held with suppliers which confirmed that they could not manage a dual twin track process and that there would need to be a gap between the process. As this would result in an extension written confirmation has been sought from suppliers to mitigate any potential challenge, which has now been received. A further update will be circulated to all chiefs.

## ACTION LOG – ONGOING ACTIONS

**Session 4 (January 2022 Extraordinary) –** **\*\*S23\*\***

**Response** – Ongoing action until pilot has been completed and will come back to the May 2022 Chiefs' Council meeting.

Date of Council	Paper Title	Item/Session Number	Action Description	Action by Date	Action Owner	Allocated To	Status	Progress	Date Closed
Extraordinary October 2021	NPCC Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensic Capability Network - FCN Refocused and Next Generation Procurement	Session 6	Action 1) Governance hosting arrangements and funding review for all national units is being reviewed by the NPCC Strategic Hub and a paper will be shared with chiefs going forward. (Action 2) Paper with the decisions and update on outline of contractual landscape across forces mapped to provide overview working towards a singular process going forwards.	02-Feb-22	Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean	Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean	Open	A further update will be presented at the May CCC meeting.	
08-Dec-21	Chair Update - Op Talla National Awards	Session 1	NPoCC Op Talla team would update chiefs on the logistics and venue for the awards so they can plan now	02-Feb-22	NPoCC - Op Talla Team	NPoCC - Op Talla Team	Closed	In relation to this action – <b>**S31**</b> Capacity will be limited (to winners only and selected partners/stakeholders) due to size of venue and budget etc, however the team are looking into the possibility of live streaming the event for colleagues to watch. Winners and runners up are in the process of being notified, with invites being sent out to the winners. Chief officer teams will be notified of these outcomes.	08/03/2022
08-Dec-21	Chair Update - College of Policing Update	Session 1	Agreed to complete stock take of misogyny recordings from forces and will write out to all chiefs.	02-Feb-22	Andy Marsh	Andy Marsh	Closed	Would form part of the discussion at the March CCC meeting.	07/03/2022
02-Feb-22	Roads Policing Strategy 2022-25 Update	Session 1	NPCC Hub would incorporate review of strategy commissioning sign off routes into work plan going forward.	01-Apr-22	Gemma Stannard	Gemma Stannard	Closed	A discussion was held at SPCB on 10 <sup>th</sup> Feb regarding strategy development. It was agreed that there should be a mutually agreed definition of strategy vs a plan, policy, guidance, etc. ensuring join-up with College, APCC, HMICFRS, etc. It was also agreed that a commissioning process for strategy development should be set out. These actions are now being managed through SPP and via the Strategy Policing Partnership Group and will report back into SPCB.	11/03/2022
02-Feb-22	College of Policing Update	Session 1	(Action 1) - Letter detailing an increase in charging for College services will be sent to all Chiefs. (Action 2 - Fundamental Review of the College out next week and will be published to all chiefs via ChiefsNet.)	11-Feb-22	Andy Marsh	Andy Marsh	Closed	Both letters were circulated to all chiefs via ChiefsNet on the 10 February 22.	07/03/2022
02-Feb-22	Regional Papers - College of Policing Review of Police Promotion and Progression	Session 1	College will liaise with regions on the feedback provided and will submit for bigger discussion at the March Council meeting.	23-Mar-22	Andy Marsh	Andy Marsh	Closed	Update will form part of session at the March CCC meeting.	07/03/2022
02-Feb-22	National Operating Budget Proposal	Session 2	Finance committee to set up group to review underspend and reserve strategy.	29-Apr-22	Gavin Stephens	Gavin Stephens	Open	Discussing this at the next Finance Coordination Committee on 9 March 2022. To set up a working group to review funding of NPCC Programmes. Further update will be given to Chiefs at the March CCC meeting.	
02-Feb-22	DEI - Uplift Update	Session 6	Uplift team to send out letter to all chiefs on current position with data standards for protected data characteristics.	23-Mar-22	Janette McCormick	Janette McCormick	Closed	Letter has been circulated to all chiefs from PUP and an update paper submitted to the March Chiefs' Council meeting.	11/03/2022



Date of Council	Paper Title	Item/Session Number	Action Description	Action by Date	Action Owner	Allocated To	Status	Progress	Date Closed
02-Feb-22	DEI - Human Rights Legislation Review	Session 6	Chiefs were requested to send in there submissions to the DEI committee to form a collated view for policing on the human rights legislation review – deadline to submit police response to the review is the 8 March.	04-Mar-22	All Chiefs	Carl Foulkes	Closed	Submissions received from a number of forces, and a response to the Human Rights Legislation Consultation has been submitted by the Human Rights Portfolio on behalf of the NPCC	11/03/2022
03-Feb-22	SOC (Chief Constable) Lead Role (Remuneration and Recruitment)	Session 7	(Action 1) - Once proposal is complete re the above decision – Gavin Stephens to write out to all chiefs to get further feedback. (Action 2 - As part of review by the external group (as per above decision) a review of gender disparity pay gap should be looked at).	23-Mar-22	Gavin Stephens and Alan Pughsley	Gavin Stephens and Alan Pughsley	Closed	A full review was completed by Crime, Finance and Workforce Chairs with the respective PCCs with the salary and T&Cs being agreed and communicated to all Chief Constables on the 9 March. Workforce Committee will take the second action as part of a wider review going forward.	10/03/2022
03-Feb-22	Forensic Science Regulator – Forensic Science Regulator Act and the progress towards Commencement	Session 8	Paul Taylor to link in with Gary Pugh in relation to the Sir Patrick Vallance strategy review.	23-Mar-22	Paul Taylor	Paul Taylor	Closed	Paul has linked in and invited Gary to be part of the ongoing working group to help form the strategy. Strategy discussion is on the March CCC agenda item.	07/03/2022
03-Feb-22	Strategic Review for Transforming Forensics Programme and the Forensics Capability Network	Session 9	BLC will meet with key suppliers next week who have raised concerns regarding resourcing and capacity issues and will update chiefs following this.	23-Mar-22	Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean	Lianne Deeming and Nick Dean	Open	Meeting held with suppliers which confirmed that they could not manage a dual twin track process and that there would need to be a gap between the process. As this would result in an extension written confirmation has been sought from suppliers to mitigate any potential challenge, which has now been received. A further update will be circulated to all chiefs.	

## **Session 1**

- **Minutes for approval – January 2022 and February 2022 (in pack)**
- **Action Log (in pack)**
- **Chair's Update (Verbal update)**
- Covid-19 Update
- Ukraine Situation
- Protests Planning
- NPCC Vice Chair Vacancy
- UCPI Update
- Hub Survey
- Commonwealth Games (Presentation in pack)
- NPCC Comms Service Level Agreement

### **Critical Incident Reporting Framework (Paper in the pack)**

### **ESN Update (Verbal Update)**

### **Aviation and NPAS Update (Verbal Update)**

- **Regional Papers: (All papers in the pack)**
- UCPI Financial Business Case
- NP2IRM Budget Bid
- NP2IRM Strategic Outline Case
- National Mobilisation Tier 3 Mutual Aid Framework of Principles
- National Mobilisation Plan Protestor Removal Proposal

# Operation **UNITY**


## **Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games**

Chief Constables' Council  
23 March 2022

(version 0.4)



Official Sensitive





## Birmingham 2022 Commonwealth Games in Numbers



Founded in **1930, XXII**  
Commonwealth Games  
awarded to Birmingham in  
**December 2017**



**7th** time in UK - London 1934,  
Cardiff 1958, Edinburgh 1970,  
Edinburgh 1986, Manchester  
2002 and Glasgow 2014



**6,600** athletes & officials  
from **72** nations and  
territories



**13k** volunteers  
**1m** spectators  
**1.5bn** worldwide audience



**30k** visitors at Opening  
Ceremony on Thursday, **28**  
**July** 2022



**19** sports (including **eight** para  
sports) over **11** days from Friday,  
**29 July** to Monday, **8 August** 2022

## Not just Birmingham!

Venues stretch from Coventry, Solihull, and Royal Leamington Spa to Cannock Chase Forest, Royal Sutton Coldfield, Wolverhampton... and Lee Valley!

**West Midlands Police,**  
**Warwickshire Police**  
**Staffordshire Police,** and  
**MPS** will all host events.



ALEXANDER STADIUM



SMITHFIELD



SUTTON PARK



UNIVERSITY OF  
BIRMINGHAM



WEST PARK



VICTORIA PARK



ST NICHOLAS PARK



ARENA BIRMINGHAM



CANNOCK CHASE FOREST



COVENTRY ARENA



EDGBASTON STADIUM



LEE VALLEY VELOPARK



NEC



SANDWELL AQUATICS



## ... and not just one Athletes' Village!

In August 2020, the Organising Committee decided athletes and team officials would be housed in **three (later four) 'campus' villages** at The University of Birmingham, The University of Warwick, The NEC Hotel Campus and the Park Regis Hotel.

### University of Birmingham



### National Exhibition Centre



### University of Warwick



### Park Regis Hotel



### Games Family Hotel






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## Countdown to the Games...

Presenter Notes  
2022-03-21 12:09:56

Dave Sturman



Games Time  
29 July 2022



Queen's Baton Relay in Northern Ireland  
24 June 2022



Queen's Baton Relay in England  
4 July 2022



Pre-Games Transition  
26 July 2022



Queen's Baton Relay in Scotland  
18 June 2022



Queen's Baton Relay in Wales  
29 June 2022

Athletes Villages Opening  
22 July 2022



Opening Ceremony  
28 July 2022



# 127 days to go!

# Key Concepts in Delivering a Safe and Secure Games



**Strategic Command** - an integrated security partnership between the Organising Committee, emergency services, local government and HMG *co-ordinated* by West Midlands Police



**Proportionality** – a reassuring, welcoming and financially sustainable policing & security operation to reflect the ethos of the '*Friendly Games*' and avoid a '*Fortress Games*'



**Clarity** – defining *security* as the mitigation of malicious threats such as terrorism, crime and public disorder; and *safety* as the contingency response to any hazard, major incident or emergency



**Legacy** - use the Games to build trust & confidence, enrich communities and leave lasting benefits for Birmingham, the West Midlands and policing





## Key Operational Threats & Risks

\*\*S31 & S23\*\*



Terrorism

Serious  
Organised Crime  
(Drugs)



Serious  
Organised Crime  
(Exploitation)



Serious  
Organised Crime  
(Economic)




Cyber Crime

Protest &  
Public Order



Serious  
Violence



Serious  
Acquisitive  
Crime

UAV

**\*\*S31 & S23\*\***

**\*\*S31 & S23\*\***


**\*\*S31 & S23\*\***



Significant planning has gone into ensuring all WMP and Mutual Aid staff & officers deployed to Operation UNITY have a *'world class experience'*

A *24/7 Logistics Operation Centre* will co-ordinate all logistical, welfare and wellbeing requirements.

- Listening to feedback**
  - ✓ Catering survey
  - ✓ Staff survey
  - ✓ Volunteer survey
  - ✓ Fed and Unions
  - ✓ National Surveys
- Learning from similar operations**
  - ✓ Queensland 2018
  - ✓ Glasgow 2014
  - ✓ Olympics 2012
  - ✓ Party Conferences
  - ✓ Football matches
  - ✓ Trump visit
  - ✓ G7
  - ✓ COP26
- Working with partners & suppliers**
  - ✓ NPoCC
  - ✓ College of Policing (Ryton)
  - ✓ Prison Services College (Newbold Revell)
  - ✓ Unite
  - ✓ Bus provider (Stagecoach)



- Integrated governance**
  - Working Groups
  - Project Board with operational and enabling services representatives, and Fed
  - Feeding into Silver Group and upwards
- Enabling Services support**
  - Business Transformation
  - Contracts and Procurement
  - Corporate Asset Management
  - Learning and Development
  - Legal Services
  - Finance



A dedicated **Welfare & Wellbeing Team** will be based within Logistics Operations Centre

## CoVID

- Robust plans, learning from CoP26 and in line with Public Health, WMP BAU and OC plans.
- Welfare managements structures using CLIO.
- Repatriation plans – NPoCC.
- Linking in with BAU structures to provide testing kits and PPE.
- Covid isolation accommodation and feeding plans.



## Accommodation

- High quality accommodation has been secured for all Mutual Aid officers and staff
- Accommodation sites visited and inspected by local Police Federation representatives



## Welfare

- Additional welfare provision at accommodation sites.
- RRT Care Kit for all Mutual Aid officers and contingency support from RRT secured.
- A dedicated prayer room in all accommodation sites.
- PMAS additional mobile drinks provision.
- Op Unity Welfare Pack for all officers and staff.



## Well-being

- Maximising existing provision
- TRIM
- Occupational Health
- Well-being vans
- National Well being Service
- Police Mutual mobile support
- Clic mental health forum
- Aquarius
- Mental Health First Aid
- Full range of wellbeing services

## Single Cohort Deployment of Mutual Aid Officers

The Op UNITY approach to pay & conditions for MA officers is in accordance with the proposed **NPoCC Framework of Principles**, *except* for the use of a '*single cohort*' deployment.

A '*single cohort*' deployment is necessary for Op UNITY because:

1. The operational need is for 12 days of ceremony and competition plus travel either side. This is significantly longer than most MA deployments; and
2. A single cohort significantly reduces costs and logistical arrangements associated with travel, accommodation, briefing and staff continuity.

The following slide is a summary of the overall MA pay & condition arrangements.  
The full paper will be circulated via NPoCC too Regional leads.

## Pay & Conditions for Mutual Aid Officers

### Shift Patterns

All MA officers will be provided with a bespoke Games shift pattern with a minimum of 3 months notice. The shift pattern will include at least one Rest Day.

### Away from Home Allowance

Will be paid for every day a MA officer is deployed to the Games (incl. Rest Days where officers held in reserve);

### Held on Reserve

All MA officers will be subject to a 4-hour 'recall to duty' notice period when on a duty day and a 12-hour 'recall to duty' notice period when on their rest day. MA officers will not be assigned to be 'on-call', however they will be discouraged from returning home on rest days; travel expenses will not be paid if a MA officer chooses to travel.

### Hardship Allowance

Will be paid to any MA officer who is not provided with proper accommodation. Considered highly unlikely.

### Tours of Duty

All MA officers will be posted to an 8 hour TOD on basic rate of pay; recommended shifts will be extended by 4 hours (paid overtime). TOD will commence for MA officers when they leave their place of accommodation.

### Rest Day Payments

WMP will not pay Rest Day overtime; donor MA Forces may choose to self-fund by paying a reasonable bonus payment est. £100 per rest day as experienced in COP 26.

### Targeted Variable Payments

WMP can not pay TVP to Insp. ranks and above; WMP recommends donor MA forces self-fund a reasonable bonus payment of £100 per day (excl. RD) to these officers

### Special Constabulary

A discretionary honorarium will be available for MA specials deployed to the Games – est. £750 on a two week deployment.





Preventing crime, protecting the public  
and helping those in need

[west-midlands.police.uk](https://west-midlands.police.uk)



# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Critical Incident Reporting Framework

23 March 2022 / Agenda Item: Session 1

<p><b>Security Classification</b></p> <p>NPCC Policy: Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA <u>may</u> apply):</p>	
<p><b>OFFICIAL</b></p>	
<p><b>Freedom of information (FOI)</b></p> <p>This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer &amp; Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. For external Public Authorities in receipt of an FOI, please consult with <a href="mailto:sherry.traquair@npcc.pnn.police.uk">sherry.traquair@npcc.pnn.police.uk</a></p>	
<b>Author:</b>	ACC Owen Weatherill
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPoCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	23 February 2022
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Operations
<b>Portfolio:</b>	
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	
<p><b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b></p> <p>In compliance with the Government's Security Policy Framework's (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised, and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a></p>	

### 1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

This paper proposes some refinements to the Public Safety Group's current incident reporting processes. In an age of 24-hour news and social media, the aim is to ensure the Home Secretary is appropriately informed and briefed on high-profile police incidents in good time.

### 2. BACKGROUND

The Public Safety Group (PSG) Emergency Response Team has been set up to provide a single home for reporting on public order, protest, civil contingencies and other operational policing incidents (such as serious violence, manhunts and high-profile police incidents). See annex C for more detail.

A key part of this is ensuring the Home Secretary receives appropriate alerts and updates in a timely fashion when high-profile police incidents occur. It is right that the Home Secretary is notified on urgent policing matters given it is the Home Secretary who is ultimately accountable for policing to parliament.

The existing approach relies on the process for information requests from the Home Office to forces set up in April 2021 by Stuart Sterling, then NPCC Transformation & Performance Lead (see annex D). This has established a process for responding to Ministers' requests for information, including out of

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hours, typically on high-profile events, such as those receiving national media coverage and ongoing issues of concern. It also ensures that Chief Constables' offices are sighted on requests for information.

This approach works well for 'reactive' requests and has helped streamline the rapid flow of information on unexpected or emerging incidents, while avoiding multiple requests into forces on the same issue.

In addition, the fortnightly police ops calls between the Home Secretary and key policing leads provide forces with the chance to brief the Home Secretary directly to provide detailed updates and assurance on live operational issues.

However, reliance on a purely reactive process means that notifications are not always as timely as they need to be. The existing process does not set out the more **proactive** reporting needed to ensure the Home Secretary is made aware of high-profile and emerging incidents as soon as possible, particularly those that will attract parliamentary and media attention. As well as new and emerging incidents, this will also apply to the key stages of high-profile ongoing investigations where parliamentary interest and national media coverage is anticipated (e.g. when a suspect is arrested or charged).

Proactive reporting from forces will be appropriate and feasible for incidents that clearly reach a trigger point in terms of scale/severity and it is anticipated that these will be relatively small in number (see below for more detail). However, it is recognised that there will continue to be a need for a reactive process for those cases where a force could not reasonably anticipate Home Secretary interest; for example, where an incident trends rapidly on social media or is of topical interest to Home Office ministers.

The proposed revised framework therefore comprises two elements:

- **'Proactive'** - Force identifies a potentially high-profile incident that requires proactive notification to Home Office
- **'Reactive'** - Home Office requests information on an incident under the existing process.

### 3. PRINCIPLES

The proposed framework will build on the information sharing agreements already in place, maintaining a proportionate and consistent approach.

Any data sharing between police forces and the Home Office for these purposes will take place under the existing Umbrella Memorandum of Understanding (UMoU) between Home Office and NPCC (Section 7 Ad-Hoc/Proactive/One-Off Disclosures Of Information).

The trigger points for proactive reporting will be relatively high due to the sheer volumes involved (for example, there are over 600 homicides a year; 124,000 police-recorded hate crimes a year; 1,955

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charges for rape in 2021); 155,211 missing persons reported in 2019/20<sup>1</sup> (over 30,000 a year in London alone). Proportionality will need to be determined based on the scale of impact or potential impact.

Given the range of factors involved (e.g. severity of incident, levels of parliamentary and media interest) it is not possible to provide absolute criteria for those incidents which should be notified to the Home Secretary and professional judgement will be required. However, this framework will provide a clear guide and process for providing the Home Secretary and Ministers with information that is appropriate, necessary and proportionate.

The police are operationally independent and requests for information must not influence or present an appearance of influencing ongoing live operations. PSG ERT will manage requests to keep the need for direct police contact to a necessary and proportionate level, and will liaise with forces via agreed points of contact.

When requesting information on behalf of Ministers, PSG ERT and Private Offices will clarify both the urgency and rationale – for example, situational information needed immediately to assist with public confidence versus details more appropriate to a post-event debrief.

#### 4. TYPES OF INCIDENT

There are a wide range of incidents that are potentially in scope, depending on the circumstances. We consider four broad categories:

- 'Business as usual' policing activity of little national interest. This will encompass the vast majority of police activity and **requires no reporting under this framework**.
- 'Business as usual' incidents that are attracting/are likely to attract significant parliamentary and media attention and as such **proactive notification is appropriate**.
- New and emerging critical incidents of significant size and scale - such as a large-scale riot, or an incident with multiple fatalities – that will **require proactive early and ongoing notification**.
- Ongoing or high-profile investigations and cases which receive significant press coverage at key stages, for example, when a suspect is charged or when a court case begins, **where proactive notification is appropriate**.

Factors to consider are as follows:

- Severity of incident – deaths, large number of victims etc
- Is the issue attracting/likely to attract public, national media coverage and/or questions in parliament. This could be for a number of reasons, for example:
  - high profile victim or offender, or prominent location.
  - press reporting of crimes that may have a significant impact for victims e.g. widespread reporting relating to domestic violence or rape cases.

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<sup>1</sup> **\*\*S23\*\***

- an incident that will cause widespread concerns of public safety.
- potential impact on confidence in policing such as police misconduct.
- incidents and investigations that raise questions about potential system failures – not just criminal justice system but also wider health and care, education systems etc.

We recognise that similar incidents occurring in different regions can attract different degrees of parliamentary and media attention, which is another reason why trigger points cannot be defined in absolute terms and professional judgement will be needed.

More detail of incidents in scope with examples are provided in annex A below.

## **5. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED**

Information should focus on known facts about the situation and operational response. It should include any public safety issues and media/communication plans. (On the latter point, HO Comms are also engaging with NPCC Comms more generally around opportunities to link up.)

A suggested template based on the existing process is included at annex B.

### Frequency of updates

The frequency of updates will depend on the type and severity of incident. For critical incidents where there is an ongoing threat to life, the Home Secretary should be provided with regular updates. For small/short-lived incidents, no further updates will be expected once the incident has concluded. For ongoing investigations receiving widespread parliamentary and national media attention, daily updates may be appropriate. Following initial contact, PSG ERT will agree with the force the appropriate frequency of updates and subsequently agree the point at which reporting can stop.

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## Annex A – Critical Incident Reporting Framework - DRAFT

This framework builds on the existing process for obtaining information on unexpected or emerging incidents from police forces to the Home Office when requested by Ministers. It seeks to clarify the types of high-profile events about which forces should expect to notify the Home Office proactively, in addition to responding to requests for information.

### Types of incident and thresholds for reporting

Incident Type	Additional steers on thresholds for reporting	Examples
<b>Serious Violence</b> <i>(including: malicious (non-CT<sup>2</sup>) firearms or knife attack; isolated homicide of significant interest; copycat attacks)</i>	<p><b>Multiple victims:</b> includes domestic homicide with multiple/family of victims</p> <p><b>Isolated attacks or homicides of significant interest due to circumstance or location</b> – for example: if occur in/around Whitehall or in a university/school, a location that would attract serious public safety concerns, or if they result from perceived system failings.</p>	<p>Plymouth shootings (2021); <a href="#">Birmingham stabbings</a> (2020).</p> <p><a href="#">Maida Vale domestic violence / murder incident</a> – man stabbed a woman (his ex-wife) to death. He was then killed by another man hitting him with a car in an attempt to save the woman.</p> <p><a href="#">Man in hospital after stabbing at Nottingham Trent University</a> - a professor was stabbed on campus; while the injuries turned out not to be life-threatening, there was significant national media coverage.</p> <p><a href="#">Jaden Moodie 'lay in pool of blood after rival gang attack' - BBC News</a> – murder of a 14 year-old-boy by rival gang member on a North London street</p>

<sup>2</sup> PSG are also engaged with Homeland Security Group (HSG) to ensure consistency with their review of data sharing agreements with CT policing

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<b>Serious Violence – assaults on police</b>	All deaths on duty and any high-profile off-duty police deaths that may be linked to policing/otherwise high media interest and the most serious injuries.	Manslaughter of PC Harper.
<b>Manhunts</b> <i>(once confirmed not terrorism related)</i>	Any manhunts that are creating public safety concerns or significant media/Parliamentary interest.	Raoul Moat; Derek Bird; Sex offender Paul Robson on the run from HMP North Sea Camp - BBC News.
<b>Armed Siege</b>	When there are hostages involved or there are concerns with the hostage taker.	<a href="#">Armed siege in Coventry which lasted several days</a> . Man, with significant mental health issues refused to leave his house with his young son. The man had several weapons including a stun gun, imitation firearm, large axes, and knives, including machetes.
<b>Significant Public Order/Riots</b>	When there is either spontaneous and widespread public order issues, or where peaceful protest turns into criminal activity and disorder.  Mass disorder at football fixtures. (NB: Disorder at football matches is monitored by UKFPU, who update NPCC lead and HO on incidents at matches.)	2011 Tottenham Riots.  Anti-vax targeting of vaccine centres.  <a href="#">Violence and disorder at Euro 2020 final leads to dozens of arrests   Metro News</a>

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<b>Non-CT incidents involving armed police response</b> particularly when leads to death following police contact.	Any incidents where police discharge firearms.	<a href="#">Man died after being shot by police in Kensington following reports that he entered a bank and bookmakers while armed.</a> MPS referred itself to IOPC to investigate.
<b>Deaths in police custody</b> leading to community tensions/protests/public order issues	Deaths in custody raising public concern/gaining significant parliamentary and media attention (NB: HO receive notification of all deaths in custody via the IOPC).	
<b>Violence Against Women and Girls/CSEA</b>	High profile MISPER cases gaining national media coverage  High profile CSEA cases  High profile VAWG incidents	Sarah Everard  Rochdale child sex abuse ring  Multiple reports of drink spiking gaining widespread news coverage and questions from many MPs
<b>Serious police misconduct cases</b>	High profile cases of alleged police criminality/misconduct likely to attract parliamentary and media attention  (NB: IOPC will notify HO where they intend to respond to media enquiries or make a public statement.)	<a href="#">Police officers charged over sharing offensive messages with Sarah Everard's killer named   UK News   Sky News</a>
<b>Ad hoc topical issues</b>	Lower level protest that may attract significant parliamentary and media attention, e.g. criminal	

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<p>High profile crime incidents garnering significant parliamentary and media attention.</p> <p>This may include policy failures; critical reports, media interest stories about which the Home Secretary is likely to be questioned by the press, MPs or urgent questions in the house.</p>	<p>damage of statues/memorials in aftermath of Colston statue incident</p> <p>Significant hate crime incidents – i.e. due to serious of crime (e.g. GBH, murder) but also particularly sensitivity due to locations and/or date (e.g. Holocaust Memorial Day, religious holidays).</p> <p>Topical international events (UK held voting by foreign citizens in their countries election; disorder/criminal activity at embassies or consulates)</p> <p>Incident that involved joint working on a small scale between police, fire and or ambulance. Major incidents that require joint response (JESIP) could be major incident on rail or road for example.</p> <p>Robbery/burglary of very high-profile people or where some is seriously injured or dies with significant parliamentary and media attention</p>	<p>People assaulted when voting in the Iranian Election at a polling station in Birmingham – Attracted FCDO and Iranian Government attention. Work was done post event for the details of what had happened</p> <p>London bus crash, number of casualties and children involved <a href="#">London bus crash: Children injured as double-decker hits shop - BBC News</a></p>
<p><b>Protest Activity</b></p>	<p>Protest activity by <b>high profile groups</b></p>	<p>Anti-Vaxx protests; Climate change protests; fuel shortage protests.</p>

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<p><i>(including disruption to critical services and infrastructure)</i></p> <p>NB: A process already exists to provide reporting on planned protests that fall under the thematic areas based on the National Strategic Risk Assessment for Public Order, Public Safety. Themes include Anti-Government and Internationally Inspired. (A review of current protest intelligence reporting is under way, which will set out the conditions for defining a Strategic Protest and criteria for inclusion in the report.)</p>	<p>Protests that are <b>internationally themed</b> and linked to <b>international events and sensitive issues</b> particularly when taking place near embassies and consulates.</p> <p>Protest activity targeted at <b>sensitive locations or individuals</b> – for example: protests at school; vaccination centres; HMG buildings; targeted at MP’s homes.</p> <p>Protest activity resulting in alleged offences and disorder including <b>criminal damage</b>, significant <b>casualties</b> including <b>injuries to police officers</b>.</p>	<p>Small groups of anti-vaxxers protesting and causing disruption at covid vaccination and test centres.</p> <p>“Kill the Bill” protests in Bristol March 2021 <a href="#">which led to serious disorder</a>, including an attempt to set fire to police vehicles with officers inside.</p>
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## Annex B: Information to be provided

### Template – information on an incident

**Key information to be provided is in BOLD.** (The remaining information to be provided *if possible* at first or at subsequent updates.)

#### 1. Facts of the case

- a. **What has happened and where?** What else do we know about the circumstances of the incident?
- b. **Which force is in the lead?**
- c. Have there been any casualties? If so, how many?
- d. **Briefly – what is the current operational response?** For example, have arrests been made or is an investigation now under way.

#### 2. Public safety

- a. What is the assessment of the ongoing risk to public safety?
- b. If there is a risk – what mitigations are currently in place?

#### 3. Communications

- a. **What is the force saying publicly? Are any public statements planned?**
- b. What level/volume of media interest/enquiries has been generated?
- c. Any key communications risks identified?

### Contacting the Home Office

Information should be sent to the PSG ERT - [PSGERT@homeoffice.gov.uk](mailto:PSGERT@homeoffice.gov.uk)

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## **Annex C: Background - PSG Emergency Response Team and PSG Hub**

The PSG Emergency Response Team has been set up to:

- Provide a single home for reporting and responding to public order, protest, civil contingencies and other operational policing incidents (such as serious violence, manhunts and high-profile police incidents).
- Ensure a clear, consistent and proportionate approach to operational police reporting into the Home Office in the event of emergency.
- Provide an out of hours emergency response capability to support PSG incident reporting, amalgamating with the current PSG Out of Hours to ensure a single point of contact out of hours and identify further improvements.
- As a priority, continue to lead on the policy and operational implications for PSG from the Covid-19 pandemic.

The PSG Hub provides:

- A secretariat function for the Public Safety Group
- A centre for responding to less complex, non-emergency requests for information that are also high profile in nature, e.g. updates on criminal investigations. The PSG Hub also requests information from individual forces using the current agreed protocol.



**Annex D: Home Office Requests - Contacting Police Forces for incident and event information** [Email sent by NPCC Transformation & Performance Lead to HO colleagues]

Colleagues,

I have been working with NPCC to set out the best way for information to be obtained from police forces when requested by Ministers. For the most part this refers to high-profile events, such as those receiving parliamentary attention and top-item media coverage and ongoing issues of concern, such as public order matters as we have seen with some protests recently. The below refers to the process to be followed for an unexpected or emerging incident. Where information is exchanged routinely between HO and a force through an existing process this should continue to be shared using those channels. NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt will be writing to forces to make them aware of this protocol for dealing with requests. Those making the request to forces should be mindful that the officers which are likely to be in a position to provide an update will often be those in direct control of the situation. For this reason approaches to forces should only be considered where a request has come to you from Ministerial private office and is agreed by the Head of the Public Safety Group Hub, or the Director General's Office.

**Office Hours contact**

If **contacting an Individual Force** then the Chief Constable's Office (or Commissioner's Chief of Staff for the Met) can be contacted directly, copied to me as the HO lead for NPCC. However, where possible, these approaches should be managed by the Public Safety Group Hub, copying the Director General's private office. Unless unavoidable, please contact those two teams prior to making direct approaches, outside of usual channels of information exchanges,

**\*\*S31\*\***

This will ensure that the query will be given the right level of attention, and assurance can be provided in relation to any release of potentially sensitive information. Initial telephone requests must be followed by an email request from an official government email address. Information will not be provided by forces unless a formal request has been made in this way. If 'frequently engaged' forces prefer an alternative level of engagement, then that is a matter for them to agree with relevant HO officials, however the default should be via the Chief Constable's office.

Officials should note that in the early hours following an incident there is likely to be a limited amount of detail that can be shared, and that some sensitive operational information may not be appropriate to share. The attached template offers a guide to support requests.

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Expectations will need to be managed accordingly, but forces will endeavour to provide updates as promptly and fully as they can.

### **Out of Hours contact**

If an enquiry is **out of hours and critical** then the Force FIM / Call Centre Inspector can be contacted, who will engage the Force Gold (senior duty officer) to decide on an escalation process relevant to the query and force. The Home Office Out of Hours Duty Officer should be used where possible, or an agreed person to avoid multiple contacts on the same incident. I have attached an out of hours contact list for forces here.

### **Other circumstances**

Where there are **multiple force contact points/national implications** then an early call with NPoCC will allow appropriate triage and signposting. An out of hours contact is available for NPoCC.

**Larger event** engagements (such as G7, COP 26 etc) will normally start with NPoCC which should be contacted in the first instance.

If you have any questions on this process then please contact me. I am part of the Public Safety Group in Home Office, but sit within NPCC.

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## Critical Incident Reporting Framework DRAFT

### Summary

This paper proposes some refinements to the Public Safety Group's current incident reporting processes. In an age of 24-hour news and social media, the aim is to ensure the Home Secretary is appropriately informed and briefed on high-profile police incidents, while respecting the operational independence of the police and ensuring that any information sharing is lawful, appropriate, proportionate, and for a clear purpose.

### Background

The Public Safety Group (PSG) Emergency Response Team has been set up to provide a single home for reporting on public order, protest, civil contingencies and other operational policing incidents (such as serious violence, manhunts and high-profile police incidents). See annex C for more detail.

A key part of this is ensuring the Home Secretary receives appropriate alerts and updates in a timely fashion when high-profile police incidents occur. It is right that the Home Secretary is appropriately notified on urgent policing matters given it is the Home Secretary who is ultimately accountable for policing to parliament.

The existing approach relies on the process for information requests from the Home Office to forces set up in April 2021 by Stuart Sterling, then NPCC Transformation & Performance Lead (see annex D) and the information sharing principles established between PSG ERT and MPS External Relations Team in August 2021. This has established a process for responding to Ministers' requests for information, including out of hours, typically on high-profile events, such as those receiving national media coverage and ongoing issues of concern, such as public order matters. It also ensures that Chief Constables' offices are sighted on requests for information.

This approach works well for 'reactive' requests and has helped streamline the rapid flow of information on unexpected or emerging incidents, while avoiding multiple requests to different forces on the same issue and to different individuals in the same force.

In addition, the fortnightly police ops calls between the Home Secretary and key policing leads provide forces with the chance to brief the Home Secretary directly to provide detailed updates and assurance on live operational issues.

However, reliance on a purely reactive process means that notifications are not always as timely as they need to be. The existing process does not set out the more **proactive** reporting needed to ensure the Home Secretary is made aware of high-profile and emerging incidents as soon as possible, particularly those that will attract parliamentary and media attention. As well as new and emerging incidents, this will also apply to the key stages of high-profile ongoing investigations where parliamentary interest and national media coverage is anticipated (e.g. when a suspect is arrested or charged).

Proactive reporting from forces will be appropriate and feasible for incidents that clearly reach a trigger point in terms of scale/severity and it is anticipated that these will be relatively small in number (see below for more detail). However, it is recognised that there will continue to be a need for a reactive process for those

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cases which do not clearly reach such trigger points; for example, where an incident trends rapidly on social media or is of topical interest to Home Office ministers.

The proposed revised framework therefore comprises two elements:

- **‘Proactive’** - Force identifies a high-profile incident where proactive notification to Home Office is appropriate
- **‘Reactive’** - Home Office requests information on an incident under the existing process.

## Principles

The proposed framework will build on the information sharing agreements already in place, maintaining a proportionate and consistent approach.

Any data sharing between police forces and the Home Office for these purposes will take place under the existing Umbrella Memorandum of Understanding (UMoU) between Home Office and NPCC (Section 7 Ad-Hoc/Proactive/One-Off Disclosures Of Information), where the disclosure is necessary and proportionate, and complies with Data Protection Legislation and the principles detailed in the UMoU. This includes the principles that access to information received by the participants must be restricted to employees on a legitimate need-to-know basis, and with security clearance at the appropriate level.

The trigger points for proactive reporting will be relatively high due to the sheer volumes involved (for example, there are over 600 homicides a year; 124,000 police-recorded hate crimes a year; 1,955 charges for rape in 2021; 155,211 missing persons reported in 2019/20<sup>1</sup> (over 30,000 a year in London alone). Proportionality will need to be determined based on the scale of impact or potential impact.

Given the range of factors involved (e.g. severity of incident, levels of media interest) it is not possible to provide absolute criteria for those incidents which should be notified to the Home Secretary and professional judgement will be required. However, this framework will provide a clear guide and process for providing the Home Secretary and Ministers with that is appropriate, necessary and proportionate.

The police are operationally independent and requests for information must not influence or present an appearance of influencing ongoing live operations. PSG ERT will manage requests to keep the need for direct police contact to a necessary and proportionate level, and will liaise with forces via agreed points of contact.

When requesting information on behalf of Ministers, PSG ERT and Private Offices will clarify both the urgency and rationale – for example, situational information needed immediately to assist with public confidence versus details more appropriate to a post-event debrief.

Any information used for commenting publicly must be in line with the College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice on Media Relations:

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<sup>1</sup> \*\*S23\*\*

<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/engagement-and-communication/media-relations/>

## Types of incident

There are a wide range of incidents that are potentially in scope, depending on the circumstances. We consider four broad categories:

- 'Business as usual' policing activity of little national interest. This will encompass the vast majority of police activity and **requires no reporting under this framework.**
- 'Business as usual' incidents that are attracting/could attract significant national press or public attention or have significant reputational impacts for policing, the Home Office or Government and as such **proactive notification is appropriate.**
- New and emerging critical incidents of significant size and scale - such as a large-scale riot, or an incident with multiple fatalities – that will **require early and ongoing notification (see Information to be provided).**
- Ongoing, high-profile investigations and cases which receive significant press coverage at key stages, for example, when a suspect is charged or when a court case begins, **where proactive notification is appropriate.**

Factors to consider are as follows:

- Severity of incident – deaths, large number of victims etc
- Is the issue attracting/likely to attract public, national media coverage and/or questions in parliament. This could be for a number of reasons, for example:
  - high profile victim or offender, or prominent location
  - press reporting of crimes that may have a significant impact for victims e.g. widespread reporting relating to domestic violence or rape cases
  - an incident that will cause widespread concerns of public safety
  - potential impact on confidence in policing such as police misconduct
  - incidents and investigations that raise questions about potential system failures – not just criminal justice system but also wider health and care, education systems etc.

We recognise that similar incidents occurring in different regions can attract different degrees of media attention, which is another reason why trigger points cannot be defined in absolute terms and professional judgement will be needed.

More detail of incidents in scope with examples are provided in annex A below.

## Information to be provided

Information should focus on known facts about the situation and operational response. It should include any public safety issues and media/communication plans. (On the latter point, HO Comms are also engaging with NPCC Comms more generally around opportunities to link up.)

The speed with which information can be provided must be balanced for the need for accuracy as the facts on the ground are being established. In particular, it is recognised that incidents that necessitate police involvement often appear on social media before the circumstances are clear with coverage occurring in parallel to the police response.

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It may therefore be appropriate to send an initial 'we are aware' type notification with headline information only to be followed up with more detail when the facts on the ground have been more established more fully.

A suggested template based on the existing process is included at annex B.

### Frequency of updates

The frequency of updates will depend on the type and severity of incident. For critical incidents where there is an ongoing threat to life, the Home Secretary will expect to receive updates as the situation unfolds. For small/short-lived incidents, no further updates will be expected once the incident has concluded. For ongoing investigations receiving widespread national media attention, daily updates may be appropriate.

Following initial contact, PSG ERT will agree with the force whether updates are expected, and if so their frequency. This may be at set time periods (eg daily) and include 'nil returns' where no new information has emerged. Alternatively, it may be at points where there is something substantive to report. PSG ERT will also agree with the force the point at which reporting can stop.

A de-brief once the live incident has concluded (during normal working hours) may be appropriate, which will also be used to establish any further requests for information, for example to inform policy or for communications to individuals such as letters of condolence.

## Annex A – Critical Incident Reporting Framework - DRAFT

This framework builds on the existing process for obtaining information on unexpected or emerging incidents from police forces to the Home Office when requested by Ministers. It seeks to clarify the types of high-profile events about which forces should expect to notify the Home Office proactively, in addition to responding to requests for information.

### Types of incident and thresholds for reporting

Incident Type	Additional steers on thresholds for reporting	Examples
<b>Serious Violence</b> <i>(including: malicious (non-CT<sup>2</sup>) firearms or knife attack with multiple victims; isolated homicide of significant interest; copycat attacks; reputational incidents)</i>	<p><b>Multiple victims:</b> includes domestic homicide with multiple/family of victims</p> <p><b>Isolated attacks or homicides of significant interest due to circumstance or location</b> – for example: if occur in/around Whitehall or in a university/school, a location that would attract serious public safety concerns, or if they result from perceived system failings.</p>	<p>Plymouth shootings (2021); <a href="#">Birmingham stabbings</a> (2020); murder of Stephen Lawrence.</p> <p><a href="#">Maida Vale domestic violence / murder incident</a> – man stabbed a woman (his ex-wife) to death. He was then killed by another man hitting him with a car in an attempt to save the woman.</p> <p><a href="#">Man in hospital after stabbing at Nottingham Trent University</a> - a professor was stabbed on campus; while the injuries turned out not to be life-threatening, there was significant disquiet among students and national media coverage.</p> <p><a href="#">Jaden Moodie 'lay in pool of blood after rival gang attack' - BBC News</a> – murder of a 14 year-old-boy by rival gang member on a North London street</p>

<sup>2</sup> PSG are also engaged with Homeland Security Group (HSG) to ensure consistency with their review of data sharing agreements with CT policing

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<b>Serious Violence – assaults on police</b>	All deaths on duty and any high-profile off-duty police deaths that may be linked to policing/otherwise high media interest and the most serious injuries.	Manslaughter of PC Harper.
<b>Manhunts</b> <i>(once confirmed not terrorism related)</i>	Any manhunts that are creating public safety concerns or significant media/Parliamentary interest.	Raoul Moat; Derek Bird; Sex offender Paul Robson on the run from HMP North Sea Camp - BBC News.
<b>Armed Siege</b>	When there are hostages involved or there are concerns with the hostage taker.	<a href="#">Armed siege in Coventry which lasted several days</a> . Man, with significant mental health issues refused to leave his house with his young son. The man had several weapons including a stun gun, imitation firearm, large axes, and knives, including machetes.
<b>Significant Public Order/Riots</b>	When there is either spontaneous and widespread public order issues, or where peaceful protest turns into criminal activity and disorder.  Mass disorder at football fixtures. (NB: Disorder at football matches is monitored by UKFPU, who update NPCC lead and HO on incidents at matches.)	2011 Tottenham Riots.  Anti-vax targeting of vaccine centres.  <a href="#">Violence and disorder at Euro 2020 final leads to dozens of arrests   Metro News</a>
<b>Non-CT incidents involving armed police response</b> particularly when leads to	Any incidents where police discharge firearms.	<a href="#">Man died after being shot by police in Kensington following reports that he entered a bank and bookmakers while armed</a> . MPS referred itself to IOPC to investigate.

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death following police contact.		
<b>Deaths in police custody</b> leading to community tensions/protests/public order issues	Deaths in custody raising public concern/gaining significant media attention (NB: HO receive notification of all deaths in custody via the IOPC).	
<b>Violence Against Women and Girls/CSEA</b>	High profile MISPER cases gaining national media coverage  High profile CSEA cases  Topical VAWG incidents	Sarah Everard  Rochdale child sex abuse ring  Multiple reports of drink spiking gaining widespread news coverage and questions from many MPs.
<b>Serious police misconduct cases</b>	High profile cases of alleged police criminality/misconduct likely to attract parliamentary and media attention  (NB: IOPC will notify HO where they intend to respond to media enquiries or make a public statement.)	<a href="#">Police officers charged over sharing offensive messages with Sarah Everard's killer named   UK News   Sky News</a>
<b>Ad hoc topical issues</b>  High profile crime incidents garnering significant parliamentary and media attention.	Lower level protest that may attract significant parliamentary and media attention, e.g. criminal damage of statues/memorials in aftermath of Colston statue incident	

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<p>This may include policy failures; critical reports, media interest stories about which the Home Secretary is likely to be questioned by the press, MPs or urgent questions in the house.</p>	<p>Significant hate crime incidents – i.e. due to serious of crime (e.g. GBH, murder) but also particularly sensitivity due to locations and/or date (Holocaust Memorial Day, religious holidays).</p> <p>Topical international events (UK held voting by foreign citizens in their countries election; disorder/criminal activity at embassies or consulates)</p> <p>Incident that involved joint working on a small scale between police, fire and or ambulance. Major incidents that require joint response (JESIP) could be major incident on rail or road for example.</p> <p>Robbery/burglary of very high-profile people or where some is seriously injured or dies with significant parliamentary and media attention</p>	<p>People assaulted when voting in the Iranian Election at a polling station in Birmingham – Attracted FCDO and Iranian Government attention. Work was done post event for the details of what had happened</p> <p>London bus crash, number of casualties and children involved <a href="#">London bus crash: Children injured as double-decker hits shop - BBC News</a></p>
<p><b>Protest Activity</b> <i>(including disruption to critical services and infrastructure)</i></p> <p>NB: Process already exists to provide reporting on planned protests that fall</p>	<p>Protest activity by <b>high profile groups</b></p> <p>Protests that are <b>internationally themed</b> and linked to <b>international events and sensitive issues</b> particularly when taking place near embassies and consulates.</p>	<p>Anti-Vaxx protests; Climate change protests ; fuel shortage protests.</p>

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<p>under the thematic areas based on the National Strategic Risk Assessment for Public Order, Public Safety. Themes include Anti-Government and Internationally Inspired. (A review of current protest intelligence reporting is under way, which will set out the conditions for defining a Strategic Protest and criteria for inclusion in the report.)</p>	<p>Protest activity targeted at <b>sensitive locations or individuals</b> – for example: protests at school; vaccination centres; HMG buildings; targeted at MP’s homes.</p> <p>Protest activity resulting in alleged offences and disorder including <b>criminal damage</b>, significant <b>casualties</b> including <b>injuries to police officers</b>.</p>	<p>Small groups of anti-vaxxers protesting and causing disruption at covid vaccination and test centres.</p> <p>“Kill the Bill” protests in Bristol March 2021 <a href="#">which led to serious disorder</a>, including an attempt to set fire to police vehicles with officers inside.</p>
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## Annex B: Information to be provided

### Template – information for Ministers on an incident

**Key information to be provided is in BOLD.** (The remaining information to be provided *if possible* at first or at subsequent updates.)

#### 1. Facts of the case

- a. **What has happened and where?** What else do we know about the circumstances of the incident?
- b. **Which force is in the lead?**
- c. Have there been any casualties? If so, how many?
- d. **Briefly – what is the current operational response?** For example, have arrests been made or is an investigation now under way.

#### 2. Public safety

- a. What is the assessment of the ongoing risk to public safety?
- b. If there is a risk – what mitigations are currently in place?

#### 3. Communications

- a. **What is the force saying publicly? Are any public statements planned?**
- b. What level/volume of media interest/enquiries has been generated?
- c. Any key communications risks identified?

### Contacting the Home Office

Information should be sent to the PSG ERT - [\\*\\*S31\\*\\*](#)

## **Annex C: Background - PSG Emergency Response Team and PSG Hub**

The PSG Emergency Response Team has been set up to:

- Provide a single home for reporting and responding to public order, protest, civil contingencies and other operational policing incidents (such as serious violence, manhunts and high-profile police incidents).
- Ensure a clear, consistent and proportionate approach to operational police reporting into the Home Office in the event of emergency.
- Provide an out of hours emergency response capability to support PSG incident reporting, amalgamating with the current PSG Out of Hours to ensure a single point of contact out of hours and identify further improvements.
- As a priority, continue to lead on the policy and operational implications for PSG from the Covid-19 pandemic.

The PSG Hub provides:

- A secretariat function for the Public Safety Group
- A centre for responding to less complex, non-emergency requests for information that are also high profile in nature, e.g. updates on criminal investigations. The PSG Hub also requests information from individual forces using the current agreed protocol.

**Annex D: Home Office Requests - Contacting Police Forces for incident and event information** [Based on an email originally sent by NPCC Transformation & Performance Lead to HO colleagues]

Colleagues,

I have been working with NPCC to set out the best way for information to be obtained from police forces when requested by Ministers. For the most part this refers to high-profile events, such as those receiving top-item media coverage and ongoing issues of concern, such as public order matters as we have seen with some protests recently. The below refers to the process to be followed for an unexpected or emerging incident. Where information is exchanged routinely between HO and a force through an existing process this should continue to be shared using those channels (for example there is a separate, established approach for MPS). NPCC Chair Martin Hewitt will be writing to forces to make them aware of this protocol for dealing with requests. Those making the request to forces should be mindful that the officers which are likely to be in a position to provide an update will often be those in direct control of the situation. For this reason approaches to forces should only be considered where a request has come to you from Ministerial private office and is agreed by the Head of the Public Safety Group Hub, or the Director General's Office.

**Office Hours contact**

If **contacting an Individual Force** then the Chief Constable's Office (or MPS External Relations Team for the Met) can be contacted directly, copied to me as the HO lead for NPCC. However, where possible, these approaches should be managed by the Public Safety Group Hub, copying the Director General's private office. Unless unavoidable, please contact those two teams prior to making direct approaches, outside of usual channels of information exchanges, **\*\*S31\*\***

This will ensure that the query will be given the right level of attention, and assurance can be provided in relation to any release of potentially sensitive information. Initial telephone requests must be followed by an email request from an official government email address. Information will not be provided by forces unless a formal request has been made in this way. If 'frequently engaged' forces prefer an alternative level of engagement, then that is a matter for them to agree with relevant HO officials, however the default should be via the Chief Constable's office.

Officials should note that in the early hours following an incident there is likely to be a limited amount of detail that can be shared, and that some sensitive operational information may not be appropriate to share. The attached template offers a guide to support requests. Expectations will need to be managed accordingly, but forces will endeavour to provide updates as promptly and fully as they can.

**Out of Hours contact**

If an enquiry is **out of hours and critical** then for non-Met forces the Force FIM / Call Centre Inspector can be contacted, who will engage the Force Gold (senior duty officer) to decide on an escalation process relevant to the query and force. For MPS, (for non-CT incidents) on weekday evenings the Commissioner's office can be contacted and at weekends there is an MPS Government on-call contact. The Home Office Out of Hours Duty Officer should be used where possible, or an agreed person

to avoid multiple contacts on the same incident. I have attached an out of hours contact list for forces here.

**Other circumstances**

Where there are **multiple force contact points/national implications** then an early call with NPoCC will allow appropriate triage and signposting. An out of hours contact is available for NPoCC.

**Larger event** engagements (such as G7, COP 26 etc) will normally start with NPoCC which should be contacted in the first instance.

If you have any questions on this process then please contact me. I am part of the Public Safety Group in Home Office, but sit within NPCC.

Regions	RAG
EM	Green
SE	Green
SW	Green
W	Green
WM	Green
NW	Green
NE	Green
E	Green
L	Yellow
CTP	Green

## UCPI Financial Business Case

**Summary:** This paper is intended to provide Chiefs Council with an update regarding the on-going Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI) and the requirements that it continues to place on the Police Service, the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team, which now incorporates Operation Elter, and future financial requirements.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the Eastern Region (Cambs Constabulary) and overall comments from the regions as follows:

- ~~Consider~~ the protracted nature of the Inquiry, which now has no clear end date and the ongoing and significant costs to forces.
- ~~City~~ on who was looking at efficiencies as part of the Inquiry which is escalating in cost.
- ~~Whether~~ the amount retained in reserve will be sufficient to meet additional legal costs if / when they fall due. If not it's likely that these costs will come back to forces to pick up.

**Decision:** NPCC Chair has written to judge in charge of the inquiry and Home Secretary for details as this looks like this will run on for some time (poss 2027) and team will need to be funded. Reserves are being used to cover civil actions.

Updated position and decision will be made in session 1 at the March CCC meeting.

Regions	RAG
EM	Green
SE	Yellow
SW	Green
W	Green
WM	Green
NW	Green
NE	Yellow
E	Green
L	Yellow
CTP	Green

## NP2IRM Budget Bid

- **Summary:** Seeking approval for contribution of £540k is sought from PCC's for the NPCC NP2IRM Team annual budget for FY 2022-23, an additional £340k from FY 2021-22.

Actions: (1) Formally link across to Bluelight Commercial regarding procurement and contract management to augment and align planning with the Police Digital Service (PDS).

(2) Link across to the NPCC Finance Coordination Committee in relation to the national operating budget agreed at February's Chiefs' Council meeting.

(3) Long term funding not yet finalised. NP2IRM team to explore Home Office and CT funding, as well as Scientific advisory access. Details will be in full business case being prepared in 12 months time.

**Decision:** Chiefs agreed the paper but Alan Pughsley (NPCC Chair Crime Committee) to comment on points in relation to the regional feedback.

Regions	RAG
EM	Green
SE	Green
SW	Green
W	Green
WM	Green
NW	Green
NE	Yellow
E	Green
L	Yellow
CTP	Green

## NP2IRM Strategic Outline Case

**Summary:** This paper outlines a series of decisions that are necessary to ensure the maintenance of momentum for the NP2IRM project. As follows: Addressing the current capability gap through a competitive procurement of the most economically advantageous solution – the Tailored Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) option. Early market engagement with likely suppliers and the prior information notice (PIN) to be released in Q1 of FY22/23. Progression to a merged Appraisal and Definition stage to allow the most appropriate platform/supplier to be recommended and to determine the most viable funding routes, delivery schedule and costs. The output of this merged stage will be the Full Business Case (FBC). Allocation of a FY22/23 project budget of £540,428 (complete with a risk inside cost (RIC) allocation of £128,140) to deliver the next project stage.

**Decision:** Overall chiefs supported the recommendations as outlined above and in paragraph 5.1 of the paper.

Regions	RAG
EM	Green
SE	Green
SW	Green
W	Green
WM	Green
NW	Green
NE	Yellow
E	Green
L	Green
CTP	Green

## National Mobilisation Tier 3 Mutual Aid Framework of Principles

**Summary:** The aim of this report is to recommend a set of high-level principles and approaches for planning teams to use when making decisions around the resourcing options for mutual aid.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the regions to address the following commentary from forces:

- Framework appears to offer a suite of options which will mean inconsistency across force areas.
- Some forces commented there is limited capacity across forces and in some cases no dedicated resource to meet any urgent requests.
- During several recent mobilisations there have been a range of approaches taken by forces in relation to how they select officers to fulfil requirements, payments (bonus/ overtime etc) and methods around rest day reinstatement/ working. The range has attracted criticism and created workforce tension as a result of variance of benefit which has then created difficulties for the host forces. There were also concerns with rest days and bonus payments through the duration of the games and that payments would be outside of regs and may not be covered.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the West Midlands to ensure no specific problems which will impede 4 months notice requirement for commonwealth games.

**Decision:** Should no issues be raised as per the above action with the West Midlands then chiefs supported the development of a Framework of Principles, to ensure commonality of planning and preparation, along with, guidelines, and entitlements from a national perspective and an agreed national position ahead of the Commonwealth Games.

An update showing how the decision was agreed would be given at the March CCC meeting.



Regions	RAG
EM	Green
SE	Green
SW	Green
W	Yellow
WM	Yellow
NW	Green
NE	Yellow
E	Green
L	Yellow
CTP	Green

## National Mobilisation Plan Protestor Removal Proposal

**Summary:** This proposal seeks to develop the current Police National Public Order Mobilisation plan (PNPOMP). This includes augmenting regional and national capability to mobilise Protester Removal Team (PRT) officers in mitigation of increased national risk and planning assumptions.

**Action:** Author to liaise with the regions to address the following commentary from forces:

- Need to understand the issues of double hatting and how mobilisation requirements will impact upon forces existing capacity and capability to meet their level 2 commitments. Also need to understand the distribution of trained officers and how long it will take forces to address the shortfall.
- difficulties if 24/7 hour cover is expected. This is felt to be disproportionate to the threat and associated concerns around increased costs.
- Requires more detail on financial implications

**Decision:** Chiefs are supportive of the proposal that Protest Removal should be a national commitment and very much part of SPR. Chiefs recognise that this capability is required but would welcome further discussion at CCC on the above feedback points.

## Chief Constables' Council – Regional Papers Feedback Responses

UCPI Financial Business Case (CC Pughsley – Crime Coordination Committee)	
<b>East Midlands</b>	<b>Supported.</b> Region would welcome the opportunity to ask questions around scale.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Derbyshire	<b>Supported.</b> Legal advice received. Project in place and big budget. Finance and HR in Derbyshire. Unknown timescales. Need to support but keep an eye on costs.
Leicestershire	<b>Supported.</b> Additional items received are a challenge.
Lincolnshire	<b>Supported.</b> The Region gets a briefing but issue is longevity and scope.
Northamptonshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Nottinghamshire	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>North West</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Cheshire	<b>Supported.</b> The vast scale of the UCPI, the significant un-redacted material and legal requirements of the Public Inquiry, if not managed by the Coordination Team would fall to individual forces. The cost of circa £18k for three years is financially proportionate and enables the Coordination Team to deliver the requirements of the Public Inquiry which individuals forces would not manage if spread across Home Office Forces.
Cumbria	<b>Supported.</b>
Greater Manchester	<b>Supported</b> - Whilst there is nothing currently in budget, and therefore a cost pressure, we would generally accept the charge, and when the CC has confirmed GMP will contribute, we will add to budget.
Lancashire	<b>Supported</b>
Merseyside	<b>Supported.</b> Continued funding for the NPCC UCPI Coordination Team has already been agreed at CCC in February as part of considerations relating to the 'National Operating Budget Proposal Update' paper.
North Wales	<b>Supported</b> - although I would make the point that the enquiry has been long running, seems unclear on future direction and the cost appears high.
<b>North East</b>	<b>Chief Constables</b> supported the paper but were concerned around the protracted nature of the Inquiry, which now has no clear end date and the ongoing and significant costs to forces (UCPI has now cost over £100m). Chief Constables also wanted clarity on who was looking at efficiencies as part of the Inquiry which is escalating in cost.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Cleveland	<b>Supported.</b>

Durham	<b>Supported.</b>
Humberside	<b>Supported.</b>
Northumbria	<b>Supported.</b>
North Yorkshire	<b>Supported.</b> Agree with the need for the team, however, usual concern about ongoing costs to forces.
South Yorkshire	<b>Supported.</b>
West Yorkshire	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>SUPPORTED</b> – noted/supported.  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Concerns noted if this extends past the three years.</li> </ul>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Staffordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Warwickshire	<b>Supported.</b>
West Mercia	<b>Supported.</b>
West Midlands	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>Eastern</b>	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the region supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Bedfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Cambridgeshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The UCPI budget is using reserves built up to hold the contributions at 2021/22 levels but there is also risk flagged in the paper around further ongoing legal costs that are not known. There is a question therefore about whether the amount retained in reserve will be sufficient to meet additional legal costs if / when they fall due. If not it's likely that these costs will come back to forces to pick up.
Essex	<b>Supported.</b>
Kent	<b>Supported.</b>
Hertfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Norfolk	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The paper covers a 3-year funding proposal, and covers staff, travel and supplies and services budgets. The amounts requested for UCPI for Norfolk and Suffolk are not significant (£15,329 and £11,685 respectively for 3 years) so no major issue financially.
Suffolk	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The paper covers a 3-year funding proposal, and covers staff, travel and supplies and services budgets. The amounts requested for UCPI for Norfolk and Suffolk are not significant (£15,329 and £11,685 respectively for 3 years) so no major issue financially.
<b>South East</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Hampshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Surrey	<b>Supported.</b>

Sussex	<b>Supported.</b>
Thames Valley	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>South West</b>	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the region supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Avon and Somerset	<b>Supported</b>
Devon and Cornwall	<b>Supported.</b> Updates noted and proposal supported. Delays noted are unfortunate and the service should seek to progress this work as quickly as possible and to try and influence progression where possible in view of the public confidence aspects of this enquiry.
Dorset	<b>Supported</b>
Gloucestershire	<b>Qualified Support</b>
Wiltshire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
<b>Wales</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Dyfed-Powys	<b>Supported.</b>
Gwent	<b>Supported.</b>
South Wales	<b>Supported</b> - If the shared collaborative NPCC proposed approach is not adopted by all forces, the alternative will be for each force acting unilaterally and managing issues such as legal support, access to material, identifying and procuring the suitable IT document management platform, dealing with redaction and disclosure and managing operational personal risk assessments.
<b>London</b>	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The CNC will need to consult the appropriate HM Government department for support, as it cannot pass the funding for UCPI on to private industry.
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Metropolitan Police	<b>Supported.</b>
City of London	<b>Supported.</b>
British Transport	<b>Supported.</b>
CNC	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
**S23**	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>CTP</b>	<b>Noted.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	

NP2IRM Budget Bid (NPCC Programme – Martin Hewitt and Crime Coordination Committee CC Pughsley)	
<b>East Midlands</b>	<b>Supported.</b> supportive of project – keen that opportunities to exploit existing work programmes such as surveillance situational awareness project are taken into consideration.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Derbyshire	<b>Supported.</b> No consistent approach across portfolios.
Leicestershire	<b>Supported.</b> Lead has asked to attend next Regional Chiefs meeting to provide a briefing on this work. Appendix and other paper say slightly different percentages.
Lincolnshire	<b>Supported.</b> Project linked to work which had already been developed. Project makes sense but does not take into account existing work programmes. Supportive as needs to be done but do need to find a better way of financing these projects.
Northamptonshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Nottinghamshire	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>North West</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Cheshire	<b>Supported.</b> The Tailored Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) preferred option suggested by the outline case; to use the best aspects of commercially available products such as Clio to deliver the key objectives of the overall project and provide an IT platform for high risk, dynamic across multi-dimensional threats makes operational and financial sense in the context of numerous PI's, for small financial cost (circa £8k). The financial implication and requirement is minimal for the likely benefit to covert policing.
Cumbria	<b>Supported</b>
Greater Manchester	<b>Supported.</b> A key aspect this proposal seeks to address is the management of proactive investigations through dedicated software. A significant part of the business case is predicated on the inquiry and subsequent report into the death of Anthony Grainger, who was killed in a GMP proactive investigation in 2012. The proposed system would support proactive investigations, including kidnap response; on a national platform that would enable interoperability. There is significant operational demand for such a product; with a lack of a consistent capability to support its management. The resulting risk to UK policing is assessed as 'Severe' Agreement with the recommendation to address the capability gap makes sense. A seconded temporary GMP superintendent is leading this work.
Lancashire	<b>Supported</b>
Merseyside	<b>Supported.</b> A point for consideration – would this bid have been better considered as part of wider discussions relating to National Operating Budget Proposals presented to CCC in February ?

North Wales	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The initial ask of NWP is £6,332 to assist with the development of the CLIO system. What is not known at this time is the ultimate annual cost of a new procured system with associated licences. From a budgetary perspective this is new and would result in additional £6,332, formula as per current convention appears to be based on NRE. The financial implications in the short term aren't budgeted but are modest enough (£6,332) to be something that could be agreed and factored into the budgets. The longer term implications are less clear and potentially more significant and are something that we would like to understand better as a force. The future costs could be significant but it hasn't been possible to estimate the implications for NWP with any confidence from the papers, this would be an area for further clarity so that NWP can consider what going to be necessary in future financial plans.
<b>North East</b> RAG Amber – Qualified Support	<b>Qualified Support:</b> Chief Constables were concerned that the request for funding was on top of the increase that had already been approved at the last CCC, which had led to an increase in NRE contributions. This paper is asking for funding to move onto the next phase of the project (see paper 1.2) and briefings have not yet been held with forces to explain exactly what the potential next stages are and what the costs will be. It is therefore difficult for Chief Constables to approve this (or the paper below) when the Briefings have not yet taken place. The project could however lead to a potential cost of around £19m and Chief Constables were concerned about where this funding would come from and queried why, given that this is a technical solution, the project and budget had not been factored into the CSR IT spend from the Home Office. The paper below is also complex and expensive and Chief Constables wanted clarity on the risk/problem that the project is trying to solve and if it is required, where the funding should come from.
Cleveland	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Durham	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Humberside	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Northumbria	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Not enough information on the paper to make a decision. This does not form part of the NPCC Operating budget as presented at Feb CCC
North Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Concern about the costs as this moves forward and what the Plan is.
South Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support</b>
West Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support</b> as this relates to the Paper below (1.2)
<b>West Midlands</b> RAG Green - Supported	<b>SUPPORTED – noted/supported.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minimal additional budget/low impact across Forces.</li> <li>Warks noted this is an 180% increase since the last budget bid.</li> <li>Timeliness of budget papers being submitted through the financial year was noted.</li> </ul> Un-supportive of placing the money in general reserves.
Staffordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Warwickshire	<b>Supported.</b>
West Mercia	<b>Supported.</b>

West Midlands	<b>Supported.</b>
Eastern	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the region supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Bedfordshire	<b>Noted.</b>
Cambridgeshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Essex	<b>Supported.</b>
Kent	<b>Noted.</b>
Hertfordshire	<b>Noted.</b>
Norfolk	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The amounts requested for Norfolk and Suffolk, are for a contribution to NP2IRM annual budget for 2022/23 and are not significant (£6,686 and £5,097 respectively) - so no major issue financially. Only other comment is in respect of section 2.2 "Expenditure". This outlines an assumed 3.5% pay increase for officers, and 2.5% increase for staff. Unsure why there would be a difference in assumption.
Suffolk	
South East	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Clarity requested regarding if paper has been through the recently agreed national funding model.
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Hampshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Surrey	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Sussex	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Thames Valley	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
South West	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Avon and Somerset	<b>Supported</b>
Devon and Cornwall	<b>Supported</b> – budgeted for. The funding was agreed by CCC earlier in year as part of general NPCC charges (was called 'NPCC CLIO team at the time).
Dorset	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
Gloucestershire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>

Wiltshire	Supported/Noted
Wales	Supported. The three forces support in principle, but the long-term financial implications need to be fully understood.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Dyfed-Powys	Supported.
Gwent	Supported.
South Wales	Supported - The strategic case is made out; our initial cost exposure looks like £12k and if the future vision is to be realised then based on formula, we could be required to contribute up to £100k per annum. We cannot really do this ourselves so national approach makes sense. FBC will provide further opportunity to challenge.
London	Qualified Support. **S23**
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Metropolitan Police	Supported.
City of London	Supported.
British Transport	Supported.
CNC	Supported.
**S23**	**S23**
CTP	Noted
RAG	
Green - Supported	

NP2IRM Strategic Outline Case (NPCC Programme – Martin Hewitt and Crime Coordination Committee CC Pughsley)	
East Midlands	Supported. Overall the region supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Derbyshire	Supported.
Leicestershire	Supported.
Lincolnshire	Supported.



Northamptonshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Nottinghamshire	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>North West</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Cheshire	<b>Supported.</b> The outline case and budget bid clearly articulate the requirement for a platform that allows decision making to be recorded (logging) and intelligence that supports it, case management and operational responses to Crime In Action and proactive SOC operations allied with those with a planned firearms capability. This informs findings of recent and varied Public Inquiries e.g. Grainger. The financial implication and requirement is minimal for the likely overall benefit.
Cumbria	<b>Supported.</b>
Greater Manchester	<b>Supported.</b> Whilst there is nothing currently in budget, and therefore a cost pressure, we would generally accept the charge, and when the CC has confirmed GMP will contribute, we will add to budget.
Lancashire	<b>Supported.</b>
Merseyside	<b>Supported.</b> see above comments on Budget Bid paper.
North Wales	<b>Supported.</b> This area of policing is not identified as causing a large demand or seen as a risk area for NWP however the national and strategic case is pretty overwhelming in terms of interoperability and efficiency. NWP get tremendous use from HOLMES for reactive investigations and, in the absence of another system are moving to use fast track HOLMES to try and get some consistency for the way SOC jobs are being run. The current system of using spreadsheets is simply confusing and difficult to work with. There was wide spread support in relation to the fact that decision making and note making is contemporaneously timed. Whilst offences such as kidnap are rare, when they do occur a system like CLIO where people can quickly see changing intelligence and other people's entries is seen as a good thing. Senior Investigation Officers are supportive and identify from looking at National Picture that NWP will increasingly become an outlier if we don't engage with this project, given the initial cost and the lack of any alternative in NWP at this time. Clarity is required though relating to when the agreed solution is procured, what sort of cost would this be annually for NWP as currently we don't currently pay for Clio so this would be additional recurring budget growth. Supported to proceed to next stage at this time - £6.3K contribution required from NWP to move forwards to next stage.
<b>North East</b>	<b>Qualified Support</b> – Links to the above paper/comments.
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Cleveland	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Durham	<b>Qualified Support</b>
Humberside	<b>Qualified Support.</b>

Northumbria	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Operationally support this, however, this appears to be a new national function. It was discussed at Feb CCC but not agreed and does not form part of the NPCC Operating Budget as presented at Feb CCC. As such, if agreed, it represents growth of £11, 510 based on Northumbria Police forecast as set out in the paper
North Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Agree with the need for the system as outlined in the paper.
South Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
West Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support:</b> Briefings on this project have not yet been held with forces, so too early to provide a considered position to the Chief. However the briefings will have taken place by the time of March CCC.
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>SUPPORTED</b> – noted/supported.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Staffordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Warwickshire	<b>Supported.</b>
West Mercia	<b>Supported.</b>
West Midlands	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>Eastern</b>	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the region supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Bedfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Cambridgeshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Essex	<b>Supported.</b>
Kent	<b>Supported.</b>
Hertfordshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b> A presentation on this paper is due in March. Some scrutiny of the project team costs is necessary, especially considering we are already investing in PDS and BLC both of whom would expect to be supporting (or even leading) this sort of work.
Norfolk	<b>Supported.</b> Nationally there remains risks around interoperability when managing covert operations across forces and agencies. CLIO is used locally to manage/ mitigate issues but this is not a universal platform and has been found to be lacking in several examples when significant operations have been debriefed. The proposal will allow the project to progress system solution identification through procurement and requests the finance required to enable the project team to continue.
Suffolk	<b>Supported.</b> Nationally there remains risks around interoperability when managing covert operations across forces and agencies. CLIO is used locally to manage/ mitigate issues but this is not a universal platform and has been found to be lacking in several examples when significant operations have been debriefed. The proposal will allow the project to progress system solution identification through procurement and requests the finance required to enable the project team to continue.
<b>South East</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	

Green - Supported	
Hampshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Surrey	<b>Supported.</b>
Sussex	<b>Supported.</b>
Thames Valley	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>South West</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Avon and Somerset	<b>Supported/Noted.</b>
Devon and Cornwall	<p><b>Supported.</b> This proposal if understood correctly, would bring all decision making together under one system. The force notes that this is for the more serious crimes as set out in the paper. If the strategic aim is consistency of practice, this would be a positive step forward in strategic information management in Covert Policing. We offer some reflections however having read the papers;</p> <p>1. In force; they are currently undergoing significant work following an IPCO inspection and subsequent recommendations about the management of data (specifically material gained during covert investigations) in our force. As a result of the findings, we have had to develop an interim means of storing material (including the material relating to crimes in action and those listed in the aims of the NP2IRM project) on existing system and force drives (p/Q/G etc) as existing processes were ineffective and non compliant. What we have learnt during this exercise is that all forces operate differently and there is no consistency on storage of This proposal if understood correctly, would bring all decision making together under one system. We note that this is for the more serious crimes as set out in the paper. If the strategic aim is consistency of practice, this would be a positive step forward in strategic information management in Covert Policing. We offer some reflections however having read the papers;</p> <p>2. In force; we are currently undergoing significant work following an IPCO inspection and subsequent recommendations about the management of data (specifically material gained during covert investigations) in our force. As a result of the findings, we have had to develop an interim means of storing material (including the material relating to crimes in action and those listed in the aims of the NP2IRM project) on existing system and force drives (p/Q/G etc) as existing processes were ineffective and non compliant. What we have learnt during this exercise is that all forces operate differently and there is no consistency on storage of DM/Logs/Policy/Product/Digital documents etc even with our nearest neighbours and we have convened a regional project to try and align this for the future, all from different starting points. We are wondering where the NP2IRM proposal sits if the starting point is 43 means of managing material in the current climate and</p>

	<p>whether, at the outset, this project should be scoping and seeking to provide assurance and consistency on the 'as is'; if this is not the case, this will potentially be problematic to develop and embed from the outset?</p> <p>3. Existing systems with capability; CLIO is mentioned as a database that most forces have access to; it appears widely used for the purpose of decision making and operates in such a way to provide auditable decision making and document/data storage. It has been used widely in significant national events and has real strengths. In running a recent K&amp;E as Gold over a prolonged period however, this force did not use CLIO for a number of operational reasons. What this tells us is we have existing capability, we don't always use it? Is there a rationale as to why we would not invest further in CLIO to serve the purpose as appears outlined and is one of the options referred to in the body of the paper?</p> <p>4. Regional solutions? At point 1, the regional work taking place has been mentioned with a recommendation that this would be an effective place to 'dock into' for this work to ensure alignment as it progresses? We have contributed a small amount of money to the regional project and from an efficiency/public purse perspective would need to consider how we may contribute to this work if this is also proposed and may duplicate some of the work planned? Could the potential regional solution and NP2IRM be aligned??</p> <p>5. IM/Policy focus – The work with IPCO has highlighted what will be national/cultural issues around information management in policing. We have refreshed policies, guidance and streamlined working practices, provided training for staff as part of our reset and would advocate that the success of any such project is in the infrastructure around it and the continued focus on changing old habits.</p> <p>6. Strategic lead IM (Covert) We have discussed and considered how policing nationally should be positioning Information Management in the Covert Data space and would encourage this project to consider the role of a National IM (Covert) Lead at NPCC to bring closer alignment and set policy and direction for all forces to adhere to which would be in the spirit of the recs from Grainger. All forces/organisations sooner or later will have an IPCO inspection and potentially similar findings to DCP</p> <p>7. Interoperability with existing force systems. Charter has capabilities to be developed in improved management of information – could this assist in this project work as a lower cost solution?</p> <p>Happy to discuss any of the above ACC Julie Fielding</p>
Dorset	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
Gloucestershire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
Wiltshire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
Wales	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	

Green - Supported	
Dyfed-Powys	<b>Supported.</b>
Gwent	<b>Supported.</b>
South Wales	<p><b>Supported</b> – SWP and regional colleagues support the scoping of a national interoperable IT platform for proactive and dynamic investigations.</p> <p>The force currently utilises Holmes2 and Altia Insight (regional), neither of which provide the functionality to address the risks highlighted in cases such as “Grainger” etc. Therefore, the national proposal aligns to work locally to address the gap and mitigate the risk.</p> <p>Whilst supportive of the scoping of a national system, the final decision should be based on the full business case anticipated to be delivered in April 2023 to ensure it meets our needs.</p>
London	<b>Qualified Support.</b> **S23**
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Metropolitan Police	<b>Supported.</b>
City of London	<b>Supported.</b>
British Transport	<b>Supported.</b>
CNC	<b>Supported.</b>
**S23**	**S23**
CTP	<b>Noted</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	

National Mobilisation Tier 3 Mutual Aid Framework of Principles (ACC Weatherill – NpoCC)	
East Midlands	<b>Supported.</b> Supportive of the principle that there should be a framework however the proposal allows a different interpretation of the framework. Clearly defined guidelines needed as too open for interpretation and needs more clarity before it can be utilised. Rest Day issues a concern and may need wider debate.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Derbyshire	<b>Supported.</b> RD and bonus payments concerns.
Leicestershire	<b>Supported.</b>

Lincolnshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Northamptonshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Nottinghamshire	<b>Supported.</b> Maximum of 12-hour shift will not work. Agree with above RD never going to be sorted out. Prefer to have the Gold commander and Chair of Staff Association sign off of the framework.
<b>North West</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Cheshire	<b>Supported.</b> This is definitely a good thing as it became clear during COP 26 that forces had a wide range of agreements in place and as a result there was disparity. Even at a local level, when dealing with the Alliance, there were difficulties reconciling the offers from Cheshire and North Wales. To formalise it in such a way makes it clearer and will definitely assist with planning, as a considerable amount of time has previously been taken up discussing and agreeing remuneration, only to discover this is out of step with other forces.
Cumbria	<b>Supported.</b>
Greater Manchester	<b>Qualified Support.</b> CI Hill - I have concerns with elements of this paper, and I have also sought our Federation viewpoint on this around Rest days and Away from home allowance. Firstly, it is in every force' interest for there to be consistency in expectations for host and donor forces with respect to major national events. I fully support the framework of having a shift pattern no less than 4 months to allow the correct warnings as per Regulations –(1.6)This is key to the planning and resourcing of the event -early communication goes a long way to ensure the welfare and goodwill of staff is recognised. I fully support the next recommendation of Duty time whilst deployed on mutual aid commences and finishes at the time the officers leave or return to their accommodation, not at a staging post or place of duty.(1.7)Caveat to this being it may also extend past 12 hours TOD dependent on where the staging post is so would need to be factored into deployment times to reduce that risk of excessive hours. The next chapter Rest Days is where I have my concerns around the interpretation of the Away from Home allowance and rest days. I am in agreement re the Rest day before travel and following travel on the return -logistically would need to review how that is built into the length of deployment. (2.2) Item 2.3 states If, having considered the principles thus far in this document, there is no remaining option but to request officers for a period of time which necessitates building in rest days whilst out of force, the aim should be that these are true rest days (unless absolutely necessary and approved by the Gold Commander) and the officers will therefore not be subject to the provisions of the 'Away From Home Allowance' (AFHA) restrictions of being immediately available for deployment. This is the area I have issue with and I think is not in the spirit of the AFHA -if they are stating they do not want staff to be readily available and not wanting to pay AFHA then staff are entitled to return home -albeit that would become a working day -they would also be entitled to travel expenses etc. I am in agreement that staff should be paid a bonus as per regulation 34 and my recommendation is that it should be at Mid-rate PC and Mid-rate Sgt for the rest days . (2.4)—This is the key element not only for fairness but also ensuring we get volunteers to deploy .I am in agreement with the rest but the 2 areas for me surround the Away from Home allowance payment and Bonus payment –they need to be paid –we want to ensure fairness and show as a force and leaders we value and respect the impact on staff's home life a deployment away as –and the simple payment of what they are entitled too along with the bonus payments would reflect that.

	I think as force we got it right for our staff deployed to COP 26 and I think this paper sets out to ensure consistency but like I say we do need to ensure we get the above factors right if we don't I think we are devaluing our staff and will be in a position where we won't have sufficient staff to support such deployments .
Lancashire	<b>Supported</b>
Merseyside	<b>Supported.</b> The Framework may benefit from a specific section covering issues relating to cost recovery. This would provide clarity and consistency within the overarching Framework.
North Wales	<b>Qualified Support.</b> It is important to note that NWP sits in the North West Region for Public Order and PRT purposes. We would not anticipate requesting or providing mutual aid in this specialism from Welsh colleagues unless for a pre-planned event such as a major conference or sporting event. PRT is a subset of public order policing but there is not as well developed nor are there common national standards in the same way as public order. There is limited capacity across forces and in our case we have no dedicated resource to meet any urgent requests. We have 6 officers who are trained but all multi-hat and none are dedicated to the role. The methodology around this is sound but there are caveats about our capacity without significant further investment for a resource we may or may not have cause to use within NWP or as a region.
<b>North East</b>	<b>Qualified Support</b> – Chief Constables supported the development of a Framework of Principles, to ensure commonality and an agreed national position. However, the framework appears to offer a suite of options which will mean inconsistency across force areas. Chief Constables agreed that this commonality (and therefore the test to see if it is achievable) is needed ahead of the Commonwealth Games
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Cleveland	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Durham	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Key to success will be full engagement with the Federation and a consistent approach.
Humberside	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Northumbria	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Support the framework set out, and would lead to commonality of planning and, preparation, along with officer guidance, guidelines, and entitlements from a national perspective
North Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Supported, but the paper reads that there are still a suite of options for forces to compensate staff when I think we were concerned about consistency to be set nationally for each operation so would like clarity on this.
South Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
West Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support.</b> Supported, but there is some ambiguity in wording that needs to be made clear in the framework.
<b>West Midlands</b>	<b>SUPPORTED</b> – noted/supported in principle.  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Would mitigate issues experienced at G7 and COP 26.</li> <li>• Would require follow up iterations following national mobilisation.</li> </ul> Need to negotiate how this will work/get the Chief's to sign-up.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Staffordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Warwickshire	<b>Supported.</b>
West Mercia	<b>Supported.</b>

West Midlands	<b>Supported.</b>
Eastern	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the paper was supported by the region.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Bedfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Cambridgeshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Essex	<b>Supported.</b>
Kent	<b>Supported.</b> Decision Required is fully <b>Supported</b> (as are the Points of Note at 2.4.5 and 3.5.6 regarding Rest Days and Allowances/Bonuses respectively)
Hertfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Norfolk	<b>Supported.</b> During several recent mobilisations there have been a range of approaches taken by forces in relation to how they select officers to fulfil requirements, payments (bonus/ overtime etc) and methods around rest day reinstatement/ working. The range has attracted criticism and created workforce tension as a result of variance of benefit which has then created difficulties for the host forces. The paper suggests a range of agreed principles that will bring consistency to future deployments and are in keeping with approaches taken by N&S during recent significant events. There has been extensive engagement with Fed during preparation and there will be responsibility on host forces (Gold) to consider and communicate the specifics of deployment in keeping with the principles. Supported to increase consistency and provide clarity for planning phases of operations.
Suffolk	<b>Supported.</b> During several recent mobilisations there have been a range of approaches taken by forces in relation to how they select officers to fulfil requirements, payments (bonus/ overtime etc) and methods around rest day reinstatement/ working. The range has attracted criticism and created workforce tension as a result of variance of benefit which has then created difficulties for the host forces. The paper suggests a range of agreed principles that will bring consistency to future deployments and are in keeping with approaches taken by N&S during recent significant events. There has been extensive engagement with Fed during preparation and there will be responsibility on host forces (Gold) to consider and communicate the specifics of deployment in keeping with the principles. Supported to increase consistency and provide clarity for planning phases of operations.
South East	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Hampshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Surrey	<b>Supported.</b>
Sussex	<b>Supported.</b>
Thames Valley	<b>Supported.</b>
South West	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	



Green - Supported	
Avon and Somerset	<b>Supported</b>
Devon and Cornwall	<b>Supported</b>
Dorset	<b>Supported</b>
Gloucestershire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
Wiltshire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
<b>Wales</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Dyfed-Powys	<b>Supported.</b>
Gwent	<b>Supported.</b>
South Wales	<b>Supported</b> - There is no risk to SWP by supporting these principles, we have adopted the majority for many years.
<b>London</b>	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the region supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Metropolitan Police	<b>Supported.</b>
City of London	<b>Supported.</b>
British Transport	<b>Supported.</b>
CNC	<b>Supported.</b>
**S23**,	**S23**,
<b>CTP</b>	<b>Noted.</b> CTP sit outside of this framework and have our own self-defined principles as per the S22a Police Act 1996 Collaboration Agreement – National Counter Terrorism Police Services (CT22A).
RAG	
Green - Supported	

National Mobilisation Plan Protestor Removal Proposal (ACC Weatherill – NpoCC)	
<b>East Midlands</b>	<b>Supported.</b> The regional overall supported the paper.
RAG	
Green - Supported	

Derbyshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Leicestershire	<b>Supported.</b>
Lincolnshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Northamptonshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Nottinghamshire	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>North West</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Cheshire	<b>Supported.</b> This is a good idea as it will formalise the process, particularly with the increase in protests so this fits in with the L2/L3 Public Order Mobilisation Plans. We have previously had to go to Tier 3 Mutual Aid for Protester Removal, but this will make such requests easier. We have supplied details of our capabilities but will await the breakdown within the region to establish what our requirements are.
Cumbria	<b>Supported.</b>
Greater Manchester	<b>Supported.</b> CI Hill - This is definitely a good thing as it became clear during COP 26 that forces had a wide range of agreements in place and as a result there was disparity. Even at a local level, when dealing with the Alliance, there were difficulties reconciling the offers from Cheshire and North Wales. To formalise it in such a way makes it clearer and will definitely assist with planning, as a considerable amount of time has previously been taken up discussing and agreeing remuneration, only to discover this is out of step with other forces.
Lancashire	<b>Supported</b>
Merseyside	<b>Supported.</b> The region is currently vulnerable in relation to the F6 Debonding trained officers only. Whilst this may appear a capability gap the regions PRT officers maintain this skill. We would request if this is a stand alone skill then a reasonable time frame should be allowed to introduce the training and obtain the necessary equipment. In addition, the report does not refer to Harrier trained staff – a skill obtained for COP26. Perhaps this should be reflected in the report.
North Wales	<b>Supported.</b> This paper is supported as it is in every forces interest for there to be consistency in expectations for host and donor forces with respect to major national events.
<b>North East</b>	<b>Qualified Support</b> – There was a difference in opinion from Chief Constables on this paper (see Force comments below) and therefore qualified support is given from a regional perspective to recognise the differences regarding each force's position.
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	
Cleveland	<b>Not Supported.</b> Need to understand the issues of double hatting and how mobilisation requirements will impact upon forces existing capacity and capability to meet their level 2 commitments. Also need to understand the distribution of trained officers and how long it will take forces to address the shortfall. We are a region with a lot of trained staff and have concerns that our officers will have to provide on-call cover for those regions with reduced numbers, which is not something we currently have to do. Need to understand what the estimated cost to the service is in providing this capability. There are numerous specialist bailiff companies who have extensive experience with removing protestors in all of these scenarios; have they been factored into the planning assumptions?

Durham	<b>Supported.</b>
Humberside	<b>Supported.</b>
Northumbria	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The proposal for a Tier 3 mobilisation capability and process would be fully supported, however due to the geography and travelling time to Northumbria the requirement for an in-house capability should still be seen as a priority.
North Yorkshire	<b>Supported.</b>
South Yorkshire	<b>Supported.</b>
West Yorkshire	<b>Qualified Support:</b> Forces (in particular smaller forces) will encounter difficulties if 24/7 hour cover is expected. This is felt to be disproportionate to the threat and therefore capability between the hours of 0700hrs and 2300hrs is suggested).
West Midlands	<b>QUALIFIED SUPPORT</b> – noted/qualified supported. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Detailed Mercury figures of numbers trained are not accurate.</li> <li>Supportive of proposal however poses potential logistical issues.</li> <li>Concerns noted on the 6-hour mobilisation requirement – requires two full teams on-call creating a significant cost – this aspect needs revisiting, suggest this needs to be time-bound around likely hours of a protest.</li> <li>Requires more detail on financial implications RE on-call.</li> <li>Need to understand national plan for F6.3 removal – this could have significant impact to capability across regions and costs.</li> </ul> Staffs – F6.3 officers on-call every day – concerns for achievability and officer welfare.
<div>RAG</div> <div>Amber – Qualified Support</div>	
Staffordshire	
Warwickshire	
West Mercia	
West Midlands	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Eastern	<b>Supported.</b> Overall the paper was supported by the region.
<div>RAG</div> <div>Green - Supported</div>	
Bedfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Cambridgeshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Essex	<b>Supported.</b>
Kent	<b>Supported.</b>
Hertfordshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Norfolk	<b>Supported.</b> All noted and plans are already in place locally to increase our capability around protest removal. There are no issues with the mobilisation uplift, and we should support.
Suffolk	<b>Supported.</b> All noted and plans are already in place locally to increase our capability around protest removal. There are no issues with the mobilisation uplift, and we should support.

<b>South East</b>	<b>Supported.</b>
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Hampshire	<b>Supported.</b>
Surrey	<b>Supported.</b>
Sussex	<b>Supported.</b>
Thames Valley	<b>Supported.</b>
<b>South West</b>	Supported. Overall the region supported the paper but please note Wiltshire comments below.
RAG	
Green - Supported	
Avon and Somerset	<b>Supported</b>
Devon and Cornwall	<b>Supported.</b> SWRICC will develop implementation plan for fair regional split. However to achieve this it will require an uplift in training capability nationally.
Dorset	<b>Supported</b>
Gloucestershire	<b>Supported/Noted</b>
Wiltshire	<b>Qualified Support</b> the need for a specific PRT element to the national mobilisation plan is met and that this paper provides a good interim position. However, further evidence is required to support the number of officers trained in each skill and that there should be a regular review process to ensure that the numbers match the future threat. Further I would advise that the South West are not yet prepared for immediate implementation of this plan and time scales should be set to ensure regions have the numbers of staff, equipment and vehicles available within the set time scales, as this is the most challenging element of the proposed model.
<b>Wales</b>	<b>Qualified support</b> – All 3 forces broadly support the proposals, however with the caveat that due to the forces not having fulltime or dedicated teams, the officers are very often the same ones who will be used for traditional PSU / BDU.
RAG	
Amber – Qualified Support	Due to the relatively low numbers of callouts for PRT and the specialist training required, Chiefs were keen on a regional approach, that could be called upon when required.
Dyfed-Powys	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
Gwent	<b>Qualified Support</b> - The regional observation from the head of RICC (SWP/GWP/DPP) is to support the plan in principle, however, there needs to be an understanding that there would be challenges to simultaneously deploying Public Order Offices and Protest Removal Teams. This is because it is usually the same officers who are trained in both disciplines.
South Wales	<b>Qualified support</b> – SWP support the proposal that Protest Removal should be a national commitment and very much part of SPR. We support the mobilisation of such assets and we will contribute. However, understanding that there is already a national commitment expected; Public Support (PSUs) and Basic Deployment Officers (BDUs), we cannot commit to simultaneous deployments of all of these skills (PSUs, BDUs and PRT) and maintain a public order capability in force.

	Proposal can be supported however limitations are to be recognised.
<b>London</b> RAG Amber – Qualified Support	<b>Qualified Support.</b> The MPS has raised a query with this paper and is in contact with the author. We are supportive of the SPR but would welcome the opportunity to review with NPoCC the PRT mercury numbers for the London region. The London region can meet the F6 request (7 PRT Officers) within 4 hours but the 7 hour request will present a challenge for the region.  Furthermore the request for a combined team of F6.2 & F6.3 (21 PRT officers) within 6 Hours will present the London region with a challenge as this request equates to two thirds of all our PRT capacity within the MPS.
Metropolitan Police	<b>Qualified Support.</b>
City of London	<b>Supported.</b>
British Transport	<b>Supported.</b>
CNC	<b>Supported.</b>
**S23**	**S23**
CTP	<b>Noted.</b>
RAG Green - Supported	

# Chief Constables' Council

## Undercover Policing Public Inquiry Update and Continued Resourcing for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination Team.

**Date: 23 March 2022/Agenda Item: Regional**

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OFFICIAL	
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Date Created:	January 2022
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Portfolio:	Serious & Organised Crime
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### 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- 1.1. This paper is intended to provide Chief Constable's Council with an update regarding the on-going Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI) and the requirements that it continues to place on the Police Service, the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team, which now incorporates Operation Elter, and future financial requirements.
- 1.2. This paper follows the previous funding paper that was presented to Chief Constables Council on 17<sup>th</sup> January 2019 and presents the required budget for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team from April 2022 and should be read in conjunction with the UCPI update paper presented to Council on the 21<sup>st</sup> July 2021.
- 1.3. Tranche 1 evidential hearings finally started in November 2020, 17 months later than the UCPI scheduled date with Tranche 2 now anticipated to begin May 2024, followed by Tranche 3 in 2025. No further projected timescales have been provided by the inquiry for the further tranche hearing.



- 1.4. The suggested overall costs for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team, including Operation Elter, is estimated at £1,339,400 per annum. Utilising current reserve to reduce costs to a net budget requirement of **£1,195,100**, with the remaining balance in the reserve being held as a contingency to cover any unforeseen costs and to fund future IT, Redundancy and IPT related costs.
- 1.5. This includes the reduction in the Co-ordination team staff from 10 to 8FTE, reducing the overall annual police staff pay and allowances to **£495,900** per annum. An underspend in legal charges due to the live hearing delays, however expected to increase. It is suggested the legal budget could be reduced by £50,000 and should be re-set at **£350,000** per annum with a continual review.
- 1.6. An NPCC Undercover Public Inquiry Co-ordination Group chaired by CC Martin Hewitt continues to meet on a regular basis.

## 2. Actions Required

- 2.1. Council to note the content of the report.
- 2.2. Council to note and agree the continued funding for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal team, including Operational Elter, over the next three years from April 2022 as per appendix 2 to be reviewed annually with the split across forces to be based on net revenue expenditure as per appendix 3.
- 2.3. Council to note the intention to include the funding for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal team, if approved, as part of the National Operating Budget.
- 2.4. Council is invited to consider the role of the non-Home Office forces, namely the British Transport Police, the Ministry of defence Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and their on-going budget contribution.
- 2.5. Council to agree that all funding, payroll and support will continue to be managed through Derbyshire Constabulary and the proposed recharge costs.
- 2.6. Council to note the potential for future increasing legal counsel fees.
- 2.7. Council to note the future additional financial requirement to continue funding the Relativity IT platform.
- 2.8. Council to acknowledge that there may be a further requirement to increase the capacity NPCC UCPI Coordination Team in response to increased demands for disclosure from the UCPI. Several options are being considered but any such growth will be addressed by the UCPI Co-ordination group and referred to Chief's Council for decision.
- 2.9. Colleagues requiring any further details or clarification are encouraged to speak to Andy Ward at the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination Team.

### 3. Background & Update

- 3.1. The governments Undercover Policing Public Inquiry (UCPI) was established in 2015 to investigate into and report upon undercover police operations conducted by English and Welsh police forces since 1968. The Inquiry's focus being operations conducted by the MPS Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) and (NPOIU). The NPOIU was active in every force in England and Wales, including the Ministry of Defence Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary. The unit worked nationally and internationally. Both the NPOIU and SDS methodology was of long-term infiltration and intelligence only deployments.
- 3.2. Although due to initially be completed by the end of 2018, at the time of the last funding paper in January 2019, the UCPI released a further update confirming that they still intended to commence with the module 1 & 2 evidential hearings in June 2019 (Tranche 1-3) including NPOIU officers in October 2020 (Tranche 4), other case studies in March 2021 (Tranche 5), senior officers in June 2021 (Tranche 6) and with a projected final report in December 2023.
- 3.3. Despite these predictions Tranche 1 evidential hearings only finally started in November 2020 and they won't conclude until after May 2022. The latest milestones being provided by the Inquiry suggest that Tranche 2 evidential hearings won't start until May 2024 followed by Tranche 3 in 2025. It is understood that the Tranche 4 hearings will not be before the end of 2025 at the earliest and that is dependent upon a further funding bid to the Home Office and appears very optimistic with the current pace of the Inquiry. No further projected timescales have been provided for the Tranche 5 and 6 hearings or indeed the final report.
- 3.4. Opening statements from the initial UCPI hearings have already identified the principle allegation themes that are being aimed at the Service which include sexism, misogyny, institutional racism, waste of police resources, no proportionate justification for using the tactic against political groups and campaigns, lack of support for officers wives, supporting blacklisting, links to the private sector and a lack of disclosure to name a few.
- 3.5. Furthermore, on 30<sup>th</sup> September 2021 the judgement following the Kate Wilson IPT case was finally delivered and found in the favour of the claimant in that the MPS/NPCC were in breach of their positive obligations under Articles 3 and 8, her Article 11 rights had been infringed and that there had been discrimination against woman prohibited by Article 14. The ruling is clear in that the IPT believe the failings in the case go far beyond the actions of a renegade officer and was scathing about supervision, training and the authorisations which they describe as unlawful in that they fail the proportionality and necessity requirement, have no understanding of collateral intrusion and have been carried out in a 'perfunctory' manner. The case will be further examined by the UCPI under Tranche 4.
- 3.6. The current cost of the UCPI is reported as being £45 million but when coupled with the cost to the MPS (£46m), regional forces (£4.4m) and the Co-ordination Team (£5.6m), in servicing the Inquiry the total costs are now well in excess of £100 million.
- 3.7. Whilst this paper seeks to update Chief Constables with the current developments in relation to UCPI, the demands it continues to place on the Police Service and the extended timescales of the Inquiry which remain fluid and unclear, the additional financial



implications for forces to meet the demands of this inquisitorial public inquiry should be noted.
<b>4. Proposal</b>
<p>4.1. <b>Agreed in 2015</b> - An NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team, led by a chief officer (or equivalent) to respond to the public inquiry as Core Participation status on behalf of the NPCC and College of Policing. A timeline of funding agreements by Council regarding the team is attached in appendix 1.</p> <p>4.2. <b>2022 Proposal</b> - In response to the delays in the timelines being projected by the Inquiry an agreement from Chiefs' to continued funding the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal team, including Operational Elter, over the next three years until 2025.</p>

## 5. STRATEGIC

**This section is to demonstrate the strategic elements of the case for funding in accordance with the national chiefs' council organisational strategy. The funding case needs to outline a clear understanding of rational and objectives of the proposal.**

<b>5.1. Rational for project / programme</b>
<p><b><i>Context around why a national response is required and the benefits of what it will deliver.</i></b></p> <p>5.1.1. A policing response is required to the government's inquiry into the conduct of undercover police operations since 1968. A coordinated national approach is required to ensure all requirements of the inquiry are responded to in a standardised agreed process. This is the most effective, efficient and a unified approach to provide governance and sustainability to all the requirements the Inquiry request off the police force.</p>
<b>5.2. Key drivers / Key factors</b>
<p><b><i>Describe the key consideration of the issues that need to be understood.</i></b></p> <p>5.2.1. Political, public and media pressure and interest. Long term operational security for those involved in covert policing</p>
<b>5.3. Strategic Objectives</b>
<p>5.3.1. To ensure transparency and to co-ordinate activity across all Forces in responding to the requirements of the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI).</p> <p>5.3.2. To develop and maintain consistent systems and processes to enable Forces to meet the requirements of the Inquiry Team, providing the link between the NPCC (Forces) and the Inquiry, whilst providing Forces with advice and guidance around undercover policing and current legislative requirements.</p> <p>5.3.3. To ensure that the safety and security of all current and former undercover operatives is considered at all times and highlight any potential compromise to the operational integrity of the undercover policing tactic.</p>

## 5.4. Progress update

### Disclosure

- 5.4.1. The processing of all the 296 centrally held NPOIU technical exhibits is now complete and they have been loaded onto the secure Relativity IT platform. The volume of material is 2.6TB of data and around 2.4 million documents which is estimated to be approximately 30 million pages. Additionally, 3.1 million 'carved data' files have now been recovered from the technical exhibit processing and have been loaded onto Relativity. The Co-ordination team have made repeated requests to disclose this material in its entirety to the UCPI to assist the Inquiry to identify material they deem relevant and speed up the disclosure process. This has been resisted due to the scale of the material involved and the associated data protection issues with the Inquiry requesting that searches of the material are undertaken by the Co-ordination team against strict search terms and then disclosed for consideration of relevance. This process is both labour intensive and time consuming and depending on the scale and extent of the material requested may not be sustainable. Currently the UCPI continue to examine each former undercover officer in the NPOIU and operations they were authorised to conduct to identify material they wish to examine for relevance.
- 5.4.2. Currently 117 boxes of hard copy records containing 3,088 documents are also held centrally from which 9 batches of material, consisting of 2,022 of the documents, have now been disclosed to the Inquiry via Relativity. Confirmation of any further requests and further assessment in terms of relevance is awaited.
- 5.4.3. In relation to the force held NPOIU material and operations that forces have identified as having a theme of failure, the UCPI have now visited a number of forces and, in the case of the force held NPOIU material, have issued a number of rule 9 requests that have to date been managed through the Co-ordination Team via the Relativity platform. Further force visits by the UCPI are anticipated.
- 5.4.4. Whilst each force will remain responsible for the disclosure of their own material including any restriction applications and redactions required this will be co-ordinated by the Co-ordination team as per the agreed protocol for all regional forces. This will ensure the consistency, integrity and security of the disclosure process across the service. Experience to date has shown that disclosure is a very complex and subjective process and a force-based redactor will not be aware of the bigger picture in relation to what has been disclosed to the UCPI over the past six years. The intention is that all the force disclosure should take place via the Relativity IT platform located in Birmingham and that the UCPI Co-ordination team at the very least will be able to guide forces in the process and at best, capacity allowing, undertake redactions on your behalf. Whilst this is the preferred co-ordinated approach to the disclosure of force held material the scale of any future requests remains unknown and needs to be understood in order to establish if there is capacity within the Relativity servers to hold the material and the appropriate level of resource required to manage any redactions required. Clearly if capacity is available on Relativity that would prevent forces needing to purchase the software separately and therefore would be a significant saving.
- 5.4.5. At the request of the Inquiry, the Co-ordination team have recently provided a statement outlining the value of the undercover policing tactic across the country in tackling a variety of different crime types. The statement signposts the UCPI to 22 successful undercover operations which they may wish to examine as part of the Inquiry. The UCPI Chairman has previously indicated that following receipt of this statement he may relax

the embargo on undercover policing related document retention that has been in place since 2015.

#### **Anonymity & Evidence Requests**

- 5.4.6. The Co-ordination Team continues to manage the on-going anonymity requests to the UCPI. The Inquiry has to date invited 64 anonymity applications from former NPOIU staff of which 55 restriction applications, 28 UCOs and 27 managers, have been submitted to date and, when requested by the UCPI, supported by risk assessments prepared by NPCC risk assessors. To date the Inquiry has ruled and published 38 of the applications, pended 1 and provided 'minded to' notices for a further 10 leaving 6 applications to be determined. The Inquiry have now indicated that they no longer require further risk assessments and the two assessors have been released.
- 5.4.7. Now that decisions are being determined in relation to anonymity and relevance of documentation, the next stage of the process is to request officers, via a rule 9 from the UCPI, for a statement as per the witness evidence protocol agreed between the Co-ordination team and UCPI.
- 5.4.8. The first stage of this process requires an 'officer eyes' check to be carried out on the document pack that the Inquiry intends to serve on the officer in conjunction with the rule 9 request. This will again be co-ordinated with the relevant forces by the NPCC team and to date four Tranche 4 officer witness packs have been completed and further packs are expected shortly.
- 5.4.9. The second stage of the process will be for the Inquiry send the rule 9 requests and document packs to the officers' legal teams. The first rule 9 request was recently sent to a Tranche 4 officer which we understand contained an extensive series of questions which the Inquiry require answering in the statement and which is proving to be a significant piece of work. The Co-ordination team are in the process of meeting with the three legal panel firms and relevant force chief officer leads and representatives to discuss the witness protocol and provide support moving forward. The Co-ordination team have stressed to the UCPI that how they facilitate the actual handling and security of the document packs will also require careful consideration as to how they can be accessed by officers and their legal teams who are spread around the country and in some cases even abroad.

#### **5.5. 2022/2023 Deliverables**

- 5.5.1. Based upon current workload and a recent letter from the Inquiry indicating their requirements the below have been identified as the on-going critical functions of the NPCC Co-ordination and Legal Team moving forward;

#### **Disclosure & Redaction**

- 5.5.2. Whilst the evidential hearings for Tranche 4 maybe sometime away the preparation for those hearings is now well underway through the disclosure of material relating to the NPOIU which is both centrally held and from forces identified by the UCPI.
- 5.5.3. Continuing to manage the disclosure and redaction of the centrally held NPOIU documentation deemed to be relevant and necessary by the UCPI. In terms of the redaction of any documents, including officer statements, that Inquiry deem relevant and which they wish to put into the public domain, this is potentially an enormous piece

of work. There are estimated to be 30 million plus pages of documents and the most experienced redactor can redact in the region of 65 pages a day. Despite numerous requests, the scale of the documents that the Inquiry may deem relevant and necessary is completely unknown but if they were to require 1% of the material it would take the current team at least 2.8 years to complete the task. This of course does not consider any force held material or the other tasks carried out by the team identified below.

5.5.4. Managing the examination and redaction of any 3<sup>rd</sup> party documents deemed relevant and necessary by the Inquiry within which the NPCC has equity. This is proving a considerable task with the NPCC effectively 'owning' the undercover tactic.

5.5.5. Supporting forces with requests for disclosure from the UCPI of regional force held material as described above, either NPOIU or force operational material.

5.5.6. Continuing to provide support to the NPCC and regional forces regarding on-going litigation. The Co-ordination team played a significant role in the disclosure of material throughout the recent Kate Wilson IPT proceedings which will conclude shortly.

#### **Anonymity & Risk Assessments**

5.5.7. Continuing to manage the on-going anonymity process for former NPOIU officers and provide support to forces with any future local applications.

5.5.8. Attending future UCPI hearings as a CP and managing the security of former undercover officers attending as witnesses.

#### **Evidence**

5.5.9. Supporting the request for witness statements from officers, carrying out relevant redaction classification checks in relation to document packs and future statements.

5.5.10. Attending and representing the interests of the NPCC future UCPI hearings as a CP.

#### **Miscarriage of Justice referrals**

5.5.11. Provide support to the Miscarriages of Justice Panel secretariat (a role undertaken by Andy Ward) as required when cases are referred by the UCPI for consideration. This will mainly take the form of document recovery.

#### **Recommendations for future**

5.5.12. Continuing to support the National Undercover Working Group and NUWG Governance Group with identified learning from the UCPI and associated litigation.

## **6. ECONOMICAL**

**This section is to demonstrate the economical rational behind the proposal to deliver best value in relation to cost, capabilities and risk management.**

### **6.1. Economic Benefits**

6.1.1. A national UCPI team ensure there is a coordinated, transparent and consistent approach is maintained in dealing with the NPOIU material and the examination of its activities by the UCPI and to support forces in the disclosure of their own material moving forward.

- 6.1.2. If the shared collaborative NPCC proposed approach is not adopted by all forces the alternative will be for each force acting unilaterally and managing issues such as legal support, access to material, identifying and procuring the suitable IT document management platform, dealing with redaction and disclosure and managing operational personal risk assessments.
- 6.1.3. This would inevitably lead to a fractured approach with each force having to create enough resilience and their own 'Public inquiry team' to deal with any requests. Each force would have to individually access and assess the centrally held NPOIU material, which would have significant impact on the overall effectiveness and timeliness of responses to the UCPI and create significant difficulties in dealing with any redaction, application for Restriction Orders and the necessary risk assessment, not to mention the potential risks to officers and the tactic due to an uncoordinated approach. In addition, the training and operational experience, not to mention vetting, required to undertake the redaction and disclosure processes into the Inquiry should not be underestimated.

## 7. RESOURCES

**This section is to demonstrate resourcing factors and a well-placed structure has been considered to meet the anticipated service requirements.**

### 7.1. Resources

- 7.1.1. NPCC UCPI Coordination Team currently consists of Mr Andy Ward as Coordinator supported by 10 FTE staff **\*\*S23\*\***, and in Merseyside. The legal team is led by Mr Craig Sutherland (Head of East Midlands Police Legal Services) supported by solicitors from EMPLS and with Leading and two Junior Counsel as required.
- 7.1.2. The UCPI no longer require any further risk assessments. The 2 NPCC risk assessors were released resulting in the team currently operating with a Co-ordinator supported by 8 FTE. which has continued to run within budget and at full capacity with current demand.
- 7.1.3. The organisational chart for the revised NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team is attached at Appendix 4.
- 7.1.4. Financial, HR and ICT support for the NPCC UCPI Coordination and Legal Teams has been managed through Derbyshire Constabulary. NPCC central office has not the means to manage these collaborative functions, and there is a requirement for a force to take a lead role.

### 7.2. Factors impacting resources

- 7.2.1. It is more than likely the team will need to increase once the Inquiry provide clarity in terms of future demand. Options currently being considered, range from seconding officers from forces with the largest UCPI footprint to requesting additional funding. Any such growth will be addressed by the NPCC Co-ordination group and referred to Chief's Council for decision.

## 8. FINANCE

This section is to demonstrate a budget has been considered and the cost of funding of the preferred option. This may also include costs of support from stakeholders and alternative funding streams.

<b>8.1. Financial Oversight</b>
8.1.1. Jon Peatling CPFA Head of Finance and Business Support at Derbyshire Constabulary
<b>8.2. Funding Update</b>
8.2.1. The costs for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team remain within the existing budget although this is only in place until the end of March 2022
8.2.2. The vacancies created by the deletion of the risk assessor posts coupled with an underspend on legal fees due to the on-going hearing delays has resulted in a saving which it was agreed would underpin the residue Operation Elter costs when the budgets were merged in March 2021, support NPCC legal costs as part of the Wilson IPT case to prevent any further requests to Council for additional funding and to cover additional Relativity IT costs. With the inclusion of the Op Elter costs in 21/22, an overspend of <b>£174,000</b> is forecast, reducing the available Reserve to <b>£787,300</b> . Council will recall from the previous budget, agreed in January 2019, that costs of <b>£115,500</b> were included in year 3 for future pension deficit and redundancy liabilities. This liability will now be held in the Reserve, should the Co-ordination team terminate in less than three years, when a proportion of those costs may be required. These costs are not therefore required again as part of this budget.
8.2.3. Following agreement at Council in October 2020 that Operation Elter would merge with the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination team it is anticipated that any future requirement for funding would reduce as the on-going investigations were completed. There remain however several significant investigations known to the UCPI and being overseen by the IOPC that require completion which include further investigation arising from the recent Kate Wilson IPT ruling. Considering the above outstanding workload, a significant resourcing restructure has now been implemented. The new structure now consists of 7 FTE posts (1 x MPS police officers and 6 x contractors) at an annual cost of <b>£445,000</b> but this will be reviewed on a three-monthly basis as the outstanding tasks are completed. It is anticipated however that there will be requirement for Operation Elter to continue until at least the end of Tranche 4 of the UCPI (timescales currently unknown) in some form to retain a footprint in the MPS to work alongside their IRSC Inquiry team and manage both live IT systems and hard copy exhibits that maybe required by the Inquiry. Co-location with the MPS IRSC Inquiry team has already taken and it has been agreed that payroll and support to Operation Elter will continue to be provided by the MPS.
<b>8.3. Funding costs</b>
8.3.1. Based upon the critical functions identified and the anticipated scale of the coordination and disclosure required it is recommended that this team maintains its new current staffing levels of a Co-ordinator supported by 8 FTE making the overall annual police staff pay and allowances for the Co-ordination team <b>£495,900</b> per annum.

<p>8.3.2. Whilst there has been an underspend in legal charges this is purely due to the live hearing delays, but legal costs will increase considerably as the pace of live hearings increases. In view of this it is suggested that the legal budget could be reduced by £50,000 and should be re-set at <b>£350,000</b> per annum but this will require continual review moving forward. Additionally, with the extended timeframe for the UCPI further costs will be incurred in relation to licencing the relativity IT platform.</p> <p>8.3.3. The suggested overall costs for the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination and Legal Team, including Operation Elter, estimated on relevant mid-point salary scales and associated costs is <b>£1,339,400</b> per annum. This figure includes travel, expenses, accommodation, and equipment costs, which have been reduced by <b>£63,500</b> following review. It is proposed that the remaining balance in the Reserve is used to reduce the annual budget requirement and is utilised over the next three years to freeze force contributions at 2021/22 levels. This would result in a net Budget Requirement of <b>£1,195,100</b>, allowing the additional Operation Elter costs to be absorbed at no extra cost. The remaining balance in the Reserve will be held as a contingency to cover any unforeseen costs and to fund future IT, Redundancy and IPT related costs – this will be reviewed on an annual basis. The detailed budget is included at Appendix 2 and details of the split across forces to be based on net revenue expenditure at Appendix 3, for consideration by Council.</p> <p>8.3.4. Finance, HR and ICT support have previously been managed through Derbyshire Constabulary at no cost. It is proposed Derbyshire Constabulary will continue to manage the additional funding and payroll for the increased team but will incur recharges of £12,500 per annum moving forward.</p>
<p><b>8.4. Financial Factors</b></p>
<p>8.4.1. Council is invited to consider the role of the non-Home Office forces, namely the British Transport Police, the Ministry of defence Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary and their contribution to the budget split. Currently these forces contribute to the shared Co-ordination team and Legal costs considering their involvement in the activities of the former NPOIU and have been included in the force split.</p> <p>8.4.2. Council will be aware from earlier papers that funding for the secure Relativity IT platform was initially provided from the CT budget and therefore additional costs for on-going licences and support should be anticipated throughout the timescales of the Inquiry.</p>
<p><b>8.5. Financial Recommendations</b></p>
<p>8.5.1. In light of the Inquiry now being extended well beyond the end of 2025, it is recommended that additional funding is agreed by forces until at least April 2025 but reviewed on an annual basis to both assess on-going workload from the Inquiry but also to ensure effective contingencies are in place to ensure team resilience and continuity which is a particular concern.</p>

## 9. Management

This section is to demonstrate the governance, delivery, monitoring and evaluation of the proposal and will encompass feedback to chiefs' council as part of the National budget strategic cycle.

<b>9.1. Governance</b>
<p><b>9.1.1.</b> The NPCC National Coordination team continues to work closely with the Undercover Public Inquiry, with forces across England and Wales and with the MPS Public Inquiry Team. Oversight and governance of the team is provided by the UCPI Co-ordination Group chaired by CC Martin Hewitt with regular reporting to Chiefs’ Council. Day to day management is provided by the NPCC Crime Operations Coordination Committee and National Undercover Working Group chair, CC Alan Pughsley, who is also the IO for Operation Elter.</p>
<b>9.2. Monitoring &amp; reporting</b>
<p><b>9.2.1.</b> Whilst accepting that undercover policing is almost unrecognisable today to the operations currently being examined by the UCPI and indeed the IPT, many of the underlying themes mirror those identified by forces to the Inquiry as themes of failure during more recent operations such as inappropriate conduct, ineffective governance and oversight, inappropriate risk management and breaches of RIPA. The Co-ordination Team continues to work alongside the NUWG in examining these themes to ensure that any lessons that can be are learnt today and not years down the road when the Inquiry finally reports.</p>
<b>9.3. National Budget Strategic cycle</b>
<p><b>9.3.1.</b> Council will recall that in December 2021 a National Operating Budget proposal paper was presented. The NPCC Co-ordination and Legal team were not included as one of the workstream in the paper, but it is anticipated the team’s funding, if approved, will be added to the National Operating Budget moving forward.</p>
<b>9.4. Oversight of funding submission</b>
<p><b>9.4.1.</b> Inderjit Singh Malhi NPCC Finance Capability Coordinator</p>



**Appendix 1.**

Date	Agreement by Chief Officers'
7 <sup>th</sup> September 2015	A nationally co-ordinated response to the UCPI and to apply for joint NPCC and College of Policing Core Participation status to the Inquiry.
27 <sup>th</sup> October 2015	The development of an NPCC central co-ordination team, to be led by a chief officer (or equivalent).
13 <sup>th</sup> October 2016	Additional funds to be allocated for the expanded remit of the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination Team and the Legal Team. This equated to a total of £1,002,800 per year until April 2019 with the HR, Finance and Admin support to be provided by Derbyshire Constabulary.
17 <sup>th</sup> January 2019	To continued funding the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination Team for a further three years, equating to £3,337,300 split over three years across forces based upon the grant funding split. Figures included staffing costs and legal fees. HR, Finance and Admin support would continue to be provided by Derbyshire Constabulary.
7 <sup>th</sup> October 2020	To merge Operation Elter into the NPCC UCPI Co-ordination team following external review by Police Scotland and a significant downsizing of the investigation team.
18 <sup>th</sup> March 2021	CC Andy Cooke authorised the merging of the existing Co-ordination Team and Operation Elter budgets.

## Appendix 2.

Description	Year 4 2022/23 Budget Proposal £	Year 5 2023/24 Budget Proposal £	Year 6 2024/25 Budget Proposal £	TOTAL £
<b>Police Staff Pay &amp; Allowances</b>				
Basic	405,100	417,300	429,800	1,252,200
NI	50,400	52,000	53,500	155,900
Superannuation	38,400	40,000	40,700	119,100
Apprenticeship Levy	2,000	2,100	2,100	6,200
	<b>495,900</b>	<b>511,400</b>	<b>526,100</b>	<b>1,533,400</b>
<b>Indirect Employee Costs</b>				
Provision for Redundancy	0	0	0	0
Provision for LGPS Pensions Shortfall	0	0	0	0
	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Transport</b>				
Travel & subsistence	25,000	25,000	25,000	75,000
Recharge from Merseyside	2,500	2,500	2,500	7,500
	<b>27,500</b>	<b>27,500</b>	<b>27,500</b>	<b>82,500</b>
<b>Supplies &amp; Services</b>				
Accommodation	5,000	5,000	5,000	15,000
Subsistence	1,000	1,000	1,000	3,000
Equipment	2,500	2,500	2,500	7,500
Op Elter	445,000	450,000	455,000	1,350,000
Professional fees (Lead Force recharges)	12,500	12,500	12,500	37,500
Professional Fees (Counsel)	250,000	250,000	250,000	750,000
EMPLS Costs	100,000	100,000	100,000	300,000
	<b>816,000</b>	<b>821,000</b>	<b>826,000</b>	<b>2,463,000</b>
<b>Annual Running Costs</b>	<b>1,339,400</b>	<b>1,359,900</b>	<b>1,379,600</b>	<b>4,078,900</b>
Contribution To / (From) Reserves	(144,300)	(164,800)	(184,500)	(493,600)
<b>Net Budget / Funding Requirement</b>	<b>1,195,100</b>	<b>1,195,100</b>	<b>1,195,100</b>	<b>3,585,300</b>
	<b>8.8 FTE</b>	<b>8.8 FTE</b>	<b>8.8 FTE</b>	

### Appendix 3

Funding Request				
Cost Type				
		FY [22/23]	FY [23/24]	FY [24/25]
Revenue Costs		£1,131,200	£1,131,200	£1,131,200
<b>Total Net Cost</b>		<b>£1,131,200</b>	<b>£1,131,200</b>	<b>£1,131,200</b>

Police Force	NRE % 2021-22	FY [22/23]	FY [23/24]	FY [24/25]
Avon & Somerset	2.52%	£28,462	£28,462	£28,462
Bedfordshire	0.94%	£10,601	£10,601	£10,601
Cambridgeshire	1.20%	£13,601	£13,601	£13,601
Cheshire	1.61%	£18,207	£18,207	£18,207
City of London	0.62%	£7,058	£7,058	£7,058
Cleveland	1.09%	£12,345	£12,345	£12,345
Cumbria	0.89%	£10,046	£10,046	£10,046
Derbyshire	1.49%	£16,859	£16,859	£16,859
Devon & Cornwall	2.59%	£29,287	£29,287	£29,287
Dorset	1.10%	£12,424	£12,424	£12,424
Durham	1.02%	£11,534	£11,534	£11,534
Dyfed-Powys	0.89%	£10,035	£10,035	£10,035
Essex	2.45%	£27,661	£27,661	£27,661
Gloucestershire	0.97%	£10,988	£10,988	£10,988
Greater Manchester	4.90%	£55,419	£55,419	£55,419
Gwent	1.09%	£12,357	£12,357	£12,357
Hampshire	2.82%	£31,946	£31,946	£31,946
Hertfordshire	1.70%	£19,265	£19,265	£19,265
Humberside	1.53%	£17,352	£17,352	£17,352
Kent	2.60%	£29,389	£29,389	£29,389
Lancashire	2.36%	£26,746	£26,746	£26,746
Leicestershire	1.56%	£17,693	£17,693	£17,693
Lincolnshire	1.01%	£11,464	£11,464	£11,464
Merseyside	2.74%	£30,963	£30,963	£30,963
MOPAC	22.10%	£249,984	£249,984	£249,984
Norfolk	1.36%	£15,329	£15,329	£15,329
North Wales	1.28%	£14,518	£14,518	£14,518
North Yorkshire	1.26%	£14,240	£14,240	£14,240
Northamptonshire	1.11%	£12,590	£12,590	£12,590
Northumbria	2.33%	£26,390	£26,390	£26,390
Nottinghamshire	1.73%	£19,540	£19,540	£19,540
South Wales	2.43%	£27,458	£27,458	£27,458
South Yorkshire	2.16%	£24,400	£24,400	£24,400

<b>Staffordshire</b>	1.61%	£18,204	£18,204	£18,204
<b>Suffolk</b>	1.03%	£11,685	£11,685	£11,685
<b>Surrey</b>	1.90%	£21,496	£21,496	£21,496
<b>Sussex</b>	2.39%	£26,989	£26,989	£26,989
<b>Thames Valley</b>	3.52%	£39,852	£39,852	£39,852
<b>Warwickshire</b>	0.85%	£9,566	£9,566	£9,566
<b>West Mercia</b>	1.81%	£20,520	£20,520	£20,520
<b>West Midlands</b>	4.75%	£53,710	£53,710	£53,710
<b>West Yorkshire</b>	3.70%	£41,902	£41,902	£41,902
<b>Wiltshire</b>	0.98%	£11,125	£11,125	£11,125

<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>£1,131,200</b>	<b>£1,131,200</b>	<b>£1,131,200</b>
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#### **Partner Contributions**


British Transport Police	<b>£21,300</b>	<b>£21,300</b>	<b>£21,300</b>
Civil Nuclear Constabulary	<b>£21,300</b>	<b>£21,300</b>	<b>£21,300</b>
Ministry Of Defence Police	<b>£21,300</b>	<b>£21,300</b>	<b>£21,300</b>

<b>Total</b>	<b>£63,900</b>	<b>£63,900</b>	<b>£63,900</b>
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<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>£1,195,100</b>	<b>£1,195,100</b>	<b>£1,195,100</b>
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## Appendix 4

### NPCC UCPI Coordination Team



# Chief Constables' Council

## NPCC NP2IRM Budget Proposal FY 2022-23

23/04/2022 Agenda Item: Regional

<b>Security Classification</b> NPCC Policy: Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA <u>may</u> apply): OFFICIAL / OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE / OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-COMMERCIAL/ OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-PERSONAL / OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE-OPERATIONAL	
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<b>Author:</b>	Martin Hewitt
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	Jan-22
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	N/A
<b>Portfolio:</b>	NPCC
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	N/A
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### 1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 The purpose of this paper is to provide CCC with details of the proposed budget bid for FY 2022-23.
- 1.2 The Budget Bid has been approved through NPCC's Audit and Assurance Board along with the NPCC SOC Board and the ROCU executive.
- 1.3 This paper should be taken into consideration alongside other NPCC / NPoCC budget proposal papers.
- 1.4 A finalised Strategic Outline Case is due to be presented at CCC in Mar-22. The SOC will outline indicative costs of the complete solution with the £540k both the preferred option and the lower tiered amount. Other higher value options are presented within the SOC along with their associated risks, value for money assessments, and different product outcomes.



## 2. NPCC NP2IRM BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR FY 2022-23

Budget Group	FY 2021-22	Net Additions / Deductions	FY 2022-23
Police Officer Pay	£72,775	£18,830	£91,605
Police Staff Pay	- Baseline £108,676	£66,808	£175,484
		£190,280	£190,280
Supplies and Services	- Travel & Subsistence £6,000	£17,059	£23,059
	- Consultancy with PDS	£60,000	£60,000
<b>Expenditure Total</b>	<b>£187,451</b>	<b>£352,977</b>	<b>£540,428</b>
PCC Contributions	-£200,000	-£340,428	-£540,428
Transfer to/(from) Reserves	£12,549	-£12,549	
<b>Income Total</b>	<b>-£187,451</b>	<b>-£352,977</b>	<b>-£540,428</b>
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>£0</b>	<b>-£0</b>	<b>£0</b>

### 2.1 INCOME & FUNDING

**2.1.1** PCC + Other forces contributions increased by £240k to £540k detailed below under the various budget lines.

**2.1.2** FY 2021-22 forecasted underspends of £12.5k to remain in general reserves

### 2.2 EXPENDITURE

#### 2.2.1 Police Officer Pay

£92k Full year funding for 1 x Supt post inclusive of a mid-year 3.5% pay award

#### 2.2.2 Police Staff Pay

£176k Full year funding for 2 x existing staff posts inclusive of a mid-year 2.5% pay award.  
£190k for an additional 2 members of staff (business analysts).

#### 2.2.3 Supplies & Services

Increase in travel & subsistence to enable all team members to meet more frequently.  
Plus £60k for commercial and legal costs associated with software development with Police Digital Service.

### 2.3 RESERVES

**2.3.1** NPCC NP2IRM have forecasted underspends in FY 2021-22 of £12.5k which will transfer to general reserves at year end.

## 3. CONCLUSION

**3.1** Contribution of £540k is sought from PCC's for the NPCC NP2IRM Team annual budget for FY 2022-23, an additional £340k from FY 2021-22.



### Appendix A: PCC Contributions by Force

Funding Party	Percentage	Contribution Amount FY 2022-23
PCC for Avon and Somerset	2.30%	£ 12,414
PCC for Bedfordshire	0.86%	£ 4,624
Cambridgeshire Constabulary	1.10%	£ 5,932
PCC for Cheshire	1.47%	£ 7,941
City of London Corporation	0.57%	£ 3,078
PCC for Cleveland	1.00%	£ 5,385
PCC for Cumbria	0.81%	£ 4,382
Derbyshire Constabulary	1.36%	£ 7,353
PCC for Devon and Cornwall	2.36%	£ 12,774
PCC for Dorset Police	1.00%	£ 5,419
Durham Constabulary	0.93%	£ 5,031
PCC for Dyfed-Powys	0.81%	£ 4,377
PCC for Essex	2.23%	£ 12,065
PCC for Gloucestershire	0.89%	£ 4,793
GMCA GMP	4.47%	£ 24,172
PCC For Gwent	1.00%	£ 5,389
Hampshire Constabulary	2.58%	£ 13,934
PCC for Hertfordshire	1.55%	£ 8,403
PCC for Humberside	1.40%	£ 7,568
PCC for Kent	2.37%	£ 12,819
Lancashire Constabulary	2.16%	£ 11,666
PCC for Leicestershire	1.43%	£ 7,717
PCC for Lincolnshire	0.93%	£ 5,000
PCC for Merseyside	2.50%	£ 13,505
Metropolitan Police Service	20.18%	£ 109,034
Norfolk Constabulary	1.24%	£ 6,686
North Wales Police	1.17%	£ 6,332
North Yorkshire Police	1.15%	£ 6,211
PCC for Northamptonshire	1.02%	£ 5,491
Northumbria Police	2.13%	£ 11,510
PCC For Nottinghamshire	1.58%	£ 8,523
South Wales Police	2.22%	£ 11,976
PCC for South Yorkshire	1.97%	£ 10,643
Staffordshire Police	1.47%	£ 7,940
Suffolk Constabulary	0.94%	£ 5,097
PCC for Surrey	1.73%	£ 9,376
PCC for Sussex	2.18%	£ 11,772
PCC for Thames Valley	3.22%	£ 17,382
PCC for Warwickshire	0.77%	£ 4,172
West Mercia Police and Crime Commissioner	1.66%	£ 8,950
PCC for West Midlands	4.33%	£ 23,427
PCC for West Yorkshire	3.38%	£ 18,276
Wiltshire Police HQ	0.90%	£ 4,853
PSNI	4.35%	£ 23,519
Police Scotland	4.35%	£ 23,519
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>	<b>£ 540,428</b>





# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: National Policing Proactive Reporting and Management (NP2IRM) Strategic Outline Project

**23 March 2022 / Agenda Item: Regional**

<b>Security Classification</b>	
NPCC Policy: Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification (Protective Marking may assist in assessing whether exemptions to FOIA <u>may</u> apply):	
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<b>Author:</b>	DCC Tim Smith
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Kent Police, NPCC Kidnap Lead and NP2IRM SRO
<b>Date Created:</b>	05 Jan 22
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	National Crime Coordination Committee
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Kidnap
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	Presentation: 20220131-NP2IRM_NCCC_Presentation-v1.1 Enclosure 1: 2021210-NP2IRM_Strategic_Outline_Case-v1.1-OSC
<b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b>	
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<a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a>	

### 1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE

- 1.1. This paper outlines a series of decisions that are necessary to ensure the maintenance of momentum for the National Policing Proactive Reporting and Management (NP2IRM) project. Primarily, this decision point represents a project gate which releases stage-specific funding and allows the next stage of the project to start.

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. UK policing is exposed to a long-lasting and severe risk that has materialised on several occasions and been the focus of successive inquiries<sup>1</sup>. There is a pressing need to address technical solution capability shortfalls across Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) operations on a national level, from initiation to resolution. The user requires a multi-functional system that is developed with common police ways-of-working at its core.

<sup>1</sup> Stockwell (JCDM) (2005), Azelle Rodney (2005), Mark Saunders (2008), Mark Duggan (2011), Anthony Grainger (2013), Jermaine Baker (2015), Yassar Yaqub (2017)



- 2.2. Following its establishment in Aug 21, at the direction of the NPCC, the project team has completed the feasibility stage and has prepared a Strategic Outline Case (see enclosure 1) for consideration to allow the project to start the next stage. This next stage of the project will precede the main investment decision, which is likely to be brought for consideration, through a Full Business Case (FBC), no later than Jan 23.
- 2.3. The feasibility stage of the project has developed a clearer understanding of the risk exposure to UK policing and its root causes. This analysis has formed the basis of the targeted approach to address system-level issues and highlighted the need for a complete solution that brings together three core capabilities for proactive operations: case management, decision logging/recording and enhanced decision support.
- 2.4. Considering the scale of capability changes, only a new procurement exercise will allow UK policing to remain compliant with the Public Contract Regulations 2015. Put simply, this means that amending or expanding existing contracted solutions is not within the regulations.

### **3. PROPOSAL**

- 3.1. **To move to the next stage of the project, continue to resource the team, initiate the early market engagement for a Competitive Procedure with Negotiation (CPN) and develop the evidence base further to support a full investment decision to be brought for consideration no later than (NLT) Jan 23.**

- 3.1.1 So far, the following stakeholders have been consulted during the development of the Strategic Outline Case (see enclosure 1):

3.1.1.1 Tactical leads within the following portfolios have been fully consulted and engaged with since the project's creation and have endorsed the NP2IRM strategic outline case are:

- 3.1.1.1.1 CT Policing (Fusion/CTPOR);
- 3.1.1.1.2 Surveillance (NSGU);
- 3.1.1.1.3 Ops Room Project (Situational Awareness);
- 3.1.1.1.4 Kidnap;
- 3.1.1.1.5 Sensitive Intelligence Unit (SIU);
- 3.1.1.1.6 National HOLMES portfolio;
- 3.1.1.1.7 National Armed Policing (NAP);
- 3.1.1.1.8 **\*\*S23\*\***; and
- 3.1.1.1.9 SOC portfolio.

3.1.1.2 The Strategic Outline Case proposals have been presented to, and endorsed by, the following (see comments in Annex A):

- 3.1.1.2.1 ROCU heads (Dec 2021);
- 3.1.1.2.2 ROCU Executive (Dec 2021); and
- 3.1.1.2.3 SOC Board (Jan 2022).

### **3.2. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE**

- 3.2.1. The Strategic Outline Case was presented to the NPCC National Crime Co-ordination Committee on 09 Feb 22. There was wide agreement on both the need and current approach. The committee approved the progression of the Strategic Outline Case to the NPCC in Mar 22 for its final approval.

- 3.3. **STATEMENT/DETAILS OF COST OR RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS (All papers which have a funding request to Council will need to be approved first by the NPCC Finance Coordination Committee before submission to the NPCC central office)**

3.3.1. The cost for FY22/23 is £540,428 (this includes a risk-inside-cost (RIC) allocation of £128,140). Note: This bid was submitted and approved by the NPCC Audit and Assurance Board (Dec 21)<sup>2</sup> and was included in the NPCC meeting 02/03 Feb 22 although the full decision on approval was deferred to 22/23 Mar 22.

3.3.2. The impact of not funding this next stage of the project i.e. FY22/23 is assessed to be:

3.3.2.1. Loss of opportunity to conduct early market engagement thereby delaying the development and implementation of a new system or replacement of existing systems.

3.3.2.2. An implicit decision to continue with the status quo and allow forces to pursue siloed capability developments/procurements to fill existing gaps. This would mean a projected spend for UK policing of between £15.4m and £25.3m over the next four years while failing to address the root causes of multiple failures.

3.3.2.3. The continued acceptance of the risk exposure without a firm commitment and action plan in place to address the root causes.

#### 4. CONCLUSION

**\*\*S31 & S24\*\***

4.1. Against the in-scope capabilities/systems, there are no zero-cost options for UK policing. For example, the 'do-nothing' option sees the maintenance of current spend on existing (in-scope) capabilities totalling £11.5m over a comparative period (four years). Note: this is a conservative estimate as it only covers four of the several systems in use and this figure does not include any monetised inefficiencies that might be expected in fragmented capabilities.

4.2. A BAU approach (not recommended), over a comparative four years, is estimated to cost between £15.4m and £25.3m.

4.3. The initial ranged estimate for the recommended solution, over a 4-year period, is between £13.1m and £19.3m. Note: this ranged estimate includes the bid for FY22/23 (£540,428).

4.4. A feasibility stage has been concluded between Aug 21 and Jan 22. This Strategic Outline Case is the result of that stage and marks the transition to a merged appraisal and definition stage.

4.5. The next stage of the project will:

4.6.1. Confirm that the Competitive Procedure with Negotiation (CPN) is indeed the optimum procurement procedure (through additional market engagement and analysis).

4.6.2. Capture and confirm the non-negotiable user requirements prior to the negotiation stage of, what is expected to be the confirmed procurement strategy, a Competitive Procedure with Negotiation (CPN).

4.6.3. Develop the case for investment through a Full Business Case (FBC) including a recommended funding mechanism.

**5. DECISIONS REQUIRED.** The Chiefs' Council is requested to approve:

5.1. Addressing the current capability gap through a competitive procurement of the most economically advantageous solution – the Tailored Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) option.

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<sup>2</sup> Assumed date

- 5.2. Early market engagement with likely suppliers and the prior information notice (PIN) to be released in Q1 of FY22/23.
- 5.3. Progression to a merged Appraisal and Definition stage to allow the most appropriate platform/supplier to be recommended and to determine the most viable funding routes, delivery schedule and costs. The output of this merged stage will be the Full Business Case (FBC).
- 5.4. Allocation of a FY22/23 project budget of £540,428 (complete with a risk inside cost (RIC) allocation of £128,140) to deliver the next project stage.

**Tim Smith**  
**DCC**  
**NPCC Kidnap Lead and NP2IRM SRO**

Annexes:

**\*\*S31 & S23\*\***

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: National Mobilisation – Tier 3 Mutual Aid – Framework of Principles

23 March 2022/ Agenda Item: Regional

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<b>Author:</b>	ACC Owen Weatherill
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPoCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	9 February 2022
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Operations
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	Annex A
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### 1. Introduction

- 1.1 The NPCC is committed to having the required number of officers and staff trained in those key specialist skills often required during large scale events, such as public order, search and protest removal, as well as the commanders required across these disciplines. These officers and staff are volunteers and we recognise that they have been called upon to perform public order and mutual aid duties on an increasing scale over recent years, none more so than 2021.
- 1.2 Deployment to events such as the recent COP26 and G7, and indeed the forthcoming Commonwealth Games 'Operation Unity' have been and are likely to be lengthy in terms of time away from home. We recognise the goodwill and sacrifice officers and staff often make to enable this to happen. It is vital therefore that in order to continue to attract people to these crucial roles and maintain the ability to deploy them to high profile events, that we ensure as far as practicable a sense of fairness and consistency around our methods of deployment and remuneration.
- 1.3 The principles extend to 'non-specialists' as well. Operation Unity for example will see requests for significant numbers of general-purpose officers on mutual aid, as well as an ambition to offer Special Constables the opportunity to deploy.
- 1.4 In order to achieve this the NPCC recognise that officers must be adequately and fairly compensated for what they do, this should be both in terms of financial recompense and the conditions under which they are operating in. It is important that these principles are applied in a consistent manner across all forces, and that Police Regulations are understood and applied consistently.



- 1.5 Whilst the deployment of over 8000 officers to Scotland during COP26 was a huge success for UK Policing, one area of concern raised through debriefs is the lack of consistency in application of regulations and remuneration.
- 1.6 It is also important to note here the work being led by Supt Sarah Johnson (Northants) on behalf of CC Harrington in respect of attracting more women and under-represented groups to put themselves forward for Public Order roles.
- 1.7 Feedback from underrepresented groups identify that late or ineffective planning reduces the ability for individuals with caring or family responsibilities to be able to take up mutual aid deployments. Local practices also reduce representation with inflexible arrangements or by choosing the 'path of least resistance' thereby not encouraging diverse representation.
- 1.8 CC Harrington (NPCC Lead – Public Order Public Safety) and ACC Weatherill (National Mobilisation Coordinator) have commissioned NPoCC to recommend a 'Framework of Principles' for use in future deployments.

## **2. Aim of Report**

- 2.1 The aim of this report is to recommend a set of high-level principles and approaches for planning teams to use when making decisions around the resourcing options for mutual aid.
- 2.2 The report will be presented to Chief Constables' Council in March 2022 where agreement will be sought for all forces to sign up to these principles.
- 2.3 It is recognised that every deployment is unique, and that on occasions and for good operational reasons there may need to be a deviation from the principles. Ultimately decisions around resource numbers and deployment methods are for Chief Constables and Gold Commanders in the host force. However, agreement is sought to allow NPoCC to place greater scrutiny on any deviation through the National Mobilisation Coordinator and Regional Mobilisation Leads.
- 2.4 The aim of the report is not to discuss in detail all eventualities and scenarios. It is intended that NPoCC will be able to provide a 'library' of best practice made available to host forces, through which more detailed approaches can be accessed and considered.

## **3. Method**

### **3.1 Working Group (chaired by NPoCC) set up to progress the issues. Membership;**

- NPoCC Team
- NPCC Pay and Rewards
- Force Resourcing Manager TVP
- Op Unity representatives
- Op Urram (COP26) representative
- National Police Federation
- Police Superintendents Association
- NPOPS Lead – Diversity and Inclusion work

### **3.2 Framework drawn up. Further consultation with;**

- Regional Mobilisation Leads
- RICCs
- Mr Andy Rhodes – Oscar Kilo / Police Wellbeing

### **3.3 Amendments and final report to CC Harrington and ACC Weatherill.**

3.4 Debriefs, recommendations and themes from the recent G7 and COP26 deployments were threaded through this work.

3.5 Op Unity Team have been included in the discussions to ensure that issues around CWG 2022 were factored into this work (as far as practicable given that planning was at an advanced stage).

#### **4. Coordination Committee sign off**

4.1 This proposal was considered at Operations committee on 27<sup>th</sup> January 2022 where it was supported.

#### **5. Decisions Required**

5.1 Chiefs are requested to accept the framework as best practice, for adoption across all forces.





## **Framework of Principles – Annex A**

### **1. Rotas, Shift Patterns and Notification Periods**

- 1.1** Mutual aid deployments should be for no more than nine operational days, including travel days.
- 1.2** Police Regulations shall be adhered to, with proper reference to Working Time Law and Health and Safety at Work provisions.
- 1.3** Shifts should be rostered as 8 hour tours of duty. <sup>1</sup>
- 1.4** Recognising the impact of 1.3 above on operational planning, a maximum of 4 hours pre-planned overtime may be factored into the rostered working day.
- 1.5** With regard to 1.4 above, the host force must take cognisance of Health and Safety Legislation relating to working time. The donor force must also take into account duty commitments of officers in their home force at either side of the deployment and work with the host force and NPoCC on a case-by-case basis where needed.
- 1.6** The host force must aim to have a shift pattern and their completed resourcing requests with NPoCC (via Mercury) for all disciplines no less than 4 calendar months from the start of deployments. This gives NPoCC and RICCs the ability to populate requests and notify officers of a change of shift pattern by the 3 month cut-off date as per regulations. <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Temporary rotas for the purposes of mutual aid will not have attracted full consultation and due process as required for any VSA agreement, therefore the starting point must be 8 hour shifts as per regulations.

<sup>2</sup> It is recognised that the intelligence picture and therefore resource requirements change and that requests may be amended and that officers / staff may be deployed at shorter notice on the lead up to the event (thus be paid or recompensed differently for cancelled rest days etc.) however the starting point must be a well-planned, timely and regulation compliant approach to resourcing.

- 1.7** Duty time whilst deployed on mutual aid commences and finishes at the time the officers leave or return to their accommodation, not at a staging post or place of duty.

## **2. Rest Days**

- 2.1** Rest Days as part of a shift pattern during a mutual aid deployment should be avoided.
- 2.2** In order to ensure adequate rest period is provided consideration can be given to commencing and finishing the mutual aid deployment on a rostered Rest Day and finishing the deployment on a rest day (to be taken in the home force) prior to and following travel days). This decision is for the host force to make and must not be made by the donor force. <sup>3</sup>
- 2.3** If, having considered the principles thus far in this document, there is no remaining option but to request officers for a period of time which necessitates building in rest days whilst out of force, the aim should be that these are true rest days (unless absolutely necessary and approved by the Gold Commander) and the officers will therefore not be subject to the provisions of the 'Away From Home Allowance' (AFHA) restrictions of being immediately available for deployment. <sup>4</sup>
- 2.4** A consequence of 2.3 above is that officers will not be eligible for the nationally agreed AFHA payment (£50 or £80 currently) on the rest days. Host forces should instead consider exploring opportunities within regulations in respect of bonus payments (regulation 34), agree a recommendation through early consultation with Staff Associations, NPoCC and RMLs. The NMC will ultimately agree a consensus position and write to all donor forces recommending a consistent approach. <sup>5</sup>
- 2.5** Should rest days need to be cancelled, police regulations must be followed in respect of recompense, based on the notification timeframes set out in regulations.

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<sup>3</sup> This allows the host force to legitimately build in the cost to the deployment, but also allows the officers a true rest day at home.

<sup>4</sup> It must be noted however that host forces must have a clear policy in place, including financial and travel considerations, should no restrictions be placed on 'rest days' for officers in receipt of AFHA. Any travel home on these 'rest days' will in fact revert to this being a duty day. This is another reason rest days should be avoided mid-deployment.

<sup>5</sup> Chief Constables are asked to note that whilst officers will not be paid on these rest days, the force will re-charge the host force at full mutual aid rate for each rest day. Therefore the adoption of a reasonable bonus payment attached to the whole deployment, cognisant of the overall impact of length of time away (not just the rest day) will not leave the donor force out of pocket. Good practice during COP26 saw a pro-rata payment of £100 per rest day paid by most forces and we consider that this is a good baseline on each occasion.

**2.6** The use of 'shadow rotas' in donor force must not be used to attract payment for rest days.

**2.7** Officers must not be paid overtime unless they are physically working and reporting for duty.

### **3. Allowances and Bonuses**

**3.1** It is best practice for host forces to engage at an early stage with NPoCC and other key stakeholders to agree a set of recommended allowances and bonus payments, within regulations, and publish these through the RICCs. These should include:

- Use of Targeted Variable Payment (TVP), for example for Inspecting and Superintending ranks
- Use of reg 34 Bonus Payments
- Application within Police Regulations of the Away From Home Allowance (AFHA)
- Host Force agreement, within Police Regulations, in respect of overtime payments
- Application of pre-determined allowances should an officer report sick or need to isolate during a deployment.

**3.2** The NMC will seek to secure early agreement and national consistency with regards to the application of allowances with the RMLs.

**3.3** A 'role not rank' based approach must be taken to the awarding of allowances and bonuses, recognising that rank does not change the personal and family impact on officers deployed.

**3.4** NPoCC will work with host forces and RICCs to ensure that these agreements and learning are taken from event to event, in order to achieve long term consistency of approach.

**3.5** Special Constabulary – forces will adopt a consistent approach to the payment of allowances to Special Constables deployed on mutual aid. <sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Of note work is ongoing through Operation Unity (CWG), NPoCC and NPCC Lead for Specials to achieve a national position on this. Chief Constable are asked to note this and to sign-up in principle to a national position, subject to NPCC lead DCC Debicki final recommendations post-CWG.

## **4. Inclusivity and Wellbeing**

**4.1** Inclusivity and Workforce Representation considerations must be threaded through the core of any operation, from the planning stage through to delivery and debrief.

**4.2** Initially and understandably the approach often taken is to allocate duties to officers who are known to be keen to deploy for periods of out of force aid. Whilst pragmatically there is a place for this approach, we recommend that Chief Constables require Gold Commanders to ensure that local Planning Teams are exploring ways of including people with a variety of backgrounds, commitments and needs in these high-profile deployments.<sup>7</sup>

**4.3** Hosts must seek advice, through staff associations and other suitable advisors, in relation to ensuring that the personal, religious and cultural needs of all staff are factored into the planning of events. This is a non-negotiable position and reflects the diversity of our service and our communities. A key part of any peer review (discussed further on in this document) must be a focus on this aspect of planning.

**4.4** The 'Blue Light Wellbeing Framework' provides a useful reference point for Gold Commanders and Planning Leads. Host forces are encouraged to engage with the National Police Wellbeing Service at [www.oscarkilo.org](http://www.oscarkilo.org) during the planning stages of an event, where guidance and support (for example Wellbeing Vans) can be explored. Gold Commanders should ensure that welfare considerations are threaded through their Gold / Silver / Bronze meetings.

**4.5** Hosts should consider the use of Wellbeing Impact Assessments and Equality Impact Assessments to assist with and shape their plans. Donor forces should consider their own return to force debrief plans, with particular focus on officer welfare and event experience.

**4.6** Hosts should ensure any staff exposed to traumatic events and / or physical harm have the right post incident support provided whilst on mutual aid and also ensure their home force Occupational Health unit is notified so that continued support can be offered post-deployment.

**4.7** Hosts – Host forces must have a plan in place for the initial care of officers and staff who fall ill during a deployment. However, repatriation considerations remain the responsibility of the donor force. Plans must also include provision for officers and staff who need to return home for other welfare related reasons.

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<sup>7</sup> Research through NPOPS (Supt S Johnson) has shown that the nature of deployments (length, conflict with caring responsibilities, culture) plays a part in the failure to attract enough female officers to public order roles.

- 4.8** Accommodation provided must be approved by the Gold Commander and they must put steps in place to quality assure its suitability for mutual aid staff. Host forces must communicate the type of accommodation, room arrangements and meal provision arrangements as soon as far in advance of the deployment as possible.

## **5. Governance and Support – Implementing the Principles**

- 5.1** Chief Constables are asked to promote these principles in their forces, and in particular ensure through their RMLs and Gold Commanders that the application of the principles is monitored during the planning stages of all mutual aid operations.
- 5.2** Forces are encouraged to request peer review not only in relation to their operational plans, but following agreement of these principles a regular, supportive review of the application of the principles during the planning and deployment phases of all such operations.
- 5.3** NPCC will develop a pool of ‘volunteers’ with relevant skills and experience (to include resourcing, staff associations, wellbeing, pay and regulations) equipping them with the ability to constructively and supportively review and advise on aspects of host force plans contained within this framework. Chief Constables are asked to actively support this ‘independent advisory’ approach both in the requesting of and the providing of such advisors.

## **6. Review and Continuous Learning**

- 6.1** Each event provides new challenges. Debrief must include not only the operational element of the deployment, but also the application of principles within this framework. Learning, best practice and proposals to amend this framework will be passed to NPoCC for consideration by the NMC.
- 6.2** NPCC will provide a central repository for access to debriefs, as well as a library of good practice and practical application of the principles. They will also facilitate contact between command and planning teams on request.
- 6.3** As agreed across stakeholders consulted in the process of producing this document that further work should be considered in respect of how ‘fit for purpose’ some regulations and payment levels are, for example the AFHA regulation. NPoCC will ensure that feedback in these areas is captured and briefed to the NMC and NPCC for further consideration.



## Chief Constables' Council

### Title: National Mobilisation Plan for Protestor Removal Trained Officers Proposal

**23 March 2022/ Agenda Item: Regional**

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<b>Author:</b>	ACC Owen Weatherill
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPoCC
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#### 1. Purpose

1.1 On behalf of the National Mobilisation Coordinator and National Public Order Public Safety(POPS), this proposal seeks to develop the current Police

National Public Order Mobilisation plan (PNPOMP). This includes augmenting regional and national capability to mobilise Protester Removal Team (PRT) officers in mitigation of increased national risk and planning assumptions.

## **2. The Strategic Policing Requirement**

- 2.1 This proposal is cognisant of the Strategic policing requirement (SPR). This sets out how UK policing should respond to National threats incorporating the 5 C's of Capacity and Contribution, Capability, Consistency and Connectivity<sup>1</sup>.

## **3. Context**

**\*\*S31 & S24\*\***

## **Session 2 – (Presentations in pack)**

- **Performance Management Coordination Committee Session**
  - Beating Crime Plan Discussion
  - Relationships with HMI in respect of PEEL
  - Crime Recording
  - Annual Data Returns
  - Research and Innovation
  - Leadership of the wider performance and analysts across all forces and development of capabilities
  - CPPB and Data Tool.
- **999 League Tables Discussion - paper in pack**



- CC Sawyer
- CC Kennedy
- CC Rowley
- Peter Langmead-Jones
- Gillian Routledge
- Karen Mellodew
- Jon Bancroft

Introduction

HMICFRS Liaison

Crime Recording

Planning and Professionalising

Information and Insight

Research and Development

CPPB and Data Tool

# HMICFRS Liaison

- Primarily concerned with policy
- Maintain relationships with HMICFRS
- Representing the service's interests in the development of inspections
- FMS and monitoring arrangements

Participation in HMICFRS steering groups and advisory groups:

- NPCC/HMICFRS Engagement meeting
- PEEL External Reference Group
- FMS Steering Group


- Forces have the opportunity via the PMCC regional networks to raise any items in regard to HMICFRS to be explored, recently we have explored:
  - AFI, Diversity data collection at initial point of contact
  - Impact of the PAF, specifically VSA (CDI) upon performance
  - Impact of DG6 on investigation timeliness
- Influence
  - PAF Rapid Review
  - Improved communications
    - CPD Event held of HMI Cooke QPM DL – The Value of Independent Inspection
    - Inspection emerging findings

# CDI / HOCR update



- Steve Williams
- HMIC CDI inspection
- NCRS refresh
- Outcomes e.g.1a
- Additional Verifiable Information
- Death N300
- Hate Incidents
- Meeting with Niche / Connect






# Pronto CDI

**A solution to assist officers with NCRS rules**






# Pronto CDI



Pronto has been designed to streamline the input of Investigations enabling officers to complete them at the scene.

It has full integration to the C&C System to ensure the officer journey is as simple as possible.

The officer is able to view the Storm log and all associated information by selecting the “Deployed” button.





# Pronto CDI

The image shows a smartphone screen displaying the Pronto CDI interface. The screen is divided into two main sections: a left sidebar with a list of categories and a right main area with details for a selected incident.

**Left Sidebar (Categories):**

- Details (highlighted in blue)
- Caller
- Markers
- People
- Vehicles
- Log Entries
- Attending Resources
- Previous Incidents
- Linked Relations
- Critical Markers
- Incident Comments


**Right Main Area (Details for Incident LC-20220214-0003):**

- Incident No:** LC-20220214-0003
- Priority:** 1. Emergency
- Status:** 05-Attending
- Incident Date/Time:** 20:46:14/2/2022
- Call Type:** DOMESTIC CRIME
- Description:** DOMESTIC CRIME
- Handling Unit:** EF20
- Level 4:** SA
- Level 5:** SA37
- Case Ref No:** PENDING
- Incident Full Address:** 1 HUTTON HALL AVE, HU...
- Incident Street:** 1 HUTTON HALL AVE
- Incident:** HUTTON HALL AVE
- Incident Town/City:**

At the bottom of the right main area, there is a blue button with a white icon and the text "USE".

From the Storm log, the officer is able to “Use” the data in to any of the Pronto forms.

Pressing “Use” for a Connect Investigation form will copy over as much data as possible from Storm to prevent data re-entry and double keying by the officer.








# Pronto CDI

A smartphone screen showing the Pronto CDI app interface. The app has a dark blue header with a back arrow, the text "Investigation: New Inves...", a magnifying glass icon, a checkmark icon, and a menu icon. Below the header are several expandable sections: "Incident Details", "Investigation Details", "Enquiry Log", "Action", "MO", and "Search Results". Below these is a grey button labeled "ADD INTO ...". There are two yellow expandable sections: the first is labeled "[ ]: Person: HAYLEY SMITH" and the second is labeled "[ ]: Person: JOHN SMITH". Each yellow section contains a grey "REMOVE" button and a grey "SEARCH" button with a magnifying glass icon. At the bottom right of the screen, the text "User 327: Training" is visible.

The form displays all mandatory fields in yellow and will not allow the form to be completed until they have all been completed and have turned grey.

The officer is able to enter a Primary and any number of Included Classifications.






# Pronto CDI

A smartphone screen displaying the Pronto CDI app interface. The screen shows a list of sections: Incident Details, Investigation Details, Enquiry Log, Action, MO, Search Results, and Golden Hour Actions. Below these is an "ADD INTO ..." button. The "Person" section is expanded, showing "HAYLEY SMITH" with "REMOVE" and "SEARCH" buttons. The "Location" section is also expanded, showing "Location" with "REMOVE" and "SEARCH" buttons. The "Person" section is expanded again, showing "JOHN SMITH" with "REMOVE" and "SEARCH" buttons. The bottom of the screen is a large white area.

Pronto will also calculate any “Golden Hour Actions” based on the Classification entered, or combination of Classifications.

These actions will be raised as individual actions within the Investigation and can be sent in as outstanding, part resulted or completed.





# Pronto CDI

A smartphone screen showing the Pronto CDI app interface. The app has a dark blue header with a back arrow, the title "Investigation: New Inves..", a search icon, a checkmark icon, and a menu icon. Below the header is a list of expandable sections: Incident Details, Investigation Details, Enquiry Log, Action, MO, Search Results, and Golden Hour Actions. Below these is an "ADD INTO ..." button. The main content area shows three entries: "[Victim]: Person: HAYLEY SMITH", "Incident Location: Location", and "[Suspect]: Person: JOHN SMITH". Each entry has a "REMOVE" button and a "SEARCH" button with a magnifying glass icon. The bottom of the screen is a large white area for additional information or notes.


Once the form has been completed the officer presses the “tick” to complete the form.

The form instantly sends to the Connect system and the Crime number is made available to the officer.

Completion at the scene allows the officer to provide this to the Victim immediately.



# Pronto CDI



Where Pronto detects Classifications that require standalone Investigations, as per NCRS rules, it automatically creates the required number of Investigations.

All Investigations contain the original details and are linked to one another.

Currently, officers are required to manually copy any Investigations that are subject to these rules. This solution will prevent this and save time.



# Pronto CDI

Additionally, officers are assisted with contextual prompts. These appear when relevant Classifications are chosen, and will inform officers of NCRS rules around recording of Rape, S4 & S4A Public Order, Affray and Breach of Restraining Order / Injunction

**Primary Classification. If this is a crime investigation ensure the crime class is selected as the Primary Classification\***

Rape of a female (16 or over) (Indictable)

**If there are multiple suspects for this offence, please submit multiple Investigations with a single suspect on each.**

**You can save time by copying this completed Investigation within Pronto using 'Copy To'.**

A smartphone screen displaying the Pronto CDI app. The screen shows a form for creating a new investigation. The top bar has a back arrow, 'Investigation: New..', a search icon, a checkmark icon, and a menu icon. The main section is titled 'Investigation Details'. It includes a 'New/Edit Investigation?' section with radio buttons for 'New Investigation' and 'Edit Investigation'. Below this is a 'Connect ID' field. Then, there are three date/time pickers: 'Event on/from\*', 'Event to\*', and 'Reported time\*'. A red box highlights the 'Primary Classification' section, which contains the text 'Primary Classification. If this is a crime investigation ensure the crime class is selected as the Primary Classification\*' and a dropdown menu showing 'Rape of a female (16 or over) (Indictable)'. Below this is an 'INCLUDED CLASSIFICATION' section with a 'NEW' button. Then, there is a 'KEYWORDS' section with a 'NEW' button. Finally, there is a 'Reporting method\*' dropdown menu. The bottom of the screen shows the standard Android navigation bar.



**Peter Langmead-Jones**

**PMCC: PLANNING AND PERFORMANCE**



# Planning and Performance Portfolio...

...support and development

...rather than projects and documents

- Excellence in Policing (EiP)
- All Forces Performance Group (AFPG)
- Regional network



Excellence in Policing

- Conferences and events
  - Run by the service for the service
  - Anticipate demands and needs
  - Share effective practice
  - Aimed at senior leaders and practitioners







## 22<sup>nd</sup> Year

*2021: Joining the dots: understanding the changing policing performance landscape*

*2020: What are you talking about ?*

*2019: Insight: in search of cause and consequence*

*2018: Better choices: the prognosis for policing*

*2017: Vital Signs: insight to action*

*2016: Current and Future Expectations*

*2015: From Knowing to Doing: what really enables practice ?*

*2014: Practice under Pressure: where are the people ?*

*2013: Missing the Targets ... let's remember the point*

*2012: People and Performance*

*2011: Choosing to be Better: what are the priorities for policing ?*

*2010: Accounting for Performance*

*2009: Confidence in the New Performance Landscape: new roles, new responsibilities*

*2008: Getting in Shape for the Future: what matters most ?*

*2007: The Future in Balance*

*2006: Joining Forces for Performance Improvement*

*2005: Shaping Citizen Focussed policing for our communities*

*2004: Improving policing for our communities*


*2003: Improving police performance for the public*

*2002: Improving standards and quality of police service delivery*

*2001: Police excellence in performance*

Presenter Notes  
2022-03-21 13:20:05

First few conferences wrestling with...  
the creation of the Police Standards Unit  
the need for a framework to assess the  
of police – which became PPAF the  
need for a standardised approach for  
assessing the quality of service  
Moved on to consider –  
the one top-down numerical target –  
One of the first conferences to



EIP17: Vital signs: insight to action

From PPAF to PEEL

7 PMCC heads / 9 Home Secretaries

# **AFPG - All Forces Performance Group**

- A practitioner group
  - Those working in planning and performance
  - 47 police forces + other agencies / organisations
  - Shares issues of interest and concern
  - Shares practice
  - Anticipates forthcoming demands
  - Informs development
  - Gives practitioners a voice in PMCC




Varying approaches to capturing data  
Varying approach to and reference to  
Varying approaches to measurement,  
management, accountability Career  
progression and status of practitioners  
Links with other needs / disciplines  
Career progression and status of  
Skills development - availability of

# AFPG- recurring issues

- **Recognition**
  - analytical and planning services
- **Systems and information**
  - availability and quality
- **Capacity, capability, condition of workforce**
  - recruitment, retention, progression
- **Career development**
  - training and coaching
- **Techniques**
  - capture, analysis, presentation
- **Demands for information (at the cost of insight)**
  - HMICFRS; Home Office; NPCC; PCC; FOI; Chief Offices
- **Making sense**
  - initiatives, performance frameworks

# Regional Network



# Regional Network

- National Outcomes
- National and proxy measures
- Context
- Patterns and trends
- Initiatives and interventions
- Anticipating future issues of interest & concern



**Peter Langmead-Jones**

**OBSERVATIONS & QUESTIONS**

## PMCC Update



Gillian Routledge  
PMCC Information and Insights Workstream Lead

March 2022

# Information and Insights



## **Aim**

To support the collection, visualisation and interpretation of data to draw insights to improve performance.

Provide advice and guidance on Performance Management Frameworks.

Link with portfolios and partners to offer guidance and support.



# The Data Dream

**Aim** – A *single* version of an accurate **Data Truth**  
Produced Once and used Many times

**Issues** – *Multiple Data sources*, collection routes, definitions and requirements.  
*Desire to have 'new*, specific, aligned **data** by new or changing leads,  
when there may already be appropriate data streams  
Indicators are *indicative*  
This leads to not only to data variations, but *issues with drawing insights*.

**Interdependencies** – IMORC Data Standards, Other NPCC Portfolios (e.g. RASSO, CJ, VAWG) HO and HMCFRS.

# Main Drivers

There have been 2 main drivers over the last 12 months:

The ***CPPB Measures*** and emerging thematic areas, working with stakeholders and partners to establish the DCPD – a ***single data truth***.

The ***ADR***, including the use of ***NDQIS***.

# Annual Data Requirement (ADR)

## The Process:

Annual cycle, commencing in April, proposals are raised, consulted upon and finalised, aligned to thematic and policy areas.

Guidance to standardise measures and collection issued to forces Q4 for the following 12 months, commencing Q1.

Main issue with some ADRs is the accuracy and completeness, resulting in big differences.

ADR can be mandated or voluntary

# 2022/23 ADR requirements

**35 ADRs with no change** - including Homicide, Recorded Crime, CSA, and 999 Calls

**8 Amendments** - custody data, use of force and NSIR

NSIR is linked to additional **ASB data**, providing a **challenge** on updating the **standard** and common definitions.

## **4 New ADRs**

ADR 151 – new voluntary requirement to **identify crimes of violence and sexual offences** which were **motivated by hostility** of the sex of the victim.

ADR 152 Crime in prisons – new mandatory requirement to identify **crimes occurring in prisons**.

ADR 153 – new voluntary requirement standardise **collection of protected characteristics** of victims/suspects data collected across all ADRs – scope tbc. Very likely will cover collection of age, sex (and gender ID), ethnicity, may also extend to disability, sexual orientation and religious belief.

ADR 722 – new voluntary requirement to collect metrics on the number of **victims of rape** who have had to **surrender mobile devices** to the police for the gathering of digital forensics for **more than 24 hours**.

# National Data Quality Improvement System NDQIS

## Purpose:

Designed to ***improve the data quality of ADRs*** using Natural Language Processing ***NLP***. Currently manual flags, with high QA levels.

Possible additional benefits in analytical time and in 'write back' to force systems.

## Current Position:

ADR 160 – ***Knife Crime first to go live*** (briefed previously to NPCC), rule set verified, and finalised. Data published

Using NDQIS has significantly ***improved accuracy***.

***39 live*** forces, ***16 coupled*** (i.e. have write back to force systems)

# National Data Quality Improvement System NDQIS

## **Future ADRs:**

### **ADR-119 *Domestic Violence:***

Rule set tested and peer reviewed. 98.5% accurate for high confidence records. The main concern of forces are downstream impacts on safeguarding teams and what this means for activity. Awaiting feedback and meeting with NPCC DV workstream.

### **ADR-205 *Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation:***

CSE Paused, subjective and inconsistent. CSA rule set finalised and being peer reviewed by forces.

### **ADR-115 *Hate Crime:***

Rule set finalised

# NPCC Performance Management Co-ordination Committee Research & Innovation

Dr Karen Mellodew



Devon & Cornwall  
**POLICE**

# Workstream 1: Understanding demand

- Launched in 2018 in collaboration with the College and HMICFRS
- Established network of demand practitioners
- Events facilitated by the College
- Supported development of Force Management Statement capability across the service
- Events to consider methods used for forecasting, futures thinking, risk assessment, demand and resource allocation.



# Workstream 2: Understanding resilience

- Evidence gathered to support spending review 2019
- FMSs reviewed to draw out common themes and issues – national narrative about service under critical pressure
- Key themes: service rationing, reduced proactive policing, limited prevention or early intervention
- Tipping point identified in 2014/15
- Contributed to Op Uplift
- Non-crime demand and implications for funding formula review

# Workstream 3: Understanding service delivery

- Covid threat to effective service delivery
- Op Talla data return established to track crime, anti-social behaviour and the service provided through the pandemic
- Used to inform Home Office, COBRA, NPCC portfolio leads, MoJ, individual forces and academic partners
- Included two futures reports tracking expected trends as restrictions eased
- Proof of concept – NPCC led, facilitated by HMICFRS

# Workstream 4: Building insight

- The challenge – to deliver a common single understanding about what the data are telling us
- Insight Working Group – NPCC-led, with Home Office, HMICFRS, APCC representatives
- Has established a common consistent method to identifying forces that are outliers
- Next step is to draw together the collected understanding about what is driving performance difference

# NPCC Performance Management Co-ordination Committee Research & Innovation

Dr Karen Mellodew

\*\*S31\*\*



Devon & Cornwall  
**POLICE**

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Initial update for the publication of 999 Performance Data (Beating Crime Plan)

**23 March 2022 / Agenda Item: Session 2 – Performance Management Coordination Committee**

<p align="center"><b>Security Classification</b></p> <p>Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI):</p>	
<p align="center"><b>OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE</b></p>	
<p align="center"><b>Freedom of information (FOI)</b></p> <p>This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer &amp; Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. For external Public Authorities in receipt of an FOI, please consult with <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk</a></p>	
<b>Author:</b>	CC Olivia Pinkney
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Chair, Local Policing Coordination Committee
<b>Date Created:</b>	17 <sup>th</sup> March 2022
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Local Policing Coordination Committee
<b>Portfolio:</b>	National Contact Management Portfolio & Digital Public Contact Programme
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	
<p align="center"><b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b></p> <p>In compliance with the Government's Security Policy Framework's (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised, and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk</a></p> <p align="center"><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a></p>	

### 1. TO ENSURE CHIEF OFFICERS ARE AWARE OF AND SUPPORT THE IMPENDING PUBLICATION OF 999 PERFORMANCE DATA

- 1.1. The publication of 999 performance data will be of interest to colleagues and the public. It is important to ensure that all understand the rationale for publication and that the data is considered with the appropriate context of a *'proactive public and transparent response by policing to the need to ensure the public know how responsive their local force is when they call them for help'* as set out in the government's Beating Crime Plan, published in July 2021.

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. The government's Beating Crime Plan, published in July 2021, aims for a targeted approach towards crime with the focus on three key areas:

- Cutting homicide, serious violence and neighbourhood crime
- Exposing and ending hidden harms and prosecuting perpetrators
- Building capability and capacity to deal with fraud and online crime



- 2.2. Additionally, the plan seeks to, “Improving the responsiveness of local police to 101 and 999 calls by working with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services to develop league tables for answering calls and ensuring that the public know how responsive their local force is when they call them for help.”
- 2.3. In response to this, the Home Office, NPCC Contact Management Portfolio, Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabularies, Fire and Rescue Service and the Digital Public Contact (DPC) Programme<sup>1</sup> established on 11<sup>TH</sup> February a 999/101 League Table Working Group with a clear Terms of Reference set up to deliver the commitment set out in the plan. Their responsibilities include:
- Representing and being empowered to make decisions on behalf of policing nationally at NPCC/APCC level; Home Office policy (NPCU) and Analysis and Insights (HOAI); HMICFRS
  - Agreeing data to be published (999 only initially). 101 is on hold due to the re-contracting of that service
  - Providing senior oversight and direction of specific agreed deliverables (commissioning work packages as necessary to DPC and suppliers)
  - Providing visible and sustained support for the project
  - Approving all major plans
  - Monitoring and controlling project progress (plan, milestones, risks, issues, change)
  - Supporting, unblocking, and escalating risks and issues outside the Group as required
  - Ensuring the appropriate resources and funding are available
  - Ensuring the appropriate communications are cascaded to the relevant stakeholders and teams
- 2.4. Senior police representatives from the National Contact Management Steering Group (Chaired by ACC Todd) have been engaging with BT and HOAI to ensure governance around the call dataset.
- 2.5. The 999 data analysis has already identified numerous anomalies around local infrastructure, routing and queuing which are being addressed locally and are driving waiting time reductions. That work is being managed within National Contact Management Steer Group network to encourage national improvement within the broader Contact Management Strategy.
- 2.6. The Working Group has agree that a full data set will be published with a corresponding narrative [how we measure and an explanation of why we are measuring in a particular way] on the “Performance” tab for every England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland force on the police-funded Police.uk platform. The name of the page will need to be changed to reflect the inclusion of an all-forces 999 performance data table to “Performance and Performance Data”.

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
<sup>1</sup> Digital Public Contact Programme - Mission: *Provide a range of convenient, accessible, integrated digital policing services for the public, to meet Policing priorities*. DPC is the delivery function supporting the Working Group.

2.7. The Initial elements from the 999 datasets will be published in sortable table forms accessed via buttons titled “999”, comprising:

- Force name (defaulted to sorted in alphabetical order, ascending)
- 999 Call volumes
- Average call answering time – as a standard indicator (and Police Scotland performance metric)
- Median call answering time – to provide an indicator of typical caller experience
- Percentage of calls answered in under 10 seconds – to show adherence to the England, Wales & Northern Ireland performance metric [BT round the call waiting time down to the nearest second]
- Percentage of calls answered in 60 seconds and more – to show provide a measure of public confidence
- Percentage of calls answered between 10 and 60 seconds – to show full call answering picture

2.8. It was also agreed by the Working Group and supported at the Local Policing Coordination Committee (LPCC) that, although the BT provided data does not always directly correspond with internal policing data, it is the appropriate data to publish as it best reflects the experience of the public when using 999.

2.9. The below initial web-page designs show how the data will appear on the police.uk platform:



[View as a list](#)

Police Force	Total calls	Average answer time	Median	Calls answered in 10 to (under) 60 seconds (% of all calls)
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%

[View as a list](#)


Police Force	Total calls	Average answer time	Median	Calls answered at 60 seconds or longer (% of all calls)
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%
Devon and Cornwall	0000000	0000000	0000000	0000000 00.0%

Public can sort on the % value

2.10. It is necessary to show the data in these separate tables as the page width for police.uk is optimised for viewing on mobile devices (the majority of police.uk traffic is from mobiles).

2.11. 999/101 League Table Working Group and suppliers are working to a Home Office publication target date of **31st May 2022**.

2.12. A subsequent iteration of the data set will allow the data to also be presented in graph form to facilitate trend understanding, demonstrated below:



2.13. The publication of 999 performance data will, in time, be followed by the publication of 101 performance and then potentially other performance data.



### **3. RISKS AND ISSUES**

- 3.1. Delivery against the end May deadline is very tight and demands quick-time decision making.
- 3.2. The Beating Crime Plan frames the Governments desire for this data to be published within a “League Table” context. No other related performance data elsewhere within the criminal justice system is presented in a “League Table” context (e.g. The CJS “Scorecard”). The published data will be titled 999 Performance Data.
- 3.3. There is a risk that the “League Table” context may drive perverse and counter-productive behaviours within policing such as a narrow focus on 999 volumes and/or answering times rather than the service trend, (for example, seasonal variations or external factors such as covid), leading to degrading public contact experience rather than the improving citizen experience over time we all want to see.
- 3.4. The “League Table” context, where forces could be pitched into competition with other forces, could also erode this spirit of the one team approach and cooperation that we have worked hard to achieve.

#### **3.5. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE**

- 3.5.1. This paper is submitted by LPCC following approval of a supporting paper by that Committee on 16 March 2022.

#### **3.6. COST/RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS**

- 3.6.1. Delivered within the Home Office DPC funding envelope and therefore no additional cost implications.
- 3.6.2. Publication of the data will need to be supported by both internal and external communicational activity to ensure it is presented within the appropriate policing transparency and responsiveness context.

### **4. CONCLUSION**

- 4.1. The publication of the 999-performance data offers policing an opportunity to demonstrate both performance transparency and focus on a performance area that is important to our communities.
- 4.2. It will be important that, when making this data public, it is received by the public within context, and by officers and staff as a metric to help drive a trend of improvement.

### **5. DECISIONS REQUIRED**

- 5.1. That this Council agrees the above plans for the publication of 999 performance data and makes communications resource available to support. A further detailed update will be provided to regional and Chief Constables’ Council in May.

**National Contact Management Portfolio – ACC Alan Todd**  
**Digital Public Contact Programme – DCC Simon Megicks**

[Back to Agenda](#)

### **Session 3**

- **Police Science and Technology Strategy Session (paper in the pack)**

# Chief Constables' Council

## Police Science and Technology Strategy

23 March 2022 / Agenda Item: Session 3

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<b>Author:</b>	Paul Taylor
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	15/03/22
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Office of the Chief Scientific Advisor (OCSA)
<b>Portfolio:</b>	N/A
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	
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### 1. INTRODUCTION/PURPOSE



- 1.1. This session invites Chief Officers to examine and give direction to key elements of our first Policing Science and Technology strategy. The conversation will inform the draft submitted to the regional process, with the intention of bringing a final version for agreement to the July 2022 Council. We will be joined in July by Sir Patrick Vallance (GCSA) and Prof. Sir Anthony Finkelstein (chair of the newly formed NPCC National Science Council).
- 1.2. Your input at this stage is valuable because a core aspect of the strategy—how we enable national leadership without curtailing local innovation—can be resolved in different ways, each with advantages and disadvantages. Moreover, other aspects of the strategy that I see as straightforward may not be to you; identifying these now will be helpful.
- 1.3. I should reinforce that this is policing's Science and Technology strategy. I will work collaboratively and unfailingly to support its implementation. But ultimately, the strategy seeks to articulate a single cross-policing ambition, one shared by Forces, the **\*\*S23\*\***, the College of Policing, HMICFRS, APCC, Bluelight Commercial, Police Digital Service, Forensic Capability Network, and others.

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1. We should be proud of the breadth and quality of science and technology (S&T) within policing. Our S&T drives crime prevention and detection, helps safeguard victims, protects our workforce, and delivers everybody's right to a fair trial. Yet, the pace of innovation means we have much more to gain, and more to do to stay ahead of the crime opportunities created by new technologies. What has got us here, will not suffice in the future. To unlock the efficiencies that S&T can deliver, we will need to do things differently.



- 2.2. Consultation with over 1,000 individuals across NPCC, government, industry and academia found a remarkably consistent account of what we need to do differently. Those consulted suggest that policing would benefit from an approach that:
- overcomes current fragmentation in S&T across the Service, to reduce duplication and catalyse learning and collaboration
  - empowers leaders with the skills and knowledge to make informed decisions, so that good S&T can rapidly scale and embed across the country
  - operates a robust prioritisation method that delivers a unified view of our S&T requirements, thus providing a clear 'demand signal' to academia and industry
  - reduces policing's focus on solving 'quick win' problems at the expense of developing game-changing capabilities. A system that gets 'up-stream' so that innovation fits policing's needs
  - addresses the view that funding dispersed between forces means there is no clear strategic direction and no efficient way to develop and deliver national-level S&T capabilities.
- 2.3. The draft national S&T strategy responds to the opportunities found in the consultation. It is structured by three pillars: Engage, Evolve, and Embed. Engage speaks to the need to catalyse and grow the community so that all who wish to contribute can do so. Evolve recognises the value of developing S&T strategically, ensuring we invest in all areas of policing and balance today's need with tomorrow's opportunity. Embed recognises that Engage and Evolve can only deliver if we have efficient ways of moving local innovation into national capability.
- 2.4. The following table outlines the strategy's commitments, the early actions I propose to take to address these commitments, and the actions Chief Officers will need to take in support.

Pillar	Commitment	Early Actions	Implication for Chiefs/Forces
 Engage	We will grow a <b>vibrant, cross-sector community</b> . We will be <b>clear about our needs</b> and collaborate by default	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement governance committees and community structures</li> <li>Run a dynamic programme of industry/academia engagement</li> <li>Publish and disseminate 'Areas of Research Interest'</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify a Force RD&amp;I lead to support two-way engagement</li> <li>Encourage officers to attend engagement events</li> <li>Be comfortable with publication of policing's S&amp;T needs</li> </ul>
	We will grow and diversify <b>scientific expertise</b> across policing to underpin growth and improve resilience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Develop the science profession via, e.g., <a href="#">GSE</a> [in collab. with CoP]</li> <li>Increase the accessibility of science knowledge xGov and with the public</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Encourage growth of a science profession and its community</li> <li>Support officers keen to report their RD&amp;I to others/public</li> </ul>
 Evolve	We will <b>prioritise and conduct high-quality research and innovation</b> that delivers the S&T policing needs now and in the future	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Deliver an <a href="#">annualised national prioritisation</a> that is clear about what we Lead, Collaborate, and Follow</li> <li>Create a 'pipeline' of S&amp;T delivering today and preparing for tomorrow</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Commit to an agreed prioritisation and a resourcing structure that ensures policing S&amp;T grows efficiently and benefits all (see Section #3 below)</li> </ul>
	We will be <b>ethical and transparent</b> in our development and use of S&T to enable scrutiny and grow public trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure central visibility of all S&amp;T activities to provide assurance against the <a href="#">Research Concordat</a> (RC) criteria</li> <li>Promote and enable best practice across NPCC members</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Understand your responsibilities under the RC</li> <li>Implement mechanisms that uphold RC standards</li> <li>Support NPCC/OCSA in returning annual Concordat report</li> </ul>



Embed

<p>We will establish mechanisms to ensure <b>great ideas can rapidly scale and embed</b> into policing practice</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deliver a system that facilitates strategic (and often joint) scaling of mature S&amp;T innovation, advising on skills, governance, procurement, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Be willing to share local innovation</li> <li>• Be responsive to 'green' and 'red' notices about possible S&amp;T investments</li> </ul>
<p>We will <b>evaluate S&amp;T's impact</b> on policing outcomes, building evidence for future investment decisions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish a programme for evaluating impact so that we can articulate the value of S&amp;T</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Engage with the evaluation process</li> <li>• Respond to learning that comes from evaluations</li> </ul>

2.5. **DISCUSSION REQUIRED:** My sense is the implications outlined in the above table are straightforward, albeit that more understanding may be needed around some issues, such as what is required to fulfil the Research Concordat. However, I welcome questions and comments before moving to the substantive question.

### 3. HOW BEST TO ENSURE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP OF S&T WITHOUT STIFLING LOCAL INNOVATION?

- 3.1. To deliver effectively what the consultation and strategy proposes, the NPCC will need complete knowledge of the research and innovation (R&I) occurring within policing. This central picture would benefit many. For example, Coordination Committees identify national S&T priorities but the delivery of R&I to address them often occurs within Forces. The Home Office Commissioning Hub seeks to resolve this discrepancy, but since 80% of their funding goes on 'servicing' (i.e., addressing near-time costs to keep technology operational), R&I remains the purview of Forces.
- 3.2. How best, then, to ensure national join-up and leadership of S&T (e.g., by the Office of the Chief Scientific Advisor, OCSA) without stifling local innovation? The Table below summarises three options for solving this challenge. They are arguably not mutually exclusive, but adopting more than one adds complexity—a factor we should seek to reduce.

Option	Advantages	Disadvantages
<p><b>Status quo+ model</b> Continue 'as is,' but add reporting into OCSA to improve national knowledge</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No interruption to current processes and no concerns about loss of control</li> <li>• Forces able to adapt and be agile in their delivery of S&amp;T / RD&amp;I</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All the limitations identified in 2.2 above largely remain</li> <li>• With no consolidation and efficiencies, we will fail to keep pace with accelerating progress in S&amp;T</li> <li>• Inability to make an informed annual report against the Research Concordat</li> </ul>
<p><b>Double-lock model</b> Funding and choice is decided locally but also goes through a national 'lock' for QA and oversight (e.g., through a Force RD&amp;I Lead board)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OCSA will support dissemination of results and implications</li> <li>• Reduce duplication (e.g., can point projects to prior examples)</li> <li>• OCSA can reinforce best practice</li> <li>• Identify opportunities for running parallel evaluation</li> <li>• Identify opportunities for scaling projects with NPCC/xGov partners</li> <li>• Provide Forces assurance around QA and ethics</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There is a time and effort burden of going through the national 'lock'</li> <li>• Difficult to ensure all who innovate understand and focus on national priorities</li> <li>• Limited ability to run large-scale national 'game-changing' RD&amp;I programmes as funds are local</li> <li>• Limited ability to create co-investment with OGDs</li> </ul>

Option	Advantages	Disadvantages
<b>Centralised Institute (the 'NIHR model')</b> All RD&I funds are collated and dispersed by a central team to maximise impact on national and local priorities	<p>Everything under the Double-lock model plus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective cost sharing on NPCC priorities, particularly supporting those with smaller resources</li> <li>• Economies of scale can enable large game-changing programmes of activity not possible currently</li> <li>• Budget control makes securing co-investment from OGDs and industry straightforward</li> <li>• Strong connection between local and national investments</li> <li>• Easier for R&amp;I to fail (as % can be supervised), critical for learning</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A further 'top-slice' given to 'centre' and a loss of RD&amp;I budget control</li> <li>• Potential of stifling innovation if Institute mechanisms are not agile</li> <li>• Potential (albeit low) for a local priority in any given year not being supported</li> <li>• The relationship between what a Force puts in and what they get back will need careful management</li> </ul>

**3.3. DISCUSSION REQUIRED: Which of the three options (or an alternative) do you support to be taken forward in the national S&T strategy?**

**4. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS**

- 4.1. The options we are discussing will have resource implications. First, delivering the strategy's objectives will require some of the STAR fund to be spent centrally rather than on local projects. The STAR board agreed at its February 2022 meeting that a split between funding local innovation and ensuring national coherence of S&T was an appropriate use of the STAR fund.
- 4.2. Second, adoption of the Centralised Institute model would require Forces to consolidate their R&I funds, and the process by which this could be achieved will need to be determined.
- 4.3. Third, as our understanding of the S&T landscape matures (as would occur under model 2 and 3), Chief Officers may wish to consider a minimum commitment regarding investment in R&I, so that the burden of development is shared proportionately. This may come in the form of expectations around %-of-budget spent on R&I, as occurs within Defence. Or it may come in the form of expectations around adoption of successful investments, giving important certainty to the innovation pipeline.

**5. NPCC STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES THAT YOUR TOPIC SUPPORTS**

- 5.1. Objective 4: Collaborate with partners to deliver transformative innovation and new technologies that improve all aspects of policing

**6. DECISIONS REQUIRED**

- 6.1. Item for discussion only. NPCC should seek to deliver the most scientifically advanced police service in the world. We have the foundation to do so. The recommendations and choices outlined above will shape the system and delivery that we achieve moving forward.

**Name:** Professor Paul Taylor

**Title:** Chief Scientific Advisor for Policing

**Lead Area:** Science, Technology, Analysis, and Research (STAR)

[Back to Agenda](#)



#### **Session 4 – (Presentation in the pack)**

- **College of Policing Update**

# College of Policing Update

**CC Andy Marsh QPM - CEO**





# The Fundamental Review

Launched in March 2021

Interviews with around 80 key stakeholders including chiefs and senior officers, staff associations and support networks, other policing bodies, PCCs, unions, academics, consultants, and other professional bodies.

90 submissions to the written call for evidence.

Focus groups with College staff, officers and police staff in forces.

Survey of police officers and staff conducted at the start of the summer.


# Challenges for the College & Policing

## For the College...

- Communications and Engagement
- Usefulness
- Quality
- Credibility
- Culture

## and policing more widely

- Learning and Development
- Leadership
- Evidence base
- Consistency
- Coordination
- D, E & I



- The College budget has reduced by 17% since 2015/16 in real terms.
- Combined with rising officer numbers, this means a 21% reduction in investment in development and skills.
- College budget is less than 0.5% of the total spend on policing.

**Key Question: How much are we collectively prioritising, and investing in, development and leadership?**



**A clear vision for  
the College**

# The Evidence Base

**Mission:** To ensure officers have access to the evidence they need to cut crime and keep the public safe

- **What Works** – The What Works Centre should be focused on promoting the most well-evidenced practice in policing, but also promoting emerging and promising practice based on policing craft and experience, not just academically approved interventions.
- **Hierarchy of Guidance** – Guidance and advice should be focused on the needs of officers and staff undertaking different roles, always passing the ‘2am test’ for utility for stretched officers responding to challenging situations.
- **Promoting Innovation** – The College should gather innovation and rapidly pass it out to other forces.
- **College in my Pocket** – An App, available for free to all officers and staff with regularly updated practical guidance on how to respond to the range of policing challenges.

# Standards and Support

**Mission: Driving greater consistency across policing and boosting performance in the basics**

- **Minimum Standards** – Supplementing APP with clearer minimum standards in areas where greater consistency should be promoted, and consider the Colleges regulation-setting powers.
- **Emerging Issues** – Produce quicker guidance on emerging issues to support forces and PCCs in navigating new challenges and innovations in policing.
- **Direct Support** – Develop a function to more actively support forces, particularly in priority areas:
  - **Implementation Support** – Active support in the implementation of new guidance, standards, innovation and best practice.
  - **Performance Improvement Team** – The College should be able to bring together experts from within policing to provide direct support on particular issues where expert input would be beneficial.
  - **Peer Review** – Boost the peer support provided to forces with serious failings, as identified by HMIC.
- **PCCs** - Boost support for PCCs across policy development, oversight and professional development

# Learning, Development and Leadership

**Mission: To ensure world-class learning, CPD and Leadership across police forces**


- **Learning and Development** – A clear learning and development framework for officers and staff, linked clearly to roles and associated development needs. College products should aspire to excellence using innovative teaching methods. Rationalise and standardise equality, diversity and inclusion training.
- **CPD** – Develop a series of world class products, including short bitesize products explicitly linked to roles officers and staff are undertaking, with menus of options developed to promote effective performance in areas necessary for the roles. There should be a single approach to PDRs across policing.
- **Delivery** – Create a wider ecosystem for learning and development, with a clear role in setting learning outcomes, standards and curricula, then licensing providers – including in the private sector – and quality assuring provision and delivery.
- **Digital** – Developing the Digital Skills Academy, working effectively with PDS. Review the range of learning and training curricula to ensure that the latest digital skills are prioritised. Consider the role for the College in the development of the Crime and Justice Data Lab.
- **Leadership** – The College as the National Police Leadership Centre, working with NPCC to boost the offer for policing at all levels and develop for a new strategic home for policing. All of the levers of the College – recruitment, training and promotion and progression routes - should be working together to drive the highest quality of leadership across forces, using a range of innovative programmes, building on the best offers in forces and other sectors. The College should have a formal advisory role in the appointment of Chief Constables.



# Asks of Chiefs

The College needs a new settlement with policing

- **Secondments** – A new model to significantly increase secondments to bring the brightest and best into the College to boost our output and improve connection.
- **Partnership** – There should be deeper and more explicit collaboration between the NPCC and the College. Policing must become a more intelligent commissioner of the College to avoid it being pulled in various directions trying to respond to NPCC leads.
- **Support** – Chief Officers should back the College – stopping rebranding our work, using us as a scapegoat or stepping into our activity without collaborating.
- **Prioritise CPD** – Time must be made for CPD within forces.
- **Consistency** - Operational independence is vital, but the benefits of greater consistency and sharing of innovation and evidence are myriad.



# College mentions

Argues for a stronger strategic centre with the College as a core component

Supports the new College leadership centre and focus on frontline supervisors

Recommends the College as the consolidated home for policing improvement functions with increased powers to enable delivery

College would be given new powers to require compliance with common IT standards across policing, so as to ensure interoperability and much more effective sharing of police data

Establishing a workforce planning and recruitment function to get ahead of problems

**The College should administer a licence to practice to all police officers, renewed every five years**

# Peer Support

- Increasing the College peer support offer by:
  - Establishing two dedicated peer support teams led by senior officers to support individual forces in areas where they may need to improve.
  - Providing research and analytical capability to diagnose problems and identify evidence based solutions.
- Dedicated teams will continue to support forces engaged by HMICFRS but in addition a particular emphasis will be given to those forces who need support on crime measures.
- We are working with PMCC and the HO to develop a process to ensure peer support is provided at the right time to those forces who need it most.
- Learning from any peer support provided will be collated and shared with all forces to support effective and timely knowledge sharing.



# Questions

# National Centre for Police Leadership

**CC Andy Marsh QPM - CEO**

**Jo Noakes – Director of Leadership & Workforce**

# National Centre for Police Leadership

## Our Ambition

\*\*S22\*\*



## **Session 5 – (Paper in the pack)**

- **Police Uplift Programme – Year 3 Planning and Police Staff Pay Updates**

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Police Uplift Programme - Year 3 Planning

23 March 2022 / Agenda Item: Session 5

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<b>Author:</b>	DCC Janette McCormick
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	Police Uplift Programme
<b>Date Created:</b>	8/3/22
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	Workforce
<b>Portfolio:</b>	Uplift
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	App A
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### 1. PURPOSE

- 1.1 This paper sets out progress towards the year 2 milestone for Uplift of an additional 12,000 officers including 300 into ROCUs, activity ongoing and planning in place for year 3 based on the learning to date. It seeks support on agreeing restrictions on transferees across Home Office forces in the final quarter of 2023 to support effective planning of forces to deliver the 20k.
- 1.2 The paper recommends Chief Constables to agree:
  - a) **Note the progress to date on delivery of the Uplift to the end of year 2 and the planning in place to track year 3 delivery to enable the Programme to support forces**
  - b) **Consider the options being scoped for a Police Now candidate pool and provide feedback to the Programme on a preferred force approach.**
  - c) **Support the proposed restriction on transferees across Home Office forces between 1<sup>st</sup> December 2022 – 1<sup>st</sup> April 2023 and further discussions with the Staff Associations on implementation.**

### 2. BACKGROUND

- 2.1 Delivery of the 20k officers through Uplift is both a service and government priority. Appendix A sets out the positive progress as of the end of January 2022 in relation to:



- The year 2 milestone of a net increase of 12,000
  - Recruitment of 300 officers into ROCUs (including 30 into fraud)
  - Acceleration of workforce representation
- 2.2 A small number of forces have been identified as unlikely to achieve their year 2 allocations. Recover plans to achieve this within the first quarter of 2022 / 3 are in place. Those forces who have presented as 'off track' or had difficulties in achieving year 2 allocations have a common set of issues identified:
- **Back ending recruitment** – where forces have profiled to recruit heavily in Q4, this has left no time to address issues that develop
  - **Inaccurate profiling of attrition** – in response to the increased attrition post lockdown some forces have been slow in reprofiling leading to shortfalls in recruitment
  - **Difficulties with training contracts** – inflexibility in terms of adding or extending courses at short notice with providers
  - **Candidate supply** – an imbalance between supply of candidates and demand for recruits in some, or all, entry routes
  - **Reliance on the transferee market** – where forces have planned in high use transferees as a recruitment strategy
- 2.3 Two other issues that need to be managed which, whilst not risking the delivery of officer numbers, could be seen to undermine a fully successful programme in the final year are increasing diversity and reverse civilianisation. These are being monitored and reported monthly to Ministers.
- 2.4 Based on the understanding of the challenges and issues highlighted, the programme has a range of activity which is aimed to support forces in the final year of the Programme in addition to that already being provided by the Programme and the decision already made to extend the Police Regulations on the use of IPLDP to the end of March 2023.
- **Analysis of the labour market analysis** including the perception of policing and the impact on confidence (commissioned and due end March)
  - **Pipeline analysis and tracking** by entry route to pre-empt support needed in force planning (the data tool is accessible by forces)
  - **Review of attrition rates** including seeking to assess the impact of pension changes to better enable accurate profiling
  - **Targeted Communications activity** through the national advertising campaign and local support for targeted outreach in areas where the labour market suggests this could be beneficial
- 2.5 Ahead of year 3, the Programme has been requested to sign off each force recruitment and attrition profiles prior to the grant agreement being sent, and a review of these is now underway. Based on the lead in times forces should consider having applications in place by the end of September.
- 2.6 A decision has yet to be taken by Ministers on the ring-fenced element of the grant for those forces not meeting their year 2 and how this will be managed in year 3 and the implications for ROCUs.
- 2.7 Police Now (PN) have provided the Programme with an outline of the forces already contracting with them for their summer Neighbourhood Programme. The deadline for the March 2023 detective programme is in May. There is the potential for PN under their existing contract with the Home Office to 'over-recruit' for this final Uplift March cohort. This could provide a small pool of additional candidates for forces should they require them or that could be deferred to the 2024 course. This would best be done on a force by force basis with Programme coordination, and Chief Constables are asked to consider if this is something they would be keen to consider.

- 2.8 Arrangements are also being scoped with PN for the information on those applicants that meet standard entry requirements, but are not offered a PN post, to be forwarded to a preferred force. Again, individual Chiefs Constables are asked to consider if they would like to opt into this and make the Programme aware.
- 2.9 There is a significant internal market for transfers of officers between forces, with some forces actively incentivising. This has contributed to significant issues faced by forces in the final quarter of Year 2. Given officers are only required to give 4 weeks' notice this has affected force planning, with forces as a result not meeting allocations. The Programme has had to assist in managing this process across multiple forces and the potential financial implications.
- 2.10 It proposed Chief Constables support a moratorium on transfers between Home Office forces between 1<sup>st</sup> December 2022 – 1<sup>st</sup> April 2023 to assist the planning as we come to the end of Uplift. This would not include for promotion, welfare reasons or other exceptional circumstances, and would not apply to secondments to ROCUs which do not affect a force's overall force headcount. Transfers in from non-Home Office forces would not be affected. Consultation with Staff Associations will be required to agree implementation.

### **3. CONCLUSION**

- 3.1. The final year of the Uplift comes with inherent challenges - it is the highest single year of recruitment, with a net 8,000 officers to be recruited, we are working to a hard deadline of 31 March 2023 where failure to deliver will impact on public confidence and the continued supply of sufficient candidates in every force remains unknown. Taking the learning from Years 1 and 2 the Programme is seeking to support forces to plan and monitor their recruitment and attrition to meet force allocations and the overall Uplift 20k. The proposals seek to mitigate the risks.

### **4. APPROVAL OF THE COORDINATION COMMITTEE**

- 5.1 CC Pam Kelly, Workforce Committee Lead, has sponsored the paper.

### **5. DECISIONS REQUIRED**

- 6.1 Chief Constables are recommended to agree to:

- a) **Support the proposed restriction on transferees across Home Office forces between 1<sup>st</sup> December 2022 – 1<sup>st</sup> April 2023 (other than on promotion, exceptional circumstances or welfare reasons) and for further discussions with the Staff Associations to take place on implementation.**



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<b>Author:</b>	Janette McCormick
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<b>Date Created:</b>	8/3/22
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<b>Portfolio:</b>	Uplift
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	None
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
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## Police Uplift Programme

# Performance Summary – National Highlight Report

February 2022



**Uplift Delivery**  
**Data to the end of Jan 2022**



National Summary – January 2022

STATUS SUMMARY

Number of Forces data up to date Reason: All 43 forces returned data.	
Accuracy of Tracker Data Reason: Margin of error of less than 0.01% due to accepted systems anomaly in MPS (7 officers).	
Overall Work Stream Status Reason: Estimated Total Officer Increase January 2022 was 12,434. Actual (12,270) is below this.	

Summary:

- Uplift growth against baseline as at 31/01/212 is 98.3% towards the 12,000 milestone. 5 forces are currently profiled to not meet year 2 allocation. Common causes are back ended recruitment, attrition profiles not adjusted, impact of transferees and training inflexibility. Implications on the ring fenced grant will be made by Ministers. A formal request will be made from December 2022 to stop transferees other than for promotion / welfare.
- Attrition overall was slightly higher than profiled, a number of forces having not adjusted these seasonally, or to take account of the latent attrition from 2021 / 22 in the system. Forces have reported some impact of pension changes and further analysis is ongoing to understand the scale and also how much the current rise in voluntary resignations is die to the latent retirements.
- To date there has been 25,257 actual gross recruitment (Oct 19 – Jan 21), and over 175,000 applications.
- All forces have submitted their Year 3 profiles and these are currently being reviewed prior to grant letters being issued to ensure forces are meeting year 3 allocations (projections show not all are) and attrition profiles are realistic.

Baseline Officer Headcount (Pro...

128,434

Current Officer Headcount


140,704138,404  
Current Officer FTE

Actual Uplift (Headcount)

11,800


What is the uplift glidepath?

Officer uplift target set by government along with estimated recruitment submitted by the Forces and actual uplift (from published baseline).



Which Forces uplift plans are on track by March 2022?

Officer estimated uplift by March 2022 compared to the government target (11,920). (Red - More than 5% below Gov target, Amber - Within 5% of Gov target, Green - At or above Gov



Summary of Force Status / Support, Escalation and Intervention Process:

- On track – 19
- On track with programme support provided – 14
- Stage 1 Support – 8
- Stage 2 Support – 1 (force profiles currently do not meet year 2 allocation)
- Stage 3 Support – 4 (force profiles currently do not meet year 2 allocation)



ROCU Uplift Summary – January 2022

SOC AMBITION OVERVIEW

Establishment - Vacancy Factor

1,505

Current Officer Headcount

1,625<sup>1,553</sup>

Current Officer FTE

Actual Uplift (Headcount)


222<sup>120</sup>

Establishment Difference

ROCU Officer Headcount



ROCU Recruitment Plans: Officer estimated uplift by March 2022 compared to the programme milestone (300):



Summary of ROCU Status / Support, Escalation and Intervention Process:

- On track – 8
- Review with programme support – 1
- Stage 1 Support – 2 (2 regions with profiles that currently do not meet Yr2 allocation).

ROCU UPLIFT OVERVIEW

Baseline Officer Headcount

1,403

Current Officer Headcount

1,625<sup>1,609</sup>

Current Officer FTE

Actual Uplift (Headcount)

222

Actual Uplift % of Mar 22 Target


74.0%

Force Progress Towards ROCU Uplift



Force growth to ROCU compared to SOC allocation

Increase in officers relevant to ROCU allocation. (Red - More than 50% below SOC allocation, Amber - Within 50% of SOC allocation, Green - At or above SOC allocation)



Status Summary:


Number of ROCU data up to date  
Reason: All 9 ROCU's returned data.

Accuracy of Tracker Data  
Reason: Both Force and Regional ROCU numbers match

Overall Work Stream Status  
Reason: Actual ROCU uplift by January 2022 was 4 officers lower than profiled.

- 23 forces continue to meet force ROCU allocation, (4 regional ROCU's (NE, WM, SE and Wales) have collaboratively met ROCU allocation.
- SOC Fraud will only achieve 21 of the 30 (3 from the NW and 6 from Y&TH will not be released in time)  
Implications on the ring fenced grant will be made by Ministers.


# Police Staff Numbers and Diversity – Jan 2022




## Summary:

- Staff numbers have grown based on the 2019 ADR March baseline. This will be amended to the Sept ADR to then reflect a growth over Uplift.
- The step change in November reflects quality assurance on the data with some forces not including PCSOs (now included)
- The red data point reflects establishment, blue headcount and yellow FTE. The gap between the red establishment and yellow FTE reflects held vacancies, which can now be tracked over time to understand potential efficiency savings.
- Staff / PCSO ethnicity levels cannot be compared to officer levels as the data below includes ‘Unknowns’, and is taken out in officer data to align to the ADR. This will be amended in future reports.
- Data on sex is available on the QLIK tracker for forces along with other protected characteristics but is not included in this report.

## Police Staff Workforce Diversity



## PCSO Diversity





Attrition – Jan 2022

\*The number of voluntary resignations as a proportion of the headcount for that group. The attrition rates in brackets show the equivalent rates for the White and Male groups (both 1.8%) for comparison.


Directional arrows indicate change compared to Y1 of the programme. “-” indicates no change. Black heritage data includes those in the mixed black groups and is only available since May 2021

	% current workforce		% of joiners		% Population (E&W)	Voluntary resignation attrition rate*
Asian	3.6%	↑	6%	↑	7.5%	3.9% (2.2%)
Black	1.3%	-	1.8%	↑	3.3%	2.6% (2.2%)
Black & Black Heritage	2.2%	N/A	3.3%	N/A	4.4%	N/A
Black, Asian & Minority Ethnic	7.9%	↑	12.6%	↑	14.0%	3.1% (2.2%)
Female	33.9%	↑	43.5%	↑	50.6%	2.5% (2.1%)


Overview of Workforce Attrition:

- Retirement main reason for leaving. Voluntary resignation just over 30% of all leavers and is consistent with previous years.
- Leaver rates vary by entry route with IPLDP the highest. This data is based on those leaving since April 2020, having joined in Uplift.
- Data provided to programme re voluntary resignation more often than not states reason for leaving as other / unknown which limits analysis to support opportunities for improved retention. Forces need to more accurately capture reasons at the exit stage.
- The Onboarding Survey for Year 1 and 2 will be launched at the end of March.

Attrition by Entry Route – Jan 2022



Breakdown of Resignation Reasons



**Uplift Cohort**  
**Diversity – Jan 2022**

Of the 28,173 officers recruited since the start of uplift **2,989** have been from **Black and Ethnic Minorities**.


Over the course of uplift the joiner rate for Black and Ethnic Minority recruits is **11.4%** once unknowns and prefer not says have been removed from overall headcount.

The overall joiner rate is currently **0.4%** above the joiner rate recorded in the **2018/19 ADR return**.

The joiner rate over the last 12 months is higher over the last 12 months **12.6%** compared to the Uplift cohort overall and pre Uplift levels. This is also seen across each of the subgroups.


Ethnicity 5+ <div>▲</div> <div>🔍</div>	Officers Recruited	Joiner Rate	12 Month Joiner ...
Asian or Asian British	1432	5.4%	6.0%
Black, African, Caribbean or Black British	429	1.6%	1.8%
Mixed or Multiple ethnic groups	897	3.4%	3.9%
Other ethnic group	231	0.9%	1.0%

Cumulative Black and Ethnic Minority Recruitment



Uplift cohort diversity data is taken from retrospective completed returns and there may be difference in total recruitment headcounts due to corrections in returns

Breakdown of Uplift Cohort by Ethnicity





Of the 28,173 officers recruited since the start of uplift. 11,178 have been Female.

Over the course of uplift the joiner rate for Female recruits is 41.2% once unknowns and prefer not says have been removed from overall headcount.

The overall joiner rate is currently 5.5% above the joiner rate recorded in the 2018/19 ADR return.

Female Joiners

11,178


Female Joiner Rate

41.2%

Rolling 12 Month


43.5%

Cumulative Female Recruitment



Uplift cohort diversity data is calculated from retrospective completed returns and there may be difference in total recruitment if adjustments due to corrections in returns

Breakdown of Uplift Cohort by Sex



## WORKFORCE DIVERSITY UPDATE

**Force:** All - England & Wales

Mar-20			Jan-21	Feb-21	Mar-21	Apr-21	May-21	Jun-21	Jul-21	Aug-21	Sep-21	Oct-21	Nov-21	Dec-21	Jan-22
<b>TOTAL HC</b>		<b>131,576</b>	<b>136,206</b>	<b>136,676</b>	<b>137,690</b>	<b>137,614</b>	<b>137,989</b>	<b>138,573</b>	<b>138,759</b>	<b>139,318</b>	<b>139,921</b>	<b>140,126</b>	<b>140,352</b>	<b>139,939</b>	<b>140,704</b>
Sex (based on HMRC groups)	Female HC	42,585	45,165	45,476	45,993	46,009	31,062	21,048	34,532	47,055	47,426	47,568	47,745	47,667	48,108
	Male HC	88,991	91,037	91,193	91,684	91,588	63,088	39,237	68,935	92,258	92,495	92,558	92,607	92,272	92,596
	Intersex HC	..	..	..	..	..	13	15	16	3	-	-	-	-	-
	Other HC	..	..	..	..	..	12	19	147	2	-	-	-	-	-
	Prefer not to say HC	..	..	..	..	..	315	454	314	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Unknown HC	..	..	..	..	..	43,826	78,273	35,276	2	-	-	-	-	-
	Female %	32.4%	33.2%	33.3%	33.4%	33.4%	33.0%	34.9%	33.3%	33.8%	33.9%	33.9%	34.0%	34.1%	34.2%
Gender	Female HC	..	45,165	45,476	45,993	46,009	42,123	41,064	27,456	20,738	20,703	20,299	20,078	20,315	20,222
	Male HC	..	91,037	91,193	91,684	91,588	84,384	82,004	51,672	38,278	37,744	36,738	36,196	36,379	35,855
	Prefer to self-describe HC	..	4	7	13	17	36	42	48	66	74	78	77	80	85
	Prefer not to say HC	..	..	..	..	..	252	389	493	744	933	1,308	1,155	1,191	1,222
	Unknown HC	..	-	-	-	-	11,194	15,074	59,090	79,492	80,467	81,703	82,846	81,974	83,320
	Female %	..	33.2%	33.3%	33.4%	33.4%	33.3%	33.4%	34.7%	35.1%	35.4%	35.5%	35.6%	35.8%	36.0%
	Prefer to self describe %	..	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%
Ethnicity	White HC	118,849	122,736	123,102	123,971	123,867	124,139	124,629	124,750	125,167	125,494	125,372	125,573	125,169	125,836
	Black HC	1,603	1,717	1,732	1,751	1,752	1,767	1,739	1,741	1,758	1,763	1,772	1,779	1,771	1,774
	Black and black heritage HC	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2,947	2,921	2,934	2,963	2,988	3,009	3,026	3,018	3,037
	Asian HC	3,931	4,338	4,382	4,437	4,469	4,686	4,695	4,719	4,790	4,823	4,854	4,891	4,873	4,926
	Mixed HC	2,751	2,915	2,940	2,999	3,024	3,046	3,158	3,176	3,215	3,271	3,296	3,322	3,328	3,357
	Other HC	1,005	1,030	1,036	1,029	1,020	851	844	849	829	834	859	863	862	878
	Total Black, Asian, Mixed and Other HC	9,290	10,000	10,090	10,216	10,265	10,350	10,436	10,485	10,592	10,691	10,781	10,855	10,834	10,935
	Unknown/prefer not to say HC	3,437	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Prefer not to say HC	..	1,237	1,244	1,926	2,006	2,040	2,071	2,087	2,159	2,013	2,192	2,243	2,233	2,250
	Unknown HC	..	2,206	2,240	1,577	1,476	1,460	1,437	1,437	1,400	1,723	1,781	1,681	1,703	1,683
	Black %	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%	1.3%
	Black and black heritage HC %	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%
	Asian %	3.1%	3.3%	3.3%	3.3%	3.3%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%
	Mixed %	2.1%	2.2%	2.2%	2.2%	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%	2.3%	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%	2.4%	2.5%
	Other %	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%	0.6%
	Total Black, Asian, Mixed and Other %	7.2%	7.5%	7.6%	7.6%	7.7%	7.7%	7.7%	7.8%	7.8%	7.9%	7.9%	8.0%	8.0%	8.0%
															Population %

\*Always excluding unknowns when calculating %

\*Sum of the parts doesn't always equate to the total. We're working on this.

\*Lots of unknowns - especially on ethnicity

\*Data on sexual orientation (LGB) and disability is also being collected. We're currently resolving some quality issues with this data and it will be included in this update once they are resolved.





Projection summary

Force: JUi- Ein laRd ,& W a l:es

Morith: Jari-22

Sex overview...



Current FEMALE representation

34.2%

FEMALI p0put!lion

50.6%

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36.3%

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

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**Quarterly Rank**  
**Data up to the end of Jan 2022**

## Quarterly Rank Numbers

### Summary


- There has been growth at all ranks, over the last 12 months Sergeants are up 1316 and Insp up 632



## Quarterly Rank Numbers

### Summary

- Over the last 12 months Superintending ranks are up by 156



# Quarterly Rank Ratio's

## Summary

- There has been growth at all ranks, over the last 12 months Sergeants are up 1316 and Insp up 632
- Sgt ratios are up on both 2010 and 2019 levels at a national level having grown since 2010, all be it have fallen slightly over the last 12 months
- Insp ratios are down on both 2010 and 2019 levels and have remained stable since 2010.
- The bottom charts shows the variation by force each point representing a force. Force data can be accessed through the QLIK Tracker by each force (includes all force posts).



Sergeants to Constables By Quarter

Quarter	Force	Regional	National
12-20	5.75		
03-21	5.71		
06-21	5.56		
09-21	5.50		
12-21	5.50		

Inspectors to Sergeants By Quarter

Quarter	Force	Regional	National
12-20	2.50		
03-21	2.53		
06-21	2.56		
09-21	2.54		
12-21	2.47		

ADR Ratios by Year (2010 - 2021) - Sergeants to Constables

Year	ADR Ratio
2010	4.78
2011	4.83
2012	4.86
2013	4.91
2014	5.07
2015	5.23
2016	5.19
2017	5.18
2018	5.23
2019	5.26
2020	5.44
2021	5.6

ADR Ratios by Year (2010 - 2021) - Inspectors to Sergeants

Year	ADR Ratio
2010	2.52
2011	2.59
2012	2.59
2013	2.56
2014	2.58
2015	2.62
2016	2.61
2017	2.65
2018	2.59
2019	2.58
2020	2.57
2021	2.49


Ratio Range - Sergeants to Constables

Ratio Range - Inspectors to Sergeants



Summary

- Superintending ratios are down on 2010 levels but up on 2019 levels and remained fairly static over time
- Chief officer ratios are down on 2010 levels but up on 2019 levels and have fallen over time
- The bottom charts shows the variation by force each point representing a force. Force data can be accessed through the QLIK Tracker by each force (includes all force posts).



Chief Officer to Superintendent / Chief Superintendent By Quarter

Quarter	Force	Regional	National
12-20			5.44
03-21			5.52
06-21			5.60
09-21			5.50
12-21			5.97

ADR Ratios by Year (2010 - 2021) - Superintendent / Chief Superintendent to Inspectors

Year	Ratio
2010	6.18
2011	6.35
2012	6.57
2013	6.84
2014	6.89
2015	6.36
2016	6.49
2017	5.80
2018	6.12
2019	5.96
2020	5.92
2021	6.12

ADR Ratios by Year (2010 - 2021) - Chief Officer to Superintendent / Chief Superintendent

Year	Ratio
2010	6.71
2011	6.37
2012	6.09
2013	5.90
2014	5.78
2015	5.71
2016	5.84
2017	5.73
2018	5.42
2019	5.37


Ratio Range - Superintendent / Chief Superintendent to Inspectors

MIN (3.81) ADR 2019 MAX (8.17)

Ratio Range - Chief Officer to Superintendent / Chief Superintendent


MIN (2.2) ADR 2019 MAX (17.75)

# Rank Diversity Progression



## Summary

- There has been progression at each rank for the proportion of female officers. Other than the Sgt and Insp levels this has reached over 30% considered the tipping point for cultural change
- Progression has been made at each rank for ethnic minority officers but at a much slower pace.
- All data is baselined against ADR 2019.



[Back to Agenda](#)

**Session 6 – (Presentation in pack)**

- **NLEDS Input and IMORCC Overview Update**

# **Chief Constables Council**

## **(24 March 2022)**

CC Jo Farrell, DCC Nav Malik and Mike Hill  
Director PPPT Home Office  
National Law Enforcement Data Programme



# Executive Summery

- The National Law Enforcement Data Programme is creating a modern data service, significantly enhancing Law Enforcement data capability.
- NLEDP is at the vanguard of the new engagement model of the Home Office and Policing.
- The Programme went through a reset in 2021 and is now moving forward with a new 'product centric' delivery approach. Capabilities are released as developed rather than in a big bang at the end. A new engagement model was agreed by Chiefs' Council with the Home Office in 2021 resulting in policing being embedded in the Programme as product owners and adoption lead.
- As the programme moves into delivery, Chiefs may wish to be aware of some of the issues and risks associated with the replacement of the PNC system with LEDS (Law Enforcement Data Service).


# **NPCC strategic objectives that your topic supports**

**Replacement of Critical National Infrastructure (PNC) with LEDS**

**LEDS enables the delivery of the National Digital Strategy**

**LEDS will provide the foundation for improved access to critical police data and the development of analytics.**

# What is LEDS? Product Centric Approach



- Iterative approach
- Faster delivery of capability to users
- De-risks delivery
- User centred approach

**\*\*S43\*\***

# Current Position

- The first two products (Property and Drivers) released to 5 pioneer forces (Beds, Cambs, Herts, North Yorks and Cheshire) at the of March 2022
- Full release to all forces as soon as practicable later in 2022
- Positive feedback from early user engagement

\*\*S31\*\*

# Adoption Strategy

- Adoption is the biggest risk to the Programme
- Defined strategy and Dedicated support through adoption team
- Bespoke training plan - *lighter training requirement identified*
- Seconded officers are leading on adoption
- Force level vendor community engagement is paramount.
- Adoption teams understanding the local change landscape and local business change requirements
- Dedication adoption packs
- Support includes advise regarding commercial vendors
- Support with exploiting the capability and enhancing tradecraft.

# Adoption Support

- P@RS (Photo at the Roadside) £30k per force allocated to support adoption (29 forces live)
- £4.1m agreed to support the adoption of Drivers and Property via Grant
- £10m pa for next 3 years from programme funding



# Risks and Issues

- There will be a period of dual running whilst we transition to LEDS resulting in an increase in MTA running costs for that period until PNC can be decommissioned and annual savings can be realised.

	FY21/22	FY22/23	FY23/24	FY24/25	FY25/26	FY26/27	FY27/28	FY28/29
NLEDP	£0.00m	£1.96m	£7.68m	£10.06m	£13.82m	£14.42m	£14.72m	£15.02m
PNC	£1.00m	£19.69m	£22.04m	£22.59m	£23.02m	£0.00m	£0.00m	£0.00m
Total	£1.00m	£21.65m	£29.71m	£32.65m	£36.84m	£14.42m	£14.72m	£15.02m

- Although forces have busy local IT and change programmes, failure to prioritise LEDS will create additional risk to policing capabilities
- Forces will require NIAM to access LEDS
- As each product is developed, 'pioneer' forces are required to work with the programme to assist with the transition to live, additional funding is available to support this work.

# Decision Request

Please document any specific decisions that council need to take

Finance related decisions need to have gone to finance committee first and if portfolio or working group related, should go through the relevant committee first

**Chiefs to note the adoption plans for LEDS**

**Chiefs to support the Charges Oversight Board and MTA Deep Dive Group work to review the MTA costs going forward**

# Action Request

**Chiefs to be aware of their local governance arrangements and current status regarding readiness to adopt LEDS**

**Forces to support requests to engage with the NLEDP Team and ensure the funding offer for adoption costs are utilised effectively locally**

**Forces incorporate LEDS into local IT delivery plans to enable PNC to be decommissioned at the earliest opportunity**

**Ensuring plans to adopt NIAM (National Identity Access Management) are in place to enable access to LEDS**

**Chiefs to note the impact of dual running costs on the MTA until PNC is decommissioned**

**Regional representation is requested to support the NLEDP Chief Constables' Reference Group**

## **Session 7 – (Report and Overview in pack)**

- **Police Foundation: Strategic Review of Policing Discussion**

## **Session 7 - POLICE FOUNDATION: STRATEGIC REVIEW OF POLICING – Background reading from Workforce Coordination Committee – Actions from this committee going forwards**

The review is chaired by Sir Michael Barber and carried out by the Police Foundation with an Advisory Board of former senior police officers, politicians and leading academics. It set out to examine how crime, fear of crime, and other threats to public safety are changing and assess the ability of the police to meet these challenges, as part of a wider strategic response.

The overall aim of the Review was to set a long-term strategic vision for English and Welsh policing. This concluding report presents substantial recommendations for a modern police service capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century and contains 56 recommendations urging radical reform to police culture, skills and training and organisational structure.

The report argues that policing requires root and branch reform and investment if it is to tackle the crisis of public confidence.

The recommendations include:

- Creation of a **new Crime Prevention Agency**.
- **\*\*S23\*\***,
- Introduction of a **new licence to practice for all police officers that is renewed every five years** and subject to strict conditions.
- **Merger of back office functions across the 43 forces** that would save hundreds of millions of pounds.
- **Investment in front line policing, training and technology** to modernise the service from top to bottom.

Sir Michael Barber said: “There is a crisis of confidence in policing in this country which is corroding public trust. The reasons are deep rooted and complex – some cultural and others systemic. However taken together, unless there is urgent change, they will end up destroying the principle of policing by consent that has been at the heart of British policing for decades.”

The Review found that the police service has not kept pace with the changing patterns of crime while also having to deal with a huge rises in non-crime related demand:


- In 2021, 53% of all crime affecting people in England and Wales was fraud and cybercrime. Despite this, just 0.1% result in a charge or summons.
- There has been a 240% increase in the numbers of rapes reported to the police and yet the percentage of rape cases resulting in a charge fell from 8.5% in 2015 to just 1.5% in 2021.
- Detection rates generally have almost halved in the last seven years, falling from 17% all reported crimes resulting in a charge or summons in 2014 to just 9% today.
- There was a 28% increase in mental health related incidents between 2014 and 2018 across 26 forces.
- Around three million ‘investigation hours’ are dedicated to missing persons reports very year, the equivalent of 1,562 full time police officers per year or the number of police officers needed for North Yorkshire.
- As a result, the report argues that the public is losing confidence:

The proportion of crime victims who were ‘very satisfied’ with the police response declined from 42% in 2014 to 32% in 2020, while the proportion ‘not satisfied’ rose from 26% to 34%. Between



# A NEW MODE OF PROTECTION

Redesigning policing and public  
safety for the 21st century



THE  
POLICE  
FOUNDATION

The UK's policing think tank

Chaired by Sir Michael Barber,  
commissioned and conducted  
by the Police Foundation

March 2022

# A NEW MODE OF PROTECTION REDESIGNING POLICING AND PUBLIC SAFETY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

## THE FINAL REPORT OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW OF POLICING IN ENGLAND AND WALES

MARCH 2022

### About the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales

Launched by the Police Foundation in September 2019, the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales set out to examine how crime, fear of crime and other threats to public safety are changing and assess the ability of the police to meet these challenges, as part of a wider strategic response. This far-reaching independent review, the first of its kind in many years, was chaired by Sir Michael Barber and guided by an Advisory Board of former senior police officers, politicians and leading academics. The overall aim of the Review was to set a long-term strategic vision for English and Welsh policing. This concluding report presents substantial recommendations for a modern police service capable of meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

More information about the Review can be found at:  
<https://www.policingreview.org.uk>

The Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales was generously funded by CGI, the City of London Corporation, the Dawes Trust, Deloitte and Mark43.



### About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is the only independent think tank focused exclusively on improving policing and developing knowledge and understanding of policing and crime reduction. Its mission is to generate evidence and develop ideas which deliver better policing and a safer society. It does this by producing trusted, impartial research and by working with the police and their partners to create change.

This report was written on behalf of the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales by Rick Muir, Andy Higgins, Ruth Halkon and Stephen Walcott with contributions from Sir Bill Jeffrey.

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Many other people and organisations have shared views, insights, and information with us over the last two and a half years, either by responding to our Calls for Evidence (listed in Appendix B), taking part in interviews (Appendix C), or during numerous meetings and informal conversations. All deserve our thanks. In particular we would like to acknowledge the assistance provided by:

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- The National Police Chiefs' Council Workforce Coordinating Committee who shared their November 2021 Strategic Assessment of Workforce.

- Professor Ian Loader, who (in addition to serving on the Advisory Board) wrote an Insight Paper for the Review on the police mission and purpose.
- Dr John Coxhead of Loughborough university for partnering with us on an international seminar on policing innovation, and all those who spoke at it.
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# FOREWORD

## A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE

“The time is come,” Sir Robert Peel argued in the House of Commons in 1828, “when...we may fairly pronounce that the country has outgrown her police institutions...” After a vigorous debate, the House of Commons agreed with him, and the following year the Metropolitan Police was established, ushering in a new era of policing in this country.

That new era was characterised by the development of a distinctly British model of policing, one in which the work of the police depends not primarily on the use of power but on the trust, confidence and cooperation of the public. Sadly, almost two hundred years on, there is a crisis of public confidence in our police institutions.

### **Policing under pressure**

This report finds that the percentage of people who think that the police do a good or excellent job has been falling steadily in recent years. People report that they are less likely than in the recent past to see police officers walking the beat. In London even fewer people say they trust the police and think that the police will treat them fairly. These signs of a deterioration in public confidence are, no doubt, linked in part to recent high-profile cases of police misconduct. However, this report reveals that there are also deeper, more long-standing reasons why our policing model no longer seems able to meet the expectations of the public.

The public aren’t alone in losing confidence over recent years. Many police officers have themselves lost confidence. They work hard and desperately want to serve the public to a high standard, but too often feel unable to. This is what I came to understand from my frontline visits where I met dedicated, hardworking police officers who were frustrated at not always being able to match people’s expectations.

The impact of austerity between 2010 and 2017 undoubtedly ate into the ability of the police to provide a decent service to the public. Unlike the NHS and schools, the police were not a protected service; over those years, police officer numbers fell from an all-time high of 143,000 to 123,000. One result of this sharp fall was the withdrawal of bobbies on the beat – community policing in the jargon – so that citizens increasingly complained that they rarely saw police officers and felt less safe, even abandoned, as a result. Compounding the problem and leading to deep public frustration is

the fact that the police response to many crimes such as burglary had become perfunctory; too often a crime number is issued for insurance purposes but there is no investigation.

In addition, the world around policing is changing dramatically, such that our police institutions are no longer a match for the challenges they face. Globalisation and technology are currently transforming our economy and society as profoundly as the industrial revolution and urbanisation did in Peel’s time. Over 40 per cent of all crime is now fraud, most of which is cyber-enabled. Yet we are tackling the crime and disorder of the digital age with an analogue policing approach.

Moreover, the police increasingly find themselves acting as a public service of last resort, picking up the pieces where other social services have failed. Mental health related cases have increased by a quarter in recent years. I accompanied two police officers to a call out related to a potentially violent youth; they knew the case and the youth, they even knew his name. They also knew they would solve the immediate issue but, most disturbingly, they knew the relevant social service would not resolve the underlying problem and that a new call out sooner or later was inevitable.

Similarly missing persons calls are a regular occurrence. Almost half of all young people in care go missing at least once and for some it is much more common. Of course, it is important to track down missing persons but it is striking that the police spend three million investigation hours per year on these cases. That is the equivalent of 1,562 full time officers, all day, every day; incredibly that is more police officer time than we currently allocate to police the whole of North Yorkshire.

The police picking up these cases often go far beyond the call of duty. For example, two officers told me that they returned a missing young man to his care home whereupon the home then asked them whether they could drop him off at his parents’ place which was more than 100 miles away; they said the home didn’t have the transport available. The police officers took the boy because they wanted to do the right thing by him; but is this really what people pay the police precept for?

Despite the hard work and dedication of police officers and staff, these changes are testing the ability of the police to deliver their core mission and public confidence has been impacted as a result. Having set

out the challenges facing policing, this report calls for root and branch reform to our police service so that it is able to meet the challenges of the future, provide a decent service and secure the confidence of the public.

### **A plan to improve public safety and modernise policing**

We have consulted widely and analysed in depth the available data and research. We have engaged with a brilliant advisory group who brought well-informed and diverse perspectives to bear. Matthew Syed argues that “cognitive diversity” is vital to reaching good decisions – we have had cognitive diversity in spades; others will judge how well we made use of it.

We have examined trends beyond policing which may be relevant and sought to bring a fresh perspective to bear from outside the tramlines of the traditional debates.

Here I will highlight some of our most significant recommendations.

First, public safety depends by no means solely on the police and it would be much better, economically and socially, to prevent crime from happening in the first place than to deal with it after the event. Yet our system is designed to do the latter not the former.

To reverse this state of affairs, we need a radical shift to a more systemic preventative approach. To achieve this we propose a new Crime Prevention Agency, whose central task would be to ensure that crime was significantly reduced through preventive efforts. The law that established the Agency would make it a legal duty for large companies to take the prevention of crime into account in the design of their products and processes. The Agency would have strong regulatory powers to enforce this duty and to intervene in, or fine, companies that neglected it. Given the shocking extent of fraud (and how little of it is ever effectively tackled) the Agency should make a substantial reduction of fraud its central priority.

Second, we need to considerably enhance our capability to tackle cross border and serious and organised crime, so much of which is beyond the grasp of local police forces. Too often those committing fraud and cybercrime believe that they can act with impunity. This is why we propose a major strengthening of the **\*\*S23\*\***. Regional serious and organised crime capabilities should be placed under the control of the **\*\*S23\*\***, so that their funding is placed on a sound footing and efforts to tackle cross border crime are coordinated by a body with a single priority and focus.

Third, it is vital that we strengthen local policing. All the evidence shows this is the best way to improve the confidence of the public. We argue that police forces should deploy a significant number of their new officers to neighbourhood policing roles, focused on those areas where trust and confidence are least.

Fourth, we need to equip police officers and staff with the tools to do the job. We clearly need more police officers and the current uplift programme which is providing 20,000 more has not come a moment too soon. Implementation is on track; across the country police officers are being recruited and deployed and already making a difference.

But there are major skills gaps that the uplift programme is not currently addressing. There is, for example, a national shortage of almost 7,000 detectives; this is a significant contributory factor to the often, shocking delays in investigating serious crimes such as rape. Specialist skills are required too in relation to, for example, cyber and economic crime. To address these gaps we recommend a pay supplement for detectives, greater use of direct entry schemes and more consistent career pathways for allied police professionals, in areas like financial investigation, data science and digital forensics. Policing needs to attract high quality skilled professionals from other sectors and there should be no second-class treatment for those who want to contribute to policing but do not have a warrant card.

Our police officers and staff also need modern technology to be able to do their work effectively.

Yet police technology in general is woefully inadequate, as police officers and staff are well aware. The evidence is set out in our report; here let me point out just one devastating fact; the Police National Computer, on which we rely daily for critical information about criminal records, stolen vehicles and drivers’ licences, is forty-eight years old.

Finally, we would significantly strengthen the strategic centre in our policing system. We propose a new Crime and Policing Strategy Unit within the Home Office that would seek to anticipate trends, identify patterns in crime and crime prevention and ensure that the Home Office was able to be proactive not just reactive.

The College of Policing should be given the task of revolutionising police education to ensure it is dramatically more effective than currently. It should also have powers to ensure that minimum professional standards are followed, that police IT systems are completely interoperable and data is properly shared and that forces are addressing the skills gaps we have identified.

## Conclusion

Over recent years, as a result of a number of high-profile scandals, dramatic social, technological and economic changes and the effects of austerity up to 2017, public confidence in the police has declined. Now is the time to take the necessary steps to enable the police to tackle the challenges of the 21st century and to improve the confidence of the public. We can do that by building a public safety system designed to minimise crime (and the harm it does) in the first place and by equipping it to tackle crime successfully if, and when, it does occur.

As a society we should have the confidence to believe we can build a low-crime, low-harm society in which

citizens of all backgrounds and perspectives can lead their lives and pursue their aspirations without fear of crime or becoming its victims. The root-and-branch reform agenda we have set out for policing in this report shows how that can be done. What Sir Robert Peel said in 1828 applies again now. If we want to restore public confidence and shift the odds in favour of the law-abiding citizen, we should not hesitate to usher in a new era in policing; **“The time is come...”**

**Sir Michael Barber**

Chair of the Strategic Review of Policing  
in England and Wales

8 March 2022





# SUMMARY

*“The time is come when, from the increase in its population, the enlargement of its resources, and the multiplying development of its energies, we may fairly pronounce that the country has outgrown her police institutions and that the cheapest and safest course will be found in the introduction of a new mode of protection.”*

Sir Robert Peel, 1828

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The world around policing is changing as radically as the world in which Sir Robert Peel founded the Metropolitan Police in 1829. It is in that context that the Police Foundation established the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, chaired by Sir Michael Barber. It is the first independent review of policing for many years and is intended to be as influential as the last Royal Commission on the Police in 1962. This final report from the Review is our attempt to describe what kind of police service we will need to address the challenges of the 21st century.

## PART I. THE CHALLENGE

### 2. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE 2020s AND 2030s

Traditional crime (all crime except fraud and cybercrime) has fallen by 75 per cent since 1995. However, these traditional forms of crime (burglary, car theft, low level assaults and so on) have been replaced by new forms of crime and harm. These have in turn been generated by three transformations.

#### The technological revolution

The technological revolution has created, via the internet, a whole new space in which crime and harm take place. This has transformed the composition of crime. For example, in the year to June 2021 53 per cent of all crime affecting people in England and Wales was just fraud and cybercrime. Despite this we have a largely analogue police service in a digital world. Just 0.6 per cent of frauds that are recorded, and just 0.1 per cent of frauds that take place, result in a charge or summons.

#### Environmental crisis

Human activity is transforming the natural environment in a way that poses new risks to public safety. Global warming is leading to more frequent and more intense extreme weather events such as floods, droughts,

storms, heat waves and heavy rainfall. By 2050 climate change will force more than 143 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America from their homes, with significant consequences for international migration. In the UK climate change is also generating an increase in political protest and the police increasingly find themselves having to manage the public order implications.

Another form of environmental change is the growing risk of global pandemics. Population growth and agricultural intensification increase the risk of viruses transferring from animals to humans. Poverty, increased population density and the ease of global travel also mean that such viruses can spread very rapidly. The experience of the coronavirus pandemic has shown how highly disruptive such events can be, with significant implications for policing and public safety.

#### Social change

We are living through a period of significant social change, characterised in part by the emergence of more complex social needs. For example, there was a 28 per cent increase in mental health related incidents between 2014 and 2018 across 26 forces. To provide another example, police devote around three million ‘investigation hours’ per year to missing persons reports, which is the equivalent of 1,562 full time police officers per year or the same number of police officers required to police the whole of North Yorkshire.

In recent years we have also seen growing demands for previously marginalised forms of violence, abuse and exploitation to be taken seriously by the criminal justice system. In particular, there has been increased reporting of male violence and sexual abuse against women and girls. For example, between 2016 and 2021 there was a 50 per cent increase in reported domestic abuse crime. Between 2013 and 2021 there was a 240 per cent increase in the numbers of rapes reported to the police.

Finally, new forms of social division and tension have emerged creating demands on those charged with keeping the peace. The number of protest events has risen steadily over the last decade, going from 83



in 2007 to 280 in 2016 and the number of protests involving confrontational tactics increased from seven in 2000 to 126 in 2019. The number of hate crimes reported to the police in England and Wales rose by 194 per cent between 2012/13 and 2018/19. Terrorism remains a serious threat and one that is made more complex by the rise of so-called 'lone actors'.

### Organised crime

Organised crime groups are profiting from each of these transformations, using more sophisticated technology to commit crimes and hide their gains, committing widespread environmental crime and exploiting vulnerable people with complex needs.

### Public security

How people experience crime and safety is important. If people feel unsafe then this is likely to have a major impact on their wellbeing. Before the pandemic there was an increase in those who thought crime was one of the biggest issues facing the country.

Fear of becoming a victim of crime is lower than it was in the past but it is not experienced equally. Those on low incomes worry significantly more about crime than those on high incomes, reflecting real differences in their likelihood of becoming a victim. 13 per cent of women have high levels of worry about violent crime, compared to just 4 per cent of men. 22 per cent of Asian people and 21 per cent of Black people report high levels of worry about violent crime, compared to just 7 per cent of White people.

## 3. POLICE PERFORMANCE

How well is English and Welsh policing adapting to a world reshaped by technological, environmental, and social change? There are worrying signs of a deterioration in the performance of the police service.

Detection rates have almost halved in the last seven years: in the year to March 2021 only 9 per cent of all recorded police crime resulted in a charge or summons, compared to 17 per cent in 2014.

While there are multiple reasons for falling detection rates (for instance more stringent crime recording practices and the impact of austerity), it is worrying that more victims do not wish to proceed with cases, potentially reflecting frustration with lengthy investigations and court delays.

The proportion of crime victims (excluding fraud victims) who were 'very satisfied' with the police response declined from 42 per cent in 2014 to 32 per cent in

2020, while the proportion 'not satisfied' rose from 26 per cent to 34 per cent.

Between 2016 and 2020 the proportion of people who say they have confidence in their local police fell from 79 per cent to 74 per cent and the proportion saying they thought the police did a good or excellent job fell from 63 per cent to 55 per cent.

The time it takes the police to attend a 999 call has also been getting longer, rising by 32 per cent between 2010 and 2018 from nine minutes to 13 minutes on average.

### Three challenges

This analysis of the future public safety challenges and recent police performance leads us to the following three conclusions that shape the rest of the report:

- The police face a **capacity challenge**: such is the range and complexity of public safety demand there is no way that the police on their own are able to tackle it.
- The police face a **capability challenge**: it is not just that the police lack sufficient resources to tackle these challenges, but also that the police service lacks many of the capabilities required to do so.
- The police face an **organisational challenge**: the police service needs a different organisational platform so it can deliver the capabilities required to meet the challenges we have described.

## PART II. POLICING IN A SYSTEM

There is no feasible strategy that addresses the range, volume and complexity of the public safety challenges of the twenty first century through the work of the police alone. In this part of the report we propose a two-step solution to this challenge. First, we need to design a whole system response to public safety that goes way beyond the work of the police. Second, we need to be much clearer about the role of the police within that system.

### 4. THE PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM

The police should be seen as just one part of a wider societal response to crime and harm. What is required is a broad social response to crime and harm based upon a more explicit and institutionally anchored public safety system.

A **public safety system** is a system of actors and institutions whose aim is to promote safety and to **prevent** harm. Note its aim is different to that of the justice system, whose purpose is to secure the just treatment of offenders in the interests of society in general and victims in particular.

### The case for prevention

The general case for prevention makes intuitive sense. It is better to stop a bad thing from happening in the first place than to deal with the deleterious effects afterwards.

There is also a strong evidence base showing that preventative measures can reduce harm in a way that is superior to later interventions and achieves wider economic and social benefits. There is now strong evidence that the drop in traditional crime described above was driven mainly by preventative security measures rather than by the actions of the police or the courts.

Despite this far too little is currently done to prevent crime and wider harm. Most of the state's direct interventions to make the public safe are reactive rather than preventative in nature.

The key reason why so many opportunities are currently missed to prevent crime and harm is that we lack a systemic approach to prevention. No one owns the prevention task.

To address this, we make the following recommendations.

#### Recommendations

1. The government should produce a cross-departmental Crime Prevention Strategy.
2. The government should establish a new Crime Prevention Agency, with responsibility for delivering the Crime Prevention Strategy, developing regulation and guidance, enforcing crime prevention duties, developing national and international partnerships and relationships in priority areas, communicating crime prevention advice to the public and horizon scanning to identify emerging threats.
3. There should be a new legal duty to prevent crime which would apply to all large private sector organisations, enforced by the Crime Prevention Agency.

4. The government should review local and regional government structures with the explicit aim of promoting increased public service collaboration to prevent complex social problems. Such a review should consider the benefits of a simplified local governance framework, place-based budgets, cross sector workforce development, integrated delivery models and how to improve data sharing locally.
5. The government should widen the remit of the Violence Reduction Units to cover a wide range of local crime types. These Crime Prevention Units should operate in every force area, led by a local Director of Crime Prevention appointed by the Police and Crime Commissioner. They should focus on crime types where prevention activity is best designed across a wider geographic area, such as modern slavery and county lines/serious violence. Community Safety Partnerships should go back to basics, focusing on volume crime and antisocial behaviour, and on those areas where the police and local authority relationship is critical.

## 5. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

We now consider a further solution to the limits on police capacity: to clarify the police role so that they can focus on those tasks where their powers and competencies are most efficacious.

We are clear that the police are not just crime fighters: 83 per cent of calls to police Command and Control Centres do not result in a crime being recorded.

It is better to see the core role of the police as being to resolve conflict and maintain order. They perform this role because of their status as officers of the law with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

We therefore define the core role of the police as being **to promote public safety by maintaining order and upholding the law, which their unique powers enable them to do, and to carry out other activities which enable them to perform this core role legitimately, effectively and with minimum reliance on those powers.**

To perform this core role we see the police as having the following functions:

1. To respond to calls for help, repair harm and refer cases on to others who can provide support and prevent reoccurrence.
2. To safeguard vulnerable people who they come across in the course of their work.
3. To prevent crime and harm, either directly where their powers and skills are required or by referring cases, issues or problems on to others who can help.
4. To investigate crime, disrupt criminal activity and bring offenders to justice.
5. To provide victims of crime access to justice and support.
6. To offer community policing that is visible, responsive and works with the community and other public services to solve problems that are a concern for safety.

### Recommendation

6. In order to clarify the police role within a changing and complex environment the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the National Police Chiefs' Council and the Home Office should agree a new police service Statement of Mission and Values.

## PART III. CAPABILITIES

The police service will require a number of systemic capabilities if it is to meet the challenges described above. We discuss each of these in turn.

### 6. LEGITIMACY

At the heart of the Peelian model of policing is the idea that the police can only successfully carry out their work with the support and cooperation of the public. While most people trust and have confidence in the police, there are reasons to be concerned about the health of police legitimacy:

- People from Black and Mixed ethnic groups, particularly those with Black Caribbean backgrounds, are much less likely than White people (and some other ethnic groups) to expect local police to treat them fairly, with respect, and to agree that police can be trusted.
- In recent years police actions have been contested to a degree that has particularly tested the strength of the relationship between the police and the public. Data from London shows a marked deterioration in Londoners' assessments of police

fairness and respectfulness, and their trust in police, from early 2020 onwards.

- When we look ahead to the environment in which police can reasonably expect to operate over coming decades, there are good reasons to believe that legitimacy will be both more challenging to sustain and more crucial to achieving public safety.

### Recommendations

7. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the National Police Chiefs' Council and the Home Office should make a first-principle commitment to policing with legitimacy. They should recognise that this is a crucial enabler of effective policing. This should be expressed as a central component of a revised Statement of Mission and Values. This commitment should be backed up by a national plan for improving police legitimacy. The other relevant recommendations set out in this report should form a part of that national plan.
8. Efforts to build and sustain police legitimacy need to be driven by better data and more sophisticated analytics. Better data should also be used to drive accountability and ensure legitimacy is prioritised when faced with competing imperatives. The Home Office should fund a substantial uplift in the Office for National Statistics' crime and policing public survey programme. As part of this a feasibility study should be carried out into the creation of a 'legitimacy index' (potentially combining inspection and survey-based inputs) to enable public scrutiny, performance monitoring and comparisons across time, area and between population groups.
9. The College of Policing should undertake a programme to improve the quality of police interactions with the public, drawing on the principles of procedural justice and the existing evidence-base about 'what works'. The programme should aim to both develop knowledge and have sufficient resources to deliver comprehensive officer and staff training and support widespread practice change. Training in interpersonal skills should be a minimum standard that all police forces are expected to meet.

10. As part of a commitment to inclusive public dialogue and opening the police up to regular and ongoing challenge, Police and Crime Commissioners and Mayors should invest in vehicles to promote public participation in decision-making, such as citizens juries and assemblies. Opinion surveys and elections every four years are not sufficient to promote the kind of ongoing dialogue that is required.

In order to understand the practical implications of prioritising legitimacy we looked at a number of areas of focus. Despite strong evidence that community policing is highly effective at improving public confidence in the police, neighbourhood policing has been cut back significantly since 2010. To address this we call for a strengthening of neighbourhood policing over the next decade.

### Recommendation

11. The Home Office should ask police forces to deliver a substantial uplift in neighbourhood policing, designed around the need to build and sustain police legitimacy, public confidence, and community resilience. This should involve deploying a significant proportion of the additional officers recruited since 2019 into neighbourhood policing. This provision should be:

- Concentrated where legitimacy is most challenged.
- Assessed against the objectives of improving legitimacy, confidence and resilience.
- Implemented in ways conducive to long-term local knowledge and relationship building.
- Accompanied by sufficient 'organisational transformation' to align wider police decision making with local insight, knowledge, and perspective.
- Designed with an emphasis on promoting local dialogue, deliberation, and to encourage broad-based public involvement in local problem definition, prioritisation and solving.

We believe that the ability to stop and search with reasonable suspicion is an important power that should be available to the police. However, we believe that the current pattern of police stop and search use is not justified. It represents a significant barrier to building trust and confidence, particularly among Black people who are disproportionately likely to be stopped and searched. We are particularly concerned about the use of Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which is used even more disproportionately against Black people and does not require an officer to have reasonable suspicion.

### Recommendations

12. The government's Serious Violence Strategy should be amended to reflect a three-strand commitment to 1. a preventative public health approach, 2. targeted law enforcement activity ('precision policing') and 3. an explicit commitment to legitimacy and working with communities. The last is lacking from current strategies and emphasises a shift to problem solving, partnership and prevention from 'blunt' street level deterrence and enforcement.
13. The College of Policing should issue mandatory guidance in relation to stop and search training. This would be based on the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme. This should emphasise the importance of procedural justice and the need for searches to have strong grounds, including through being intelligence-led, and to align with wider police priorities. Where a drugs search leading to a 'find' and a charge of possession would otherwise be made, individuals should be consistently diverted toward a social intervention and away from the criminal justice system.
14. The Section 60 legislation should be changed to make clear that this is a power to be used only in extraordinary circumstances, where the police have intelligence that a significant outbreak of serious violence is likely to occur. The authorisation should be made by a chief officer. The grounds for the decision should be clearly communicated to the public and the impact on police-community relations considered.



We are living in a digital age and we must consider the implications of this change for police legitimacy and public trust. It is unhelpful that public debate around police use of technology tends to be polarised between critics on the one side and the police acting as proponents on the other. It would be better for the police to subject proposed data and technology initiatives to independent scrutiny.

### Recommendation

15. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs' Council should establish an independent National Commission for Police Technology Ethics to consider and advise on proposals for new technology projects. Police forces and law enforcement agencies should work with the Centre on a voluntary basis, but a public register of all police technology projects should be kept, indicating each project's referral/approval status.

The work of the Commission should be informed by 1. a standing Citizens Panel on police use of technology, and 2. a programme of research, commissioned by the College of Policing, to better understand how police personnel make technologically augmented decisions.

The Commission should work with the College of Policing to develop guidance around the proportionate use of intrusive technologies. This should be based on the principle of minimal intrusion, with an ability to escalate as circumstances demand.

Nothing is more corrosive of public trust in the police than unethical, illegal and immoral conduct by police officers. To address this, we make a number of recommendations aimed at improving the misconduct system and promoting a wider culture of integrity in policing.

### Recommendations

16. The Home Office should review the use of independent chairs of police misconduct hearings. Such a review should identify whether the recent reforms have made it harder to secure the dismissal of officers found guilty of misconduct.

17. The College of Policing should instigate a programme of work to ensure that the Code of Ethics is deeply embedded into police training, decision making and professional practice. This should include:

- Ensuring that the principles set out in the Code of Ethics are core components of all leadership development programmes in policing.
- Ensuring that 'ethical health checks' are a standard part of police officer professional development.
- Ensuring that reflective practice is used systematically to promote discussion of the implications of the Code of Ethics for police decision making.

18. The College of Policing should ensure that police leadership development programmes are informed by the principles of organisational justice. These programmes should promote a model of police leadership that understands and seeks to address the causes of perceived unfairness within the workforce.

19. The Home Office should bring forward legislation to introduce an organisational duty of candour for police forces.

Finally, having a more diverse workforce and one that is more representative of society is a key building block of police legitimacy. At the current rate of progress it will take another 20 years for England and Wales to achieve a representative workforce in terms of gender. At current rates it will take another 58 years (until 2079) for policing to achieve a workforce that is representative of England and Wales in terms of ethnicity (using the projected Black and Minority Ethnic population in 2050).

### Recommendation

20. The government should develop a plan to improve workforce diversity, setting targets for female and ethnic minority recruitment for each police force. In order to facilitate this the government should legislate to allow police forces to introduce time limited positive discrimination policies until such time as these targets are achieved.

## 7. SKILLS AND TECHNOLOGY

Police officers and staff need the skills and technological tools to enable them to perform their roles successfully in the face of radically changing demand.

### Future skills

The future skills requirement can be broken down into three categories:

- **Relational skills** required to manage complexity, respond to vulnerability, de-escalate social tension, and build and sustain public trust and confidence.
- **Investigatory skills** required to investigate increasingly complex areas of crime;
- **Digital skills** to operate effectively in a digital environment.

Turning to relational skills first, while very many police officers have excellent people skills, current police training does not sufficiently emphasise communication and interpersonal skills.

### Recommendation

21. The College of Policing should review the National Police Curriculum to increase focus on relational skills covering themes such as conflict management, co-production, cultural competency, victim care, mental health, trauma and neurodiversity awareness. Officers should refresh these relational skills annually alongside officer safety training. They should be made part of a mandatory professional minimum standard regulated by the College of Policing.

There is a national shortage of detectives. In 2021 there were 6,851 fewer PIP 2 accredited investigators in post than was required. These gaps are not being dealt with through the current Uplift Programme.

### Recommendations

22. A pay supplement should be introduced to make detective roles a more attractive career choice for police officers.
23. All forces should introduce direct entry detective programmes.

There is a pressing need to improve digital skills and knowledge across the whole police workforce, both for generalist officers and for specialists.

### Recommendations

24. **\*\*S23\*\***,

25. Digital intelligence and investigation training should be incorporated into minimum professional standards regulated by the College of Policing.
26. The College of Policing should strengthen career pathways for allied policing professions in areas such as data analysis/science, digital forensics and financial investigation.
27. A national police workforce planning unit should be established within the College of Policing to project future demand, monitor current and future skill gaps and coordinate a national response. The College should have the power to require local forces to address emerging capability gaps and to cooperate with national recruitment and learning and development initiatives.

### Technology

Policing is an information business and yet too often police technology is outdated and cumbersome, causing frustration to the officers and staff who use it, and letting down the public who get a poorer service as a result. In 70 percent of forces less than half of officers are satisfied with their current IT provision. The Police National Computer is 48 years old and will soon be running on unsupportable technology. The National Digital Strategy and the Police Digital Service are steps in the right direction, but we need to build on the progress being made and go further.

### Recommendations

28. The government should increase investment to enable a significant upgrade of police IT over the course of the next two spending reviews.
29. English and Welsh policing needs a common set of information and communications technology (ICT) standards' to be applied across the country. These should be developed nationally and then mandated for adoption by the College of Policing, which would be given powers to direct Chief Constables in relation to IT.

30. The Home Office must prioritise the modernisation of the Police National Computer and the Police National Database. The major national police databases should be housed within the College of Policing.

## 8. LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Police officers and staff need to continually develop and refresh their skills and knowledge to serve the public effectively. However, between 2011/12 and 2017/18, 33 forces reduced their budgeted spending on training in real terms by a greater percentage than their overall reduction in spending. 40 per cent of police officers say they had not received necessary training to do their job well. The quality of the learning and development provided for officers and staff needs to be considerably improved. We also need to take steps to ensure a culture of professional development is inculcated.

### Recommendations

31. The Home Office should establish a Learning and Development Fund that would be used by the College of Policing to fund police learning and development. In order to receive funding police forces would have to demonstrate that their training programmes meet standards set by the College.
32. There should be a minimum set of hours per year reserved for each officer's learning and development. This will be a national minimum standard that the College of Policing will require police forces to fulfil.
33. The Home Office should introduce a Licence to Practice for police officers, administered by the College of Policing. The Licence to Practice ought to be renewed every five years, subject to an officer demonstrating professional development through achieving relevant qualifications, passing an interview or presenting a portfolio of activities and achievements. Any police officer who fails this assessment could receive further support including mentoring. After successive failures they would have their licence removed and would no longer be able to practice as a police officer.

Policing should make greater use of research evidence, scientific methods, and systematically acquired knowledge to improve the effectiveness of its activities.

### Recommendations

34. The police service should further promote evidence-based practice:
  - The College of Policing should make better use of mobile technology to make targeted evidence-based practice guidance available to frontline operational personnel.
  - More police forces should establish Evidence Based Policing Units to carry out research, spread knowledge and promote an evidence and knowledge based culture.
  - The College of Policing should expand and accelerate its programme for generating evidence-based practice guidelines.
  - The College of Policing should set mandatory national minimum standards in guideline areas that are high risk, where the public expect consistency and where the evidence base is strong.
  - Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should introduce a grading for guideline compliance into the HMICFRS PEEL police force inspection regime.

## 9. WELLBEING

Having a healthy and motivated workforce should be seen as a strategic capability for policing. Between 2010/11 and 2015/16 the number of officers on long-term sick leave for physical and mental health reasons increased by 14 per cent and the number of those off sick for psychological illness alone increased by 35 per cent. 48 per cent of police officers say they have low personal morale, compared to 29 per cent of army soldiers. 64 per cent of officers and 55 per cent of staff had experienced post traumatic stress symptoms.

### Recommendations

35. All police officers and staff should be provided with ongoing clinical support throughout their careers. In practical terms this means an annual (physical and mental) health check and appropriate ongoing occupational health support.

36. The College of Policing should develop national standards to address unresolved trauma. This should include the use of regular debriefing sessions. Training in mental resilience should become a core part of both initial police training and continuing professional development (CPD). In addition, frontline supervisors should be trained to recognise signs of trauma and support those who are struggling.

## 10. LEADERSHIP

Effective leadership at all levels is a critical condition for enabling policing to meet the public safety demands of the future. There are very many excellent leaders at all levels of the police service, but everyone in a leadership role, whatever their rank, deserves the support and development to be the best they can be.

### Recommendations

37. The College of Policing should establish a Police Leadership Centre which would have the following responsibilities:
- To promote the learning and development of police leaders at all levels, from Sergeants to Chief Constables.
  - To provide structured support to promote the wellbeing of police leaders.
  - To directly fund police leadership training and professional development throughout the system.
  - To ensure that the learning and development opportunities for police leaders meet national standards.
  - To focus in its first two years on a development programme for police Sergeants, considerably strengthening the support Sergeants receive and increasing the learning time available to them.
  - To build on the international reputation of British policing by offering courses for police leaders overseas. The fees from these courses would be reinvested to support the work of the Police Leadership Centre.

38. The College of Policing should review police leadership selection processes and should explore whether greater national regulation and oversight of these processes would improve fairness, transparency and competition.

39. The appointment process for Chief Constables should be reformed to increase competition for these vital posts. While the Police and Crime Commissioner should continue to make the appointment, they should do so from a short list of candidates drawn up by a national Senior Appointments Board constituted from among the relevant national bodies. That Board would have a responsibility, working with the College of Policing to actively identify suitable applicants.

## PART IV. ORGANISATION

### 11. STRUCTURE

#### Appraising the current structure

The main benefit of the existing 43 force structure is that it provides a strong local dimension in our policing system. This is important for three reasons:

- Visible, engaged and responsive local policing is critical for improving public confidence in the police.
- We need local police leaders to have the autonomy to work much more collaboratively with other local public services to tackle complex public safety problems.
- A strong local dimension in policing structure also creates the space for innovation.

However, the existing structure has five significant faults which need to be addressed:

- The 43 force structure struggles to deal with the rising forms of crime that cross force and national borders.
- The model does not support the development of effective specialist capabilities, which have high fixed costs, do not always require a local presence and benefit from concentration of expertise. A more consistent approach to high-risk areas of policing would also contribute to improved public confidence.



- It is inefficient, because organising specialist and support functions at a higher level would generate economies of scale and reduced duplication. There are indications from the experience of Police Scotland that hundreds of millions of pounds could be saved.
- The existing approach of bottom-up voluntary collaborative arrangements has created a patchwork of ad hoc arrangements that lack a stable foundation.
- Policing lacks a strong strategic centre, which leads to a lack of a clear strategy to meet future challenges, weaknesses in addressing under performance and an inability to ensure policing has the people it needs to perform the tasks set for it. It also means that there is no national platform for delivering core capabilities, including for example forensics, about which we make a recommendation below.

### Recommendation

40. The Home Office should establish a national forensic science service. This would not necessarily replace existing private providers but would incorporate most in-house provision currently provided by forces. This would put forensic science services on a stable and secure footing. The new service would:

- Carry out national procurement of forensics services where these would benefit from being commissioned once on behalf of the whole service.
- Ensure a consistent approach was taken to meeting international quality standards.
- Carry out horizon scanning and research and development to ensure that forensics capability can keep pace with technological and scientific innovation.
- Provide for a concentration of specialism at the centre, as well as ensuring that expertise and learning is shared more effectively.

**\*\*S23\*\***

### A reallocation of functions

The analysis above strongly suggests a reallocation of capabilities and functions to different geographic levels would improve efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. We propose that:

- The local level, currently organised into the 43 forces, should focus on the delivery of local police services: 24/7 response, local crime investigation, neighbourhood policing, safeguarding and offender management.
- A large number of other functions and capabilities would be organised at the regional level. These include serious and organised crime related capabilities and uniformed specialisms (dogs, horses, public order etc). They also include both operational support functions such as forensics and contact management, and business support functions such as procurement and HR.
- The national level would focus on serious and organised crime, counter-terrorism, system stewardship functions (strategy, performance management and human capital development) and the delivery of some high specialist capabilities such as air support and the national IT databases.

Note we do not set out here a defined number of regions, as this is an area where some flexibility and adaptation to local circumstances is required. We also acknowledge that local forces may need to retain a proactive investigation capability to deal with more locally contained serious and organised crime groups.

The reallocation of functions would largely not affect the Metropolitan Police Service as it already operates as a regional force.

### Structural implications

In this report we review a number of options for reform in light of the reallocation of functions we propose. We conclude that the status quo (voluntary collaborations) will not achieve the pace and scale of change required. We think that the alternatives of a smaller number of regional police forces or a single national police force would endanger the local link described above.

For the reasons we conclude that there are two desirable structural solutions:

- The 43 forces remain to provide the local link but Regional Police Units are established by statute to deliver most specialist, operational support and business support functions. These would be accountable to regional boards of Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCS).
- The 43 forces remain and Regional Police Support Units are established to deliver specialist, operational support and business support functions, apart from the regional-level investigation of serious and organised

crime. These would be established by statute and would be accountable to regional boards of Chief Constables and PCCs. **\*\*S23\*\***,

We conclude that the latter approach has the considerable advantages of providing clearer governance and a stronger national model for delivering serious and organised crime capabilities.

We do not rule out future amalgamations of local forces and we acknowledge that the current number of forces and their boundaries are somewhat arbitrary. However, we are more concerned with where capabilities should sit rather than the question of how many local forces there should be.

**\*\*S23\*\***,

## The national landscape

The current national landscape is highly fragmented with a number of organisations performing these system stewardship and delivery roles. It is far from ideal to have such a cluttered landscape as this risks poor coordination, inefficient duplication, confused ownership and gaps emerging between institutions. If possible, we should seek to rationalise this landscape.

In order for the centre to perform an effective system stewardship role it requires a number of strategic capabilities some of which are currently lacking. These capabilities include: setting the overall strategic direction for policing; horizon scanning, national data analytics; and workforce planning.

National policing improvement functions are also fragmented among a number of existing organisations. There is a strong case for having a consolidated national home for police improvement, which would clarify strategic direction and could host the necessary powers to make things happen.

### Recommendation

43. The national policing landscape should be rationalised in the following way:

- The Home Secretary should set the national strategic direction for the service, working in partnership with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs' Council through the National Policing Board.
- This strategic role of ministers would be supported by a new Crime and Policing Strategy Unit within the Home Office which would develop the evidence base to inform the national strategy, monitor performance across the system and horizon scan to ensure the system is always thinking ahead.
- There should be three main delivery organisations at the centre: the Crime Prevention Agency, the **\*\*S23\*\***, and the College of Policing.
- **\*\*S23\*\***,

- The College of Policing should be expanded to become the single home for all national policing improvement functions including learning and development, professional standards, developing the evidence base, IT and national procurement. It would also host a national workforce planning function and a data analytics function. The College would have powers to direct Chief Constables in relation to national minimum professional standards, workforce planning and common standards in relation to IT.

## 12. GOVERNANCE

The fundamental building blocks of the police governance system remain sound. These are:

- The office of Constable: this provides the basis for a model of policing in which constables enforce the law impartially “without fear or favour” and in which they have the discretion to make judgments, subject to law, regulation and guidance.
- The operational independence of Chief Constables: chief officers should make operational decisions, free from political interference, but they should always be accountable for those decisions afterwards.
- The tripartite system: policy making power within policing is shared between the Home Secretary, Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners.

### Police and Crime Commissioners

We believe that local police accountability and governance should continue to be performed by Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and directly elected Mayors. Since their introduction PCCs (and Mayors) have sharpened the accountability of Chief Constables and helped to anchor policing around the concerns of local people. The alternative of returning to a Police Authority arrangement holds little appeal. We also consider that in principle there is a case for PCCs playing more of a role in the wider criminal justice system, particularly in areas such as youth justice and probation.

However, we have concerns about the PCC’s absolute power to dismiss the Chief Constable and below we set out a number of measures to improve the PCC (and mayoral) system of police governance.

## Recommendations

44. The Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) should retain the power to dismiss the Chief Constable, but this should be subject to a confirmatory vote of the Police and Crime Panel, requiring a majority of the total membership. The Panel may ask HMICFRS for a review of the PCC’s decision prior to that confirmatory vote.

45. The Home Secretary should put legislation before parliament to introduce recall referenda for PCCs. The possibility of a recall referendum would be triggered where the Police and Crime Panel has voted by a two thirds majority to express no confidence in the PCC on the following grounds:

- Where the PCC has been sentenced to a custodial prison sentence.
- Where the PCC has been found following an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct to have breached the Nolan Principles on Standards in Public Life.

Following such a vote by the panel there would then be a recall referendum where 10 per cent of the local electorate sign a petition to support one.

46. Where a police force area is coterminous with the jurisdiction of a directly elected Mayor, the Mayor should automatically become the Police and Crime Commissioner for that area. The government should also seek where possible to promote coterminosity between police force areas and the jurisdictional boundaries of city-regional or regional Mayors.

47. The government should consider extending the remit of Police and Crime Commissioners (and their mayoral equivalents) to include greater commissioning of wider criminal justice services, particularly youth custody and probation services.

## The Home Secretary

The Home Secretary should play a leading role in strengthening the strategic centre in policing.

### Recommendation

48. The Home Secretary should use her powers to put in place a stronger strategic centre in policing. In particular, she should:

- Through the National Policing Board set out a five-year national strategy for policing.
- Develop the Strategic Policing Requirement into a much more detailed document setting out the nature of the capabilities the government expects regional and local police organisations to put in place to tackle terrorism and serious and organised crime, including fraud.
- Legislate to mandate Police and Crime Commissioners to collaborate in Regional Police Support Units that would provide specialist and support functions for local forces.

## HMICFRS

Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) plays a critical role in ensuring that police performance is measured and assessed transparently. The PEEL process is well structured and the clarity with which outcomes are presented on its website contribute significantly to the transparency of policing and its accountability to the public.

There are two areas where we think change ought to be considered. First, HMICFRS should be clearer as to how it is inspecting against standards set by the College of Policing. Second, there is a need for more systemic lesson learning from HMICFRS inspections with the other national stakeholders (see Recommendation 49).

## The Independent Office for Police Conduct

We welcome the progress made by the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) in seeking to conclude investigations more speedily and this progress needs to continue. We also welcome its shift away from a 'blame' focus and to more of a 'learning focus'. We think that more could be done to ensure that the lessons learned from IOPC investigations are considered at a strategic level in the police service. In addition, the IOPC ought to work with the College of Policing to discuss how learning points from its investigations can get into the hands of police officers so to inform everyday practice.

## Recommendations

49. The national policing bodies should establish a regular forum to share learning from Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) investigations and HMICFRS inspections and agree actions to ensure that learning is taken forward.

50. The IOPC should work with the College of Policing to look at how lessons learned through IOPC investigations can be turned into learning points and put into the hands of frontline police officers.

## The College of Policing

Above we set out an expanded role for the College of Policing as the single home for national policing improvement functions. To perform its function effectively the College should possess powers in three areas (see Recommendation 43).

First, the College's powers to issue 'codes of practice' should be strengthened so that it can (with the support of the Home Secretary) issue binding regulations, mandating compliance with a basket of national minimum professional standards.

Second, the College would be given new powers to require compliance with common IT standards across policing, so as to ensure interoperability and much more effective sharing of police data.

Third, the College should have powers to require police forces to cooperate with national recruitment, educational and learning and development programmes and to address emerging skills gaps.

## The national system of police governance

One of the most significant problems with the existing system of police governance is that it lacks formal mechanisms for making collective decisions. The legal entities in the system are the 43 Chief Constables and the 43 Police and Crime Commissioners or Mayors. Each of these is a 'corporation sole' and cannot be bound by any collective decision of the others.

The result is a system which, for the purposes of making national decisions, moves at the speed of the slowest passenger. To address this we considered establishing a new legally binding decision-making system, but we concluded that this might not be necessary. Instead we recommend that the Home Secretary should be more proactive in using her powers to ensure decisions are made in the national interest.

### 13. FUNDING

Given the strong local and national interests in policing there is a good rationale for retaining a funding system that contains a blend of national and local funding streams.

However, there are a number of problems with the existing system:

- The current funding formula for the Police Grant is an inadequate reflection of the real relative needs of individual forces.
- The ad hoc nature of the Regional Organised Crime Units' (ROCUs) funding is a major barrier to ROCUs operating effectively.
- The current funding system is complex and short term providing a poor basis for longer term business planning at force level.
- There is a case for the government using the funding system more proactively to ensure national priorities are addressed.
- There is a case for exploring the feasibility of a government grant specifically directed at cross-agency work to prevent and reduce crime.

#### Recommendations

51. The funding of local police forces should continue to be a mixture of central and local contributions. Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Mayors should have greater discretion to raise further revenues for policing via the precept.
52. The government should design and win support for a fairer and more intelligent system for allocating Police Grant between forces. Such a system would be based on up-to-date data, revised annually, and (consistent with this Review) with a focus on the social factors influencing policing demand as well as crime levels. It would take account of Inspectorate perceptions and findings bearing on the capabilities and financial resilience of individual forces (a source which has become markedly richer in recent years), and of government priorities. It would aim to secure acceptable minimum levels of service in all parts of the country, and be robust enough to avoid or at least mitigate the marked disparities in outcomes which the combination of a mechanistic formula and the exercise of local discretion produced during the period of austerity.

53. **\*\*S23\*\***,



## The resource and public value implications of this Review

This Strategic Review has been charitably funded and carried out with the assistance of a small team of Police Foundation staff. Without the resources of a government department it has not been possible for us to fully cost all of our recommendations. But it is possible to outline, with a degree of confidence, their implications for the resources devoted to policing and public safety.

The timeframe within which we have cast our recommendations is intentionally long, and extends beyond a single expenditure planning period. Some recommendations, we believe, are urgent, and where that is the case we have said so. But elsewhere our purpose has been to set a long term direction and argue for a shift in focus over the next decade.

To deliver our recommendations additional resources would be required in the following areas:

- To create the new Crime Prevention Agency and a Crime Prevention Fund.
- To strengthen neighbourhood policing, although we see this as being delivered mainly through the existing additional 20,000 officers.
- To provide higher quality learning and development programmes, such as through the new Leadership Centre and minimum CPD hours for each officer and staff member.
- To deliver improved clinical and occupational health support for police officers.
- **\*\*S23\*\***,
- To deliver much needed investment in police IT.

We have also set out areas where significant savings could be made. In particular, doing much more procurement nationally would deliver economies of scale in areas like uniform, vehicles and equipment. Most significantly, forming mandated Regional Police Support Units would reduce duplication across local forces in relation to specialist capabilities and support functions.

Overall, we consider that the recommendations in this report would generate public value in the following ways:

- They would clarify the overall goals of policing within a wider public safety system and align the work of the police more closely to an assessment of future challenges.
- They would deliver a more efficient use of police resources in particular through the reallocation of functions.
- They would achieve greater public involvement in policing through a revived neighbourhood policing model and greater use of participatory engagement methods by local police.
- They would strengthen the ability of the service to plan for the long term.
- They would prevent more crime, leading to less harm to victims and a safer society.

## 14. CONCLUSION

Policing is at a critical juncture. If it does not embrace reform it will likely be overwhelmed by the scale and complexity of the demands coming down the track. But if we take the necessary decisions now the prize will be great: to develop the conditions in which people can live freely and safely in the 21st century and to renew for our age the promise of the Peelian model, a form of policing that serves rather than oppresses the people and that can continue to be an example to the world of the art of reconciling order with liberty.

# 1. INTRODUCTION: A NEW MODE OF PROTECTION

*“The time is come when, from the increase in its population, the enlargement of its resources, and the multiplying development of its energies, we may fairly pronounce that the country has outgrown her police institutions and that the cheapest and safest course will be found in the introduction of a new mode of protection.”*

Sir Robert Peel, 1828

The world is experiencing changes as radical as those wrought in this country during the Industrial Revolution, which gave birth to the first modern police service in 1829.

Technology is transforming the nature of crime, meaning that offenders living on the other side of the world are harming victims in this country on an industrial scale. The relationship between humanity and the natural environment is also changing profoundly and in ways that are causing enormous turbulence, leading to climate change, biodiversity loss and more frequent pandemic disease. These transformations not only put the environment and humankind at risk, but also throw up a whole range of new challenges for public safety.

Finally, society is changing too: social needs are becoming more complex requiring a response that goes beyond traditional professional silos; previously marginalised victims of crime are rightly demanding that they are taken seriously by the criminal justice system; and new patterns of social division are emerging that require sensitive management by those responsible for keeping the peace.

In the context of these transformations, and despite the hard work and best efforts of police officers and staff, the police service appears at times overwhelmed, seemingly lacking either the capacity or the capabilities to address these challenges. Internet crime remains largely beyond the reach of police institutions designed in the 19th century to control crime and maintain order in local towns and cities.

The police have struggled to respond to increased volumes of sexual offences being reported, never mind being able to proactively look for where the majority of unreported harm is occurring. With rising demand for more complex areas of investigation, the service often struggles to deliver its traditional level of local service, meaning that victims reporting a burglary or a stolen car may receive very little by way of a police response.

In addition to all this we may be reaching a critical juncture in terms of public confidence in the police. Many women’s trust in the police has been undermined by the historic failure to tackle violence against women and girls, and by cases of male police officers themselves abusing women. The Black Lives Matter movement has highlighted once again how Black people remain disproportionately likely to be the subject of police powers, undoubtedly a cause of a deficit of trust and confidence in the police within Black communities.

It is in this context that the Police Foundation has been undertaking the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, launched in 2019. This is the first independent review of policing for many years and is intended to be as influential as the last Royal Commission on the Police in 1962. Then, as now, social change and concerns about how well the police were adapting to it led to a major review that set the framework in which the police operated for decades. Although we do not have the resources of a review supported by the government, we aim to have the same level of impact.

This final report from the Review is our attempt to describe what kind of police service we will need to address the challenges of the 21st century. We started the work from the premise that the British Peelian model of policing remains in many ways an example to the world, but one that needs to be renewed and reformed if it is to keep pace with social change. Our conclusion at the end of the Review is that we live in a moment comparable to that in 1828 when Sir Robert Peel told parliament that the country had “*outgrown her police institutions*”. To keep people free and safe in the transformed conditions of the 21st century will require “*a new mode of protection*”.

## 1.1 THE AIMS OF THE REVIEW

The Review was intended to be strategic in two senses. First, we wanted to think about policing with a long-term perspective. Far too much policing policy is made in response to short term political calculation and immediate operational imperatives. Moreover, policing as a profession tends to have a blind spot when it comes to thinking about the future. As an emergency service policing's core competency is responding quickly and professionally to those at immediate risk of harm. It is also a service facing far more demand than it could ever meet. As a result, it tends to operate very much in the 'here and now'.

This Review represented an opportunity to lift our sights and consider what kind of police service we will need as we move through the 2020s and into the 2030s. We considered that a time horizon of 20 years was long enough to provide a consideration of the foreseeable future, while not being so far away as to result in speculation.

The second sense in which the Review was strategic was that it aimed to look at the 'whole system' rather than diving into particular aspects of operational policing. It aimed to fill a gap in public policy thinking about how the police service as a whole operates and whether it does so in a way that meets the long-term challenges we have identified. Indeed, we look way beyond policing itself and explore the place of the police within a wider system of public safety. This is based on the conviction that the police alone cannot tackle the public safety challenges of the 21st century.

The aims of the Review were therefore:

1. To assess the public safety and security challenges facing the country as we move through the 2020s and into the 2030s.
2. To consider what kind of response we need to make as a country to those challenges.
3. To consider, as part of that wider societal response, what kind of police service we will require, looking at police legitimacy, skills, technology, learning and career pathways, leadership, organisational structure, governance and funding.

## 1.2 HOW WE WORKED

The Review was chaired by Sir Michael Barber and hosted by the Police Foundation, which acted as the Review's secretariat. It took place over two phases: first, an assessment of current and future public safety and security challenges; and second, an analysis of

how society, and the police service in particular, ought to respond to those challenges. The Review's Terms of Reference are included as Appendix A.

### 1.2.1 Calls for Evidence

Each phase of the Review was informed by a public Call for Evidence. These sought views and information from stakeholders, practitioners, and other interested parties, in the form of written responses to a set of questions relevant to each phase's themes.

Both calls were made publicly available on the Police Foundation website and advertised and disseminated via policing networks and our social media feeds. In addition, responses were specifically invited from individuals and organisations with a stake in policing, including Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners, law enforcement agencies, charities, civil society and community groups and relevant private sector stakeholders.

The first Call for Evidence ran from October to December 2019 and received 65 responses. The second took place in February and March 2021 and received 43 responses. A full list of respondents is included as Appendix B. All responses were read and thematically organised using the qualitative data analysis programme NVivo. Unattributed quotations are included throughout the report, labelled as *CE1* and *CE2*, denoting Call for Evidence one and two respectively.

### 1.2.2 Stakeholder engagement

The Review engaged extensively with stakeholders, commentators, and subject matter experts, including academics, campaigners, politicians, police leaders and practitioners, and public, private and third sector representatives. This took the form of numerous one-to-one conversations and meetings held by the Chair, Vice-Chair, and project team members. In addition, a set of 16 Key Informant Interviews were conducted by the Police Foundation research team at the beginning of Phase One, to gain an informed and rounded perspective on current policing challenges. A list of Key Informants is provided in Appendix C. Unattributed quotations are labelled *K/I*. Sir Michael Barber visited Gwent, South Wales, and Warwickshire Police to spend time observing and talking to police officers and staff.

In summer 2021 Police Foundation researchers conducted four focus group discussions (via video conferencing), convened for us by the Revolving Doors Agency, with participants who had lived experience of repeat contact with the criminal justice system,



including one group specifically with women and another with young adults. Their perspectives inform Chapter 6 of this report in particular, with quotations labelled RD.

### 1.2.3 Data analysis and secondary reading

During both phases of the Review and under each of its headings we conducted a comprehensive review of the academic and policy literature. We also analysed a number of publicly available data sets, including data on crime trends, incident data, police workforce, public opinion surveys, enforcement data and police outcomes data. We are grateful to the Evidence and Insight team at the London Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) for making available unpublished data from their Public Attitude Survey and to the National Police Chiefs' Workforce Coordinating Committee for sharing their November 2021 Strategic Assessment of Workforce.

### 1.2.4 The Advisory Board

The work of the Review was guided by an Advisory Board, chaired by Sir Michael Barber, and made up of serving and former police officers, politicians, and leading academics. The Advisory Board members used their expertise to contribute informed views surrounding all the issues covered in the course of our work, as well as providing expert commentary and feedback on the Review's published outputs and developing thinking. The Board met (in person or remotely) on eight occasions during the Review and as several sub-groups, to advise on specific subject areas.

The Advisory Board made a huge contribution to the work of the Review and has considerably influenced its thinking. They are not however responsible for the Review's conclusions which are those of the Review's Chair Sir Michael Barber, the Review's Vice Chair Sir Bill Jeffrey and the Police Foundation team led by Dr Rick Muir. The makeup of the Board is set out in Appendix D.

### 1.2.5 Interim publications

The Review published a report on Phase One of the work in July 2020. In addition, the Police Foundation authored or commissioned three Insight Papers, to inform the Review's deliberations. The first, by Police Foundation Research Director Andy Higgins, focused on the public's perceptions of, and priorities for, today's police service. The second paper, written by Professor

Ian Loader, explored the history of the policing mission and addressed questions about the purpose of the police in the 21st century. The third paper, written by the Police Foundation's Director Rick Muir argued for the establishment of a much more explicit crime and harm prevention system. Several further contributory blogs and articles were published on the Review's website.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.2.6 Events

A series of seminars and conferences were held during the Review and have informed our deliberations, these include:

- The launch event for the Phase One report, and expert panel discussion, on 29th July 2020.<sup>2</sup>
- The Police Foundation's 11th Annual Conference, between 23rd and 25th February 2021, themed around the future police workforce, including sessions on workforce wellbeing, learning and development, recruitment, skills and diversity.<sup>3</sup>
- An International Seminar on policing innovation held on 19th May 2021.<sup>4</sup>
- A Leadership Symposium, held on 8th June 2021 including contributions from senior police and military leaders, consultants, and academics.
- Two seminars with policing stakeholders in Scotland, held in late 2021 in partnership with the Scottish Institute for Policing Research and CGI Scotland.
- A seminar to discuss roads policing held in partnership with DriveTech, which will be followed by a report on the future of roads policing published in February 2022.

### 1.2.7 Geographic and historical perspective

In this Review we wanted to address three gaps in police policy discussion in this country. First, we wanted to break with the parochialism of English and Welsh policing debates. It is striking that countries all over the world are grappling with the same issues and yet little attention is generally paid to experience elsewhere. To address this, we commissioned a review of international experiences of police reform, which particularly informs the findings in Chapter 11 on organisational structures.

We were also aware how little policy discussion there is between the different policing jurisdictions within the

<sup>1</sup> [www.policingreview.org.uk](http://www.policingreview.org.uk).

<sup>2</sup> See: <https://www.policingreview.org.uk/events/launch-event/>

<sup>3</sup> See: <https://www.police-foundation.org.uk/events-programme/annual-conference/>

<sup>4</sup> See: <https://www.policingreview.org.uk/events/policing-innovation-international-seminar-19th-may-2021/>.

United Kingdom. To address this, in partnership with the Scottish Institute for Policing Research (SIPR) and CGI, we organised two seminars in Scotland specifically focused on police reform north of the border. A planned trip to Northern Ireland was cancelled owing to the Covid-19 restrictions, but we studied the experience of police reform in Northern Ireland and make several references to it in the report.

Second, we wanted to look to at the long-term rather than just focusing on tactical responses to the 'here and now'. In doing so our work was particularly informed by the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) sixth Global Strategic Trends report *The Future Starts Today* published in 2018 (MoD, 2018). This substantial piece of work is one of a series published regularly by the MoD's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) and is intended to provide a strategic context for long-term planning, not just for the MoD but across government. Given its pedigree, its focus on questions of security and its comprehensive scope it provides a natural starting point for thinking about the future of policing. Our work was also informed by the College of Policing's recent report on the Future Operating Environment 2040 (College of Policing, 2020).

Although our time horizon was 20 years ahead, throughout the report we describe some future scenarios, distinctly annotated, to highlight possibilities that lie at the outer limits of this time horizon and beyond. Because they are more speculative, these do not lead to hard recommendations, but illustrate a possible direction of travel.

Third, just as the police tend not to look to the future, so too are they reluctant to spend much time reflecting on the past. Police history has very little weight in discussions of policing policy, although it is striking how often the same issues and dilemmas emerge over the years. We are convinced that much could be learned if we took police history more seriously. In this report we try where possible to put contemporary debates in a historical context.

## 1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT

The report comes in four parts. In Part I we outline the challenge facing the country and the police service in terms of public safety and security. This part of the report identifies three sets of changes that are generating new forms of public safety demand: technological, environmental and social change. We then outline how successfully the police service is responding to these changes.

Our analysis in Part I results in three conclusions that shape the rest of the report:

- That the police service alone cannot successfully respond to the range and complexity of the challenges identified (we call this *the capacity challenge*).
- That the police service currently lacks the capabilities required to respond effectively to the threats, risks and harms of the future (we call this *the capability challenge*).
- That the way policing is organised as a system cannot deliver the capabilities required in a way that is effective or efficient (we call this *the organisational challenge*).

In Part II we respond to the capacity challenge in two ways. First, we argue that we need to take a whole system approach to crime and harm. This means we should stop thinking that the 'crime problem' is owned singularly by the police and the criminal justice system. Rather we need a more explicit and institutionally anchored public safety system focused on preventing crime and harm from occurring in the first place.

Second, we argue that in the context of the challenges we have described and of the wider public safety system we have called for, we need to bring greater clarity to the role of the police. This is so that the police are focused on those tasks within the wider public safety system to which their powers, knowledge and skills are best suited. At a general level the role for the police we describe remains consistent with the historic mission of the English and Welsh police, but we aim to provide a sharper focus for police work.

In Part III we respond to the capability challenge by describing five sets of capabilities that the police service will require to meet the challenges of the 2020s and 2030s. These are: legitimacy, skills and technology, learning and development, wellbeing and leadership. These are not operational capabilities as traditionally understood in policing, but systemic capabilities that will enable the system as a whole to achieve the outcomes we have set for it.

In Part IV we argue that the police service needs a new organisational platform upon which to deliver those capabilities. A police force structure that was created in 1964 is no longer capable of delivering policing in a way that is effective or that provides value for money. To address this we propose a set of reforms to the system of police organisation and to its governance framework.

## 1.4 NEXT STEPS

We do not see the publication of this report as the end of the process, but merely an important step on a longer journey. Following the launch of the report we will begin a programme of discussion and engagement throughout policing and beyond.

Over the course of the next twelve months we will:

- Begin a roadshow, visiting police forces in each English region and Wales, to discuss our findings.
- Hold events and seminars to discuss the themes identified in the report with a wide range of people, from the police service, government, business, academia and the third sector.
- Hold direct conversations with policymakers to identify practical options for taking forward our recommendations.
- At the end of that period assess the impact of the Review, reflect on how our thinking has evolved and identify further steps.

We would encourage anyone who has an interest in the themes addressed here to engage with us throughout this process.

PART I  
THE CHALLENGE



## 2. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE 2020s AND 2030s

**Summary:** In this chapter we describe how the public safety challenges facing England and Wales have been transformed. Traditional volume crime has fallen by 75 per cent since 1995. In its place the technological revolution has led to an explosion in internet crime. Environmental change is generating enormous turbulence, from extreme weather events to increased political protest. Social change is leading to more complex needs, heightened political tension and demands for previously marginalised forms of abuse to be taken seriously by the criminal justice system. Organised crime groups are exploiting these technological, environmental and social changes. Public concern about crime is growing, but concerns for safety are higher among women, Black and Minority Ethnic groups and those on low incomes.

In this chapter we describe how the public safety and security challenges facing the country have changed since the turn of the millennium and how they can be expected to evolve through the 2020s and into the 2030s.

We describe three transformations which are creating new kinds of crime, harm, fracture and tension. First, there is the technological revolution, which has created a new venue for crime and harm in the form of the internet. This is an arena which is to a significant extent beyond the grasp of local policing institutions that were born as a response to the challenges of the early 19th century.

Second, there is the environmental transformation. Humanity's over-exploitation of the natural world is creating enormous turbulence, posing a direct challenge to our safety, as well as to our survival as a species.

Third, social change is generating new forms of complex need, increased social tension and demands for previously neglected forms of violence and abuse to be taken seriously. All of this makes the task of creating public safety and security more complex today than it was 20 years ago.

Before describing these three transformations, however, we describe one of the most significant social changes in recent years: the decline of traditional volume crime.

### 2.1 THE TRADITIONAL CRIME DROP

Crime, as measured by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW),<sup>5</sup> has fallen significantly since the mid-1990s (Figure 2.1) (ONS 2021a). In 1995, there were an estimated 19.8 million crimes committed, but this had fallen to just 4.9 million by 2021. These figures exclude fraud and computer misuse offences, which were only introduced into the survey in 2017 and which take the 2021 figure to 11.7 million offences.


That means, if we exclude fraud and computer misuse offences, 'traditional crime' has fallen by 75 per cent since the mid-1990s.

The addition of cybercrime and fraud offences to these figures shows that what initially looked like a sharp overall fall masked an increase in crime taking place on the internet. Nevertheless, the volume and prevalence of crime is still much lower today than it was in the mid-1990s. According to the Office for National Statistics (ONS), eight out of 10 people in the CSEW did not experience *any* of the crimes asked about in the survey in the year to June 2021 (ONS, 2021a).

This 'crime drop' is driven largely by falls in what we call 'traditional volume crime', the sorts of offences that are less serious in terms of the harm caused but which tend to affect large numbers of people. Between 1995 and 2021 we can see that (ONS, 2021a):

<sup>5</sup> The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) ordinarily conducts face to face interviews and provides estimates for adults aged 16 years and over. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, these face to face interviews were paused in March 2020 and continued via telephone (Telephone-operated Crime Survey for England and Wales (TCSEW)) in July 2020. The TCSEW data only relate to adults aged 18 and over. Therefore, throughout this report, where we refer to long term trends we compare historic data to the year ending March 2020. Where we report crime figures in isolation we use data from the year ending June 2021.

**Figure 2.1** Crime in England and Wales 1981 to 2020 (ONS, 2021a; ONS 2021b)



- Violent crime fell by 77 per cent.
- Theft fell by 75 per cent.
- Domestic burglary fell by 81 per cent.
- Vehicle related theft fell by 84 per cent.
- Other household theft fell by 55 per cent.

There are some qualifications that ought to be made in relation to this crime drop. First, the most harmful offences fell by a smaller degree than the least harmful offences. So, the Cambridge Harm Index (which weights offences by the harm they cause) fell by 21 per cent between 2002/03 and 2011/12, compared to a 37 per cent in the raw crime count (Sherman et al 2016).

Indeed, some of the most harmful forms of crime appear to have increased in recent years. According to the ONS (2021a), police recorded knife offences increased by 32 per cent between 2011 and 2021<sup>6</sup> and homicides increased by 18 per cent between 2014 and 2021.<sup>7</sup>

Second, the traditional crime drop is not unique to England and Wales but occurred across the developed world. According to the UNODC (no date), between 2003 and 2018 (or 2016 for France) burglary and car crime fell:

- By 46 per cent and 40 per cent (respectively) in the United States
- By 25 per cent and 54 per cent in Germany
- By six per cent and 44 per cent in France

These trends suggest that the causes of the crime drop are likely to be common across developed countries. Indeed, there is strong evidence that much of the fall in domestic burglary and vehicle crime was due to improvements in home and vehicle security during this period (Tseloni et al, 2017).


Another area of high-volume public safety demand that was prominent in the early 2000s was antisocial behaviour. Here too we see some significant change, at least at the level of reporting and public perceptions. As shown in Figure 2.2, the proportion of people reporting a high level of perceived antisocial behaviour has fallen from 21 per cent in 2003 to just 7 per cent in 2020. Similarly, the number of antisocial behaviour incidents recorded by the police has also been in steady decline, although we do not know if this reflects a decline in incidents, a decline in the willingness to report or indeed a shift in police focus away from this area of work (Strategic Review of Policing, 2020).

<sup>6</sup> A 47 per cent increase between 2011 and 2019, for a pre-Covid-19 pandemic comparison.

7. A 28 per cent increase in homicides between 2014 and 2019, for a pre-Covid-19 pandemic comparison.



**Figure 2.2** Percentage of Crime Survey for England and Wales respondents reporting a high level of perceived antisocial behaviour (ONS, 2021a)



More recently there was an uptick in police recorded antisocial behaviour incidents during the coronavirus pandemic; despite falling by 63 per cent between 2008 and 2019, police recorded antisocial behaviour increased by 23 per cent in the two years to June 2021 (ONS, 2021a). This is almost certainly because people were confined to their homes, resulting in both more neighbourhood nuisance and more people being at home to report it. There may also have been occasions where police were called out to deal with breaches to the coronavirus regulations but ended up dealing with incidents through antisocial behaviour legislation.

## 2.2 TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

The creation of the internet and the spread of digital technology has transformed the nature of crime, creating an entirely new venue (cyberspace) in which crime and harm can take place. Moreover, it is a space that operates across national boundaries, meaning that offending is generally beyond the reach of local police forces or even national law enforcement agencies.

The scale of internet crime is obvious from the CSEW, which was amended from 2017 to include, for the first time, computer misuse and fraud offences (see Figure 2.1). Fraud and computer misuse offences made up 53 per cent of crime detected in the survey (Telephone-operated Crime Survey for England and Wales (TCSEW)) in the year to June 2021.

**Computer misuse offences** made up 14 per cent of crimes against households in 2021 (they also make up a large proportion of crimes against businesses). Computer misuse crime covers any unauthorised access to computer material. It includes offences such as spreading computer viruses, hacking and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks (the flooding of internet servers to take down network infrastructure or websites).

**Fraud offences**, many of which are cyber-enabled or cyber-dependent crimes, made up 40 per cent of crime in 2021, the most common type of crime. Fraud involves a person dishonestly and deliberately deceiving a victim for personal gain of property or money or causing loss or risk of loss to another. It has existed as a criminal offence for centuries, but while in the past it was seen as a largely 'white collar' crime affecting large businesses, it is now a volume crime affecting ordinary people, with 5 million offences occurring in the year to June 2021.

The reason for this explosion in fraud is the internet, which has enabled people to commit fraud on an industrial scale. According to a Police Foundation analysis, 69 per cent of fraud cases investigated by the police in 2016/17 included at least one element of cybercrime (Skidmore et al, 2018).

Far from being a victimless crime, fraud not only harms UK institutions but can have a devastating effect on victims, nearly half of whom feel their financial loss has affected their emotional wellbeing (Skidmore et al, 2018).

Compared with the scale of fraud perpetrated in England and Wales, the police response to it is extremely limited. In the year to March 2021 while there were 4.6 million frauds reported in the crime survey, just 806,637 were reported to Action Fraud, CIFAS or UK Finance. Of those reports just 3 per cent (24,805) were disseminated to police forces for investigation. In the same period just 4,853 fraud cases resulted in a charge or summons, which represents just 0.6 per cent of those recorded that year and just 0.1 per cent of those frauds that took place in that period (Home Office, 2021a, ONS, 2021a).

Another crime type that has been transformed by the internet is the **sexual abuse of children**. Whereas in the past the availability of child sexual abuse (CSA) imagery was limited to all but the most committed offenders, with the growth of online communications and social media, it is now relatively easy to access.

The volume of CSA imagery online is vast (some 8.3 million unique images were added to the Child Abuse Image Database in the four years to 2019) and this number is growing. The number of industry referrals regarding CSA imagery to the **\*\*S23\*\*** increased from 1,591 in 2009 to 113,948 in 2018. Since 2016, between 400 and 450 people are arrested every month in the UK in relation to online CSA (IICSA 2020).

Looking ahead, the degree to which public safety is shaped by the digital environment will only increase. In the years ahead we will see exponential growth in processing power, the volume and variety of data and the degree of connectivity between devices. Ever more information will flow across national boundaries, much of it generated by machine-to-machine communication. As more and more human activity takes place online we will become more exposed to internet crime. In particular, the rise of smart sensors, wearable tech and the Internet of Things will create new opportunities for cybercrime.

Whether and how to regulate this information space will be a central public policy question over the next 20 years. Within that broader debate policymakers will need to decide what the role of the police (and others such as the large technology companies) should be in enforcing rules and laws on the internet, and what skills and competencies those working within policing will require if they are to successfully perform such a role.

The police will need to invest in the digital tools required to operate effectively in this new environment. The police will also have to be mindful of their legitimacy as they operate in these new spaces, in particular in striking a balance between keeping people safe and respecting their privacy.

Finally, there is a growing risk that if formal and politically accountable forms of rule enforcement, such as public policing, cannot adequately provide protection on the internet then it seems likely that alternative non-state actors will emerge to fill the vacuum. This will be in the shape of private sector cybersecurity and investigatory bodies, but also potentially through new forms of cyber-vigilantism.

## 2.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE

We live in the geological epoch known as the Anthropocene, an era defined by the degree to which human activity is transforming the natural environment. This has led to a loss of biodiversity, an accelerated rate of species extinction, changes in the distribution of organisms around the world, deforestation and most significantly of course, climate change.

Few of these matters are traditionally thought to concern the police, but they will increasingly pose significant risks to public safety. We highlight two forms of environmental change that will pose an increased risk to human safety in the years ahead: climate change and pandemics.

### 2.3.1 Climate change


The global temperatures are rising as a result of human activity. Global warming is likely to lead to more frequent and more intense extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, storms, heat waves and heavy rainfall. Drought and heat stress will be disruptive for agriculture, causing problems with food supply.

Between 2005 and 2014 there was an average of 335 climate and weather-related disasters globally per year, which is an increase of 14 per cent compared to the period 1995-2004, and almost twice the level recorded during 1985/95 (CRED and UNISDR, 2015). For the UK specifically we will see changing rainfall patterns, rising sea levels and a greater likelihood of extreme flooding. The summer 2007 floods claimed 13 lives, led to 7,000 people being evacuated by emergency services and cost the UK economy £3.2bn, or droughts such as that in 2003 which led to 2,000 deaths (Cabinet Office, 2017).

The College of Policing states that this creates a “*potentially significant operational and financial risk for the service*” (College of Policing, 2015). For example, it is estimated that the 2015-2016 winter floods cost the emergency services £3m (Environment Agency, 2018).

In addition to extreme weather here, climate change will also make some parts of the world less habitable causing millions of people to move. Rising sea levels are already forcing coastal communities in countries such as the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Sierra Leone to relocate. The World Bank estimates that by 2050 climate change will force more than 143 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America from their homes (Bharadwaj et al 2021).

**Figure 2.3** Number of police flagged mental health incidents (36 forces) (Jones, 2019)



Climate change is also generating political protest and we should expect that to intensify as global temperatures rise and citizens become frustrated with the scale and pace of the political response. The Extinction Rebellion and Insulate Britain protests have shown that people are willing to engage in more militant forms of direct action to make their views known. The police will increasingly find themselves seeking to balance the right to peaceful protest with their responsibilities to uphold public order.

### 2.3.2 Pandemics

Research has found that the risk of global pandemics is increasing (Penn 2021). This is thought to be the result of population growth and agricultural intensification which increase the risk of viruses transferring from animals to humans. Poverty, increased population density and the ease of global travel also mean that such viruses can spread more rapidly.

The experience of the coronavirus pandemic has shown how highly disruptive such events can be. The world economy has been shut down for prolonged periods. Governments have instructed their citizens to stay in their homes and have given the police extensive powers to enforce tight restrictions on liberty in the name of protecting public health. The way we live and work has been transformed, probably permanently.

If there are to be more frequent pandemics, consideration will need to be given to how we become more resilient in dealing with them. We will also need to learn the lessons from the response to Covid-19 (see Box 2.1).

## 2.4 SOCIAL CHANGE

We are living through a period of significant social change, characterised by the growing complexity of social need, a demand for previously marginalised forms of violence, abuse and exploitation to be taken more seriously by the criminal justice system and the development of new forms of social tension and political polarisation.

### 2.4.1 Complex needs

The College of Policing noted in 2015 that “*Non-crime incidents account for 84 per cent of all command and control calls.*”<sup>8</sup> Local police data suggests in some forces, ‘public safety and concern for welfare’ incidents now represent the largest category of recorded incidents. As with crimes that related to vulnerability, public protection and safeguarding, these incidents are likely to consume more resource effort as they can be more complex, many involving combined agency responses” (College of Policing, 2015).

An increasing amount of police work involves responding to incidents linked to **mental health** problems. A survey of 36 police forces by the BBC shows a 28 per cent increase in incidents flagged as mental health related between 2014 and 2018 across 26 forces (Figure 2.3). Police use of their powers to detain a person under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 increased by 33 per cent between 2017 and 2020.<sup>9</sup>

This increase in the number of police recorded mental health incidents has been attributed to a number of causes, including reductions in funding for mental

<sup>8</sup> We should note that some of those incidents that did not result in a crime being recorded may nevertheless have been linked to crime.

<sup>9</sup> Excluding Lancashire, Warwickshire and West Mercia for comparability due to changed recording systems.

## Box 2.1 The police response to the coronavirus pandemic

Recent research by the Police Foundation and Crest Advisory into how successfully the police responded to the pandemic has come to the following conclusions:

There was widespread support for the Covid restrictions and considerable public sympathy with the police task in enforcing them. Although public support for the police held up during the pandemic, in London there are signs that public confidence has eroded. The 'four Es' approach (engage, explain, encourage and enforce) was felt by most policing stakeholders interviewed to have helped the service maintain public support.

While overall recorded crime fell sharply in the earliest stages of the March 2020 lockdown it returned to pre-pandemic levels after just 12 weeks. There is little evidence that the police got more time to proactively investigate more serious offences as a result because increases in non-crime demand, often associated with Covid-19, offset reductions in crime demand.

Overall, it appears that the pandemic has accelerated pre-existing trends of crime moving online and becoming more complex, higher harm and harder to solve. For example, shoplifting declined sharply while stalking increased significantly.

Policing demonstrated considerable resilience by continuing to provide core services and stepping into gaps left by other agencies during lockdown.

Central coordination of the police operation to respond to the pandemic was essential and proved effective in relation to the sourcing and distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE) for officers and staff, working with government, issuing guidance and collating and analysing data.

There were limited productivity gains through the use of technology to enable more agile working. It remains to be seen how much of this technology-enabled innovation will be sustained or whether there will be a return to previous modes of working.

For more detail see Aitkenhead et al (2022).

health services, leading to fewer beds and less out-of-hours support, greater reporting due to increased awareness among members of the public and better understanding and recording of mental health incidents by the police (HMICFRS, 2018).

Police devote upwards of three million 'investigation hours' per year to **missing persons** reports in England and Wales, which is the equivalent of 1,562 full-time police officers per year or 36 officers per force.<sup>10</sup> The average cost per investigation can range from £1,870 to £2,415, and the total annual cost of these investigations is estimated to be between £394m and £509m or between three and four per cent of the 2021/22 £13.7bn police budget (Babuta and Sidebottom, 2018).

According to the **\*\*S23\*\*** the number of missing incidents recorded by police increased by 65 per cent between 2013/14 and 2019/20 (Figure 2.4).

Increased missing persons incidents is partly linked to the pressure on mental health services, with eight in ten adults going missing because of diagnosed or undiagnosed mental health reasons (Home Affairs Committee, 2018; Holmes, 2017).


Another driver is the care system. Nearly half of all young people in care go missing at least once compared to one in 10 of the general population (Babuta and Sidebottom, 2018). One respondent to our Call for Evidence argued that under-investment in children's services has led to increased use of private, unregulated care homes in lower cost areas miles away from family networks. This leaves children in these homes vulnerable to exploitation. Indeed, a large proportion of missing child incidents originate from a small number of private care homes (Shalev Greene and Hayden, 2014).

Although self-reported **drug use** has declined in England and Wales over the last two decades (largely driven by reduced cannabis consumption) the proportion of people using Class A drugs has increased (Figure 2.5) (ONS, 2020a).


There is also evidence that use of some of the most addictive drugs has been rising. The estimated number of opiate and crack cocaine users in England rose 4.4 per cent between 2014/15 and 2016/17 (O'Connor, 2019). Recorded deaths linked to drug misuse rose 83 per cent between 2012 and 2020 (ONS, 2021c) and hospital admissions for drug-related mental and behavioural disorders in England have more than doubled in a decade (NHS Digital, 2019).

<sup>10</sup> This assumes each officer works 1920 hours per year (40 hours per week, 48 weeks of the year).

**Figure 2.4** Missing related calls and missing incidents between 2013/14 and 2019/20 (\*\*S23\*\*, 2019a; \*\*S23\*\*, 2021)



**Figure 2.5** Proportion of 16 to 59-year-olds reporting use of drugs in the last year (percentage)



Looking ahead, many of the factors that have driven the rise in the number of people presenting with complex social needs look set to continue or intensify. Most long-term forecasts predict that income inequality and relative poverty will worsen in the years ahead unless action is taken by government to tackle it.

While the latest Spending Review increased the budgets of almost all government departments, there are reasons to think that in the long-term public spending may continue to be constrained. Even before the coronavirus pandemic the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) was forecasting a tight fiscal context as we move through the 2020s and 2030s (OBR 2018). This is a result of the need to spend much more on health, social care and pensions as the population becomes steadily older. The additional fiscal challenges that will result from the economic downturn and huge increase in state support

required during the coronavirus pandemic will only limit further the fiscal room for manoeuvre.


If these trends hold we can expect the police to continue to dedicate a large amount of time responding to the needs and problems of people who suffer from multiple and complex disadvantages. This will require the police to work in an increasingly collaborative and integrated way with other public services. We address how they might do this in Part II of this report.

#### 2.4.2 Violence against women and girls

In recent years we have seen growing demands for previously marginalised forms of violence, abuse and exploitation to be taken seriously by the criminal justice system. In particular, there has been increased reporting of male violence and sexual abuse against women and girls.



**Figure 2.6** Police recorded domestic abuse: violence, other crime and incidents (ONS, 2021e)



Most violence experienced by women is **domestic abuse** perpetrated by a current or former intimate partner or another family member. For female victims of violent crime, the offender was an intimate partner in 49 per cent of cases, compared with 22 per cent of cases for male victims (ONS, 2021d).

The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) reports a gradual downward trend in the prevalence rates of domestic abuse against women aged 16 to 59 over the last 15 years from 1.7 million incidents in March 2005 to 1.3 million incidents in the year ending March 2020 survey (ONS, 2020b). However, at the same time, we have seen increased reporting of domestic abuse, which is thought to be linked to increased confidence among victims that the criminal justice system will take cases seriously (Holder, 2001; Keeling et al, 2015). As Figure 2.6 shows, there was a 50 per cent increase in reported domestic violence and other domestic abuse crime between 2016 and 2021.

23 per cent of women have experienced **sexual assault** in since the age of 16, compared to five per cent of men (ONS, 2021a). In the year to March 2020, 773,000 adults aged 16 to 74 were victims of sexual assault (including attempts), of whom 80 per cent were women (ONS, 2021f).

In recent years, there has been a major increase in the number of victims reporting sexual offences to the police. For rape, this figure increased from 16,374 to 55,709 between March 2013 and March 2021, a 240 per cent increase. For other sexual offences this figure increased from 37,225 to 92,174 in the same period, a 148 per cent increase (Figure 2.7) (ONS, 2021a). The launch of Operation Yewtree in 2012 and the birth of the #MeToo movement in 2017 are believed to have contributed to this huge rise in reporting (Bowcott, 2019).

Despite improved crime recording and increased reporting, conviction rates for the most serious offences remain low. Of the approximately 128,000 victims of rape a year, only 1.6 per cent resulted in someone being charged, down from 8.5 per cent in 2015 (HM Government, 2021; Home Office, 2021a).

### 2.4.3 The physical and sexual abuse of children

It is estimated that approximately 8.5 million adults (21 per cent of the population) experienced abuse before the age of 16 years and an estimated 3.1 million adults were victims of sexual abuse as children (ONS, 2020c).

NSPCC research shows that police recorded child sexual abuse (CSA) offences rose from 32,821 in England and Wales in 2014/15 to 59,793 in 2019/20, an 82 per cent increase (NSPCC, 2021).


Only 4 per cent of child abuse reports made to the police end in a charge or summons and this is thought to be due to the difficulty in collecting evidence especially in non-recent cases (ONS, 2020d).

A major challenge for the police in the years ahead is how to meet the demand for non-recent abuse to be investigated. With constrained resources and large volumes of unreported demand, difficult decisions will inevitably need to be made about the balance between investigating the crimes of the past and the need for immediate safeguarding.


### 2.4.4 Social tension

Since the foundation of the police service in the 19th century, the police have always played a role in ensuring public order and managing social tension. This

**Figure 2.7** Crime Survey for England and Wales sexual assault and police recorded rape and sexual assault from March 2005 to March 2021 (ONS, 2021a; ONS, 2021g)



**Figure 2.8** Frequency of types of protest action since 1985 (Bailey, 2020)



section explores how these tensions have manifested themselves in three areas in recent years: the policing of protest, hate crime and terrorism.

The number of **protest** events has risen steadily over the last decade, going from 83 in 2007 to 280 in 2016. While the vast majority of these protests have been peaceful, there has been a rise in more confrontational protest tactics. Figure 2.8 shows a dramatic spike in the number of confrontational protests, increasing from seven in 2000 to 126 in 2019. This is linked to the Extinction Rebellion protests in 2018 and 2019 which


actively promoted civil disobedience as a way of calling for stronger action on climate change. These forms of protest look set to intensify as the climate crisis accelerates.

The number of **hate crimes** reported to the police in England and Wales rose by 194 per cent between 2012/13 and 2018/19, when 114,958 hate crimes were recorded (Figure 2.9).

This increase is likely to reflect an increased willingness among victims to report, alongside a reduced tolerance for prejudice and discrimination. It also reflects an



**Figure 2.9** Hate crimes recorded by the police, by monitored strand 2011/12 to 2020/21 (excluding Greater Manchester) (Home Office, 2021b)



increase in incidents which take place via social media. Looking ahead, managing the growing numbers of hate incidents online will be a major challenge for social media companies, regulators and the police.

In total, 3,411 people have died as a result of **terrorism** since 1970 in the UK. Most deaths between 1970 and 1990 were a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland, but since the turn of millennium a large number have been the result of Islamist attacks. Al Qaida claimed responsibility for the deaths of 56 people, during the London bombings of 7th July 2005, while, in 2017, 42 people were killed in Islamist terror attacks in London and Manchester (Allen and Harding, 2021).

There is also a growing threat from far-right groups. Each year between 2018 and 2021, the proportion of White people arrested for terrorism-related activity exceeded the proportion of Asian people (Home Office, 2021c). **\*\*23\*\***

It is predicted that the demand on the police generated by terrorism will continue to increase, even if the number of attacks does not. This is because the methodology and sophistication of terrorist plots are expected to continue to evolve and, according to police responses to our Call for Evidence, there will continue to be “*self-radicalising lone actor terrorists who can cause huge disruption with relatively small-scale attacks*”. CE1.29

## 2.5 ORGANISED CRIME GROUPS ARE EXPLOITING THESE CHANGES

So far, we have described three transformations that will shape the context for public safety in the 2020s and 2030s. One common thread that runs through all three is that they are each being exploited for profit by organised crime groups.<sup>11</sup>

Organised crime groups have been particularly adept at exploiting the potential of the **technological revolution**. They are using ever more sophisticated technology to trade criminal commodities via the dark web, launder profits through virtual currencies and conceal communications using encryption technology (**\*\*S23\*\***, 2019b, 2020).

They have also been exploiting **environmental change**. In many parts of the world organised crime groups are profiting from resource shortages and environmental crime. This includes cartels taking control of local water supplies in countries such as Pakistan and Kenya. Armed groups are also exploiting the boom in demand for rare earth and precious metals. Electric vehicle (EV) production is increasing demand for the lithium and cobalt used in EV batteries, which in turn is fuelling labour exploitation including child labour. Organised crime is also involved in fraudulently taking the recyclable waste from developed countries and disposing of it through dangerous processes in the Global South (Walker, 2021).

<sup>11</sup> We note that the definition of ‘organised crime group’ is contested. Here we use the definition in statute of three or more people working together for a criminal purpose (Section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015).

**\*\*S23\*\***, organised crime groups also moved quickly to both adapt to and exploit the conditions of the **coronavirus pandemic**.<sup>12</sup>

- The pandemic made it harder to use conventional money transfer services such as Money Service Businesses (MSBs). Organised crime groups therefore turned to covert digital transfer methods such as crypto-assets or currencies to engage in **money laundering**.
- During the pandemic there was an increase in **cyber-enabled fraud**. This included a 'boom' in the sale of counterfeit healthcare and sanitary products, PPE and pharmaceuticals (Europol, 2020a). There were also attempts to exploit the UK's track and trace app, using vishing, phishing and bogus calls to obtain personal data from victims.
- The threat from **cyber-dependent crimes** increased, particularly criminal ransomware attacks targeting organisations. The rise in remote working and the use of unfamiliar online services (e.g. video conferencing applications) brought new opportunities to infiltrate networks.
- The fact that children and young people were spending more unsupervised time on the internet is considered likely to have increased opportunities for **child sexual offenders** to contact children via gaming sites, chat groups in apps, phishing attempts via email or approaches on social media. During the first lockdown referrals of child sexual abuse material from the technology industry to Europol rose sharply from under 200,000 in January 2020, to over one million in March 2020 (Europol, 2020b).
- Social distancing and other restrictions on movement reduced the ability to engage in street **drug dealing**. Drug users increasingly turned to open web and darknet markets, as well as to secure encrypted communication applications. This may have been a catalyst for longer term changes at the retail end of supply.

Finally, organised crime groups have been exploiting many of the **social changes** described above, particularly through the criminal exploitation of those who have complex needs.

Organised crime has been heavily involved in the exploitation and abuse of vulnerable women and

children through modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT). The police recorded 8,730 offences in the year to March 2020 with 10,613 potential victims referred to the National Referral Mechanism (Modern Slavery Unit, 2021). Although these figures represent an increase on previous years, this is believed to reflect growing awareness and law enforcement activity. The scale of offending is much greater than official figures suggest, with one estimate suggesting there are more than 100,000 victims in the UK (Centre for Social Justice, 2020).

Organised crime groups have also been exploiting vulnerable children in order to expand drug markets outside of the big cities. The **County Lines** distribution model involves the supply of drugs, principally crack cocaine and heroin, by city-based networks and organised crime groups, into smaller towns and rural areas, and the use of dedicated, branded mobile phone 'deal lines' to take orders and arrange delivery. More than 3,000 such lines were identified in 2019, with 800 to 1,100 believed active at any one time (**\*\*S23\*\***, 2020).

The County Lines model relies on the exploitation of children and young people to move consignments of drugs, make deliveries, collect payment and carry out other related criminal activities. They might threaten a young person or their family, or else offer rewards such as money, food, alcohol, clothes and jewellery, or improved status, but in such a way that the child feels in debt to their exploiter (Stone, 2018).

Vulnerable adults are also sometimes exploited, for example through the 'cuckooing' of accommodation for use in drugs activity (**\*\*S23\*\***). Due to the increased availability and aggressive marketing tactics used in new territories, Class A consumption appears to have grown more rapidly away from urban markets (Hales et al, 2020). The rise of the County Lines model has also been linked to the increase in **knife crime** in the last few years (see Box 2.2).

## 2.6 PUBLIC SECURITY

In this section we turn to the subjective aspects of security. How people experience crime and safety is important. If people feel unsafe then this is likely to have a major impact on their wellbeing and is therefore a legitimate focus for public policy.

Here we focus on people's levels of concern about crime and how these have changed in recent years. In the next chapter we discuss how people view

<sup>12</sup> **\*\*S23\*\***


## Box 2.2 Knife crime

In recent years we have seen an increase in serious and weapon enabled violence, (\*\*S23\*\*), which has become one of the most pressing and high-profile policing and public safety challenges facing the country.


Overall, the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) shows that levels of violence have fallen significantly since the peak of crime in 1995, from an estimated 4.5 million incidents in 1995 to approximately one million in 2021.

However, police crime records and NHS data (ONS, 2021a), show a marked increase in levels of serious violence, particularly violence involving knives, since 2015 (Figure 2.10). Knife homicides, most notably of younger male victims (Figure 2.11), have also increased over the same period.

**Figure 2.10** Trends in police recorded violence involving knives and NHS hospital admissions for assault with sharp objects (ONS, 2021a)



**Figure 2.11** Homicides by sharp instruments by age and sex of victim (ONS, 2021h)



The most significant immediate driver behind this increase in serious violence is changes in the drug market. The link between drug market dynamics and spikes in serious violence is well-documented internationally (for a recent summary see Morgan et al, 2020).

The timing and locations of recent increases in England and Wales is consistent with the hypothesis that county lines activity is a significant driver of serious violence. For instance, although continuing to concentrate in urban areas, knife crime and robberies have increased fastest in more rural police force areas (Hales et al, 2020), and the number and proportion of homicides identified as being 'drug related' have also all increased (ONS, 2020e).

and experience policing, which is also an important contributor to people's sense of security.

Ipsos MORI regularly ask the public what they see as the most important issues facing the country. In January 2020, before the coronavirus pandemic, 20 per cent of the public cited 'crime, law and order and antisocial behaviour' as one of the top issues facing Britain today. Of greater concern were Brexit, healthcare, climate change and poverty and inequality. However, crime has been rising as a public concern since 2015 and in 2019 reached the same level of salience in the Ipsos MORI Issues Index as during the August 2011 riots (Figure 2.12).

This pre-pandemic increase in the public salience of crime is most likely linked to the fact that more people think that crime is going up. Figure 2.13 shows that there has been an increase since 2015 in the numbers of people who believe that crime is getting worse locally and nationally.

These figures are at odds with the findings from the CSEW which show that overall crime has continued to go down or stayed broadly flat in recent years. We should note that these perceptions also seem to beat odds with people's perceptions of the likelihood that they themselves will become a victim of violence, car theft and burglary. Perceived likelihood of victimisation of those common crime types has declined steadily since the mid-1990s.


One reason for the apparent tension between a perception of rising crime and a broadly flat overall crime rate may be the rise in serious violent crime in recent years (see Box 2.2), which has received substantial attention in the news media. Such serious incidents affect relatively small numbers of people directly but because of their seriousness receive substantial coverage in the media and permeate the public consciousness.

Fear of crime is not experienced equally. Those on low incomes worry significantly more about car theft, race attacks, robbery, being attacked, burglary, rape, online crime and identity theft than those on high incomes (Cuthbertson, 2018). Those who live in deprived areas are up to almost three times more likely to be fearful of violent crime (ONS, 2021a).


Indeed, if we look at victim data, they are right to be more fearful. In the latest Telephone-operated Crime Survey for England and Wales (May 2020 to March 2021) 3.5 per cent of people living in the most deprived areas in England and 4.7 per cent of those living in the most deprived areas in Wales were victims of personal crime (excluding fraud and computer misuse). These figures were 2.9 per cent and 1.3 per cent for people in the least deprived areas, respectively (ONS, 2021a).

Fear of crime is also unequally felt among different ethnic groups. 22 per cent of Asian people, 21 per cent of Black people, 13 per cent of people of mixed

**Figure 2.12** Ipsos MORI Issues Index: How the public see crime/law and order/antisocial behaviour as an issue facing the country (Ipsos MORI, 2021)



**Figure 2.13** Public perception of crime. Percentage of people saying crime has gone up ‘a little’ or ‘a lot’ (ONS, 2021a)



ethnicity and 4 per cent of people from ‘other’ ethnic groups (down from 22 per cent in the previous year) report high levels of worry about violent crime, compared to seven per cent of White people (ONS 2021a).

Similarly, for burglary, 22 per cent of Asian people, 16 per cent of Black people, 8 per cent of people of mixed ethnicity and 13 per cent of people from ‘other’ ethnic groups have high levels of worry about burglary, compared to 8 per cent of White people (ONS 2021a).

There are also marked gender differences in the fear of crime. 13 per cent of women have high levels of worry about violent crime, compared to just four per cent of men. Women also report higher levels of worry about burglary and car crime than men (ONS, 2021a).

## 2.7 CONCLUSION

In this section we have described how three forms of change have transformed the nature of the public safety and security challenges we face. The technological revolution has led to an explosion in crime on the internet, making fraud and cybercrime now more than half of the offences experienced by people in England and Wales.

Environmental change is creating much greater turbulence, from more frequent extreme weather events to mass migration, from more frequent disease pandemics to more widespread civil disobedience.

We are also living through social changes that all have an impact on the work of the police and the safety and security of citizens. We have seen the rise of more complex social needs that tend to require a police response when they escalate into crisis. We have seen growing demands for previously neglected forms of crime and harm, particularly those committed by men against women and children, to be taken more seriously by the criminal justice system. And we have seen rising social tensions and increased political polarisation, which play themselves out in terms of levels of protest, hate crime and terrorism.

Organised crime groups are taking advantage of these changes, directly exploiting technology, environmental crisis and vulnerable people to make illicit profits.

We have also seen growing insecurity as the public has become more concerned about crime in recent years, alongside major inequalities in how people experience harm and insecurity, with those on low incomes, women and those from BME groups being much more likely to be a victim of crime and to feel insecure.

In the next chapter we examine how well the police service has been responding to these challenges.



# 3. POLICE PERFORMANCE

**Summary:** Despite the extensive efforts of dedicated police officers and staff across the country our policing model is failing to tackle the new public safety challenges we have described. Detection rates have halved in the last seven years, meaning the police now solve just 9 per cent of crimes reported. The detection rate for rape has fallen from 8.5 per cent to just 1.8 per cent in the last six years. The detection rate for fraud stands at just 0.6 per cent. Fewer victims are satisfied with the service they receive. Although most people trust and have confidence in the police, public confidence has declined in recent years.

How well is English and Welsh policing adapting to a world reshaped by technological, environmental, and social change? In this chapter we look at measures of recent police performance to assess the extent to which our current policing arrangements are coping with the dramatic shifts in the public safety and security context we have described.

We do this by looking at four measures of police performance:

- *Detection rates*: the proportion of crimes reported to the police that lead to a charge or summons.
- *Victim satisfaction*: how satisfied victims of crime are with the service they receive from the police.
- *Public confidence*: how well the public as a whole think the police are doing.
- *Response times*: how quickly the police are able to attend calls for assistance.

We also look at the results of HMICFRS inspections and note an important difference between the direction of travel identified by the inspectorate and what is happening to the four measures identified above.

We should clarify three points at the outset. First, nothing we say about the performance of the system as a whole should be seen as a criticism of police officers and staff, who work extremely hard, often in difficult and dangerous circumstances, to serve the public. As we shall see many of the problems we describe below are a result of our policing institutions not keeping up with social change, rather than the performance of individual officers and staff or even the performance of the organisations they work for. We explain this point more fully toward the end of the chapter.

Second, we do not use crime rates as a measure of police performance. Police presence and tactics can play a role at the local level in affecting crime, but the overall national crime rate is the product of many social and economic drivers. As we saw in Chapter 2 the overwhelming cause of the 75 per cent drop in

traditional crime since 1995 was improved home and vehicle security, not policing. So, we focus here on indicators that are at least to some extent within the control of the police.

Third, we should note that there are many reasons why some key measures of police performance have deteriorated in recent years. We particularly need to highlight one: austerity. Between 2010 and 2014 total funding for the police fell by approximately 14 per cent, and by a further 2 per cent by 2018 (Institute for Government, 2019). Spending has since increased to fund the Prime Minister's pledge to recruit an extra 20,000 police officers by 2023. Despite this we are undoubtedly still living with the consequences of a decade of significant cuts to police budgets and that needs to be taken into account as part of any assessment of police performance.


## 3.1 CRIME DETECTION

Detecting crime and bringing offenders to justice are core police functions. The available data shows a substantial deterioration in police performance at bringing offenders to justice over the recent period. Detection rates have almost halved in the last seven years: in the year to March 2021 only 9.3 per cent of all recorded police crime resulted in a charge or summons, compared to 17 per cent in 2014 (Figure 3.1).


- These reductions apply to all types of crime but are most striking for sexual crime, violent crime and robbery (Figure 3.2):
- Only 1.5 per cent of rapes reported to the police in the year to March 2021 resulted in a charge compared to 8.5 per cent in 2015.
- Just 7 per cent of violent offences resulted in a charge in 2021 compared to 22 per cent in 2015.

Just 8 per cent of robberies recorded resulted in a charge in 2021 compared to 17 per cent previously.

**Figure 3.1:** Percentage of offences recorded in year resulting in charges/summons, year ending March 2004 to March 2021 (Home Office, 2021)



**Figure 3.2:** Percentage of offences recorded in year resulting in charges/summons and otherwise 'detected'<sup>13</sup> by crime group year ending March 2015 to March 2021 (Home Office, 2021)



<sup>13</sup> In addition to those resulting in a charge/summons some 'detected' crimes are dealt with by way of (formal or informal) out of court disposal or are Taken into Consideration.

For fraud, only one charge was brought for every 166 offences recorded by Action Fraud, CIFAS and UK Finance in the year to March 2021 (0.6 per cent), compared with one for every 69 (1.4 per cent) in 2015.

Detection rates must be interpreted carefully in the context of changing reporting behaviours and recording practices; however it is concerning that one of the main drivers for falling detection rates appears to be the withdrawal of victim support for further action. The proportion of total cases with an identified suspect, but where further action was not taken due to victims not wishing to continue, tripled between 2015 and 2021 (from 8.7 to 26.3 per cent of all cases). This increase applied across all crime types, with particularly notable jumps for rape (20 per cent to 42 per cent), robbery (8 per cent to 21.5 per cent), violence (24 per cent to 44 per cent) and criminal damage/arson (5 per cent to 17 per cent).

An important driver of victim disengagement is how long it takes to complete an investigation and to charge a suspect. The average length of time taken for the police to charge offences has increased from 10 days in 2015 to 23 days in 2019 (Institute for Government, 2019). Sexual offences (69 days) and rape (97 days) take the longest to be assigned a criminal justice outcome, although these have reduced by 30 and 14 per cent since 2016, respectively (Home Office, 2021).


Delays between a crime being reported and a suspect being charged negatively impacts the mental and physical health of victims, witnesses and the accused, who are often vulnerable (HMICFRS, 2021).

We should be clear that not all of the blame for these lengthening investigation times can be placed at the door of the police. The increased complexity of the caseload, combined with enormous capacity constraints in a service affected by austerity, play a significant role. In addition there are significant capacity issues within the rest of the criminal justice system, affecting the courts and the Crown Prosecution Service.

*"It should be acknowledged that the criminal justice system reflects directly upon the police with the public often making the link between police actions and activity and convictions. The conviction rates for domestic abuse and rape being worryingly low and not inspiring confidence in police investigations is a good example where media attention tends to focus solely on the police. We have seen and continue to see significant court backlogs, extended and protracted court processes and an increase in demand on the whole system at a time when investment has been receding" (CE2.06).*

We should note a further driver behind falling detection rates, which is more stringent crime recording standards. As HMICFRS has required forces to record crime much more accurately, this has almost certainly led to more offences being recorded, very many of them being minor offences where the victim would not wish to see the case progress.

**Figure 3.3:** Percentage of offences recorded in year assigned selected outcome codes (Home Office, 2021)





### Box 3.1 Key relationship: policing and the Crown Prosecution Service

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) advises the police on the most serious and complex cases for possible prosecution, reviews cases submitted, determines charges, prepares cases, and presents them at court. Aside from central casework divisions that require specialist expertise, it is divided into 13 geographical areas in England and Wales each led by a Chief Crown Prosecutor (CCP) while CPS Direct provides charging support and out-of-hours decision making.

The police are responsible for detecting and investigating crime but then also play a pivotal role in the prosecution process. As a case passes through the sequential steps of the justice system the police have three key responsibilities: keeping victims informed about progress, collecting witness statements, and ensuring witnesses attend court. The police will also gather evidence for prosecutors working on a charge, who remain independent; a prosecutor must not interfere with an investigation or direct police operations, but providing advice to the police is a core function.

In short, the relationship between the police and the CPS involves informing, consulting and advising (CPS, 2018) and is fundamental to the effectiveness and efficiency of the criminal justice system. Doing this effectively saves time throughout the criminal justice process and improves outcomes and experiences for victims, witnesses and defendants.

Below we explore a number of challenges to the way the relationship currently works and make suggestions for improvement. First, capacity constraints can prevent cases from being progressed and cause considerable frustration to victims and witnesses.

Second, there are real pressures on the police around the disclosure process, particularly given large volumes of digital evidence and poor police technology. During the *R v Allan* investigation the police had no method for analysing the victim's mobile phone and no recording of the search. The mobile phone was not listed in the disclosure schedule and had previously been reported to the CPS as containing no relevant data. Such practice risks breaching privacy laws and undermining victim trust. A recommendation has been made to implement a nationally agreed joint CPS/police protocol and a process for the examination of digital media (CPS and MPS, 2018).

Third, legal practitioners can make unrealistic demands of the police and digital forensic examiners due to a lack of understanding of digital evidence. The CPS does not always understand police technical capabilities, whether that is due to resource constraints or outdated equipment. Improved training for prosecutors in digital forensics ought to help with this.

Fourth, there is a need for much greater joint working from an early stage during the course of a case. A joint file quality improvement plan has been made between each police force and the relevant CPS area (as well as the introduction of a National File Standard). Also, the CPS recently announced that police and prosecutors will work more collaboratively to increase the numbers of rape cases reaching court (CPS, 2021a) by making greater use of Early Advice to consult on investigative strategy, reasonable lines of enquiry and discuss the evidence needed to strengthen a case. This will save the police and CPS time and resources, increase rape referrals to the CPS and reduce the time taken for a charging decision to be reached.

Fifth, as the CPS (2021b) suggest, oversight and management of work volumes should be proactive (moving away from a culture of working to trial dates). Prosecution Team Performance Meetings should ensure local accountability for local outcomes regarding case progression.


## 3.2 VICTIM SATISFACTION

The police responsibility towards crime victims extends beyond bringing perpetrators to justice; victims also want to see a thorough investigation, to be treated fairly and with respect, to be given practical assistance and reassurance (Hibberd, 2021). According to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), after improving markedly around 2008/09, the proportion of all crime victims (excluding fraud victims) who were 'very satisfied' with the police response declined from 42 per cent in 2014 to 32 per cent in 2020, while the proportion 'not satisfied' rose from 26 per cent to 34 per cent (Figure 3.4).

Victim satisfaction differs by crime type; 71 per cent of victims of violence were 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied, compared to 61 per cent of criminal damage victims. It also differs by ethnicity (67 per cent of White victims, compared to 59 and 57 per cent of Black and Asian victims, respectively were 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied with the police) and by area-level deprivation (77 per cent in the least deprived areas, compared to 56 per cent in the most deprived) (ONS, 2021).

Unsurprisingly investigative outcomes are associated with victim satisfaction: 71 per cent of victims were 'very' or 'fairly' satisfied where the police had found out who committed the crime against them, compared

**Figure 3.4:** Victim satisfaction with the police (ONS, 2021)



to 63 per cent where this was not the case, and where there was a charge, a caution, or court case, satisfaction was greater still (80 per cent or more). Irrespective of outcomes however, satisfaction was greater where victims felt well informed (91 per cent) compared to those who were 'not well' informed (31 per cent) (ONS, 2021).

One private citizen responding to the Call for Evidence reflected on the way some victims felt the service offered to 'volume' crime victims had been withdrawn to deal with priorities elsewhere.

*"Whilst there is a general public acceptance that some minor crimes cannot be pursued in the lack of evidence, there is anger and dismay that reported crimes are assessed at point of contact or that investigations are closed without the victim ever having physical contact with police and despite victims providing additional evidence themselves by what they see as necessity in the lack of police interest. The general complaint is that Police show no interest, merely handing out Crime Numbers as a response ... Police are currently losing public confidence in failing to deal effectively with the everyday crimes" (CE1.37).*

### 3.3 PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL POLICING


As a public service it is also important that the public as a whole feel that they are getting good value from policing. While public views and attitudes about the police are often complex, they can be summarised into a general confidence indicator, often operationalised in opinion surveys as a rating of overall local service quality (Jackson and Bradford, 2010; Bradford and Jackson 2010).

From a high-point of public approval in the mid-20th century – when Royal Commissioners (1962) found that four in five Britons expressed "great respect" for their police service – public confidence is widely thought to have deteriorated over subsequent decades, as the reputation of policing was hit by a succession of corruption scandals, miscarriages of justice and civil disruption (Reiner, 2000). Despite this, a bedrock of public support endured, with approximately half of British adults at the turn of the millennium, rating their local policing as at least 'good' (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003; Bradford and Jackson, 2010).


Since then we can identify two trends in the Crime Survey for England and Wales, set out in Figure 3.5 below. There was a rise in public confidence between 2006 and 2012, followed by stabilisation and then a decline after 2016.<sup>14</sup> These changes seem

<sup>14</sup> The CSEW public perceptions module was suspended in early 2020 due to Covid-19 and no more recent national data is available. The London Public Attitude Survey (PAS), conducted by the Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC), switched to a telephone methodology during Covid and shows that public confidence (as measured by agreement that 'police do a good job in the local area') has continued to fall in London during 2020 and 2021. During the 12 months to September 2021, 52 per cent of Londoners agreed that local police did a good job, compared with a high of 69 per cent in 2016/17 and 58 per cent in early 2020. See <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/public-voice-dashboard>

**Figure 3.5:** Public confidence in local police, years ending March 2006 to March 2020. Crime Survey for England and Wales (ONS, 2020).



**Figure 3.6:** Perceptions of local police, years ending March 2006 to March 2020. Crime Survey for England and Wales (ONS, 2020) (percentage strongly/tend to agree)




to be linked to a rise and then a fall in indicators of community connection (reliability, local understanding and dealing with local problems). They are less directly linked to perceptions of police treatment (fairness, respectfulness, and trust) which have remained more consistent.<sup>15</sup>

What is the best explanation for these trends? Figure 3.7 compares the rise and fall of these perception indicators with the rise and fall of the numbers of officers in neighbourhood policing roles. We can see that broadly speaking as the National Neighbourhood Policing Programme was rolled out after 2008 indicators of police visibility rose and so too did public confidence.

<sup>15</sup> Although, as we describe in Chapter 6, London PAS data suggests these treatment indicators have been in decline since early 2020, raising concerns about police legitimacy.

**Figure 3.7:** Confidence in local police, police visibility (ONS, 2020) and police officers and PCSOs in 'Neighbourhood Policing' roles (years ending March 2008 to March 2020).<sup>16</sup>



Once neighbourhood policing numbers started to decline we see a fall in visibility and public confidence.

This interpretation is consistent with research showing links between public confidence and police visibility, and with overall police officer numbers (Sindall and Sturgis, 2013), with both relationships mediated by the quality and quantity of local police engagement. It is also consistent with our analysis of variations in public confidence across police forces, where we found a positive correlation between changes in the numbers of neighbourhood officers and PCSOs in a force and public confidence.<sup>17</sup>

We conclude that if the police systematically seek to engage, listen and respond to local concerns, this tends to improve public confidence in the police. When, as over the last decade, the police do less of that, public confidence tends to decline. We return to the implications of this insight in Chapter 6.

### 3.4 RESPONDING TO CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE

Arguably above all other functions, responding to calls for urgent public assistance, defines the police role (see Chapter 5). The available data indicates that between 2016 and 2019 the volume of 999 calls increased by 14 per cent, while the number of non-emergency calls to 101 fell by 13 per cent.<sup>18</sup> This meant that the combined volume of calls reduced by around 5 per cent in this timeframe. HMICFRS (2020) has suggested that the public is losing confidence in 101 due to poor responses and are therefore calling 999 instead. Volumes of online reporting are far lower.

The publicly available data indicates that between 2016/17 and 2018/19 13 per cent of 999 calls and 24 per cent of 101 calls were not answered within the waiting time target (within 10 seconds for all but two forces).<sup>19</sup> On average, 0.8 per cent of 999 calls and 12 per cent of 101 calls were not answered at all or dropped (CoPaCC, 2020).


<sup>16</sup> Home Office workforce data is used for years ending March 2012 to 2020, see: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/police-workforce-england-and-wales>. The 2008 figure is derived from a set of HMIC inspections of Neighbourhood Policing and Developing Citizen Focus Policing conducted in that year, for full methodology see Higgins (2017).

<sup>17</sup> Comparing 2015/16 with 2019/20, a weak positive correlation (0.42) was found between force-level changes in ('single' measure) public confidence and workforce numbers allocated to 'neighbourhood policing' (for police officers only, the correlation was 0.40). No relationship was found with overall police officer numbers, or total workforce, or with the numbers allocated to 'local policing' (neighbourhood and response functions combined).

<sup>18</sup> These figures are based on data from 35 police forces.

<sup>19</sup> These figures are based on data from 30 police forces.

**Figure 3.8** Average response times for immediate 999 calls



Source: see References (page 175) which shows the data sources for the response times analysis.

Turning from call handling to attendance, Figure 3.8 indicates that the speed of police response to the most urgent 999 calls has slowed. Between 2010 and 2018 response times increased by 32 per cent.<sup>20</sup>


### 3.5 POLICING UNDER PRESSURE

This chapter has found strong indications that police performance is going backwards: decreasingly able to secure justice for crime victims, very rarely being able to do so for victims of rape, cybercrime and fraud, less often meeting victims' expectations, decreasingly visible within communities, losing public confidence and responding less quickly to public calls for urgent assistance. Whatever the cause it is noteworthy that all of these traditional indicators of police performance are going backwards.

However, we also note that HMICFRS judge that police forces are more consistently achieving 'good' standards of effectiveness (see Figure 3.9). Despite the pressures they are under, the inspectorate finds that most forces continue to use the resources they have efficiently and in responsible ways. It appears then that police forces are doing better with what they have, under the circumstances they find themselves in – but the *results* of that performance are increasingly poor.

This indicates that the problem is not principally with how police forces are managed but rather that they are struggling because of the circumstances in which they find themselves. For one thing, the police (and the other public services they depend upon) have been subject to a period of unprecedented austerity which has eaten into their ability to provide a service to the public. This has now started to be reversed, but the consequences

**Figure 3.9** HMICFRS PEEL police force ratings 2015 to 2018/19 (HMICFRS, no date)



<sup>20</sup> This is based on a collation of existing FOI data. Data was found for 14 forces, with some missing values.

of such significant cuts to police and other public service budgets will be with us for some time.

But perhaps more significantly still the police are operating in a world that is changing radically, generating more complex cases and a wider range of demands. It is likely that declining police performance is less of a management problem and more of a sociological one. The world has changed and our traditional model of policing has not kept pace.

## 3.6 CONCLUSION

There are three main implications from our analysis so far and responding to these provides the structure for the rest of this report.

First, there is a **capacity challenge**: such is the range and complexity of public safety demand there is no way that the police on their own are able to tackle it. We can already see this with the response to surging levels of internet crime. Very few of the fraud offences reported to the police result in a person being charged. If one of the most basic expectations of the police is that they catch criminals and bring them before the courts, when it comes to the largest category of crime affecting the people of England and Wales the police are simply not able to perform that function.

We can also see this capacity challenge in relation to the way the police have had to shift to focusing more on high harm cases and less on volume crime. With increased focus on sexual and domestic abuse offences, generally requiring complex and lengthy investigation, the police response to victims of traditional volume crime is often minimal.

Part II of this report focuses on addressing this capacity challenge, first, by looking at the role wider society should play in public safety and, second, by bringing greater clarity to the role of the police.

Second, there is a **capability challenge**. It is not just that the police lack sufficient resources to tackle these challenges, but also that the police service lacks many of the capabilities required to do so. In Part III of this report we show how these capability gaps are impacting on the ability of the police to protect the public.

Finally, there is an **organisational challenge**. The police service needs an organisational platform that can deliver the capabilities required to meet the challenges we have described. Part IV of the report focuses on addressing this organisational challenge.





# PART II

# POLICING IN A SYSTEM



# 4. THE PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM

**Summary:** The police cannot tackle the range and volume of the public safety challenges we face on their own. We need to do much more to prevent crime and harm from happening in the first place. We need a public safety system as well as a criminal justice system. A public safety system must be anchored around a new Crime Prevention Agency, backed up by a new duty on business to prevent crime.

There is no feasible strategy that addresses the range, volume and complexity of the public safety challenges of the 21st century through the work of the police and the criminal justice system alone.

The technological revolution is a transformative event which means that the single largest categories of crime affecting people in England and Wales (fraud and cybercrime) are very largely beyond the reach of the police and the courts. If the public's traditional expectation is that we deal with crime by catching and punishing the perpetrators, this is simply not happening in relation to internet crime.

Added to this is the need to address vast swathes of unreported harm, particularly violence against women and girls and child sexual abuse. Currently police forces are simply unable to proactively focus on the most harmful offenders and the most vulnerable victims, many of whom will not report to the police. Instead, the police struggle to cope with the minority of cases that are reported to them.

Then there is the need to provide a more effective response to the traditional volume crimes such as burglary and car theft which the public expect the police to attend and investigate. Many of these incidents are simply being 'screened out' at the point of reporting, given the lack of resources to pursue them.

So, there is a **capacity challenge** in terms of public safety. But this should not however be a counsel of despair. In this part of the report we propose a two-step solution to this challenge.<sup>21</sup> First, we need to design a whole system response to public safety that goes way beyond the work of the police. Second, we need to be much clearer about the role of the police within that system.

In this chapter we make the case for seeing the police as just one part of a wider societal response to crime and harm. The police role is vital and important, but it

is just one element in a wider strategy for promoting public safety. What is required is a broad social response to crime and harm based upon a more explicit and institutionally anchored public safety system.

In what follows we do four things: first, we define what we mean by a public safety system; second, we make the case for a systemic focus on crime and harm prevention; third, we describe how other sectors have successfully adopted harm prevention approaches; and finally we outline what the public safety system should look like, making a number of recommendations whose aim is to shift the focus of our response to crime and harm away from simply reacting to it and towards preventing it from happening in the first place.

## 4.1 WHAT IS A PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM?

**Public safety** can be defined as the protection of the public from various forms of harm, including crime, fire, medical emergencies, natural disasters and antisocial behaviour. In this chapter we exclude the work of the fire and ambulance services from our focus, although we note that these could in principle be incorporated into a 'public safety system'. Our focus here is on preventing those problems from occurring that would otherwise require a response from the police.

A **public safety system** is a system of actors and institutions whose aim is to promote safety and to prevent harm. Note its aim is different to that of the justice system, whose purpose is to secure the just treatment of offenders in the interests of society and victims in particular. In some ways it is comparable to other safety-oriented systems, such as the health and safety system which seeks to prevent workplace accidents and the road safety system which seeks to prevent road traffic collisions.

<sup>21</sup> Note we address another aspect of capacity – the funding for the police service – in Chapter 13.

#### Box 4.1 The distinction between direct and indirect prevention

**When we claim that the state is not investing sufficiently in preventing crime and wider harms we are talking about direct as opposed to indirect prevention.**

Direct prevention refers to activities whose primary purpose is to prevent crime and wider harms. This would include for example the work of initiatives such as Secured By Design, a police service programme run by Police Crime Prevention Initiatives that works to improve the security of buildings and their immediate surroundings (SBD, 2021). It would also include the work of the Violence Reduction Units, whose role is explicitly to tackle the causes of violent crime.

Our argument is that the state spends too little on that kind of direct, strategically organised preventative work. It does spend money by contrast on activities that may indirectly prevent crime and harm. There are two main ways in which it does this.

First, the operation of the criminal justice system may have the effect of preventing crime, such as by deterring potential offenders or taking convicted offenders off the streets by putting them in prison. However, these preventative effects of the criminal justice system are indirect by-products of activities undertaken for other reasons, most importantly the need to bring an offender to justice for their crimes.

The second way in which the state might be understood to invest in prevention is that many welfare state provisions and public services may have a preventative impact on crime and wider harms. One might argue, for example, that social security expenditure or spending on schools and nurseries all prevent crime because they ameliorate some of the social conditions in which crime would otherwise flourish. One might argue on that basis that the state does in fact spend a lot of money on preventing crime. However, these preventative effects are indirect by-products of activities undertaken for other reasons.

Our claim is not that the state does nothing to prevent crime and wider harm, but rather that it engages in far too little **direct** preventative work in the arena of public safety. This means that very many opportunities are being missed to prevent crime and to keep people safe.

We identify a number of different ways of thinking about **prevention** which we discuss in an Insight Paper published as part of this Review (Muir, 2021). Our preferred typology is that used within the public health field which breaks prevention down into:

- **Primary prevention:** efforts to prevent problems occurring in the first place.
- **Secondary prevention:** intervening early when a problem starts to emerge, to prevent it becoming established.
- **Tertiary prevention:** making sure ongoing problems are well managed to avoid crises and reduce harmful consequences.

We favour this typology because it contains broad categories that can be applied in changing circumstances. It is also a typology with which police practitioners are increasingly familiar, given the growing intersection of their work with that of public health professionals.

A public safety system should be designed to ensure that work to prevent crime and harm is undertaken at all three stages. Actors within the public safety system would not necessarily deliver this work themselves.

Much of the activity will take place in other sectors (education, health, local government etc) and most of that activity will not be undertaken with the primary aim of preventing crime. Crime and harm prevention will often be an indirect by-product of social policies and programmes which are important in their own right (see Box 4.1).

However, institutions within the public safety system will have responsibility for thinking strategically about what needs to be in place to prevent crime and harm. They will identify gaps and either work with others to fill them or commission or deliver direct prevention work themselves.

## 4.2 THE CASE FOR A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO PREVENTION

In this section we make the case for a public safety system, looking first at the evidence base on the efficacy of prevention, second, at why prevention is not currently prioritised and, finally, at why we need a systemic approach.

#### 4.2.1 Prevention is better than cure: the evidence

The general case for prevention makes intuitive sense. It is better to stop a bad thing from happening in the first place than to deal with the deleterious effects afterwards. Not only does this make intuitive sense, but there is also a strong evidence base showing that preventative measures can reduce harm in a way that is superior to later interventions and achieves wider economic and social benefits.

For example, there is strong evidence that action in the **early years** of a child's life helps to avoid harms later. Research has shown that a child's healthy physical development can be promoted by providing breast feeding support or smoking cessation assistance to mothers during pregnancy. Good quality early years provision, offered alongside parental support, can help close cognitive development gaps between richer and poorer children, with lasting benefits (Early Intervention Foundation, 2018).

Not only do these forms of early intervention have intrinsic benefits (improving children's health, wellbeing and educational attainment), they generate wider economic gains. Moreover, they reduce the costs to the public purse that are incurred when things go wrong (Early Intervention Foundation, 2018).

Another policy area where there is a strong evidence base for the value of preventative work is **public health**. Long-term health conditions lead to hundreds of thousands of premature deaths every year. And yet such diseases are largely preventable through lifestyle changes, such as stopping smoking, doing more exercise, eating healthier food and drinking less alcohol (Owen et al, 2011). Research has repeatedly demonstrated the cost effectiveness of often very simple public health interventions, compared with the costs of treating and managing disease (Owen et al, 2011, WHO, 2014).

The case for doing more to prevent **crime** is equally powerful. The evidence is now unequivocal that the biggest factor in explaining the traditional crime drop discussed in Chapter 2 was not activity by the police or tougher prison sentences but upstream preventative action, in particular in reducing the opportunities to offend.

Crime fell across all industrialised nations over roughly the same period, despite these nations having very different approaches to policing and criminal justice. Between 1995 and 2021 the number of **burglaries** in England and Wales fell by 81 per cent (ONS, 2021).

Similarly, in the US the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) found that recorded burglary victimisation rates fell from 11 per cent of households in 1973 to under 3 per cent in 2003. There were similar falls in domestic burglary across all industrialised countries (Ross, 2013).

Tseloni et al (2017) show that the cause of this drop was improved home security. There were rapid increases in the prevalence of security measures over this period (improved locks, burglar alarms, lighting, cameras etc). Homes without security were much more likely to be burgled and the decline in burglary was in forced rather than unforced entry (Tseloni et al, 2017). The increase in the number of attempted but failed entries alongside the drop in burglaries is also supportive of this 'security hypothesis' (Ross, 2013).

There is a similar story with the fall in **car crime**. Vehicle related theft in England and Wales fell by 84 per cent between 1995 and 2021, according to the Crime Survey for England and Wales (ONS, 2021). In the US, car theft in 2011 had fallen to its lowest level since 1967 (Ross, 2013). Between 2003 and 2016 car theft in France fell by 43.5 per cent and between 2003 and 2018 car theft in Germany fell by 54 per cent (Strategic Review of Policing, 2020).

The cause of this decline in vehicle theft across industrialised countries was again not tougher sentences or changes in policing tactics, but rather the introduction of improved security measures by the car manufacturers, including immobilisers, intruder alarms, central locking, better keys and tougher doors, windows and boots. The trend in 'twerking' that drove car theft in the 1980s and 90s went into sharp reverse as vehicles that were relatively easy to steal became much harder to penetrate (Ross, 2013).

Indeed, the reverse of this argument is also true: simple technical changes to products very often cause crime waves. For example, the recent increase in car theft has been concentrated in high value vehicles that have keyless entry and can be penetrated using remote technology (Harding, 2020). Such crime waves could be avoided if more was done earlier on to anticipate the criminogenic effects of new products.

#### 4.2.2. Why so little focus on prevention?

So, the case for prioritising crime and harm prevention is compelling. Despite this far too little is currently done to prevent crime and wider harm. Most of the state's direct interventions to make the public safe are reactive rather than preventative in nature. We spend £24.5bn a year on policing and criminal justice, most of which is spent on

responding to calls for assistance, investigating crimes, apprehending suspects, bringing suspects before the courts and then managing those convicted in prison or in the community.<sup>22</sup> While some of that reactive work can have a preventative effect, only a small proportion of that money is spent on direct preventative work (see Box 4.1 for what we mean by this).

Why, then, is there so little focus on crime and harm prevention? There are various interconnected reasons for this.

First, in a democracy with regular **election cycles** there is a natural tendency towards political short termism. In order to show voters tangible results, political leaders are incentivised to focus on addressing acute problems of high public concern. This crowds out the space and funding available for preventative measures whose costs are paid upfront and whose benefits may only be realised long after the current class of politicians has moved on.

Second, **policy making is fragmented** into different government departments and this creates barriers to preventative action. Specifically, it means that the benefits from adopting a preventative policy often do not accrue to those who invest in it. So, for example, there is evidence that investment in early years education can reduce the likelihood of a child getting involved in crime in adolescence. In this case the costs of the preventative measures fall to the education department, while the benefits in terms of reduced costs accrue to the home and justice departments.

Third, although preventative action can lead to reductions in costs on public services, it **may not necessarily lead to ‘cashable savings’** (immediate reductions in what local providers, commissioners or central government need to spend on providing services). For example, because the police service faces such large volumes of unmet demand, if one source of demand is reduced the organisation would be expected to use the opportunity to deal with the other sources of demand that were not previously prioritised.

Fourth, **the evidence base for interventions may not be strong** and research in areas such as early childhood intervention can take a long time to bear fruit. These gaps in the evidence base can make it hard to convince policymakers that funding will be worthwhile.

Fifth, taking preventative action can involve **costs** for social and economic actors that they would rather avoid. For example, this is particularly the case with

increased regulation, which may be required to ensure that businesses take steps to prevent crime or other harms.

Finally, specifically in relation to crime, our traditional attachment to **ideas about human agency and responsibility** also plays a role in the state's under investment in prevention. There is a powerful human instinct to hold an individual who has committed a crime responsible for it. It is that instinct that has arguably led us to locate the state's response to crime within the criminal justice system, whose role is to hold people to account for the crimes they have committed.

A commitment to crime prevention is certainly not incompatible with the punishment of individual offenders but there are tensions between the pursuit of justice and the demands of prevention. So, for example, it is now widely accepted that for lower-level criminal offences, certainly first-time offences by children and young people, it is better to divert the offender to a social intervention than to see them charged with an offence which may suck them into a lifetime of interactions with the criminal justice system. The focus in such cases is on preventing re-occurrence rather than on holding the individual to account.

However, public support for such approaches tends to fall away the older the offender, the greater the impact on the victim and the more responsible for their actions we deem the offender to be.

Nevertheless, there is no reason why this has to be an ‘either/or’ choice between pursuing justice and preventing future harm. As we shall see, it is perfectly possible to do a lot more to prevent future crimes, while also doing more to secure justice for victims.

#### 4.2.3 Why we need a systemic approach

Public policy aimed at tackling crime tends to focus on the response of the police and the criminal justice system. But by the time the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts get involved the harm has already been caused and we are left bearing the costs of late interventions to tackle entrenched problems. Because of this focus on responding when things go wrong, we are missing a whole range of earlier opportunities to prevent harm. In an Insight Paper written to inform this review Muir highlighted a whole range of missed preventive opportunities found through in-depth case studies of pension scams, online child sexual abuse and serious violence (see Muir, 2021).

<sup>22</sup> The £24.5 billion figure includes the combined budget for the police (£15.2 billion) and the Ministry of Justice (£9.3 billion) in 2020/21 (Home Office, 2020: HM Treasury 2021).



Why are these opportunities being missed? The reason is that no one is responsible for crime and harm prevention. We have clear roles and responsibilities for reacting to crime and harm once it has occurred, in relation to responding to emergencies, investigating crimes, safeguarding those in acute need, bringing suspects before the courts and so on. But no one owns the task of prevention. What is required if we are to move prevention to the heart of our public safety efforts is a much more systemic approach.

We have a criminal justice system, but we lack an explicit and institutionally anchored public safety system, whose focus is on promoting safety and preventing harm. We now turn to other sectors where clearer ownership of safety and harm prevention has shown real benefits.

## 4.3 SAFETY SYSTEMS IN OTHER SECTORS

In this section we describe two areas of public policy where safety systems have long been established, with a strong track record of harm prevention. These are aviation safety and health and safety at work.

### 4.3.1 Aviation safety

As a society our approach to crime contrasts markedly with our approach to aviation safety. Whereas with crime the main focus of our activities is on holding offenders to account after a crime has occurred, through the efforts of the police and the wider criminal justice system, with aviation safety the approach is the reverse. No one wants to see any planes crash resulting in a stroke in the deaths of hundreds of passengers. As a result the focus of air safety efforts is not on accountability after an accident has occurred but is rather on preventing flight failures through regulation, technical improvement and education.

In the UK, air safety is promoted by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) which was established in 1972 as an independent regulator of the aviation industry. The CAA is not funded from the public purse but derives its income from charges to those it provides services to and regulates. The CAA's functions are to promote the highest possible safety standards in the airline industry, protect the interests of consumers (such as by running ATOL, the customer protection scheme), manage the impact of flying on the environment and ensure security risks are properly managed.

The investigation of air accidents sits separately with the Air Accidents Investigations Branch (AAIB). Their investigators use data from the aircraft and air traffic control and interviews with those involved to come to a conclusion as to the cause of any accident. These results are published and the AAIB can make recommendations to the CAA, aircraft manufacturers or other organisations to look into issues in more detail or make changes. It is noteworthy that the AAIB tends to take a 'no blame' approach to its investigations in order to promote honesty and openness about what went wrong so that adjustments can be made to prevent re-occurrence (The Police Foundation, 2018).

The results of this regulatory system overall are impressive. Air travel is extremely safe. There is an average of one fatality for every 287 million passengers carried by UK airlines. This can be compared with a one in 19 million chance of being struck and killed by lightning in the UK or a one in 17,000 chance of being killed in a road accident (CAA, 2021).

### 4.3.2 Health and safety at work

At around the same time as the Civil Aviation Authority was established so too was the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), founded by the 1974 Safety at Work etc Act. The HSE's mission is to prevent work related death, injury and ill health. To achieve this, it provides advice and guidance to business and workers, investigates possible breaches of the law, promotes research and training and proposes health and safety regulations to the government.

Health and safety regulation and enforcement is split between the HSE which leads on national policy and local authorities who are generally responsible for inspection and enforcement in retail, wholesale distribution and warehousing, hotel and catering premises, offices, and the consumer/ leisure industries. The HSE has a Local Authority Unit (LAU) which provides support to councils in the performance of their health and safety functions, promoting consistency and providing guidance.

The HSE focuses its work on those sectors where the risks to health and safety are high, for example where work is intrinsically hazardous or where a sector's health and safety record is poor. For example, it has in recent years focused on reducing occupational asthma by targeting the vehicle repair industry. Exposure to chemicals in the paints used in car repair is a common cause of asthma. The HSE has worked with the industry to train workers in how to safely spray paint and to monitor risk, leading to a reduction in exposure (HSE, 2016).

It is worth emphasising that the HSE largely focuses its work at the point where there is most leverage, with the employers who hold most of the power to effect change. The HSE also has a horizon scanning function to look out for and anticipate future risks so that preventative steps can be taken. For example, over the past decade the HSE has been working with industry and academia to set standards for the safe introduction of hydrogen-powered, fuel-cell electric vehicles and the development of a safe refuelling infrastructure (HSE, 2016).

The HSE has a very successful record. Since 1981 the rate of fatal injury has fallen in the UK from 2.1 per 100,000 workers to 0.34 per 100,000. In 2017 there were just 0.52 fatal injuries at work per 100,000 employees in the UK, compared to 0.93 in Italy, 1.7 in Spain and three in France (HSE, 2020). In 2017 the UK was ranked fifth out of 29 European countries for the lowest number of fatal injuries in the workplace. The percentage of workers reporting an accident at work resulting in sick leave in the last twelve months was just 1.35 per cent in the UK, compared to 1.8 per cent in Spain and 3 per cent in France.

#### 4.3.3 Lessons

The UK's experience in aviation and workplace safety shows the value of having a system focused on the prevention of harm. Such a system means that there is a set of organisations and relationships that provide an institutional anchor around which goals can be set, priorities decided upon, regulations developed and action instigated.

Moreover, it is clear who owns the problem of air and workplace accidents and is accountable for outcomes. So, if the number of air accidents or workplace fatalities increased, we would want to know what the CAA or the HSE were going to do make air travel and work safer.

When we turn to crime and other public safety threats there is no such system nor any real ownership of the prevention task. Instead, most of the resource and the accountability in relation to crime is vested downstream with the police and the criminal justice system. We know that the police are accountable for responding to calls for assistance, investigating crimes and catching criminals and that the justice system is responsible for holding individuals to account for crimes they have committed. It is not clear who is responsible for preventing crimes from happening in the first place.

We now turn to what a public safety system should look like in practice.

## 4.4 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY SYSTEM

The core challenge in making a shift to a more preventative approach to public safety is to make sure that there is clear ownership of the problem at all levels.

### 4.4.1 A national crime prevention strategy

Tackling crime and wider harms requires a truly cross-government approach. There is therefore a need for a cross-departmental strategy for crime prevention that mobilises work across the whole of government. There is currently a Modern Crime Prevention Strategy, owned by the Home Office, but it is largely aspirational and as one national police leader told us "it isn't a strategy" because it contains no delivery plan.

Instead, a strategy is required that focuses the government's work on priority areas, sets outcomes, articulates how those outcomes will be achieved and by whom. This strategy ought to make explicit what roles and responsibilities different actors are expected to play. Rather than the strategy being the responsibility of a single minister in a particular department it would make sense for this to be a cross government effort, led by the Cabinet Office in collaboration with the Home Office and with the authority of the Prime Minister behind it.

### 4.4.2 A Crime Prevention Agency

The evidence from other sectors shows that it is important to have a flagship agency that owns the problem and is responsible for coordinating activity to ensure that strategic aims are delivered.

There are two options here:

- We could establish a new non-departmental public body, akin to the HSE or the CAA, which would have ownership of crime and harm prevention nationally; Or
- We could vest these responsibilities within an existing body, presumably within the policing family of institutions.

We support the creation of a new agency. The advantages of a dedicated agency are that it would prioritise this work and bring about a focus that is likely to be lacking if these tasks were added to the portfolio of an existing organisation. There are also advantages to this not being a policing institution. Part of the point of such a body is that all sectors of society should play their part in crime prevention and that crime control should not be seen as a 'police problem'.



A new Crime Prevention Agency (CPA) would perform the following functions:

- In an annual report to parliament, it would provide an independent assessment of the state of crime and related harms and the preventative measures required to tackle them.
- It would provide strategic advice to the government on the policies required to improve public safety. In particular, it would develop guidance and regulations for priority sectors.
- It would have an enforcement function in relation to a duty to prevent crime, with power to enforce such a duty (see below).
- It would establish national level partnerships in those industries and sectors where concerns are highest, and ensure these partnerships are sustained and effective, with their own preventative strategies. In particular, a core focus on the agency in its early years should be on bringing down the volumes of fraud and cybercrime where it is hard to catch cross border offenders and where prevention rather than prosecution is key.
- The agency would lead on developing and maintaining key international relationships, such as with the US based tech companies, to ensure ongoing dialogue, data sharing and joint work.
- It would oversee strategic communications around crime prevention so that the public receive consistent messages in areas where behaviour change is required.
- Working alongside a new Home Office unit which will provide a horizon scanning function (see Chapter 11) it would look to the future to understand for example what new products and technologies are in development and what their criminogenic impact might be. This should lead to something analogous to an 'early warning system' and prompt earlier intervention to ensure crime is designed out at source.
- The agency would provide a research function that would work with universities and practitioner groups to support primary research, systematic reviews, evaluations and practice guidance. This would develop the evidence base around effective interventions and share findings in a way that is useful to practitioners.

- It would provide leadership, advice and support from the centre to the other actors in the system.

#### 4.4.3 A duty to prevent crime

In order to catalyse preventative action throughout society the government should legislate to create a statutory duty on commercial organisations to prevent crime. Under the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act a number of public bodies including local authorities and the police already have a duty to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime. We suggest that a general 'duty to prevent crime' should be applied to large firms across the private sector.<sup>23</sup> This would reflect the 'polluter pays' principle: those whose products and services are currently creating opportunities for crime would be asked to invest upfront in designing it out at source.

This was successfully achieved with the car manufacturers in the 1980s and 90s, who were persuaded to invest in improved security measures. Rather than this constituting a major cost to business, in many ways this effort spurred greater innovation as companies competed to demonstrate the security of their vehicles.

Companies will of course be concerned about potential liabilities and whether a broader duty to prevent crime would be proportionate. However, it is worth pointing to the example of the 2010 Bribery Act which introduced a duty on commercial organisations to prevent bribery. Companies have a defence under the act if they have implemented adequate policies and processes to prevent bribery.

Despite initial criticism from business groups, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010 recently concluded that the legislation is operating very effectively (House of Lords Select Committee on the Bribery Act 2010, 2019). Importantly rather than taking firms straight to court, prosecutors have used Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) which mean that prosecutions can be suspended and ultimately avoided if companies implement policies agreed with the Serious Fraud Office. Rather than leading to an avalanche of prosecutions the Act, combined with DPAs, has created an important tool to ensure that anti-bribery procedures are implemented (Given and Kerr, 2018).

While the CPA would have enforcement powers in relation to the new crime prevention duty our hope

<sup>23</sup> We do not specify the size of the organisations here as this is something that will need to be considered at length by the government. We are clear that we should seek to avoid imposing excessive requirements on small businesses.

would be that the mere possibility of their use will be sufficient to promote change.

The general duty to prevent crime would build on existing duties in particular sectors. For example, it would build on the 'duty of care' being introduced for social media companies under the Online Harms Bill. It would also build on existing requirements for financial services institutions, such as the requirement to report suspicious activity. In introducing a general duty, the government would need to consider if the general duty would supplant these existing responsibilities.

#### 4.4.4 Greater local collaboration to prevent harm

Preventing social problems from escalating into crisis and ending up requiring an emergency response necessitates much greater collaboration between local public services.

We illustrate some of the challenges in Boxes 4.2 and 4.3 which focus on the relationship between policing, health and local government respectively and how

these relationships could be improved to promote a more preventative approach.

We identify the following barriers to public service collaboration:

- A reluctance to share data often due to risk aversion in relation to data protection laws.
- A cluttered patchwork of partnership structures that requires rationalisation.
- Mismatched governance, with multiple layers of local government and public services often operating on different boundaries, serving different political masters and pursuing different outcomes.
- Silo-based funding from Whitehall which inhibits joint working.
- Long-standing differences in professional mind sets and cultures.

To develop a plan to tackle all of these barriers would require a major review in itself. Therefore, we suggest six propositions, which if followed could help to unlock

#### Box 4.2 Key relationship: policing and local mental health services

One of the most critical relationships in terms of harm prevention is that between the police and the local NHS, particularly focusing on mental health problems that so often result in a call for service from the police. Almost a third of those taken into police custody are identified as having a current mental health problem (Adebolawe, 2013). In addition, police detain around 33,600 people a year who are in a public place and in need of 'immediate care or control' under Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1988. They also have powers under Section 135 of the Mental Health Act to aid medical professionals in removing someone with a mental health disorder to a place of safety for assessment so their needs can be met.

A number of reports over the last ten years have highlighted failings in the way the police have responded to mental health incidents (see Bradley, 2009, Adebolawe, 2013). These include:

- The fact that the police receive too little specific training in mental health awareness despite high levels of contact with those with mental health problems.
- Disproportionate use of force.
- Discriminatory attitudes.
- A disconnect between police policy and frontline practice.
- A failure to share information, made worse by incompatible information systems and unclear or non-existent protocols for joint working
- A lack of priority for mental health issues within the Ambulance Service, leaving the police often inappropriately as the only means of providing transport for a patient.

Since these reports the Mental Health Crisis Care Concordat was agreed, setting set out how public services – including health, police and social care – should work together to respond to people with mental health problems. A 2021 inspection detailed the measures that police had put in place with partners to build trust and ensure collaborative decision making; it found, for example, that:

- Most forces had accessible mental health leads.
- Mental health professionals work alongside police to consider cases coming in and advise officers on the ground, either in person via street triage vehicles or remotely through control room triage.
- In all forces, there is a mental health expert carrying out liaison and diversion to ensure those coming into custody are assessed and receive appropriate help and support.

*(continued on page 64)*

#### Box 4.2 Key relationship: policing and local mental health services (continued from page 63)

- Improvement in the availability of 'place of safety beds', so police facilities are now only being used as a place of safety (for adults) in exceptional circumstances.
- Police officers understand minor crimes, linked to mental health needs, could be discontinued in favour of a health care approach.
- There is an extensive suite of diversion opportunities and critical pathways in every force.
- Police custody staff take screening and managing detainee risk very seriously and this featured heavily in custody staff training and in custody management systems.
- Most forces have extensive healthcare coverage in all sites (Singh, 2021).

However, while much has improved, people with mental health needs are still being failed, and demand still exceeds police capacity to meet it. As Michael Brown writes, the problem is not with the police "but the extent to which we over-rely upon the police as a *de facto* mental health and crisis care provider" (Brown, 2020).

Remaining challenges include:

- High thresholds for mental health assessments meaning that police still have to deal with a huge amount of mental health demand, either because an individual's needs are not deemed to be acute enough for mental health specialists or the fact they are under the influence of drink or drugs means they cannot be assessed (Singh, 2021).
- The fact that other mental health services are not available 24/7. A 2018 inspection by HMICFRS found that, at the end of each working day partner organisations shifted responsibilities for mental health onto policing, resulting in worse care out of hours (HMICFRS, 2018).
- Where someone has been arrested for a criminal offence but then assessed as having mental health needs, shortages of beds in mental health units means they can wait days in a police cell before there is a space for them to be admitted.
- The police are routinely called out when someone has 'absconded' from a mental health setting, when there have not been enough medical staff to either prevent someone from leaving or to locate them (Brown, 2020).

The solutions to these issues lie way beyond improved training for the police, but rather with enhanced capacity within the NHS to prevent mental health crises developing in the first place. The latest National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) strategy calls for minimising "those occasions where police officers provide responses purely because of capacity issues or other difficulties in health care agencies", since even the most compassionate and understanding police officers are not a substitute for professional mental health care (NPCC, 2020).

The NPCC strategy argues that partnership is best done, not when each organisation seeks to bridge the gaps left by the other, but when they work collectively to properly understand the demand they face and what they can each do, according to their expertise, to reduce it by intervening early (NPCC, 2020).

This can be done by jointly reviewing the reasons why individuals repeatedly present to the police or the emergency system as a whole, and seek to prevent this using targeted interventions by healthcare organisations or the criminal justice system (NPCC, 2020).

collaboration and enable preventative activity at the local level. None of these are specific to preventing crime and other public safety incidents, simply because in order to tackle those problems a wider prevention effort cutting across all public service sectors, orientated to a range of different outcomes, is required.

First, the government should find ways of simplifying local governance. Ideally most local public services should sit under a single governance framework. This is starting to happen in many towns, cities and city regions that have directly elected Mayors. In Greater Manchester for example the Mayor has responsibility for economic development, transport, skills, policing and health, working alongside local government through a Combined Authority.

As we shall discuss in Chapter 11 below, the mayoral model has the great advantage of providing a single form of political authority across a range of services which are all often dealing with the same complex problems.

Second, whatever the governance arrangements, local public services should work to a common vision for the future of their area and there should be a common outcomes and accountability framework with an emphasis on harm prevention.<sup>24</sup> This should be accompanied by a set of operating principles describing how the different partners will work together.

Third, the government should continue to explore ways of creating place-based budgets covering multiple

<sup>24</sup> We are grateful to members of the Board of Liveable Exeter who discussed with us how their partnership for the city operates. They emphasised that having a motivating and unifying vision for a place is critical.

### Box 4.3: Key relationship: policing and local government

There are multiple points of contact and overlap between the police and local government services:

- The police regularly make referrals to local authority social services relating to vulnerable children and adults. Almost 200,000 police referrals to children's social care were made in England during 2021 (Gov.uk, 2021),
- Police frequently deal with reports of children missing from local authority care. There were almost 66,500 incidents relating to children missing from care in 2019/20, these made up about 80 per cent of all missing children incidents (\*\*S23\*\*),
- Both police and local authorities have regular interactions with people who are homeless and sleeping rough, and can work together to improve outcomes (NPCC and Crisis, 2021),
- Local authorities play a key role in managing the night-time economy and improving safety in public spaces through licensing, CCTV, street lighting and environmental design.
- Local councils also play an important role in responding to antisocial behaviour, dealing with environmental health issues, and trading standards issues.

With the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act the then Labour government put local partnership working on a statutory footing, creating 376 Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) through which police and local authorities discharged their joint duty to work together (and with others) to deliver against locally formulated plans.

CDRPs – or Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) as they were rebadged in 2010 – have been credited with improving joint working and local information sharing, and contributing to reductions in crime, antisocial behaviour and reoffending during the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (LGA, 2018).

However, CDRPs/CSPs have also been criticised for not living up to their promise, with the following problems highlighted (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015):

- They were overly focused on volume crime and antisocial behaviour.
- They were preoccupied with situational/enforcement activity (particularly the proliferation of CCTV).
- They were too dominated by the police.
- Some partners failed to engage and share information.
- Budgets were limited and then cut significantly after 2010.
- There was an over-reliance on transitory, informal relationships (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015).

While there is some evidence that, from 2010 onwards, the focus of many CSPs began to shift with the emergence of the 'vulnerability agenda' (Menichelli, 2018), this coincided with a significant reduction in CSP's resources and relevance. Much of their funding was rolled into the Police Main Grant and handed over to Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) to deliver their Police and Crime Plans over larger, police force-level geographies.

Today, although diminished in prominence, CSPs remain part of the local partnership landscape and retain a set of statutory responsibilities. However, despite the mutual duty on PCCs and CSPs (in England) to cooperate and 'have regard' to each other's priorities, funding insecurity and cuts (of up to 60 per cent since 2010), staffing reductions in community safety teams and the shift in strategic emphasis to the police force level, have left a mixed and fragmented national picture. While some CSPs have found new roles and established strong working relationships with PCC's offices, others have little contact and have been left 'looking for statutory minimum'. It has been suggested that some CSPs feel compelled to align themselves with PCC priorities in order to secure funding (LGA, 2018).

There is clearly an important role for a partnership between the police, councils and other relevant bodies at the local authority level. The critical thing is to provide it with a clear focus, which is distinct from the other local partnership arrangements (see Recommendation 5).

services across a single area. The ability to move resources between and across service boundaries is critical for enabling preventative work.

Fourth, there should be a shared workforce development programme for a place which will seek to develop the right skills to address local needs. This could enable the development of new or hybrid roles in

areas of complex need where traditional professional silos may prevent a holistic response.

Fifth, local public services should develop integrated delivery models across policing, social services, housing and mental health services for example. These joint teams will focus on intervening early to prevent problems from escalating and could involve the use of

key workers who develop strong relationships with and holistic solutions for those with complex needs.

Finally, there should be data sharing protocols agreed across all partners and, beyond that, a central hub for interrogating data and understanding where the priority problems are.<sup>25</sup>

There are examples of each of these propositions in practice in towns and cities across the country, but we believe that the government should provide a framework for local public service delivery that would galvanise collaboration and prevention activity across the country.

#### 4.4.5 Reinigorating local crime prevention work

We believe that place-based public service delivery in general is required to galvanise preventative work that would, either directly or indirectly, prevent crime and other public safety incidents. However, we also think that within that wider framework of collaboration there is a role for some dedicated crime prevention partnerships and activity.

There is currently a cluttered landscape of local crime prevention activity that is not always well coordinated. There are Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs), first set up following the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. Overlaid on top of these we have seen the establishment of 18 Violence Reduction Units (VRUs) across England and Wales. Some of these VRUs clearly see their role as expanding way beyond the problem of serious violence and are advocating for a 'public health approach' to be taken to a wider range of issues, including for example domestic violence. It seems clear that the push within policing for a more proactive approach to tackling crime has found a home in the nascent VRU landscape. However, it is not clear how these new arrangements at force level ought best to relate to the CSP landscape at local authority level. Nor do VRUs cover all force areas.

We propose the following steps to bring about greater clarity to this landscape:

- The remit of VRUs should be widened to include a wider range of crime types. They should be renamed

Crime Prevention Units (CPUs) and should operate in each of the 43 police force areas, accountable to the Police and Crime Commissioner or Mayor. The CPUs would develop a local crime prevention strategy, that would concord with the place-based outcomes framework described in 4.4.4. The Police and Crime Commissioner or Mayor should appoint a Director of Crime Prevention who would head up the Crime Prevention Unit and who would operate as an independent senior advocate for this agenda throughout their area. They would work in collaboration with other local public services as described in 4.4.4 above. They would also work as part of a wider network of crime prevention professionals facilitated by the Crime Prevention Agency.

- The CPUs would focus their efforts on crime types that require prevention work at a higher level of geography, such as for example modern slavery and county lines/serious violence. They would also own the strategic relationship with partners who operate across larger geographies, such as local health bodies.
- CSPs should re-focus by going back to basics. They should prioritise their traditional agenda of volume crime, antisocial behaviour and problems in the night-time economy, and on those areas where the local authority/police relationship has most purchase.

## 4.5 CONCLUSION

To tackle the range and complexity of the public safety challenges we face we cannot depend on the police alone. We need a full spectrum response and one that is focused on preventing crime from happening in the first place. To achieve this we need a much more explicit public safety system, led by a dedicated national agency that will be accountable for driving down crime, in particular those forms of crime such as fraud and cybercrime to which the criminal justice system offers little answer. To enable this radical shift in focus, we make five recommendations.

<sup>25</sup> These propositions are based on the 'nine building blocks of collaborative local infrastructure' set out in Randle and Anderson (2017).



## Recommendations

1. The government should produce a cross-departmental Crime Prevention Strategy.
2. The government should establish a new Crime Prevention Agency, with responsibility for delivering the Crime Prevention Strategy, developing regulation and guidance, enforcing crime prevention duties, developing national and international partnerships and relationships in priority areas, communicating crime prevention advice to the public and horizon scanning to identify emerging threats.
3. There should be a new legal duty to prevent crime which would apply to all large private sector organisations, enforced by the Crime Prevention Agency.
4. The government should review local and regional government structures with the explicit aim of promoting increased public service collaboration to prevent complex social problems. Such a review should consider the benefits of a simplified local governance framework, place-based budgets, cross sector workforce development, integrated delivery models and how to improve data sharing locally.
5. The government should widen the remit of the Violence Reduction Units to cover a wide range of local crime types. These Crime Prevention Units should operate in every force area, led by a local Director of Crime Prevention appointed by the Police and Crime Commissioner. They should focus on crime types where prevention activity is best designed across a wider geographic area, such as modern slavery and county lines/serious violence. Community Safety Partnerships should go back to basics, focusing on volume crime and antisocial behaviour, and on those areas where the police and local authority relationship is critical.

# 5. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

**Summary:** The police are not just crime fighters. Their core role is to maintain order and uphold the law, based on their possession of unique powers. Their role is not limited to just those situations in which the possible use of power is necessary, but also extends to activities that enable them to perform this core role effectively and legitimately. Being clear about this core police role enables us to better understand which functions the police should perform within the wider public safety and criminal justice systems. To provide a clearer focus for its work in an increasingly complex environment the police service needs a new Statement of Mission and Values.

We have argued that the public safety challenges of the 2020s and 2030s are too great to be dealt with singularly or even mainly by the police service. In Chapter 4 we concluded that in order to deal with this capacity challenge, we need to mobilise a broad societal response to promoting public safety. In this chapter we consider a further solution to the limits on police capacity: to clarify the police role so that officers can focus on those tasks where their powers and competencies are most efficacious.

In this chapter we do three things: first, we describe the core role of the police; second, we appraise the current main functions of the police and discuss whether these ought to change; and third, we set out a new Statement of Mission and Values for the police service. Box 5.1 puts all of this in context by outlining a brief history of English and Welsh policing since 1829.

## 5.1 THE CORE ROLE OF THE POLICE

There are four standard approaches to the question of the role of the police.<sup>26</sup> First, one common response to the question “what are the police for?” is simply to list all of the things that the police currently do. Indeed, that was the approach taken by the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, which set out the functions of the police as being:

1. The maintenance of law and order and protection of persons and property.
2. The prevention of crime.
3. The detection of criminals.
4. Controlling of road traffic and advising local authorities on traffic questions.

5. Carrying out certain duties on behalf of government departments.
6. Befriending anyone who needs help and being available at any time to cope with minor or major emergencies.

The problem with this approach is that it wrongly turns an ‘is’ into an ‘ought’. It does not ask whether this is what the police *should* be doing. In failing to do that it cannot help with the challenge of prioritisation. The strategic and operational reality is that the police are always making choices about which activities are more important than others. It would be better from an accountability point of view to be explicit rather than implicit about those choices and the reasons for making them.

A second tendency is to refer back to the Peelian Principles. The standard list of these principles found on the Home Office website is set out in Box 5.2. While many of these principles do have an animating value in shaping the ethos of British policing, particularly the importance of policing by consent, they are not on their own an adequate description of the police mission. For one thing they tend to focus on *how* policing should be done, rather than *what* its objectives are. For another thing their timeless appeal is a result of their generality which again does not help with placing boundaries around what the police should and should not be doing or what they should or should not be prioritising.

The final two positions take a different approach, seeking to define a core role for the police, which can help us with the question of focus and prioritisation in the face of ever widening and more complex demand.

The third perspective is that the police should be seen principally as crime fighters. This position has an enduring popular appeal. Politicians from across the spectrum have routinely stated that they want the

<sup>26</sup> This section is heavily informed by an Insight Paper commissioned for this Review by Professor Ian Loader, see Loader (2020).

### **Box 5.1 A brief history of policing in England and Wales since 1829**

1829 The Metropolitan Police is established, made up of divisions containing Constables, Sergeants, Inspectors and a Superintendent.

1835 Boroughs required to introduce police forces.

1856 All rural areas made to establish police forces, the first Inspectors of Constabulary are appointed and local Police Authorities required to submit crime statistics to the Home Office.

1859 The Inspectorate notes that one or two detective officers have been established in most police forces.

1871 Scotland Yard establishes a Criminal Records Office.

1878 The Metropolitan Criminal Investigation Department established. In the late 19th century a Special Branch is also created in response to the rise of Irish nationalism, but its remit later expanded to gather intelligence on wider threats to national security.

1888 Police forces serving fewer than 10,000 people abolished and the number of forces falls from 231 to 183 and joint committees of councillors and magistrates created to oversee forces.

1890s The first motor cars appear and, as laws around motoring expand, so too do police responsibilities for enforcement.

1919 Following a wave of police strikes the Desborough Committee placed the pay and conditions of officers under the regulatory control of the Home Secretary and led to the establishment of the Police Federation, accompanied by a ban on strike action by police officers. It also led to the establishment of the Central Conference of Chief Constables.

1933 A Home Office appointed committee leads to improvements in detective work, including specialist training for detectives, the consolidation of forensic laboratories and a system for sharing information about criminals between forces.

1934 The first Metropolitan Police College established at Hendon.

1948 The first National Police College opens at Ryton-on-Dunmore, mainly to prepare officers for promotion to the more senior ranks. This followed the creation eight regional training centres for new recruits.

1940s A shortage of police officers led to the expansion of civilian staff and the employment of more women police -50s officers.

1955 The Metropolitan Police established a Traffic Squad and more widely traditional foot patrols were being replaced by mechanised beats.

1960 The National Police College moves to Bramshill, where it remains until its closure in 2015.

1961 The Special Patrol Group is founded by the Met as a mobile reserve of officers specialising in public order and protest.

1962 The Royal Commission on the Police reports, leading to the establishment of modern police authorities and a reduction in the number of forces to 49 in 1966 and then later to 43 in 1972.

1965 Nine regional crime squads established comprising 600 detectives with a focus on serious and organised criminals and supported by regional intelligence bureaux.

1966 Unit beat policing introduced overriding the traditional foot patrol, blending a Constable responsible for an area with motor car patrols.

1973 The Police National Computer goes live, containing licence plate and fingerprint information.

1975 The Balcombe Street Siege marks the first deployment by the Met of a specialist firearms unit D11.

1970s Sir Robert Mark as Commissioner of the Met introduces A10 a specialist anti-corruption unit in response to growing concerns about police corruption. For similar reasons he places the Met CID under local uniform control.



1981 The arrest of the Yorkshire Ripper Peter Sutcliffe leads to debate as to why he was not apprehended sooner. This leads to greater standardisation in incident rooms and the introduction of the Home Office Large Major Enquiry System (HOLMES).

1981 The Brixton Riots lead to the Scarman Report which recommended improving workforce diversity, a greater focus on 'policing by consent' in police training and new consultative arrangements with local communities.

1983 The Metropolitan Police begins the practice of 'screening out' some crimes that will not be investigated.

1984 The Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) is introduced to clarify and regulate police powers.

1986 The Crown Prosecution Service is introduced, taking the decision to prosecute off police forces.

1988 The Public Order Act creates new statutory offences of affray, riot, violent disorder and unlawful assembly. It gives the police new powers to regulate protest.

The Serious Fraud Office is formed to investigate complex fraud.

1990s New longer batons, stab proof vests and pepper spray introduced.

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) policies and guidelines start replacing Home Office Circulars as a way of setting national standards.

1993 The Sheehy Report recommends, among other things, performance related pay, local pay setting and fixed term appointments.

1994 The Posen Review increased the push for greater civilianisation and specialisation within the workforce.

1998 The DNA Database established, the first such national database in the world.

The National Crime Squad founded.

1999 The Macpherson Report published into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, concluding that the Metropolitan Police Service was institutionally racist. It leads to targets for BME recruitment, more systematic recording of stop and search incidents and the launch of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC)

2000 The National Intelligence Model formally adopted by ACPO.

2002 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) introduced.

2004 The Children Act leads to much greater multi-agency working to safeguard children. The Bichard Report leads to the introduction of the Police National Database to create a national police intelligence system.

2005 Airwave radio rolled out, creating encrypted personal radio coverage across the whole country.

2006 The Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) is formed.

2007 The government drops plans to merge police forces into larger regional organisations.

2008 Neighbourhood policing teams mandated across the whole country.

2011 Police and Crime Commissioners introduced to replace Police Authorities.

The Winsor Review leads to major reforms to police pay and in its second phase makes recommendations on direct entry and graduate entry.

2012 The College of Policing launched.

2013 **\*\*S23\*\***,

2015 The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) replaces (ACPO).

2016 Police Now is launched as a scheme to encourage university graduates to join the police.

The Policing Education Qualifications Framework (PEQF) creates new entry routes into policing, which means that all officers will either enter with a degree or will obtain one through the Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship (PCDA).

### Box 5.2 The Peelian Principles

1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force and severity of legal punishment.
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their ability to secure and maintain public respect.
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public means also the securing of the willing cooperation of the public in the task of securing observance of laws.
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the cooperation of the public can be secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and compulsion for achieving police objectives.
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by constantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting and preserving life.
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is found to be insufficient to obtain public cooperation to an extent necessary to secure observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective.
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence.
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging individuals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty.
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.

police to focus on their core function of fighting crime. For example, in 2011 the then Home Secretary Theresa May urged the police to pursue “just one objective – to cut crime” (May, 2011). We should note that in focus groups undertaken by the Police Foundation this position resonates with members of the public (Higgins, 2020).

It is of course a core function of the police to tackle crime, by enforcing the law, investigating crimes, apprehending suspects and, with the agreement of the Crown Prosecution Service, bringing them before the courts. The most harmful matters the police deal with (homicide, rape, terrorism etc) are all crimes, precisely because they are so serious.

Nevertheless, the College of Policing reported in 2015 that 83 per cent of calls to police Command and Control Centres did not result in a crime being recorded (College of Policing, 2015). While there will still be many crime *related* incidents within that 83 per cent (reports of ‘suspicious activity’ for example), this makes clear just how much demand on policing is not about crime but about wider disorder, harm and calls for help. A recent piece of qualitative research with new police

recruits found that while officers initially believed that their work would be crime focused, they discovered over their first few years in post that most of their work does not involve responding to crime but rather to a whole array of other incidents (Charman, 2018).

The problem with the crime fighting view is that it simply does not reflect the reality of police work nor the reality of public demand on policing. The police are, and always have been, about more than just crime.

The final position in the debate about the role of the police is that rather than being crime fighters the core role of the police is to resolve conflict and maintain order. They perform this role because of their status as officers of the law with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The very presence of police power, even when that power is not actually used, is enough in many cases to diffuse tension and impose social stability.

The sociologist Egon Bittner famously encapsulated this view of the police as order maintainers by saying that the reason people call the police is to deal with “*something-that-ought-not-to-be-happening-and-about-which-someone-had-better-do-something-now!*”

Once called to an incident the police role is then to impose a 'provisional solution' through their possession of lawful coercive powers.

This view of policing is supported by the empirical reality of police work referred to above (College of Policing, 2015). The police respond routinely to all sorts of incidents (mental health crisis, missing persons, antisocial behaviour and so on) that are not crimes or related to crime. What unites most of the incidents to which the police are called is that they might benefit from the presence of an officer of the law with the backstop powers to impose a solution.

We believe that this view offers the best starting point for thinking about the role of the police simply because it captures the empirical reality of policing.

However, this position needs some qualification. First, this understanding of the core role should not mean that policing is limited to enforcement activity. We know that if the only time people ever see the police is when they arrive to make an arrest or impose order, this can lead to a fracturing of police-community relations. If people do not trust the police they may not cooperate with them and the police cannot carry out their core role effectively. If the police do not understand the communities in which they work they will not be able to carry out their core role effectively or use their powers proportionately. If the police lack legitimacy in the eyes of the public their work becomes ever more difficult. Therefore, while 'order maintenance through potential use of power' provides the best starting point for thinking about the role of the police, one quickly has to build out from that to take in other activities, such as community policing for example, that are essential for supporting that core role.

Another problem with the order maintenance view is that it is so broad that it is susceptible to mission creep. Although Bittner was describing a largely reactive order maintenance role, many advocates of this position see policing as having a much more proactive mission, to help contribute broadly to public safety, to solve local problems, to prevent crime before it occurs and even to contribute to wider social wellbeing. As Ian Loader comments: *"This extended role for the police in order upkeep and public protection may bring benefits for vulnerable individuals and communities. But the attendant risks lie in the difficulties of specifying the nature and limits of police involvement in such collaborations and the colonisation of tasks that are more suited to being undertaken by, say, social work, education, or public health."* (Loader 2020)

So, there remains a challenge of defining where the limits of this broad order maintenance role lie.

To conclude this section, we define the core role of the police as being **to promote public safety by maintaining order and upholding the law, which their unique powers enable them to do, and to carry out other activities which enable them to perform this core role legitimately, effectively and with minimum reliance on those powers.**

## 5.2 THE CORE FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE

Having established that the police are best seen as order maintainers by virtue of their powers, we now go on to review four of the main current functions of the police and discuss whether the police should continue to carry out these activities. We do this based on two criteria: first, are these justified as police functions given the definition of the core role of the police already described, and, second, how might their performance of these functions have to change to meet the changing public safety context?

### 5.2.1 Emergency response

In most societies the police provide a general emergency response function. In England and Wales this started to take on its present form once police officers were equipped with cars and radios from the 1960s onwards.

Why do the police provide this function? Why not develop a range of specialist response services to deal with specific types of demand? Such an alternative has been suggested by some within the movement to 'defund the police' in the United States, for example.

There are three reasons why it makes good sense for the police to perform this role. First, a *generalist* response function is required because of the geographic and temporal unpredictability of demand. There is a need for some agency with the capacity to cover a wide area and to be available 24/7.

Second, it is not easy at the point a call comes in to diagnose the nature of the problem. What is required is for generalist first responders to attend, diagnose the problem and potentially then refer the case on to others with more specialist skills.

Finally, many emergency incidents involve danger and we therefore require our generalist first responders to have the backstop powers that only the police possess. Their very presence can help to de-escalate a situation

that would otherwise get out of hand. This 24/7 response function is the natural outgrowth of the core order maintenance and conflict resolution role we have described.

But are there any limits to this general response role? There are three main ones. First, there are other specialist emergency response agencies who deal with matters the police are not best equipped to. This includes the fire and ambulance services of course, but also other types of emergency service are typically provided by private or charitable actors (for example, mountain and offshore rescue, alarm monitoring, vehicle breakdown etc).

Second, the police cannot respond to every call and therefore require a basis for prioritising between them. In recent times incoming police demand has been subject to increasingly formal prioritisation and triage based on assessments of threat, harm, risk and vulnerability. The implicit basis for this is that, given police resource is finite and insufficient to meet all demand, immediate safety risks and potential high harm should take precedence.

Third, in order to deal with the problem of rising demand and reduced resources, some have suggested that the police simply stop responding to certain categories of call, such as missing person incidents that are taking up the work of around 1,500 full time officers per year. We consider this to be a mistake. If the police do not respond to these cases someone would have to. Moreover, generalist first responders are required in such cases because it is not obvious when a call comes in what type or degree of harm may have occurred.

We think it is preferable for the police to retain a generalist response role, but to also encourage a wider societal focus on reducing demand through precisely the sort of preventative public safety system we described in Chapter 4. So, for example, in relation to missing persons this would mean a concerted effort to deal with the crisis in the children's care sector and particularly the placement of vulnerable children in unsuitable locations.

### 5.2.2 Crime investigation

Though the 'New Police' founded in 1829 initially had a principally preventative role (mainly in terms of the deterrent effect of their presence on the street), during the second half of the 19th century crime investigation became a core police function. Although there was initially some resistance to the notion of 'detectives' in English and Welsh policing, because of concerns for privacy and civil liberties, in the end this function has

#### Future scenario 5.1

The way the police perform their emergency response function will need to adapt to the changing demands we articulated earlier in this report.

In particular, the growth in the number of incidents involving people with complex needs requires a local public service system that is much more collaborative and integrated. We highlight two implications of this for the response function:

- It may be that **multi-agency response teams** might be brought together to deal with certain categories of incident or be focused around certain locations. These would involve police officers but also other professionals whose skills may be required to address complex needs. We have already seen this with the development of mental health street triage teams, involving both police officers and qualified mental health professionals. Potentially we could also see response teams at certain times or in certain locations involving professionals with expertise in addiction issues, street homelessness or environmental health issues.
- It may be that we could see the development of **hybrid response roles**, which combine police powers with competencies in other relevant areas, such as social work, housing, youth work, drug and alcohol addiction issues and so on. As we argued in Chapter 4 it should be the responsibility of local public service partnerships to develop workforce strategies that think across professional boundaries to design roles that best meet future demands.

become as synonymous with the police as the so-called 'bobby on the beat'.

Today the police play a pivotal role as the gate keeper into the criminal justice system: they respond to reports of crime, manage crime scenes, pursue investigations, liaise with victims, apprehend suspects, hold those suspects in custody if required and prepare evidence for submission to the Crown Prosecution Service.

Why should the police continue to own the crime investigation function? First, many of the incidents the police will be called to under their response function will involve law breaking and the police as first responders are in the best position to gather evidence from the outset and then pursue the matter through the criminal law.

Second, for police powers (or their possible use) to help in maintaining order, they need to be attached to criminal justice sanctions, which will entail a criminal investigation that the police again are best positioned to carry out.



Third, crime investigations generally require at various points the use of police power, whether that be to arrest a suspect, to hold a suspect in custody, to execute a warrant to search a property and so forth. In theory those powers could be given to others, but keeping them in one place provides a level of regulatory control that should act as safeguard against their improper use.

So, crime investigation should remain a core police function, but we make the following qualifications. First, while it is normally important for the police to manage the investigation, this does not mean that all police investigations must be carried out by warranted officers. Indeed, in an area like financial crime for example, where the use of power may be less frequent and where specialist expertise is required, increasingly civilian investigators are being deployed to do much of the investigative work.

In the future we may also see greater use of mixed teams as part of investigations in areas where the police themselves lack the technical skills required (see Future Scenario 5.2).

#### Future scenario 5.2

Policing is struggling to recruit people with the specialist skills required to investigate new and complex area of crime, such as cybercrime, fraud and money laundering.

One model for the future might be **mixed investigation teams**, led by a Senior Investigative Officer (SIO) but involving experts from other sectors. These could include for example security experts from the financial sector and technical experts from the technology sector who can help investigate crime in a digital environment. Police organisations could have ongoing agreements with firms that would allow them to 'call in' expertise on an ongoing basis as required.

This offers one solution to the problem of police organisations being unable to compete with the salaries offered in other sectors.

Second, the internet is enabling more non-state actors to take on investigations themselves. For example, increasingly Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is being used to investigate crimes, often by private or third sector operators. The most famous example is the open source investigations organisation Bellingcat which helped identify suspects in the downing of plane MH17 in 2014, among other cases.

Another example is the so-called 'paedophile hunters'. The internet has created an opportunity for digital vigilantism in the form of groups who target sex offenders on social media platforms by pretending to

be children. The police have a difficult relationship with these groups: they have sometimes compromised evidence and in some cases have themselves committed crimes. Nonetheless they also produce evidence that is used to prosecute offenders in court (see Future Scenario 5.3).

#### Future scenario 5.3

It seems likely that we will see more and more digital entrepreneurs breaking into crime investigation, particularly in areas like online child sexual abuse where the police themselves are unable to undertake proactive work because of the levels of reactive demand they have to deal with. It is impossible to stop people doing this kind of work and it can produce evidence that is used in court.

In the future it may be that the police and the Crown Prosecution Service create a regulatory framework to try to bring some basic standards to bear on this 'wild west' area of 'Do It Yourself' crime investigation.

So, while the police must lead the crime investigation function, they do not have a total monopoly over it and, given the limitations on police resource, we can expect more non-state actors to emerge to fill the gaps in the years ahead.

Our third qualification to police ownership of the crime investigation function is that in the growing area of cross-border crime the traditional police role (investigate, arrest, charge) is increasingly untenable. The detection rate for fraud for example is just 0.6 per cent. It is simply impossible for local police forces in England and Wales to have the kind of resources and global reach necessary to catch the vast majority of internationally mobile offenders, many of whom operate in states with whom the UK lacks any policing and criminal justice cooperation.

It is for this reason that in the serious and organised crime space we are likely to see a growing emphasis on **disruption** rather than on criminal investigation. This involves gathering of intelligence to understand more about criminal behaviour and then tackling the enablers of criminality such as by freezing bank accounts and taking down servers. This is an under researched and little scrutinised area of police work but one that is becoming increasingly important.

#### 5.2.3 Neighbourhood policing

A familiar, locally knowledgeable policing presence has always been a feature of the British policing model, evoked in the notion of the 'bobby on the beat'. It reached its contemporary high point in the 2000s

when a national neighbourhood policing programme was rolled out. Delivered by a patchwork of small teams of police and police community support officers (PCSOs), it had three main functions: to provide a visible presence, to engage with communities and to tackle their concerns through 'problem solving'. It was universal, centrally designed and funded, and resource intensive. Since 2010 neighbourhood policing has been eroded and we discuss its future role in detail in Chapter 6.

One reading of the core police role we have described would seem to rule out this kind of work. Much of the activity undertaken under the rubric of neighbourhood policing (community engagement and problem-solving work etc) does not require even the potential use of police power. So, why should police officers do it?

We would highlight two reasons. First, neighbourhood policing can provide the police with an understanding of the context in which they may have to use their powers. Having such an understanding is crucial so that those powers can be used in a way that is proportionate, precisely targeted, and ultimately more effective.

Second, neighbourhood policing can cultivate a context in which there is community consent for the police use of power when required. As we shall discuss in Chapter 6 having police officers who are embedded in and close to local communities is vital for police legitimacy.

#### 5.2.4 Crime prevention

The police have always had a role in crime prevention. Indeed, in the early days the regular patrolling of a beat by uniformed officers was intended principally to prevent crime through deterrence (Critchley, 1978).

Since then, however, most police work has been dominated by reactive rather than preventative tasks. One might argue that this is no bad thing: crime and wider harm should largely be prevented by other actors in society (businesses, regulators, parents, schools etc) as described in Chapter 4. The police should focus on dealing with immediate harm, where their unique powers are likely to be required, otherwise they will end up straying into areas of work that are beyond their core competencies. They are already overwhelmed with demand, so dropping any role in crime prevention might allow the police to refocus on their core responsibilities.

However, while we agree that policing is principally and inevitably a reactive business, we think there is a role for the police in prevention. The first way in which the police can play a valuable role in prevention is through their use of power. Sometimes this is an indirect by-product of work undertaken for other reasons,

such as to bring offenders to justice. For example, by investigating crimes and making arrests the police physically remove offenders from the street. The use of police criminal justice powers can also have a deterrent effect: potential offenders may decide that the risk of apprehension and/or the severity of sanction is too great and refrain from criminal or harmful activities.

However, the police can also use their powers directly and proactively to prevent crime. For example, in the arena of public protection the police are involved in managing offenders and safeguarding victims in the community, generally in partnership with social services, the voluntary sector and other bodies. This should be seen as an important form of tertiary prevention: managing entrenched problems to ameliorate their harmful effects.

Another example would be the way the police use intelligence on criminals and their activities to disrupt offending. Disruption activity is not undertaken as part of a reactive crime investigation, but rather to make offending more difficult and therefore prevent future harm.

We might be tempted at this point to assert that the police should only engage in prevention work where it involves the use of their core powers – otherwise it is a job for someone else. However, there is also a valuable preventative dimension to neighbourhood policing, which involves understanding local problems and working with partners and communities to develop solutions ('problem solving').

This kind of preventive activity does not rest on the use of police power, but there are good reasons why the police specifically should be doing it. For one thing the public will come to the police about public safety problems and it makes practical sense for them to then lead or at least initiate and coordinate the response. For another thing it is crucial for wider public confidence in the police that when the public raise these matters the police take action. The police as 'public helpers, fixers and sorters' is arguably a key building block for police legitimacy.

So, if the use of power does not provide a limitation on the police role in prevention, what does? In our view the best way to demarcate the police role in prevention is to locate it downstream at the tertiary and secondary ends of the public health prevention framework (see Chapter 4). This position can be summarised as follows:

- The police should often *lead on tertiary prevention*, which is concerned with minimising the impact of problems that have become entrenched. This will

generally be where the use of police powers will have a preventative effect. Examples would include managing prolific offenders and disrupting organised crime.

- The police should *work in partnership with others when it comes to secondary prevention* which focuses on nipping problems in the bud before they get much worse. Examples would include much of the problem-solving work undertaken by neighbourhood teams.
- The police should *not take the lead and should rarely directly deliver primary prevention* (preventing problems from occurring in the first place). However, through the data they collect and the witness their bear the police can play a role in highlighting the range of social problems that the rest of the system ought to be addressing. In addition, they can play an important role in supporting or facilitating primary interventions, such as by triaging cases and making appropriate referrals.

#### **International case study: New Zealand**

In 2010 New Zealand launched its Policing Excellence change programme which aimed to reduce demand by bringing about improved services, leadership and value for money. There were also specific targets to reduce the crime rate by 15 per cent and the reoffending rate by 25 per cent (den Heyer, 2018). As part of this change programme a Prevention First strategy was implemented. The police identified the main drivers of crime and partnered with agencies who could help them address underlying social issues. A National Tactical Plan recognised demographic variation across the country and used tactics tailored to the needs of different communities. Neighbourhood policing teams were brought into high-demand areas to work with the community to resolve specified issues. Alternative methods of disposal were introduced and a victim-centred approach adopted.

By the end of June 2014 there had been a 20 per cent reduction in recorded crime and a rise in public trust and confidence to 78 per cent, which has remained high since. There was also a substantial financial saving (den Heyer, 2021). However, the Prevention First model has its critics who argue that the core functions of the police are being neglected and there are some jobs that could be best suited to other agencies rather than the police (den Heyer, 2021).

## **5.3 A NEW STATEMENT OF MISSION AND VALUES**

The existing mission statement for the police in England and Wales was written by the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in 2011 and remains adopted by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) in the Policing Vision 2025. It reads:

*"The mission of the police is to make communities safer by upholding the law fairly and firmly; preventing crime and antisocial behaviour; keeping the peace; protecting and reassuring communities; investigating crime and bringing offenders to justice."*

There are two problems with this statement. First, there are some important aspects of the modern police role that are missing. These include crime disruption and safeguarding, for example. Second, a general statement of role needs to be accompanied by a more detailed statement of the specific functions that will be performed in order to fulfil that role, as well as an articulation of how the police will go about their duties.

We propose a redefined Statement of Mission and Values that seeks to deal with these problems. This contains the thinking we have set out so far in this chapter on what the core role is and how this plays out in different functional areas. This is set out in Box 5.3.

#### **Recommendation**

6. In order to clarify the police role within a changing and complex environment the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the National Police Chiefs' Council and the Home Office should agree a new police service Statement of Mission and Values.

### **Box 5.3 A new Statement of Mission and Values for policing**

The role of the police is to maintain order and uphold the law so that the public can go about their lives safely and securely, and to do this in a way that balances the need for order with the protection of liberty.

In order to perform this role the police will:

- Respond to calls for help, repair harm and refer cases on to others who can provide support and prevent reoccurrence.
- Safeguard vulnerable people who they come across in the course of their work.
- Prevent crime and harm, either directly where their powers and skills are required or by referring cases, issues or problems on to others who can help.
- Investigate crime, disrupt criminal activity and bring offenders to justice.
- Provide victims of crime access to justice and support.
- Offer community policing that is visible, responsive and works with the community and other public services to solve problems that are a concern for safety.

In carrying out this work the police will:

- Always work in ways that improve the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the public.
- Promote the willing cooperation of the public in upholding the law and use lawful force only as a last resort to keep themselves and the public safe.
- Prioritise assistance towards those who face the greatest risk of harm.
- Treat all people fairly and actively oppose racism, misogyny, homophobia and other forms of prejudice.
- Be accountable for their actions and decisions, explain why they do what they do and actively encourage public participation in discussing how they work.
- Focus their work on those areas where the use or potential use of police knowledge, skills and powers are necessary for the promotion of public safety.
- Work in collaboration with other public agencies, businesses, groups and communities, as part of a wider system of public safety.
- Focus their preventative work on preventing problems getting worse and minimising their impact, while supporting others to address the underlying causes.
- Continually generate knowledge as to how public safety and security can be improved and actively share and apply this evidence base throughout their work.



# PART III

# CAPABILITIES



# 6. LEGITIMACY

**Summary:** There are worrying signs that police legitimacy and public confidence in the police have deteriorated in recent years. Addressing this needs to be made a strategic priority for the police service. This means investing in neighbourhood policing, which has been in decline over the last decade. It means having a much better understanding of where legitimacy is weak and delivering focused work to rebuild it. It means the police must constantly explain and justify why they do what they do. Specifically, we conclude that it means reducing the use of the stop and search power, exposing new technology to independent ethical scrutiny, addressing negative internal cultures and improving workforce diversity.

In this chapter we describe the first capability policing will require to meet the challenges of the 21st century: legitimacy. First, we describe what we mean by police legitimacy and explain why it is increasingly important given the changing nature of the world we live in. Second, we describe the main drivers behind police legitimacy, identifying those things the police need to put in place if they are to police with the trust and support of the public. Third, we make the case for seeing legitimacy as a strategic capability. Finally, we explore the implications of this thinking in five critical areas of police policy and practice: community policing, policing in a digital environment, stop and search, police conduct and workforce diversity.

## 6.1 POLICING WITH THE PUBLIC

At the heart of the Peelian model of policing is the idea that the police can only successfully carry out their work with the support and cooperation of the public. In this section we describe what we mean by legitimacy, why it is so important in thinking about the relationship between the police and the public and explain why we may have reached a defining moment in that relationship.

### 6.1.1. Legitimacy

Legitimacy can be defined as the recognition of the right to hold power by those subject to it (Beetham, 1991; Mawby, 2002; Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Hough, 2020).

As well as being ethically preferable there are a number of well-evidenced 'pragmatic' benefits from policing with legitimacy. These include:

- Encouraging public cooperation (Jackson et al, 2012a).
- Promoting acceptance of police decisions (Tyler and Huo, 2002).
- Rejecting violence as a way to change society (Jackson et al, 2012b).
- Fostering compliance with the law (Sunshine and Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 2006, Jackson et al, 2012c).

Many of these ideas were summed up by a chief police officer interviewed for this Review, in the first quotation below. The second, from a woman with lived experience of the criminal justice system, illustrates the disengagement and antipathy that can follow when legitimacy is lost.

*"Trust and confidence in policing is quite simple for me. How do you police 70 million people, with 120,000 people who haven't got guns? If you... think about all the current things I do ...which are incredibly hard edge and intrusive. The only way you get ... the public to tolerate that is if they trust that you are doing it for the right reasons." (KII.12)*

*"I try not to have any dealings with them [police] as much as I possibly can...because they're untrustworthy. First and foremost, I'm a Black woman. I'm in black skin. So, I have to be sure that I have no other options before I even think about calling 999. I've seen the way that they treat the Black men who I know and love." (RD: Women)*

The importance of policing with legitimacy has been recognised since the inception of modern policing and is woven into the service's founding Peelian principles, which emphasise willing public cooperation, crime prevention as an alternative to repression, and minimal use of force (Home Office, 2012). These values continue to be evoked as part of the 'British model of policing', characterised in 2009 by the then Chief Inspector of Constabulary as "approachable, impartial, accountable...based on minimal force and anchored in public consent" and as "plac[ing] a high value on tolerance" (HMCIC, 2009).

At its core this Peelian model of policing is committed to the idea that people generally obey laws and behave in socially responsible ways because they believe it is *the right thing to do*, rather than because of the fear of law enforcement or punishment. According to this model criminal justice mechanisms are best viewed as a 'hard backstop' for when informal social controls

(rooted in families, education, religion, and workplaces etc) fail or are insufficient (Hough, 2020). On this model a core police role should be to buttress those informal social processes, so that the need for force and formal sanction is minimised.

This understanding of British policing can sometimes take a backseat particularly in the face of demands for the police to 'get tough' on crime (Jacobson and Hough, 2018). Nevertheless, it remains the case that this Peelian conception remains a core part of the identity of policing in this country. Moreover, the ideas associated with it have continued to find expression in initiatives to promote community policing, restorative justice and procedural justice.

They also surfaced prominently during the Covid-19 pandemic, when British police forces adopted a policy, of *engaging, explaining, and encouraging* public compliance, before only finally *enforcing* public health laws (NPCC, 2020). This experience reaffirms the continuing value of *discretion, dialogue, and attention to the manner of police interactions*, within the British approach. This contrasted markedly to the experience of policing in some other European countries (Aitkenhead et al, 2022).

### 6.1.2 A defining moment


It is clear from the data discussed in Chapter 3 that ratings of public confidence and of measures associated with legitimacy (such as trust and a sense of fair treatment) are relatively high in England and Wales. Most members of the public trust and are satisfied with the police.

Nevertheless, there are some reasons for thinking that the police need to do much more to improve their legitimacy.

First, while overall most people express approval for police performance and feel they can trust the police, there are major deficits for some groups within the population.

As Figure 6.1 illustrates, people from Black and Mixed ethnic groups, particularly those with Black Caribbean backgrounds, are much less likely to expect local police to treat them fairly, with respect, and to agree that police can be trusted, than the White British majority (and some other ethnic groups).<sup>27</sup> These differences are less apparent for other 'service' ratings (such as whether police are reliable or do a 'good job') and speak to specific deficits of trust and legitimacy, rather than views on 'service quality'. These deficits in trust and expectations of fair treatment are long-standing,

**Figure 6.1:** Trust in local police and expectations of fair and respectful treatment: lower-level ethnic groups compared to White British majority, year ending March 2020 (ONS, 2020) (chart shows percentage point difference from White British majority)



<sup>27</sup> The CSEW data in Figure 6.1 reflects surveys conducted in the year to March 2020, although bases for some sub-groups are small, the main findings are consistent across multiple years. It is also of note that MOPAC's Public Attitude Survey shows that Black and Mixed Ethnicity Londoners' perceptions of police fairness, respectfulness and trustworthiness fell more, and from a lower starting point, than other ethnic groups during the more recent period (year ending March 2021).

deeply problematic and demand strategic attention by the police service.

Second, while policing is always controversial, in recent years police actions have been contested to a degree that has particularly tested the strength of the relationship between the police and the public.


Since this Review was launched in late 2019 the police service has been asked to enforce unprecedented public health regulations in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and called upon to take meaningful action on racial inequality following the police-killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, USA. The Metropolitan Police were strongly criticised (but then largely exonerated by HMICFRS) for their handling of a vigil on Clapham Common for murder victim Sarah Everard. The police have had to manage protests against the government's Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill; the Metropolitan Police have faced accusations of ongoing 'institutional corruption' for the way they engaged with the Inquiry into the murder of Daniel Morgan (O'Loan, 2021) and finally, the police service (and the country) was shaken to its core by the

kidnap, rape and murder of Sarah Everard by Metropolitan Police Constable Wayne Couzens. Sentencing judge Lord Justice Fulford described Couzens' crimes as jeopardising the "critical trust that we repose in the constabulary, that they will act lawfully and in the best interests of society... one of the enduring safeguards of law and order in this country" (Fulford, 2021).

It is unfortunate that we do not have national survey data to assess the impact of these events, individually or cumulatively, on public support. The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) perceptions module was suspended in early 2020 due to the pandemic and more generally there is a paucity of useful data on public sentiment, highlighted by some of our Call for Evidence respondents.

*"It is not possible to accurately or reliably report on the state of public trust and confidence in the police. Broad surveys conducted infrequently and across vast areas do not provide the nuanced or actionable data that police leaders need to ensure that their community feels safe and supported."* (CE2.25)

**Figure 6.2:** Crime Survey for England and Wales and London Public Attitude Survey perceptions of local police (fairness, respect, trust)<sup>29</sup>



<sup>29</sup> We are grateful to the London Mayor's Office for Policing and Crime (MOPAC) Evidence and Insight team for providing data from their Public Attitude Survey (PAS), much of which can be accessed via their Public Voice Dashboard. See: <https://www.london.gov.uk/what-we-do/mayors-office-policing-and-crime-mopac/data-and-statistics/public-voice-dashboard>. PAS data is presented quarterly based on rolling 12 months of interviewing and a representative annual sample size of approximately 12,800 Londoners. The survey methodology moved from face to face to telephone interviewing during the Covid pandemic and an effect on comparability cannot be ruled out. CSEW data is based on an annual sample of approximately 33,000 English and Welsh adults. Note the CSEW and PAS questions shown are not directly comparable.

*“For a more accurate assessment of confidence in policing, a larger survey of the population in England and Wales would need to be conducted. In the United States for example, the Bureau of Justice Statistics conduct a ‘Police-Public Contact Survey’ ...of approximately 260,000 [respondents]. A survey of this size ...may provide the data necessary to draw more accurate conclusions relating to public attitudes towards the police”. (CE2.28)*

Recent survey data for London is however available and strongly indicates that recent events have impacted legitimacy-associated public perceptions in unprecedented ways. Figure 6.2 shows a marked deterioration in Londoners’ assessments of police fairness and respectfulness, and their trust in police, from early 2020 onwards (when national data became unavailable).

Third, when we look ahead to the environment in which police can reasonably expect to operate over coming decades, there are good reasons to believe that legitimacy will be both more challenging to sustain and more crucial to achieving public safety.

Sustaining legitimacy will be more challenging for a number of reasons. The College of Policing’s recent horizon scan (2020) highlights the impact of the shifting digital landscape on public trust in police and other institutions. We add to this growing public dissatisfaction with the ability of the police to respond to crimes of abuse, power violation, intolerance, and hatred. There is also a growing dissonance between the ‘helping’ persona required by police in the context of expanding ‘crisis demand’ and the confrontational methods the police often rely upon to address local manifestations of organised crime. All these are likely to further challenge trust and legitimacy in the coming period.

But legitimacy will also be more important in meeting the challenges of the future. We expect this to be a world in which public safety emergencies (linked to extreme weather events, pandemic disease, global conflict, etc) will arise with increasing frequency. It will be increasingly vital to have in place strong, cooperative working relationships between citizens, communities and the police, as a critical enabler of state efforts to manage and control public behaviour, in the interests of public safety. A reservoir of public trust and willing preparedness to cooperate when crisis strikes, cannot, and should not, be taken for granted. It must instead be understood as an essential part of national and community resilience, requiring up-front investment, strategic preparation, and energetic delivery.

## Recommendations

7. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the National Police Chiefs’ Council and the Home Office should make a first-principle commitment to policing with legitimacy. They should recognise that this is a crucial enabler of effective policing. This should be expressed as a central component of a revised Statement of Mission and Values. This commitment should be backed up by a national plan for improving police legitimacy. The other relevant recommendations set out in this report should form a part of that national plan.
8. Efforts to build and sustain police legitimacy need to be driven by better data and more sophisticated analytics. Better data should also be used to drive accountability and ensure legitimacy is prioritised when faced with competing imperatives. The Home Office should fund a substantial uplift in the Office for National Statistics’ crime and policing public survey programme. As part of this a feasibility study should be carried out into the creation of a ‘legitimacy index’ (potentially combining inspection and survey-based inputs) to enable public scrutiny, performance monitoring and comparisons across time, area and between population groups.

## 6.2 THE DRIVERS OF POLICE LEGITIMACY

In this section we describe the key drivers underlying police legitimacy.

### 6.2.1 Fair and respectful treatment

Research has shown that treating people with fairness and respect can enhance police legitimacy and promote compliance with the law.

In his seminal study of *Why People Obey the Law* (2006) Tom Tyler found that citizens were more likely to comply with rules if they viewed the legal institutions like the police and the courts as legitimate. In turn whether they viewed those institutions as legitimate was determined more by perceptions of *fair process* (specifically the quality of decision-making and decency of treatment), rather than by the favourability of the outcomes.



In an important British replication, Jackson et al (2012c) showed that public trust in procedurally fair policing predicts self-reported legal compliance, and that this is strongly mediated through a sense of *moral alignment* with the police (of *‘being on the same side’*).

These connections between being treated fairly and the formation of attitudes towards the police are captured in this quote from one of our focus group participants with lived experience of the criminal justice system:

*“Police judge a book by its cover. They see me as a scumbag drug user; therefore, I will be treated like a scumbag. I do the same when I see the police uniform, I think scumbag police”. (RD: South)*

These and similar studies provide a clear message for police agencies: legitimacy matters, not just in ethical terms, but as a component of an evidence-based crime control strategy. If police agencies can routinely demonstrate fair process and respectful treatment, through their officers’ dealings with the public, they are more likely to meet with a law abiding and cooperative population. Myhill and Quinton (2011) make the case to English and Welsh police forces in the context of austerity:

*“When [police] forces decide how best to reduce crime with fewer resources, they should consider whether their proposed approach would enhance or undermine police legitimacy in the eyes of the public. While a narrow focus on enforcing the law might appeal to traditional ‘cop culture’, it was not found [in Jackson’s et al (2012c) study] to have the strongest effect on cooperation and compliance and might even be counter-productive in the longer-term if it is perceived to be unfair.”*

We should note that some of the evidence around procedural justice remains contested. Some studies question whether behaviours that the police might see as procedurally just are read the same way by the people on the receiving end (Worden and McLean, 2017; Waddington et al, 2015). On reviewing the evidence, Nagin and Telep (2020) conclude: *“perceptions of procedurally just treatment and of legitimacy are the product of a lifetime accumulation of historical, cultural, community and familial influences, not just one or more interactions with the police”*. In other words, the long history of people’s personal and vicarious interaction and associations with the police also matters. There is more to building legitimacy than simply training officers in better ways to interact with the public.

While noting these challenges we view procedural justice as a necessary, although not sufficient, basis for improving police legitimacy. As things stand currently, public complaints data and multiple inspection reports (e.g. HMICFRS, 2020) suggest that the police service is very far from having embedded procedural justice techniques into culture and practice. In 2020/21 more than 18,000 official complaints were logged about the ‘Individual Behaviours’ of police personnel (actions perceived as disrespectful, impolite, unfair, overbearing etc) – 17 per cent of all complaints received (IOPC, 2021).

### Recommendation

9. The College of Policing should undertake a programme to improve the quality of police interactions with the public, drawing on the principles of procedural justice and the existing evidence base about ‘what works’. The programme should aim to both develop knowledge and have sufficient resources to deliver comprehensive officer and staff training and support widespread practice change. Training in interpersonal skills should be a minimum standard that all police forces are expected to meet.

### 6.2.2 Beyond procedural justice: the other key drivers

As noted above, however, securing legitimacy must go wider than simply improving one-off interactions between the police and members of the public. As Trinkner et al (2018, p3) comment: *“one could read the procedural justice literature and come to the conclusion that anything the police do is appropriate and legitimate, so long as it is done respectfully and impartially”* – but as any citizen subject to multiple ‘procedurally just’ stop and searches can attest, this is clearly not the case, and we must also look to the *‘lifetime accumulation’* of other factors, to understand how legitimacy is formed.

While procedural factors are consistently shown to be important we highlight these additional key drivers from the evidence base:

- Lawfulness: whether the police are acting in accordance with the law.
- Effectiveness: whether the police are effective at achieving the goals society has set for them, with the powers provided to them.

- Distributive fairness: whether some people bear more of the costs and/or feel fewer benefits of policing than others (Bottoms and Tankebe, 2012; Tankebe, 2013)
- Boundaries: whether police are perceived to respect the appropriate (and not just legal) limits of their powers (Huq et al, 2016; Trinkner et al, 2018).

One police Call for Evidence respondent raised these latter ‘boundary concerns’ in the context of recent Covid regulations.

*“Legitimacy in policing is also as much about what you don’t do...In a free, democratic, rights-based society such as ours, restraining people’s freedom of movement and association with others... is almost anathema... Covid-19 and the police role in the pandemic has taken the police to the very outer edges of legitimacy in the eyes of the public.” (CE2.40)*

Underpinning all of these drivers is a need for the police to be involved in a continual dialogue with the public about how they work and in particular why they do what they do. This involves being committed to having hard and difficult conversations about the rationale behind police policies, priorities, actions, and decisions.

A recognition of the need for improved, inclusive public dialogue permeated Call for Evidence returns.

*“We [police] need to be better at listening and responding to the needs of our local communities. This means listening to people, not just when they are a victim or witness to a crime, but as part of getting to know what matters, [and] what is of concern... It’s about understanding our diverse communities and increasing our efforts to listen to those who don’t always have a voice, and not viewing our local communities as one homogenous group.” (CE2.02)*

*“It is important for legitimacy that there is discourse between the public and policing around how resources are used and what police priorities should be... This can only be achieved through good relations and communications with all social groups” (CE1.21)*

*“Everyone must be given a chance to have their say. Even when their views are not fully accepted, being offered the opportunity to be heard is important. This engagement with the community must be authentic and adhere to principles of procedural justice.” (CE2:25)*

It was also expressed by those with lived experience of police contact.

*“Instead of putting more people [officers] on street, and making things heightened, they should have interventions in the community ... to let people know you’re still there and are not against them. Police should ask if there any problems in the area...and tell police what’s going on in the area. You have to build up better relations with the local community...they’re not talking to the whole community... to all aspects of society. This would help people feel more safe and secure.” (RD: Male, young adult).*

To demonstrate this commitment, the police service needs to be better designed to facilitate public listening and more committed to explaining the reasons behind its actions, decisions, and priorities. It needs to be open to, and actively seek out, new perspectives, information, evidence, and challenge, and use these to inform its decisions.

## Recommendation

10. As part of a commitment to inclusive public dialogue and opening the police up to regular and ongoing challenge, Police and Crime Commissioners and Mayors should invest in vehicles to promote public participation in decision-making, such as citizens juries and assemblies. Opinion surveys and elections every four years are not sufficient to promote the kind of ongoing dialogue that is required.

So far we have argued that police legitimacy and public confidence need to be seen as strategic capabilities for policing. The following sections explore the implications of taking this commitment seriously in five areas.



## 6.3 COMMUNITY POLICING: BUILDING TRUST AND CONNECTION LOCALLY

The description offered above, of a police service better geared for public dialogue and cooperation, aligned with public priorities and values, and capable of applying more deeply informed discretion – resonates with the key tenets of community policing. This emerged as a policing philosophy in the late 20th century, in response to concerns about public disconnect.

As recognised by the Call for Evidence contributions below, the community policing approach has strong affinities with the ‘Peelian’ tradition and manifested most notably in England and Wales during the neighbourhood policing programme rolled out in the 2000s, but since 2010 eroded under the pressures of austerity (HMIC, 2017; Higgins, 2018, see Figure 6.3).<sup>30</sup>

*“[The public] believe it is important to have police officers or PCSOs on foot in the local area. This expectation is rooted in the founding principles of the service – that it is a civilian service that depends on the consent and cooperation of the people it serves. The type of policing that gives fullest expression to that expectation is neighbourhood policing.” (CE1.21)*


*“Policing by Safer Neighbourhood Teams and Local Policing Units remains the “cornerstone of British policing” and officers’ discretion ...can aid community relations”. (CE2:10)*

Despite substantial practice variation, sufficient international evidence has amassed to confirm that community policing approaches (more precisely, those that involve consultation or collaboration between police and local citizens, to define, prioritise or solve problems) “have positive effects on citizen satisfaction, perceptions of disorder, and police legitimacy” (Gill et al, 2014).

This accords with broader evidence about the value of public engagement (purposeful, positive dialogue between police and public, conducted away from fraught enforcement or victimisation contexts) on public confidence and legitimacy (Myhill, 2012), particularly when it is ‘infused with’ procedural justice (Mazerolle, 2013). One recent American randomised control trial concluded that a “single instance of positive contact with a uniformed police officer can substantially improve public attitudes toward police, including legitimacy and willingness to cooperate”, and furthermore, that “the largest attitudinal improvements...occurred among racial minorities and those who held the most negative views toward police at baseline.” (Peyton et al, 2019).

There is good reason, therefore, to believe that a renewed focus on community policing and positive,

**Figure 6.3:** Police officers and PCSOs in ‘Neighbourhood Policing’ roles<sup>30</sup> and foot patrol visibility (Crime Survey for England and Wales)



<sup>29</sup> The disintegration of Neighbourhood Policing was checked, to some extent, by the publication of a set of College of Policing Guidelines in 2019. Of the 12,100 officers added to the total police workforce under Operation Uplift, 2,400 (20 per cent) have found their way into neighbourhood roles, almost all during the year to March 2021. The national PCSO cohort has reduced by nearly 1,500 over the same period (Home Office, 2021b). The total Neighbourhood ‘headcount’ remains 20 percent below that at the end of the national roll-out and 32 per cent below the putative high-water mark in 2015.

<sup>30</sup> Home Office workforce data is used for years ending March 2012 to 2020, see: <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/police-workforce-england-and-wales>. The figure for 2008 is derived from a set of HMIC inspections of Neighbourhood Policing and Developing Citizen Focus Policing conducted in that year, for full methodology see Higgins, (2017).

discretionary public contact, would be effective at strengthening police legitimacy, including in the places and population groups where it is most challenged. We advocate this as a central component of a strategic plan for bolstering police legitimacy. This should involve both police officers and PCSOs.

While we welcome the recent College of Policing guidelines,<sup>31</sup> which set out the 'essential elements' of Neighbourhood Policing, we note that these seek to embed a version of neighbourhood/community policing predominantly oriented towards crime, disorder, and demand reduction/prevention (in line with the tone set by the Policing Vision 2025 (APCC and NPCC, 2016) and the HMIC recommendation that prompted their creation (HMIC, 2017)). Our concern here, however, is to advocate an approach which is, in addition to those aims, also explicitly premised on nurturing local trust, legitimacy, and cooperation. This is a fundamental reorientation of neighbourhood policing with implications for how the function should be geographically targeted, staffed and connected to other policing functions, and for the set of activities undertaken.

### Recommendation

11. The Home Office should ask police forces to deliver a substantial uplift in neighbourhood policing, designed around the need to build and sustain police legitimacy, public confidence, and community resilience. This should involve deploying a significant proportion of the additional officers recruited since 2019 into neighbourhood policing. This provision should be:

- Concentrated where legitimacy is most challenged,
- Assessed against the objectives of improving legitimacy, confidence and resilience,
- Implemented in ways conducive to long-term local knowledge and relationship building,
- Accompanied by sufficient 'organisational transformation' to align wider police decision making with local insight, knowledge, and perspective,
- Designed with an emphasis on promoting local dialogue, deliberation, and to encourage broad-based public involvement in local problem definition, prioritisation and solving.

## 6.4 REDUCING RELIANCE ON STOP AND SEARCH

We believe that the current pattern of police stop and search use is not justified and represents a significant barrier to building trust and confidence, particularly among Black people who are disproportionately likely to be stopped and searched by police.

### 6.4.1 The police power to stop and search

The police have two powers to stop and search. Under Section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) (and associated legislation), police can stop and search someone if they have 'reasonable grounds for suspicion' that they are carrying an unlawful item. Between April 2020 and March 2021, these accounted for approximately 99 per cent (695,009) of all stop and searches.

The police have a second power under Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This allows a police officer to stop and search someone without the need for reasonable suspicion. A senior police officer (Inspector or above) can authorise the use of these exceptional stop and search powers in a defined locality for up to 24 hours, where they believe that incidents involving serious violence may take place, and that it is expedient to give such authorisation to prevent their occurrence, or that such an incident has already taken place and the use of the powers would help to find the weapon. The authorisation can be extended by up to a further 24 hours by an officer of Superintendent rank or above.

Between April 2020 and March 2021, 1.3 per cent of all stop and searches were conducted under Section 60, equating to 9,230 searches.


### 6.4.2 How stop and search is used

Figure 6.4 shows that the numbers of stops and searches (under PACE) have fluctuated considerably over time, with a big fall after the then Home Secretary Theresa May tightened the guidelines around the use of the power, followed by a significant rise following the recent increase in knife crime. Approximately 23 per cent of all searches carried out in 2020/21 resulted in a criminal justice outcome, including 11 per cent that resulted in an arrest. Figure 6.4 shows that as the number of searches increases, a lower proportion of them result in an arrest.


69 per cent of searches under PACE were for drugs (Figure 6.5), a proportion that has been increasing

<sup>31</sup> See: <https://www.college.police.uk/guidance/neighbourhood-policing>

**Figure 6.4** Number of stops and searches under Section 1 of PACE and the proportion resulting in an arrest (Home Office, 2021a)



**Figure 6.5** Reason for searches under Section 1 of PACE (Home Office, 2021a)



over time. In all but one force, most drug searches are for possession, rather than the supply offences most associated with serious violence (HMICFRS, 2021).

To reiterate PACE searches require ‘reasonable suspicion’ by the officer that someone is carrying an unlawful item. HMICFRS has found that searches conducted on ‘stronger grounds’ are more likely to be effective (i.e. result in a ‘find’) (Table 6.1). Furthermore,

grounds are more likely to be strong when searches are intelligence-led rather than ‘self-generated’ (based on the suspicion of the individual officer) (Table 6.2) (HMICFRS, 2021). Strong grounds and good intelligence are, therefore, vital to both the legitimacy and efficacy of stop and search (College of Policing APP, 2017).

**Table 6.1** Recorded grounds for stop and search, and subsequent find rates (HMICFRS, 2021)

Recorded grounds	% of PACE stop and searches	Find rate
'Strong'	21%	40%
'Moderate'	42%	22%
'Weak'	22%	17%
'Not reasonable'	14%	14%

**Table 6.2** Type of search and proportion of those with 'weak' recorded grounds (HMICFRS, 2021)

Search type	% PACE searches	% 'weak' recorded grounds
Self-generated	55% (70% in MPS)	54%
Third-party information	37%	34%
Intelligence led	9%	11%


Turning to the separate Section 60 power, which does not require reasonable suspicion, we can see from Figure 6.6 that use has also fluctuated considerably over time. Use of the power fell dramatically following the Theresa May reforms, but the numbers have again picked up more recently following concerns about the rise in serious violence. As with the PACE power, the more it is used, the lower the find rate. The find rate last year, looking specifically at the possession of offensive weapons (the stated aim of the Section 60 power) was just 0.8 per cent, the lowest proportion since 2011/12 (Home Office, 2021a) (Figure 6.6).

We draw the following conclusions from this summary of the stop and search data:


- The use of the power varies hugely over time with big fluctuations which would seem to depend at

least as much on the political context at the time as any objective reading of conditions on the ground.

- The more it is used the less effective the power becomes. Both the PACE and Section 60 powers have a higher find rate when they are used in lower volumes.
- There is a lot we cannot know from this data. For example, we do not know whether, as some claim, the possession of the power has a deterrent effect on potential knife carriers. We also cannot tell from these data what the impact of these searches is on police legitimacy and public trust in the police. However we can understand more about this latter point by looking at the data on racial disproportionality in the use of the power.

**Figure 6.6** Number of Section 60 stops and searches and the proportion of those where a weapon is found (Home Office, 2020)

**Figure 6.7** Stop and search rate per 1,000 people, both PACE and Section 60 powers (Home Office, 2021a)



### 6.4.3 Racial disproportionality

Black people are seven times more likely to be stopped than White people; people of 'Other' ethnicities 2.7 times more likely and those of Mixed ethnicity and Asian people 2.4 times more likely (Home Office, 2021a) (Figure 6.7). These disparities have been increasing over time but narrowed in 2020/21.

Racial and ethnic disproportionality is even greater for the use of the Section 60 power. Between April 2019 and March 2020, ethnic minority groups were seven times more likely to be stopped under Section 60 than their White counterparts, and Black people 18 times more likely (Home Office, 2020). People from Black, and Minority Ethnic (BME) background were subject to 54 per cent of all Section 60 searches last year (Home Office, 2021a).

### 6.4.4 Impact

*"I've been stopped eight times in one day... I was nine when I first started being stopped... you can't be Black in a tracksuit" (Young adult)*

*"It's trivial [Section 60] because taking one knife off the streets doesn't save lives, it makes no difference as people have so many more weapons. I am 100 per cent against Section 60... being searched without suspicion is against my rights as a citizen of my country" (Professional working with young adults with lived experience of the criminal justice system)*

The experience of stop and search can be "embarrassing, intrusive and frightening" (HMICFRS, 2021 p.9). And there is emerging evidence that it can result in longer term individual harm (Del Toro et al, 2019a; Del Toro et al, 2019b ). Repeated and disproportionate use leads people to develop concerns about racial profiling. Adversarial encounters with the police can have long lasting effects (Bradford, 2015). 85 per cent of Black people are not confident that the police would treat them the same as a White person (JCHR, 2020) and 74 per cent of people from an ethnic minority background aged 16 to 30 think BME people are unfairly targeted by stop and search (Keeling, 2017). All of this is likely to reduce public trust in the police and cooperation with them.

The police tend to justify use of stop and search as being an effective tool to tackle violent crime, but there is limited evidence to suggest a significant relationship. The College of Policing APP (2017) states that any contribution that stop and search makes to crime reduction, by detecting and deterring criminals, is likely to be "small, highly localised and short-lived" (see also Quinton et al, 2017; Tiratelli et al, 2018; McCandless et al, 2016).

In the US, consistent and statistically significant short-term crime reduction effects have been identified when stop, question and frisk (SQF) is targeted in places with high levels of violence (and serious gun crime) and focused on high-risk repeat offenders. However there is an absence of evidence of its long-term impact (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2018), and the mechanisms driving any crime reduction are unclear (whether, for instance it is the result of greater police visibility rather than the search itself (Quinton et al, 2017)).



## 6.4.5 Conclusion and recommendations

*“The recent rise of serious violence, against the backdrop of falls in other crime types, has reopened the conversation about how the police effectively build trust with communities most affected by these crimes and implement strategies that protect the public with due regard to their long-term effects. While there has been much debate about the need for a ‘public health approach’ to address serious violence, and some positive developments at regional levels, [we are] concerned that the approach’s potential success is being undermined by heavy-handed tactics and changes in policy that will inflict further damage on the relationship between the police and the community. In particular, the return of Section 60 stop and search is a shift that is un-evidenced in terms of need or the likelihood of positive outcomes”. (CE1.03)*

The first thing to say is that in principle the police should have a power to stop and search a person where they have reasonable grounds to suspect someone is carrying an unlawful item.

However, focusing for the moment on the PACE power, there are some issues that need to be addressed. First, the fact that the ‘find rate’ is higher the less the power is used indicates that high volumes of stop and search bring with them diminishing returns and moreover are likely to generate a significant cost in terms of reduced trust and confidence in the police and ultimately reduced cooperation between the police and local communities. The police should have the power but they should use it proportionately, with discretion, and only when they have strong grounds for suspicion and be mindful of its impact on community confidence and harm to the individual.

Second, taking this thinking one step further, there is a case for greater intelligence-led targeting of the use of the PACE power. We urge police leaders to look at the concept of ‘precision policing’ developed in the United States. This approach calls for a shift in policing from the ‘three Rs’ (rapid response, random patrol and reactive investigation) to three Ps (problem solving, partnership and prevention). It is *“a framework, an organising principle, to ensure that police work with the community in ways that add up to police legitimacy because the methods are integrated into the heart of patrol work and not segregated as an ancillary function. It ensures that police use connectivity more than enforcement; but when enforcement is necessary, it is accurately and narrowly directed”* (Bratton and Murad, 2018: 32).

‘Precision policing’ provides a possible framework for moving to a model of street-level crime control less reliant on ‘blunt’ tactics like stop and search and focuses on developing better local intelligence through community policing and greater legitimacy (Bratton and Murad, 2018).

Third, how the power is used is important and there is plenty of evidence from the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) that the power is very often used in ways that do not conform to the theory and practice of procedural justice outlined earlier (IOPC, 2020).

Fourth, the levels of racial and ethnic disproportionality in its use are a cause of a deep sense of unfairness and contribute to less trust and confidence in the police among Black people (Naseem, 2021).

Fifth, there is an over concentration of the use of the power on minor drugs possession offences, which is striking given that the general justification for its use is that it is a tactical option to deal with serious violence.

These points suggest the importance of a much stronger framework of policy, tactics and training around the use of the PACE power. Training must emphasise the importance of procedurally just encounters, the causes and impact of disproportionality and how the use of stop and search needs to align with overall priorities. We make a recommendation below which aims to create a more consistent standard of training and practice in the use of the power.

Finally, we turn to Section 60. In principle we consider a power that enables the police to search a person without any reasonable grounds for suspicion that they are carrying an unlawful item is problematic from a civil liberties perspective. It should not be used frequently and only in extraordinary circumstances. We note that the power tends to be used in a way that is highly disproportionate on racial and ethnic lines and that it generates considerable community concern. We also note that the ‘find rate’ from Section 60 searches is extremely low.

We also heard representations that this is a useful tactical option when the police are concerned about an outbreak in serious violence. It has been suggested that there may be a deterrent effect from its use, which is a counterfactual that, if it were true, would be hard to evidence.

Our view is that the Section 60 power has been misused in the past and applied too often in conditions where it should not have been. However, we can conceive of emergency conditions under which a temporary power of this kind is justified. This would be where the police have intelligence that a *significant* outbreak of serious violence *is likely to occur*. At the very least the government’s recent relaxation of the

rules around Section 60 ought to be reversed. Section 60 powers ought only to be used when a senior officer considers that such serious violence ‘is likely to’ (rather than ‘may’) occur and the authorisation ought to be made by a chief officer, rather than an Inspector. The guidance must also make clear that the impact on community relations must be considered prior to authorisation and the grounds for the authorisation must be properly communicated to the public.

### Recommendations

12. The government’s Serious Violence Strategy should be amended to reflect a three-strand commitment to 1. a preventative public health approach, 2. targeted law enforcement activity (‘precision policing’) and 3. an explicit commitment to legitimacy and working with communities. The last is lacking from current strategies and emphasises a shift to problem solving, partnership and prevention from ‘blunt’ street level deterrence and enforcement.
13. The College of Policing should issue mandatory guidance in relation to stop and search training. This would be based on the Best Use of Stop and Search Scheme. This should emphasise the importance of procedural justice and the need for searches to have strong grounds, including through being intelligence-led, and to align with wider police priorities. Where a drugs search leads to a ‘find’ and a charge of possession would otherwise be made, individuals should be consistently diverted towards a social intervention and away from the criminal justice system.
14. The Section 60 legislation should be changed to make clear that this is a power to be used only in extraordinary circumstances, where the police have intelligence that a significant outbreak of serious violence is likely to occur. The authorisation should be made by a chief officer. The grounds for the decision should be clearly communicated to the public and the impact on police-community relations considered.

## 6.5 TRUST AND LEGITIMACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE

So far in this chapter our concerns have been analogue ones. But we are living in a digital age and we must consider the implications of this change for police legitimacy and public trust.

The core challenge here is how the police can harness the power of new technologies – such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Live Facial Recognition (LFR) – while avoiding disproportionate intrusion, unethical practice and the breaching of public trust.<sup>32</sup>

These challenges were highlighted by Metropolitan Police Commissioner Cressida Dick in a pair of lectures to the Police Foundation in 2019 and the Royal United Services Institute the following year. She said that digital technologies can help to predict, prevent, and detect significant volumes of crime, but that policing also needed to embrace “*well-governed and well-explained proportionate use of tech*”. She offered an articulation of a British policing model for the digital age, in which technology would always be used to augment, not replace, accountable human decision making, and where deployments would be subject to principles of minimal intrusion (analogous to those underpinning use of physical force), backed by the capability for agile escalation and de-escalation as circumstances change. We consider that this provides a useful starting point for developing a framework for police use of intrusive technologies.

There are three specific challenges that need to be addressed, relating to governance, bias, and privacy (Rowe and Muir, 2021).

First, the governance problems relate to the challenge of achieving satisfactory oversight of predictive ‘big data’ algorithms, given their inherent complexity and the additional layers of opacity added when these are ‘self-learning’, developed with the private sector or by networks that cross jurisdictional borders.

Second, there is a challenge of bias, linked to the way algorithmic processing can exaggerate or ‘ratchet up’ (Harcourt, 2007) unintentional coding biases or partiality/disproportionality in input data, leading to over or under-policing of problems, neighbourhoods, or marginalised groups (Lum and Isaac, 2016).

Both of these challenges give rise to questions about how ‘human’ police officers, can be held accountable

<sup>32</sup> We note that the House of Lords Justice and Home Affairs Committee is currently conducting an inquiry into new technologies and the application of the law, which will no doubt tackle these questions. We look forward to its findings <https://committees.parliament.uk/work/1272/new-technologies-and-the-application-of-the-law/>

for algorithmically informed decisions (and/or where else accountability should lie). Empirically, too little is known about how police personnel interact with algorithmic outputs, but there are clearly risks of police officers relying excessively on the judgements of machines when reaching decisions for which they are ultimately accountable (Kearns and Muir, 2019).

Third, the problem of privacy cuts across multiple areas of police work in the information age, from investigative use of communications data to biometrics, to network analysis and data-mining. The primary challenge currently is to ensure that police intrusions into citizens' privacy, are necessary, proportionate and compliant with the complex patchwork of relevant legislation. Recent investigations and court cases identifying problems with police use of mobile phone extraction (ICO, 2020), their trial use of Live Facial Recognition (R (Bridges) v CC South Wales, 2020), and controversy over the 'consent' required of victims for digital examination of electronic devices, demonstrate the need for continued vigilance to ensure that police assurances around digital ethics are carried through into practice.

It is unhelpful that public debate about these questions tends to be dominated by critical campaigning voices on one side, with the police often obliged to take up the position of proponents on the other. Given what we have said about the importance of the police committing to inclusive dialogue, and the role they play as societal arbiters, this position of advocacy for greater power, feels undesirable. Much more conducive to public trust, we suggest, is the way some police forces have voluntarily subjected their proposed data and technology initiatives to the scrutiny of independent ethics panels and responded to their recommendations and advice (Oswald, 2021).

We believe a commitment to this kind of rigorous external, expert scrutiny and challenge by non-partisan bodies, representing the public interest, can go some way to establishing police trustworthiness in this fast-developing field.

Policing would do well to put such arrangements on a firmer footing than exists at present. Noting the risk of inconsistencies emerging, and the limited pool of available expertise, there appears to be a strong argument for moving from the current set of fragmented local arrangements to a single national ethics and oversight panel.

## Recommendation

15. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs' Council should establish an independent National Commission for Police Technology Ethics to consider and advise on proposals for new technology projects. Police forces and law enforcement agencies should work with the Centre on a voluntary basis, but a public register of all police technology projects should be kept, indicating each project's referral/approval status.

The work of the Commission should be informed by 1. a standing Citizens Panel on police use of technology, and 2. a programme of research, commissioned by the College of Policing, to better understand how police personnel make technologically augmented decisions.

The Commission should work with the College of Policing to develop guidance around the proportionate use of intrusive technologies. This should be based on the principle of minimal intrusion, with an ability to escalate as circumstances demand.

## 6.6 CONDUCT

As recent events have demonstrated, nothing is more corrosive of public trust in the police than unethical, illegal and immoral conduct by police officers. A healthy, functioning relationship between the public and the police requires the former to trust that the latter will act professionally, competently, lawfully, and based on sound motives.

Just as with members of the public, good conduct for police officers requires both 1. sanctions for bad behaviour and 2. a supportive cultural and social context. Here we discuss first the effectiveness of the police conduct system and second the need for a culture that promotes the right norms and values.

First, it must be said that there have been significant changes to the police conduct system and it is very early to judge their impact. In 2020 the Home Office introduced a number of reforms to police disciplinary procedures to try to place less emphasis on punishment, particularly for errors, sub-optimal practice etc and more on organisational learning (Home Office,



2018). Under new arrangements less serious breaches of professional standards are dealt with outside of the misconduct system, through line management action, Reflective Practice Review Processes and Unsatisfactory Performance Procedures.

The direction of these reforms, toward more of a learning culture and a focus on preventing mistakes from re-occurring is positive. We do however have concerns about one specific change: the introduction of independent 'legally qualified persons' to chair police misconduct hearings. While this change seems well motivated there is a widespread view among chief officers that, for whatever reason, these chairs seem less likely than Chief Constables to dismiss officers found guilty of serious misconduct (Hamilton, 2021; Hewitt 2021a). This has led to the bizarre situation of police forces taking their own misconduct panels to court to try to secure an officer's dismissal.

### Recommendation

16. The Home Office should review the use of independent chairs of police misconduct hearings. Such a review should identify whether the recent reforms have made it harder to secure the dismissal of officers found guilty of misconduct.

Second, it is clear that having a robust misconduct system is not sufficient to promote good conduct. This requires a wider culture of integrity. There are good reasons to be concerned about the current state of police occupational culture, or at least some of the sub-cultures within it. Following the murder of Sarah Everard, there has been widespread condemnation of persistent and problematic 'canteen' cultures, that allow misogynistic, racist, homophobic, and otherwise discriminatory attitudes and behaviours to persist unchecked (Hewitt, 2021b; Saner, 2021; Marsh, 2021; Apter, 2021).

Given the persistence of these issues it is questionable whether the obligation in the police Code of Ethics to question and report, challenge or take action against unprofessional behaviour has really been embedded culturally within the police service (College of Policing, 2014).

Currently there are two inquiries underway which will explore many of these issues, one led by Dame Elish Angiolini for the Home Office and another by Dame Louise Casey for the Metropolitan Police. Clearly any reforms aimed at improving police conduct and organisational culture should follow the conclusions of these two important inquiries.

We also note the existence of well-documented strategies for promoting police integrity (e.g., Newburn, 2015), which include lessons around vetting, resourcing of professional standards departments, and close monitoring of 'closed' or specialist units, demonstrably more vulnerable to corruption (Punch, 2000). We leave it for other, better placed reviews to assess where current practice in these areas requires improvement.

However, here we make three recommendations which are within our strategic remit. First, the College of Policing should initiate a programme of work to ensure that the Code of Ethics becomes fully embedded into police culture and practice. This should include placing the Code of Ethics at the heart of the new leadership development programmes we call for in Chapter 10 of this report. Sergeants, Inspectors, Superintendents and chief officers need to be role models for good conduct and the highest professional standards. That is the key to achieving a culture of integrity.

Second, we note research evidence that links the way police officers behave vis-à-vis members of the public, to the way they are treated within their organisations. Across a range of workplace contexts, studies found that how employees are treated within their organisations has an impact on their performance, including organisational commitment, 'going the extra mile', and job satisfaction (Colquitt, 2008; Tyler and Blader, 2000).

In the policing context, Bradford et al (2013), have shown that police officers who perceive their organisation as distributivity fair, and their supervisors and leaders as procedurally just, are more likely to identify with the organisation, demonstrate discretionary effort, value the public and feel empowered in their work.<sup>33</sup> In this context the finding that only 36 per cent of frontline officers believe that they are 'treated fairly' (the same proportion who explicitly disagree, (Chandler, 2020)) should be of particular concern, and the drivers of these perceptions need to be understood and addressed.

In light of this evidence the College of Policing should ensure that the principles for promoting 'organisational justice' are embedded into police leadership development programmes.

Third, the way in which police organisations often fail to respond transparently and empathetically following cases of internal misconduct, whether current or in the past, can act to further undermine public trust. As has been recognised within the service (Dodd, 2016), learning from failure is too often impaired by an

<sup>33</sup> The perceived risk of sanctions (i.e., disciplinary or performance measures), on the other hand, did not impact on these outcomes, but did predict self-reported rule following and 'blind obedience' (as did supervisory procedural justice).

institutional tendency towards defensiveness. In the wake of Inquiries into the Hillsborough Stadium disaster (HIP, 2012; Jones 2017) and, more recently, the murder of Daniel Morgan (O'Loan, 2021), calls have been made for a statutory 'Duty of Candour' to be applied to police and other public authorities, to ensure that those seeking truth following tragedy, are not obstructed.

We believe that an organisational duty of candour on police forces would help to promote openness and reduce defensiveness. This would be a duty on police bodies to, at all times, act within 'the public interest, to be transparent candid and frank', as well as a duty 'to assist court proceedings, inquiries, and official investigations and to cooperate with public inquiries'. Certainly, within the NHS there are signs that a comparable duty of candour has led to an increased reporting of serious incidents (Gardiner et al, 2021). However we also note that an organisational duty of candour is unlikely to work unless also underpinned by active efforts to embed a culture of integrity as described above (Gardiner et al, 2021).

### Recommendations

17. The College of Policing should instigate a programme of work to ensure that the Code of Ethics is deeply embedded into police training, decision-making and professional practice. This should include:
  - Ensuring that the principles set out in the Code of Ethics are core components of all leadership development programmes in policing.
  - Ensuring that 'ethical health checks' are a standard part of police officer professional development.
  - Ensuring that reflective practice is used systematically to promote discussion of the implications of the Code of Ethics for police decision-making.
18. The College of Policing should ensure that police leadership development programmes are informed by the principles of organisational justice. These programmes should promote a model of police leadership that understands and seeks to address the causes of perceived unfairness within the workforce.
19. The Home Office should bring forward legislation to introduce an organisational duty of candour for police forces.

## 6.7 WORKFORCE DIVERSITY

In this section we examine the diversity of the police workforce as a key building block for police legitimacy. First, we set out why a more diverse workforce is important. Second, we examine the data on the representation of different groups within the workforce, focusing on those characteristics for which we have data (gender and race and ethnicity). Third, we explore why the police service remains so unrepresentative of the populations it serves. Fourth, we make a series of recommendations that amount to a call for a 'diversity uplift' in policing.

### 6.7.1 The importance of a diverse workforce

We identify a number of reasons why having a more representative workforce should benefit both the police and society:

- A more representative organisation should strengthen police legitimacy, particularly with those groups hitherto under-represented (Gade and Wilkins, 2013; Theobald and Haider-Markel, 2009).
- A more representative workforce may be less likely to discriminate against minority communities and will be more likely to consider the interests and perspectives of those communities (Meier, 1993).
- Having a diversity of perspectives within an organisation can help to tackle outdated thinking, prevent 'group think' and promote innovation (Syed, 2021).

### 6.7.2 Diversity within the police workforce


In this section we break down the police workforce by gender and race/ethnicity and seek to understand how representative it is of the population of England and Wales, and of local police force areas. Note that figures on other protected characteristics such as disability, religion and sexual orientation are not available.

#### Gender


There has been a steady increase in the proportion of female police officers in the workforce as illustrated in Figure 6.8. This has risen by 6.6 percentage points between 2010 and 2021 to 32.3 per cent of the workforce but is still significantly less than the proportion of women in the general population of England and Wales (over 50 per cent).

Figure 6.9 shows female representation is highest at the Constable rank (34.3 per cent). It is lowest at the Sergeant rank (24.6 per cent). When looking more broadly at roles within the workforce, there is strong


**Figure 6.8** Female police officers as a proportion of all police officers (Home Office, 2021b)




**Figure 6.9.** Proportion of all police officers who are female by rank 2021 (Home Office, 2021b)



**Figure 6.10.** Gender balance within the police workforce 2021 (Home Office, 2021c)



**Figure 6.11** Average proportion of women police officers in Europe and USA 2016-2018 (Eurostat, 2020)



female representation within police staff and designated officers (61 per cent), Police Support Volunteers (49 per cent) and PCSOs (47 per cent) (Figure 6.10).

By comparison with other European countries and the United States, England and Wales have one of the highest proportions of women police officers, coming seventh out of 37 countries (Figure 6.11). While in England and Wales 29 per cent of police officers were women in 2016 to 2018, the figure was just 4 per cent in Turkey, 8 per cent in Portugal, 8 per cent in Italy and 11 per cent in the USA. The Baltic states have by contrast the highest proportions of women police officers: 39 per cent in Lithuania, 37 per cent Latvia and 35 per cent in Estonia.


Nevertheless, at the current rate of progress it will take another 20 years for England and Wales to achieve a representative workforce in terms of gender.

### Race and ethnicity


Since 2000, the percentage of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) police officers has increased steadily from 2.2 per cent to 7.6 per cent (excluding not stated) (Figure 6.12). However, this is still some way off being representative of the population of England and Wales (17.6 per cent in 2021) (Wohland et al, 2021)

Figure 6.13 illustrates that Asian and mixed ethnicity police officer representation is the highest and their representation is increasing at the fastest rate. The

**Figure 6.12** Proportion of all police officers who are BME 2000-2021 (Home Office, 2021c)



**Figure 6.13.** Ethnic minorities as a percentage of all police officers (Home Office, 2021b)



proportion of Asian and mixed ethnicity officers more than doubled between 2007 and 2020. By contrast Black police officers only increased from 1 to 1.3 per cent as a proportion of the workforce in the 14 years to 2021. This is a major concern given that Black Caribbean communities have the lowest levels of trust and confidence in the police.

Table 6.3 shows that although the ethnic diversity of officers has increased in recent years, in 2021, all ethnic minorities remain under-represented in policing compared to their proportion of the English and Welsh population.

If we look at progress made in the last ten years, there is a wide variation in performance. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) saw a 97.5 per cent increase in BME officers between 2015 and 2021. In comparison, West Midlands Police (WMP) saw a 44 per cent increase and the Metropolitan Police (MPS) a 37.8 per cent increase. Improvements in each of the three biggest forces in England and Wales has been driven predominantly by the recruitment of Asian officers. There has also been some success in the recruitment of people of mixed

ethnicity. The proportion of Black police officers in the MPS has increased by just 0.9 percentage points in the past 10 years. In GMP this figure is 0.3 percentage points and WMP has in fact seen a reduction in the proportion of Black officers.

What about the impact of Operation Uplift? As of September 2021, 7.9 per cent of all officers were BME, an increase of 0.6 percentage points since March 2020. Of new officers recruited between April 2020 and September 2021, 11.4 per cent identified as BME. This is only a 1.1 percentage point increase on the percentage of new recruits that were BME in the year to March 2020 (10.3 per cent) (Home Office, 2021d). These figures suggest that Operation Uplift is having a negligible impact on workforce diversity.

We can also make future projections, based on current trends. Using Wohland's (2021) projections, the BME population of England and Wales will increase to 27.1 per cent by 2050. If the number of BME officers continues to increase by only 0.34 percentage points annually (the average over the last five years) it will take 58.2 years for

**Table 6.3** The representation gap by ethnic group 2021 (Home Office, 2021b; Wohland et al, 2021)<sup>34</sup>

Ethnicity	Proportion of all BME officers (%)	Proportion of all police officers (%)	Proportion of population in England and Wales
Asian/Asian British	44.9	3.4	9.8
Black/Black British	16.9	1.3	3.8
Other	7.9	0.6	1.2
Mixed	30.3	2.3	2.8

<sup>34</sup> Officers who identify as Chinese in 2021 were counted under the Asian ethnic group instead of under the Chinese and Other ethnic group.

the police service to be representative of a population that is 27.1 per cent BME, taking us to the year 2079. By then, of course, the BME population of England and Wales will have again increased significantly.

Looking at the three largest metropolitan forces, we estimate that it will take the Metropolitan Police 59 years to be representative of London's Asian population and 91 years to be representative of London's Black population (as at 2050). For Greater Manchester it will take 24 and 40 years respectively. At the current rate of change in the number of its Black officers (falling) West Midlands Police will never become representative of its Black population.

### 6.7.3 The causes of low minority representation in the police workforce

We identify the following reasons why members of ethnic minority groups are less likely to consider policing as a career:

- There is the feeling of being unwelcome, considering the fraught history of race relations in this country and the long history of racism and discrimination in policing, evidenced in numerous public inquiries over the years, such as Scarman (1981) and Macpherson (1998).
- A lack of minority ethnic role models in the police.
- BME candidates are more likely to receive a hostile reaction from their families due to their perceptions of the police.
- BME graduates in particular may see policing as lacking the status of other professions such as medicine and the law (Waters et al, 2007).
- Vetting can exclude candidates if a criminal record is associated with their social or familial networks and candidates from more disadvantaged backgrounds may be more likely to be excluded on that basis.
- BME candidates are more likely than White candidates to fail assessment centres, suggesting much more needs to be done to create a level playing field in the recruitment process.
- BME officers are less likely to stay in the police and less likely to get promoted. Police officers with a BME background are more likely to voluntarily resign than White officers, with 27 voluntary resignations per 1,000 officers in the year ending March 2021 compared to 15.1 for White officers. During 2020/21, just 4.5 per cent of all police officers promoted were BME (excluding the MPS) (Home Office, 2021c). The dismissal rate for BME officers is 2.9 per 1,000 compared to 1.2 for White officers (Home Office, 2021c)

However, none of these factors should become a cause for fatalism. As we shall see there are good examples of police organisations bringing in talent from more diverse backgrounds.

### 6.7.4 Improving diversity

There are several examples of success in recruiting a more diverse police workforce. For example, the Police Now graduate recruitment programme has done well in recruiting new female officers: 54 per cent of New Graduate Leadership Programme (NGLP) recruits and 66 per cent of New Detective Programme (NDP) offer holders starting in 2020/21 were women (compared to 37 per cent of joiners nationally). Of those starting in 2020/21, 17 per cent of NGLP and 26 per cent NDP recruits were BME, compared to 10 per cent of joiners nationally in 2019/20. 45 per cent of these were female. Additionally, the number of Black people on the NGLP increased from eight in 2019 to 29 in 2020.

The significant increase in Police Now applications since 2015 is a clear indication that policing can attract diverse and motivated graduates. Some of the reasons for their success are attributable to much better targeting of marketing at BME audiences, using diverse role models and framing policing as being about social change and public service rather than traditional crime fighting.

What the experience of Police Now shows is that women and people from BME groups do want to join the police when there is a real focus on reaching out and making it an attractive career choice.

However, both the Scarman and Macpherson Reports argued for improving minority representation in the police workforce and far too little has been achieved since those landmark reports. Macpherson set targets for police force representation by 2009, none of which were met. The Home Affairs Select Committee noted in 2013 that progress since the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry was '*disappointing*' and that there being (at that time) no Black or Asian Chief Constables was '*shameful*'. It also said that progress had not been sufficient and that there was a need to address the issue with greater urgency.

It is time to take further steps to improve the representativeness of policing. We note the success of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in recruiting more Catholic officers following the Good Friday Agreement (see Box 6.1). In that case the PSNI was allowed for a time limited period to use positive discrimination, essentially a 50/50 recruitment process. We note that the success in Northern Ireland was not



### Box 6.1 The experience of the Police Service of Northern Ireland

The 1999 Patten Report on policing was a significant step towards peace in Northern Ireland. Following the recommendations of the enquiry, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), which drew its officers overwhelmingly from the Protestant community, was replaced by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Alongside the latter was a reformed recruitment policy, where 50 per cent of new officers would be Catholics. Where six or more similar vacancies were to be filled, all candidates of a specified standard of merit were pooled from which an equal number of Protestants and Catholics were appointed.

The first step to make this change was to create vacancies by offering severance schemes. The result was increased Catholic representation in the police workforce, from 8 per cent in 2001 to 30 per cent when the initiative was stopped in 2011. In this period the application rate of Catholics also increased from 23 per cent to 37 per cent (Home Affairs Committee, 2016) as did confidence in the police among Catholic communities. The uplift in Catholic representation has stalled since; in 2020 32 per cent of PSNI officers are Catholic (PSNI, 2020). The 2011 census showed that 45 per cent of the population of Northern Ireland were Catholic (48 per cent Protestant), but a Catholic majority is predicted for the near future (Gordan, 2018).

simply about positive discrimination, but also about re-founding the police service as a new organisation and that this helped to change how those in the nationalist community saw the police. We are clear that any use of recruitment targets and positive discrimination in England and Wales needs to be backed up by a wider programme of work to build trust in policing particularly among Black communities.

#### Recommendation

20. The government should develop a plan to improve workforce diversity, setting targets for female and ethnic minority recruitment for each police force. In order to facilitate this the government should legislate to allow police forces to introduce time limited positive discrimination policies until such time as these targets are achieved.

## 6.8 CONCLUSION

There are worrying signs of a deterioration in public confidence in the police and in particular there are signs of a decline in police legitimacy in the nation's capital. There are longstanding legitimacy deficits in the Black community and, in a more disrupted and unpredictable future operating environment, the ability of the police to work cooperatively with the public will become more important. Legitimacy must be seen as a core strategic capability for the police service, without which it is impossible for our policing model to function effectively.

The police service should develop a long-term plan to build and promote police legitimacy. That plan should be backed up by better data on where trust and confidence are weakest and efforts to promote legitimacy should be focused on those communities. A restored neighbourhood policing model should be at the centre of efforts to improve trust and confidence, with a significant proportion of the new Operation Uplift recruits dedicated to neighbourhood policing roles.

Part of that plan must also include new guidance and mandatory training around the use of the stop and search power, a clearer national framework around the ethics of using new technologies in policing, work to tackle negative internal cultures and clear targets to improve workforce diversity.

# 7. SKILLS AND TECHNOLOGY

**Summary:** The police need the right skills and technology to be able to perform their role in a changing world. The police service currently suffers from gaps in relational, investigative and digital skills. Strong interpersonal and communication skills are crucial to improving police legitimacy and must be a mandatory minimum standard across all forces. There should be greater use of direct entry schemes and improved pay to deal with the chronic shortage of detectives. Policing should collaborate much more closely with the private sector to fill gaps in specialist digital skills.

To fill crucial skills gaps policing needs to become a more plural workforce, for example by strengthening career pathways in allied policing professions, such as data analytics, financial investigation and digital forensics. There should be strategic workforce planning at a national level to ensure the service can properly meet the demands of the future.

Police information technology also requires substantial improvement. It is alarming that the Police National Computer, a critical part of police infrastructure, is 48 years old and will soon be running on the basis of unsupported technology. There needs to be significant investment in police IT over the next decade. The College of Policing, as a single home for police improvement, should have powers to mandate common IT standards across the whole system to improve data sharing and interoperability.

Police officers and staff need the skills and technological assets to enable them to perform their roles successfully in the face of radically changing demand. In this chapter we identify a number of core skills gaps within the police workforce and describe what should be done to fill them. We also review the state of police IT and call for a ‘technology uplift’ over the next decade.

## 7.1 SKILLS

The future skills requirement can be broken down into three categories:

- **Relational skills** required to manage complexity, respond to vulnerability, de-escalate social tension, and build and sustain public trust and confidence.
- **Investigatory skills** required to investigate increasingly complex areas of crime.
- **Digital skills** to operate effectively in a digital environment.

Figure 7.1 summarises our assessment of the future skills needs of the police service.

### 7.1.1 Relational skills

Policing is fundamentally a relational business: the outcomes the police achieve for society depend on the quality of their internal and external relationships. Future trends will render these relational skills even more important.

### Communication and interpersonal skills

The projected increase of social tensions and civil emergencies and the need to respond to increasingly complex needs, put a premium on officers’ communication skills. As we have discussed, police also need good interpersonal skills to police with legitimacy.

Tens of thousands of police officers of course have excellent people skills. However, current police training does not sufficiently emphasise communication and interpersonal skills. Surveys of people who have encountered police officers suggest officers often do not properly attempt verbal de-escalation before using force. Many officers say they manage conflict through communication, but just half have been trained to do this (Clark-Darby and Quinton, 2020). HMICFRS’ 2018/19 PEEL inspection found none of the 19 forces inspected provided structured communication training (HMICFRS, 2021).

While conflict management now features in officer safety training,<sup>35</sup> HMICFRS (2021) has found officers are not taught associated skills like active listening, showing empathy, building rapport, using positive language and de-escalation techniques. Providing proper training and assessment for verbal and non-verbal communication skills could prevent confrontation, reduce demand for conflict management and bolster legitimacy (HMICFRS, 2020).

<sup>35</sup> The College of Policing has now designed a conflict management training package but many officers rely on CPD and supervisor debriefing to acquire these skills.



**Figure 7.1.** Future skills assessment for policing

Future trends	Skills requirement	Implications for workforce organisation
More crime on the internet	Digital skills	Increased specialisation in complex areas of investigatory and operational support work, alongside wider awareness among the general workforce
Investment in digital tools to keep pace with internet crime	Investigatory skills	More specialist entry points Locating specialisms within centres of expertise. Upgrading technology and ending reliance on legacy systems
Greater need to work within an ethical framework online	Understanding of ethical issues	Needed for all roles, with specialist input
More frequent high impact disruptive events	Communication and interpersonal skills	Needed across all public facing roles Large number of generalist police officers needed to tackle large scale disruption
Policing of social tension and public order more challenging	Communication and interpersonal skills Cultural competency Local knowledge Conflict management	Needed across all public facing roles, particularly neighbourhood, response and public order roles Need for reinvestment in neighbourhood policing and specialist public order capacity
More complex social demands	Communication and interpersonal skills Conflict management Trauma Informed Practice Problem solving Co-production Collaboration across sectors Specialist investigatory skills to tackle complex crime patterns	Needed across all public facing roles, particularly in neighbourhood and response. Need for sufficient numbers of officers with specialist skills to tackle increasingly complex crime
Fiscal constraint/resource pressure	Resource management Change management Commercial awareness Leadership	Attracting people from other sectors with these skills, particularly into non-warranted roles Strengthening learning and development for police leaders
Organised crime groups exploiting opportunities	Digital skills Collaboration skills	Important for serious and organised crime and investigatory roles
Competition from other 'policing' actors	Collaboration skills Appreciation of ethical issues	Strategic and operational leaders need to manage risks and rewards
Increased public scrutiny and accountability	Communication and interpersonal skills, ability to operate in a political environment, reflective practice skills	Needed for all public facing roles. Greater political awareness for everyone. Reflective practice to be underpinned by supporting a culture of continuous professional development (CPD)

## Co-production skills

Public servants increasingly need to share power with citizen experts to achieve results (Needham and Mangan, 2014; Dzur, 2021). New technologies have altered citizens' expectations of the state while deference to professional judgement has declined. Neighbourhood policing especially should be strongly co-productive.

However, the police do not prioritise the skills required to work co-productively.

## Victim care

Officers need interpersonal skills to support victims. The Victims' Commissioner (2020) has found that victims are losing confidence in the police and we noted a recent decline in victim satisfaction in Chapter 3. Although victims are often initially positive, many grow dissatisfied with police because of poor communication, lack of action, rudeness and disrespectful attitudes (Wedlock, 2020). To address this the Victims' Commissioner has called for greater police training in trauma-informed practice and victim support (Victims' Commissioner, 2021).

## Trauma-informed practice

*"Training in trauma exposure management and resilience practices should be incorporated in basic training with options for specialist training for high-risk roles (CE2.08)".*

Police officers are increasingly aware of the impact of trauma, particularly that resulting from Adverse Childhood Experiences, on brain development and behaviour later in life. Knowing more about the possible causes of someone's behaviour can enable better decision making, such as whether a suspect should be charged or receive a diversionary resolution. Since many in the criminal justice system experience trauma, it should be central to initial and ongoing training.<sup>36</sup>

## Mental health awareness

According to the Home Affairs Committee (2018), police forces view mental health training as 'nice-to-have' rather than an essential skill. The committee argues it is 'ludicrous' to have a three-week police driving course but just a few hours of mental health training.

Some forces rely on external input to manage mental health demand. HMICFRS (2018) found 21 forces have

approved mental health professional, psychiatric nurses or Mind representatives working alongside call handlers. Many use street triage teams, whereby a mental health practitioner accompanies police officers on shift. But, given the scale of demand, forces should make such training a core part of police officers' learning and development. For example, North Yorkshire Police has collaborated with York University to train officers in mental health issues. Evaluation shows those trained had greater knowledge and confidence, better equipping them to tackle mental health-related incidents (Scantlebury et al 2017).

## Neurodiversity

Young people in custody are more likely to have neurodevelopmental conditions like autism and ADHD. Police officers should be familiar with these conditions to reduce the likelihood of police encounters resulting in unnecessary stress, anxiety and conflict. There is a need to better identify neuro-diverse conditions and for greater support to be put in place, particularly in custody settings.

### Recommendation

21. The College of Policing should review the National Police Curriculum to increase focus on relational skills covering themes such as conflict management, co-production, cultural competency, victim care, mental health, trauma and neurodiversity awareness. Officers should refresh these relational skills annually alongside officer safety training. They should be made part of a mandatory professional minimum standard regulated by the College of Policing.

## 7.1.2 Investigatory skills

There is a national shortage of detectives. In 2021 there were 6,851 fewer Professionalising Investigation Programme Level 2 (PIP2) accredited investigators in post than was required, up from a shortfall of 4,974 in 2020 (NPCC, 2021).

These shortages have led to unmanageable workloads, long waits for victims and fewer offenders being brought to justice (HMICFRS, 2020; 2018). They also mean that high volume crimes such as burglary, assault and theft have been de-prioritised, that there is inadequate

<sup>36</sup> We will revisit mandatory training and standards in Chapter 12.

supervision of less experienced investigators, and that generalist investigators are often carrying out work without the specialist training required (HMICFRS, 2020).

During visits to police forces undertaken as part of the Review, detectives highlighted a number of reasons for the detective shortage:

- Changes to terms and conditions that have made detective roles less financially attractive. The Winsor pay reforms led to forces introducing a supplement for officers working antisocial hours (affecting uniformed officers) but did not lead to the adoption of pay supplements for those working on complex investigations. A National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) analysis suggests that this means a loss in earnings of £1,200 a year if one were to move from a response role to an investigative role for example (NPCC, 2021).
- High workloads.
- Managing high risk and emotionally challenging investigations.

As well as a general shortage of detectives there are also gaps in specialist areas. For example, 52 per cent of senior child sexual abuse leads surveyed by the Police Foundation told us their specialist investigation teams lacked resources (Skidmore et al, forthcoming).

In another example, despite there being over five million frauds a year, just 0.7 per cent of the police workforce are in specialist economic crime teams. These teams can take on very few cases. A member of a fraud team covering a whole English region told the Police Foundation just two investigations could put his team at capacity (Skidmore et al, 2018). The sheer scale of fraud and the limited specialist resource available means that, in 22 out of 32 police forces surveyed, generalist investigators tackle almost all fraud investigations despite them and their supervisors lacking adequate knowledge (Skidmore et al, 2018).

**\*\*S23\*\***

To address the shortage of detectives the gap in pay between those in uniform roles and detectives needs to be addressed. Given the chronic shortage of detectives

there is a strong case for improving the incentive for officers to go into investigative roles.

While in time some of the officers recruited through Operation Uplift will move into investigatory roles, we cannot wait to solve the shortage through internal training alone. For that reason we believe there is a strong case for all forces to open up direct entry detective programmes, which are currently limited to 15 forces with a further nine planning to introduce such schemes (NPCC, 2021).

Finally, there needs to be shift away from the default assumption that these investigatory gaps need to be filled by warranted officers. There is an urgent need for the College of Policing to strengthen career pathways in areas like financial investigation which do not require a warrant card (see Recommendation 24).

### Recommendations

22. A pay supplement should be introduced to make detective roles a more attractive career choice for police officers.

23. All forces should introduce direct entry detective programmes.

#### 7.1.3 Digital skills

There is widespread recognition of the need to improve digital skills and knowledge across the whole police workforce (NPCC, 2021). Increasingly most crime scenes will have a digital element and even fairly routine investigations may require the gathering of digital evidence, from phones, computers or social media accounts.

However, there are reasons for thinking that digital skills among the generalist police workforce are not sufficiently developed. For example, when we asked child sexual abuse (CSA) leads in police forces if they thought generalist officers were trained to respond to online CSA, only 33 per cent considered them to be trained in online investigation and only 40 per cent in collecting and managing digital evidence. The main barrier was said to be the absence of core digital skills training programmes for officers in non-specialist roles, leading to lengthy investigations, inconsistent practice and missed investigative and safeguarding opportunities.

Similarly, when we spoke to digital forensics specialists they told us of the need for much better training and awareness of digital forensic techniques among the general workforce, so that officers can be much more

intelligent users of specialist services (Muir and Walcott, 2021).

There are also specialist digital skills gaps that need to be addressed.

### Digital forensics

Digital forensics demand is growing: most investigations now involve digital evidence and expanding volumes of potentially relevant data. Yet forces lack enough people and technology to process it. This is partly because forensic budgets have halved over the last decade (House of Lords, 2019).

Experts interviewed by the Police Foundation said they could wait between a few weeks and six months for data to be extracted and examined from devices, or even a year for some specialist services (Muir and Walcott, 2021).

To meet current demand, one practitioner told us, staff numbers would have to increase by a third to a half. The so-called “brain drain” of digital expertise has exacerbated the problem, as digital forensics examiners leave the police for the private sector where salaries are higher.

### Data analysts/scientists

The NPCC Strategic Workforce Assessment (2021) highlights the lack of a more coherent career pathway for data specialists within policing. The lack of reward through the pay system means data specialists are frequently lost to the private sector. This means that the wealth of the data the police hold is not being sufficiently exploited to generate an operational impact.

To address these gaps in mission critical areas the police service needs to make a strategic shift towards embracing a more plural workforce. The service will always need a strong cadre of generalist Police Constables to provide 24/7 response, apprehend suspects, manage public order, respond to civil emergencies, provide a visible presence and so on. However, to meet both these digital gaps (and the specialist investigatory gaps identified above) the service needs to have a much stronger offer for allied police professions, to attract and retain talent from the wider labour market.

To achieve this the College of Policing should develop consistent career pathways and parity of esteem for allied police professionals in areas such as digital forensics, data analysis and data science, and financial investigation. These specialists do not need a warrant card. They do need to know that if they join policing

they can have a long and rewarding career that, taken in the round, compares favourably with the private sector or other parts of the public sector.

Police forces should also develop closer partnerships with the private sector, including ongoing contracts that enable them to bring in private sector expertise in areas like data science or financial crime on a systematic basis.

The emergence of these skills shortages across policing also highlights the lack of strategic workforce planning across the police service. The College of Policing is the body best placed to host a workforce planning function on behalf of policing. This function would undertake horizon scanning to map out future demand, analyse workforce data from forces, highlight current and future gaps and be able to require local forces to address emerging gaps and cooperate with national initiatives (such as direct entry detective schemes for example).

### Recommendations

24. **\*\*S23\*\***,

25. Digital intelligence and investigation training should be incorporated into minimum professional standards regulated by the College of Policing.

26. The College of Policing should strengthen career pathways for allied policing professions in areas such as data analysis/science, digital forensics and financial investigation.

27. A national police workforce planning unit should be established within the College of Policing to project future demand, monitor current and future skill gaps and coordinate a national response. The College should have the power to require local forces to address emerging capability gaps and to cooperate with national recruitment and learning and development initiatives.



## 7.2 TECHNOLOGY

Policing is an information business and yet too often police technology is outdated and cumbersome, causing frustration to the officers and staff who use it, and letting down the public who get a poorer service as a result. Critical parts of the national policing IT infrastructure are decades old, based on obsolescent technology and are on the brink of becoming unserviceable. A lack of basic data sharing between different police organisations contributed to the Soham murders in 2004 and it is not clear that a similar failing could not happen again. While there is plenty of technological innovation in the police service, it is too often isolated with no route to widespread adoption. Too often risk aversion dominates in procurement decisions around IT rather than a desire to innovate and improve. Despite widespread agreement that policing requires more of a service-wide approach to its information systems, there is still no major policing body with the resources and power to drive change. The National Digital Strategy and the Police Digital Service are steps in the right direction, but we need to build on the progress being made and go further.

### 7.2.1 The current state of police information technology

We identify a number of problems with police information technology that require urgent attention from the Home Office and the national policing partners. First, police IT is outdated. As one submission to our Call for Evidence said:

*“Numerous governance and delivery models have been attempted, spending has increased to unprecedented levels and despite this, policing is still reliant on old and legacy solutions to share information and manage significant operations (CE2.20)”.*

Surveys of police IT have labelled hardware and software as “archaic”, “unreliable”, “unfit for purpose”, “not user friendly” and “painfully slow” (CoPaCC, 2019). According to CoPaCC’s 2018 IT survey, in 70 per cent of forces less than half of officers were satisfied with their current IT provision.

In that same survey, officers and staff raised concerns about forces’ IT investment strategies, highlighting inadequate technologies and delayed or failed projects, such as tablets that were already obsolete when given to officers (CoPaCC, 2018). Years of financial austerity mean police IT budgets are mainly spent supporting existing legacy systems, leaving little room for investment in new technology (CoPaCC, 2018).

Second, the major national police databases are in urgent need of renewal and the most heavily used database is at real risk of failure, which could have catastrophic operational consequences. The Police National Computer (PNC) is the main police criminal records database and is used 133 million times a year by officers and staff all over the country. The PNC is however 48 years old and, according to the National Audit Office (NAO), “*while generally reliable, the PNC is based on obsolescent technology that makes it expensive to operate and difficult to update, with a shortage of staff with the necessary skills*” (NAO, 2021). The Home Office has told the NAO that it is willing to accept the risk of running the PNC after its technology becomes unsupportable while it tries to put in place a replacement.

The Police National Database (PND) was introduced in 2011 after the Bichard Report into the Soham murders. The aim of the PND was to ensure that police intelligence data can be shared across the 43 police forces and other relevant bodies. However, the PND is also now considered technologically outdated and in need of replacement (NAO, 2021). It has long been criticised for being difficult to use, which has limited its impact and raises questions as to whether an intelligence sharing failure as serious as that in Soham could happen again.

The Home Office runs the two databases on behalf of policing, but its performance in seeking a replacement for both through the National Law Enforcement Data Service (NLEDS) programme has been severely criticised by the NAO, which reports a 68 per cent overspend, poor programme management and substantial delays (NAO, 2021).

Third, there remains a major challenge of a lack of inter-operability between police IT systems. Each operationally independent police force procures its own IT systems, which mean they cannot easily speak to systems in other forces. This makes sharing data difficult and in complex business an inability to share basic data is hugely problematic. The lack of integration between systems even within forces causes frustration for officers, who have to waste time memorising many passwords and manually double keying information (CoPaCC, 2019; HMICFRS, 2020a).

*“Police technology, systems and infrastructure is a patchwork quilt across the country. There are many excellent examples of successful IT programmes, but many more examples of unsuccessful ones[...] technological systems need integrating across the whole system if we are to bring about improved effectiveness and efficiency (CE2.06)”.*

Fourth, while there is innovation in police IT, it is often small in scale and there are limited pathways to more widespread adoption. The approach of ‘letting a thousand flowers bloom’ can generate innovation. For example, Avon and Somerset Constabulary has created a Data Science and Innovation Centre, using a cloud-based analytic platform to collaborate with key partners. West Midlands Police operates a data-driven insights programme and has created a new core data hub for better service delivery. South Yorkshire Police worked with Sheffield Hallam University to develop an artificial intelligence-based algorithm which helps identify at risk children (Flood, 2021).

However, there is no real pathway for successful local innovation to spread to the rest of the system or to be adopted at scale. In this course of the Review we were told that there is a cultural resistance in local force IT departments to try new ideas, because their primary concern was to avoid the risk of anything disrupting their major day to day systems. The risk of failure is concentrated in the hands of a small number of named people, while the benefits that would flow from testing new ideas and technologies is diffuse and has few powerful allies in the system. This is not a challenge that is unique to policing, but it is an important barrier to progress.

### 7.2.2 Solutions

In the last two years the police service has experienced a workforce uplift, but it now requires a technology uplift. We identify three ways of achieving this.

First, police IT requires substantial investment over the next decade. The politics of policing means that there is an inevitable focus on officer numbers, often at the expense of the more hidden but equally important assets policing requires. The government should increase investment in police IT over the course of the next two spending reviews.

Second, we need to address the problem of inter-operability. There is currently no organisation within policing that can require police forces to abide by common IT standards, including for example data entry codes and data access protocols. Without this there remain substantial barriers to data sharing across policing, which makes it harder to identify risk, prevent harm, solve crimes and protect victims.

In Chapter 10 we go on to set out the case for the College of Policing becoming a single home for police national improvement functions. As part of this expanded role the College should be given the power to set common IT standards across the service.

It is important to note that inter-operability does not require shifting the whole of policing onto a single IT

platform. Rather than ‘knit’ legacy systems together, policing should pursue data sharing and interoperability through the use of cloud-based technologies, which enable “secure transmission of data between connected applications and technologies” (Police Digital Service, 2020).

Finally, the Home Office must prioritise the replacement of the Police National Computer. The NAO notes that the NLEDS programme has received less priority in terms of investment than other Home Office IT programmes such as Airwave. We cannot stress how important it is that this system is modernised. The consequences of a major failure would be catastrophic for operational policing. We endorse the recommendations made by the NAO in its August 2021 report. The Home Office should also put in place plans to modernise the Police National Database, with a focus on producing a system that is more useable by police officers and staff.

We also believe that ultimately the major national databases should be housed within policing rather than in the Home Office. The police are the users of the systems and they are best placed to design systems that meet their needs. A key priority for the next phase of the development of these databases is to ensure that they are more useable to the end-user and we think that is most likely to be ensured if the systems are housed within a police institution. As the single home for police improvement functions these databases should therefore be transferred to the College of Policing.

### Recommendations

28. The government should increase investment to enable a significant upgrade of police IT over the course of the next two spending reviews.
29. English and Welsh policing needs a common set of information and communications technology (ICT) standards to be applied across the country. These should be developed nationally and then mandated for adoption by the College of Policing, which would be given powers to direct Chief Constables in relation to IT.
30. The Home Office must prioritise the modernisation of the Police National Computer and the Police National Database. The major national police databases should be housed within the College of Policing.

# 8. LEARNING AND DEVELOPMENT

**Summary:** Policing needs a learning culture, so that police officers have better opportunities to develop professionally, so that professional standards are raised and so that the police can use the best evidence to achieve better outcomes for the public. Continuous professional development is not sufficiently prioritised within policing. The quality of the learning offered to police officers and staff needs to be significantly improved and it needs to be planned around their professional development needs rather than simply the organisational needs of police forces. Police officers should have a dedicated minimum number of learning hours per year. There should be a licence to practice for all police officers who will need to demonstrate they have kept up to date and progressed with their professional development. Funding for learning and development should be channelled to forces via the College of Policing, contingent on high quality provision being delivered.

Over the last decade policing in England and Wales has explicitly sought to emulate medicine, law and engineering by seeking to become a learning profession. This is intended to raise professional standards, to promote practice that is based on evidence rather than intuition or habit and to enable policing to improve itself through continual learning, rather than being subject to regular external interventions from the government.

In this chapter we examine the quality of police learning and development. We do this, first, by assessing the recent reforms to initial police training, second, by examining the state of continuous professional development in policing and, third, by looking at progress in embedding evidence-based practice.

## 8.1 INITIAL POLICE TRAINING

Developed by the College of Policing from 2016, the Police Education Qualification Framework (PEQF) seeks to provide “a modern curriculum of dynamic operational training, underpinned by sound theoretical knowledge” (College of Policing, 2020). It has initially focused on professional training for new Constables, recognising the need for consistency across police forces and for accredited, role-specific skills and knowledge.

The PEQF has introduced three new training pathways, which culminate in full operational competency alongside an academic qualification at degree-level. They are:

- **Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship (PCDA):** A minimum three-year paid apprenticeship, spent serving as a Constable within a police force, while undertaking at least 20 per cent ‘off the job’ learning.

- **Degree-holder entry programme:** Recruits can study, ‘on the job’, for a graduate diploma in professional policing, and can specialise in neighbourhood policing or investigation.
- **Degree in professional policing:** A self-funded degree course taken prior to joining the police which does not guarantee a job in policing.

There is in addition the Police Now scheme which provides a programme tailored to graduates wanting to join the police (see Box 8.1).

With the PEQF, the College of Policing (2016) seeks to improve the ‘standing and status’ of the police while equipping them with the knowledge they require to exercise their discretion effectively (College of Policing, 2020).

It is too soon to come to conclusions as to the impact of the new entry routes and we do not have the space in this report to undertake such an evaluation. However, we support the principle that police officers should have access to higher learning. Applicants should not need a degree to join the police, as this would exclude many excellent candidates. However, police professionals will benefit from higher learning, whether undertaken before they join or undertaken ‘on the job’ because:

- It will accredit their existing skills and provide them with a formal qualification, recognition and status. Police officers are operating at this higher level of learning but until these reforms this was not recognised or accredited.
- It will help to impart the kind of problem solving and cognitive skills that are becoming more important for police officers using their discretion in a more complex operating environment.



### Box 8.1 Police Now

Police Now is a not-for-profit initiative aiming to recruit, develop and inspire police officers. It recruited and trained over 1,500 officers in England and Wales since 2015 through its National Graduate Leadership Programme (NGLP) and the National Detective Programme (NDP). Participants on the NGLP spend two years in neighbourhood policing before being absorbed into the general workforce.

Police Now has performed particularly successfully in terms of recruiting a more diverse workforce:

- 55 per cent of Police Now graduates in 2020 were the first in their family to go to university, 19 per cent said their families had received income support and 16 per cent were eligible for free school meals.
- Women make up 54 per cent of NGLP recruits and 66 per cent of NDP offer holders starting in 2020/21 (compared to 37 per cent nationally).
- Of those starting in 2020/21, 17 per cent of NGLP and 26 per cent NDP recruits were BME, compared to 10 per cent of joiners nationally in 2019/20.

The significant increase in Police Now applications since 2015 is a clear indication that policing can attract diverse and motivated graduates. They suggest that part of this success has been a result of stressing the public service and social impact elements of police work, as opposed to reactive crime fighting, and focusing on leadership opportunities from an early stage.

Another factor is Police Now targeting marketing campaigns and using diverse role models to share their experiences with the media and with university courses with high BME audiences.

Clearly the success of the new entry routes should be assessed over time. In the course of our Review, however, we heard much greater concern about the state of police learning and development after initial training, and it is to this that we now turn.

## 8.2 CONTINUOUS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Police officers and staff need to continually develop and refresh their skills and knowledge to serve the public effectively (College of Policing 2020a; Huey et al, 2019). Indeed, many of the skills officers need, such as emergency life support or self-defence, are perishable and so must be regularly used and refreshed (Honess, 2020).

However, the recent Home Office Front Line Review concluded “police officers lack the time, opportunity and support to properly develop their skills and knowledge” (Betts and Farmer, 2019).

### 8.2.1 The approach to continuous professional development within the police service

There has tended to be a culture within policing of seeing continuous professional development (CPD) as an “abstraction from policing duties” (Honess, 2018). As the College of Policing said in response to our Call for Evidence:

*“There needs to be a wider cultural shift with the support of senior leaders in the service, to see learning and development, not as an inconvenient abstraction, but as an essential investment in the workforce which can help in tackling current and future challenges and provide greater benefit to the public” (CE2.28).*

A recent study found that learning practices in police training Martin et al, 2019b are “transactional” and “reactive” directed towards solving immediate problems, such as new legislation and changes in authorised professional practice, rather than changing what officers do or helping them raise their skill set (Martin et al, 2019b). According to a submission to our Call for Evidence, learning is “delivered for a given period” and once a particular crisis has died down, “is not repeated” (CE2.02).

Cordner adds that police CPD is focused mainly on teaching officers to handle their work “incident by incident”, without much reference to either criminological theory or evidence-based practices such as problem oriented policing (Cordner, 2021).

### 8.2.2 Resources

Police CPD is under-resourced. Between 2011/12 and 2017/18, 33 forces reduced their budgeted spending on training in real terms by a greater percentage than their overall reduction in spending. Despite recent funding boosts, increased demand means that gap is predicted to remain (Martin et al, 2019a; Martin et al, 2019b).

### 8.2.3. What officers think

The 2020 Police Federation Pay and Morale survey indicates that more officers are dissatisfied than satisfied with the training they receive:

- More than a third of respondents were dissatisfied with the training they have received.
- 41 per cent of respondents said that they had not been supported to learn new skills.
- 40 per cent of officers said they had not received necessary training to do their job well (Chandler, 2020).

Officers interviewed as part of the Home Office initiated Front Line Review expressed concern that police learning leans too heavily on traditional training courses rather than encouraging independent learning. Some specialist courses were seen as essential to career development but accessing them depended on having a line manager's support (Betts and Farmer, 2019).

For many, training consists of sitting in a room being "talked at" and is seen as neither interesting nor relevant (Honess, 2018; Martin et al, 2019b). Until recently online training was carried out through the Managed Learning Environment (MLE) run by The National Centre for Applied Learning Technologies (NCALT).<sup>37</sup> E-learning packages are aimed at filling specific knowledge gaps or quickly sharing new legislation with many people. These are often designed so that users can "click as quick as possible". Therefore, learners need discipline to engage deeply and retain information (Martin et al, 2019b; Honess, 2018; HMICFRS, 2014; Honess, 2020).

### 8.2.4 The PDR process

The PDR process (performance and development review) is intended to review professional development, identify areas of improvement and determine strategies to enhance skills and learning (College of Policing, 2020b; HMICFRS, 2017).

However, in many forces the PDR process is seen as a "bureaucratic exercise" and is not used effectively (Betts and Farmer, 2019; Martin et al, 2019b). Both HMICFRS and the Police Federation found "considerable gaps" in compliance across forces even though Police Regulations (2003) require a PDR for all officers (HMICFRS, 2017; PFEW, 2021). Some supervisors did not review PDR submissions, with officers reporting either submitting blank PDRs or copying and pasting

the same entries for multiple years without anyone noticing (Betts and Farmer, 2019).

In some forces officers and supervisors are on different shifts and in different stations, making it difficult for them to meet to complete them (HMICFRS, 2017). Officers see the PDR process as inflexible and only beneficial to those seeking promotion, training or lateral moves (Betts and Farmer, 2019). As with accessing training opportunities, the PDR process is contingent on the attitude of supervisors. Some reportedly carry out PDRs by shouting across the office. Others lack time so PDRs are "rushed" and therefore lack value (Betts and Farmer, 2019).

### 8.2.5 Strengthening continuous professional development

To strengthen the culture of CPD in policing we need high quality learning opportunities to be provided and for policing professionals to be actively and continually engaged in their learning. Instead of being seen as an abstraction, learning needs to be woven into the flow of work. Supervisors will have to take on more responsibility to develop and mentor their teams to supplement formal learning programmes (CE2.27).

We believe that the best way to achieve this is for the College of Policing to create an expectation that all police officers must continually develop their learning throughout their careers. We identify three mechanisms for achieving this.

First, there must be a considerable improvement in the quality of the learning provided by police forces. Training has tended to be seen as a convenient budget to cut during financially difficult times. To address this the government should earmark a learning and development fund from within the overall police budget and provide this budget to the College of Policing. The College should use this fund both to develop its own suite of national training packages but also to commission training in individual police forces so that it meets required standards.

Second, there should be a minimum set of hours per year reserved for each officer's learning and development, as exists for the medical professions. This will be a national minimum standard that the College of Policing will require police forces to fulfil.

Third, the government should legislate to introduce a licence to practice for all police officers, provided through the College of Policing. To retain their licence

<sup>37</sup> We note the College of Policing has now introduced a new platform called College Learn but it is too soon to come to any conclusions as to its success.

to practice every police officer will have to undergo revalidation every five years.

Renewing their licence would involve officers demonstrating improved learning and professional development through achieving relevant qualifications, passing an interview or presenting a portfolio of activities and achievements. Any police officer who fails this assessment would receive further support and mentoring. After successive failures they would be removed from the register.

The licence to practice is intended to raise professional standards, encourage career long learning and promote a culture in which professionals engage in and take responsibility for their professional development.

### Recommendations

31. The Home Office should establish a Learning and Development Fund that would be used by the College of Policing to fund police learning and development. In order to receive funding police forces would have to demonstrate that their training programmes meet standards set by the College.
32. There should be a minimum set of hours per year reserved for each officer's learning and development. This will be a national minimum standard that the College of Policing will require police forces to fulfil.
33. The Home Office should introduce a Licence to Practice for police officers, administered by the College of Policing. The Licence to Practice ought to be renewed every five years, subject to an officer demonstrating professional development through achieving relevant qualifications, passing an interview or presenting a portfolio of activities and achievements. Any police officer who fails this assessment could receive further support including mentoring. After successive failures they would have their licence removed and would no longer be able to practice as a police officer.

## 8.3 EMBEDDING EVIDENCE AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED PRACTICE

Policing should make good use of research evidence, scientific methods, and systematically acquired knowledge to improve the effectiveness of its activities.

Writing in 1998, Lawrence Sherman made the seminal case for Evidence-Based Policing that would drive improvement by using "*the best available research evidence on the outcomes of police work to implement guidelines and evaluate agencies, units and officers*" (Sherman, 1998, p.3). Drawing on a medical paradigm, he argued that a set of mechanisms needed to be put in place to ensure that the learning gained through rigorous academic research and evaluation was fed back into practice.

Fifteen years later Sherman (2013) described a "three Ts" approach to evidence-based policing and assessed progress in its implementation. He argued that more police agencies were now *targeting* resources toward predictable concentrations of harm (through 'hot spots' initiatives for example). However, he argued there had been less progress in embedding into police practice the evidence that has emerged from *testing* (through techniques such as randomised control trials) nor in *tracking* implementation of evidence-based practice.<sup>38</sup>

In order to better embed evidence-based policing Sherman argued for a greater focus on evidence-based principles within police education, promotion processes and professional development, as well as for the College of Policing to play a world-leading role in producing evidence-informed practice guidelines. We return to these ideas below.

It is important to note that the evidence-based policing paradigm has been challenged, and that alternative accounts of the appropriate relationship between police practice and scientific enquiry should also be considered. As Malcolm Sparrow (2016) points out, it is important to acknowledge that experimental trials and evaluations represent only one branch of rigorous scientific enquiry. Sparrow argues that other methods have much to offer policing. These include the systematic observation and hypothesis testing characteristic of the natural sciences, for instance.

Whereas evidence-based policing seeks to establish generalised knowledge about '*what works*' and make

<sup>38</sup> A verdict largely unchanged when Sherman gave 'two cheers' for evidence-based policing in his 2018 Police Foundation conference address see: <https://www.police-foundation.org.uk/past-event/2018-annual-conference-innovation-and-learning-in-policing/>

it available so that it can inform police decision making in specific instances, the Problem-Oriented model championed by Sparrow uses empirical research to build knowledge about *'what's going on'*, as the basis for bespoke interventions.

Both paradigms have much to offer and both can, and should, co-exist within a strategy for producing reliable and useful knowledge that can improve police effectiveness.

So, what more can be done to embed an evidence and knowledge-based culture in policing? The College of Policing has made progress in trying to incorporate evidence-based policing in initial police training and it should continue to embed it through learning and development programmes at every level. We highlight below a number of additional reforms that would seek to embed evidence and knowledge-based practice.

### Better use of mobile technology

The College of Policing should invest in making information on evidence and knowledge-based practice available to frontline officers, in a format that is easy to digest while on the job. It should be looking to develop apps that can put information directly into the hands of police officers, without requiring them to study complex guidance on the College website. We understand that the College is looking to develop its offer in this direction and we strongly encourage it to do so.

### Evidence-based policing units

More police forces could establish evidence-based policing units which would be responsible for undertaking research, conducting experimental trials and more generally promoting an evidence and knowledge-based culture throughout the organisation. In order for evidence and knowledge-based practice to become part of mainstream policing it requires strong institutional champions, headed by a senior officer.

### Evidence-based practice guidelines

The College of Policing has instigated a process for producing evidence-based operational guidelines.<sup>39</sup> So far four sets of guidelines are already in existence and others are in development. Using a process model borrowed from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE),<sup>40</sup> the College's guidelines are developed by committees of specialist practitioners, academics, and subject matter experts, drawing on compilations of 'best available evidence'.

The resulting products have become important resources for policing and there is therefore a strong case for developing evidence-based practice guidelines across other areas of police work. There remains, however, some ambiguity about the status of these guidelines, and associated questions about how their implementation into practice should be monitored and incentivised.

College of Policing guidelines form part of Approved Professional Practice (APP) and it is expected, therefore, that police practitioners (including Chief Constables and others responsible for the design, not just delivery, of services and policies) should *'have regard'* to them when discharging their duties.<sup>41</sup> We believe that this expectation needs to be strengthened if evidence-based practice is to gain the necessary strategic traction in policing; if guidelines are viewed by police forces and personnel as little more than 'advisory' resources for optional reference, implementation is unlikely to receive sufficient impetus.

As we argue in Chapter 11 there is a strong case for the College of Policing defining a set of national minimum standards in relations to those parts of APP that are high risk, where the public expects consistency across the country and where the evidence base is strong. Compliance with these minimum standards and with College guidance more generally also needs to be given much more explicit emphasis within HMICFRS's inspection regime. For example, each police force could receive a grading for how well it adheres to (and can appropriately account for departures from) College of Policing guidelines.

<sup>39</sup> See: <https://www.college.police.uk/guidance>

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/nice-guidance/nice-guidelines/how-we-develop-nice-guidelines>

<sup>41</sup> <https://www.app.college.police.uk/about-app/>

## Recommendations

34. The police service should further promote evidence-based practice:
- The College of Policing should make better use of mobile technology to make targeted evidence-based practice guidance available to frontline operational personnel.
  - More police forces should establish Evidence Based Policing Units to carry out research, spread knowledge and promote an evidence and knowledge based culture.
  - The College of Policing should expand and accelerate its programme for generating evidence-based practice guidelines.
  - The College of Policing should set mandatory national minimum standards in guideline areas that are high risk, where the public expect consistency and where the evidence base is strong.
  - Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) should introduce a grading for guideline compliance into the HMICFRS PEEL police force inspection regime.

## 8.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have called for the promotion of a learning culture in policing to raise professional standards, to spread evidence-based practice and to allow the police profession to continually self-improve. We have called for a much stronger emphasis on continuous professional development, with an investment in learning and development that should be shaped around the development needs of police officers and staff rather than simply meeting the short-term needs of police forces. The quality of the learning offered must significantly improve. Police officers should be given guaranteed learning hours every year. There should also be a licence to practice for police officers to raise standards and promote engagement with professional development. Evidence-based policing should be embedded much more systematically into the everyday practice. More forces should establish Evidence Based Policing Units and the College of Policing should use mobile technology to get the best evidence into the hands of frontline officers. There should be a core set of national minimum standards in terms of professional practice, mandated by the College, in areas that are high risk, where the public expect consistency and where the evidence base is strong.



# 9. WELLBEING

**Summary:** Workforce wellbeing is a core strategic capability for policing: a stressed, anxious and traumatised workforce is not one that can deliver a good service to the public. There have been significant increases in levels of sickness absence among police officers related to mental health problems. Morale in the police service is much lower than in comparable sectors, such as the armed forces for example. Poor wellbeing is driven by exposure to trauma, difficult working conditions, hierarchical decision-making and poor management and supervision. Police officers and staff should have access to ongoing clinical support at work, including an annual physical and mental health check. They should also be provided with the necessary time and space to process traumatic incidents.

Having a healthy and motivated workforce should be seen as a strategic capability for policing. Workforce wellbeing is a good thing in and of itself, of course, benefiting individual officers and staff, but it also leads to wider organisational benefits (Robertson and Cooper, 2011). Employees with high levels of wellbeing show increased discretionary effort and take less sick leave (Hesketh, Cooper and Ivy, 2016). Organisations that fail to support their employees' wellbeing can face serious financial consequences (Vitality, 2019).

There is unquestionably a challenge here within policing. Police officers report poorer wellbeing than the general population (Hesketh and Tehrani, 2020). They have greater risk of contracting heart disease, diabetes, cancer and of dying early (Violanti et al, 2013). Anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), chronic fatigue and chronic severe stress can exacerbate these physical conditions (McEwen, 1998).

In this chapter we assess the state of police workforce wellbeing, examine possible reasons why it is so poor and set out recommendations to address the problem.


## 9.1 UNDERSTANDING POLICE WORKFORCE WELLBEING

### 9.1.1 Sickness absence


Home Office data reveals there were 1,965 officers on long-term sick leave in the year ending March 2021 (see Figure 9.1). Long-term sickness includes any recognised medical condition, physical or psychological, which has lasted longer than 28 days. Sickness rates are consistently higher among women than men (Home Office, 2021).

Historically officers took long-term sickness for physical issues like musculoskeletal injuries. However, over the past decade increasing numbers are absent because of psychological illnesses. Figures obtained by the BBC reveal that between 2010/11 and 2015/16 the number of officers on long-term sick leave for physical and mental health reasons increased by 14 per cent from 19,825 in 2010 to 2011 to 22,547 in 2014 to 2015 and the number of those off sick for psychological illness alone increased by 35 per cent (BBC, 2016).

**Figure 9.1.** Levels of long-term sickness in the police (Home Office, 2021)



**Figure 9.2** Presenteeism in the police (Source Houdmot and Elliott-Davies, 2016; Elliott-Davies 2021)



### 9.1.2 Presenteeism and leaveism

As with sickness levels, presenteeism and leaveism (taking annual leave instead of sickness absence and working in one's own time) are also indicators of workforce wellbeing (Hesketh and Cooper, 2014). Both can lead to burnout and sickness as employees exhaust themselves physically and mentally by continually working near maximum capacity (Hampson and Jacob, 2020; Hansen, 2009).

Presenteeism is common when employees are stressed, have low control over their work and low support from colleagues and supervisors (Leineweber, 2011; Gerich, 2015). Police officers may practice it out of professional pride, unwillingness to burden colleagues and fear of being negatively perceived for taking sick leave (Police Care, 2019).

The Police Federation's Demand, Capacity and Welfare Survey first revealed in 2016 the scale of presenteeism in the police service (see Fig 9.2). In the past four years

the number of officers reporting presenteeism has reduced but still stands at 66 per cent for both mental and physical causes (Houdmont and Elliott-Davies, 2016; Elliott-Davies, 2021).


Leaveism is motivated by fear of having personnel records blighted by periods of sickness or seeming overwhelmed with workloads (Hesketh and Cooper, 2014). Although not as prevalent as presenteeism, leaveism is still common, with around 40 per cent of officers admitting to practising it (Elliott-Davies, 2018).

### 9.1.3 Morale

Morale, defined as "the fitness of the mind for the task at hand" (Gocke, 1945) is "a thermometer" for the health of a workforce and is linked to coping with "day-to-day demands, the ups and downs of the job" (Johnson, 2019).

The Police Federation's annual Pay and Morale Survey shows far more officers report low morale than high

**Figure 9.3** Percentage of police officers reporting low morale in England and Wales (Source, Police Federation Pay and Morale Survey 2014 to 2020)



2014                      2015                      2016                      2017                      2018                      2019                      2020

— Low personal morale    — Low force morale    — Low police service morale



morale. 85 per cent of police officers think police service morale is low, 75 per cent think force morale is low and 48 per cent have low personal morale (Chandler, 2020).

Morale is much lower in the police than the army, another hierarchical uniformed service with a strong public service ethos. In the latest armed forces continuous attitude survey, 53 per cent rated the service's morale as low, 42 per cent rated their unit's morale as low and 29 per cent rated their own as low (Ministry of Defence, 2020).

## 9.2 THE CAUSES OF POOR WELLBEING IN THE POLICE WORKFORCE

There are number of causes of low levels of wellbeing within the police workforce and here we discuss these in turn.

### 9.2.1 Exposure to trauma

The evidence base suggests:

- The majority of police officers experience traumatic events in their careers (Miller, 2019).
- Police officers are at greater risk of mental health conditions like post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than the rest of the population (Violanti & Gehrke, 2004). 64 per cent of officers and 55 per cent of staff had experienced post-traumatic stress symptoms including re-experiencing trauma and avoidance of thoughts or acts related to traumatic event(s) (Graham, 2021; Breslau, 1998). Few are formally diagnosed (Miller, 2019).
- Repeated exposure can trigger “chronic, cumulative and complex trauma” called complex PTSD (CPTSD) (Andersen, 2015). This is associated with feelings of worthlessness and difficulties with relationships and emotions (Maercker, 2021).
- Trauma negatively affects officers' ability to work. Traumatized emergency service workers estimated their capability to perform was reduced by 37 per cent (Tehrani, 2020).
- Being longer in service, of low rank and suffering humiliation or sexual harassment are linked to developing symptoms (Brewin et al, 2020).

### 9.2.2 Working conditions

Many officers who have escaped developing PTSD or other serious conditions, nevertheless report anxiety, depression, poor sleep and other ailments linked to poor wellbeing (Miller, 2019).

The annual National Wellbeing Survey asks officers and staff about various indicators of mental and physical health and job satisfaction (Graham, 2021). Results show police officers and staff report moderately high levels of mental and general fatigue, anxiety and depression. They also report poor sleep and relatively low emotional energy. Officers work hard and feel valued by their co-workers, but not necessarily by the public or their force. The survey found measures of wellbeing worsen with length of service, until officers reach 20 years when it improves (Graham, 2019).

The drivers of low emotional energy and high anxiety within policing include:

- Shift work, though necessary for a 24-hour service, leads to below average levels of emotional energy, poor sleep, and a higher intention to quit. Other research suggests effects are worsened by irregular working patterns, regular overtime and insufficient rest days (Peterson, 2019).
- Poor sleep can lead to fatigue, reduced emotional energy, lower physical wellbeing and poorer job and life satisfaction (Graham, 2021).
- Cancelled rest days, extended shifts and overtime can make officers feel depressed, less valued by their force and more likely to quit (Graham, 2021; Elliott-Davies, 2021).
- The main reasons given for cancelled rest days and overtime was too few people on shift and unrealistic expectations (Elliott-Davies, 2021).

### 9.2.3 Hierarchy

Officers of chief inspector rank and over report higher job satisfaction, more emotional energy and fewer symptoms of anxiety, depression and PTSD (Graham, 2021). They also report better physical wellbeing, even though they may put in more discretionary effort (Hesketh, Cooper and Ivy, 2016).

These findings demonstrate a link between authority, autonomy and wellbeing. Those at the top can act and make choices that reflect their values and thus have better wellbeing (Graham, 2021). Those in more reactive roles, such as response, local investigations and safeguarding, where officers have little control over daily activities and are more likely to be exposed to trauma, report the lowest wellbeing (Graham, 2021; College of Policing, 2019; Bri ne, 2019; Brewin, 2000).

### 9.2.4 Leadership

Good leadership at all levels is crucial in promoting wellbeing. Having “uncaring and unkind” supervisors, who overwork employees can reduce their motivation, increase stress and worsen health (Van Der Velden et al 2013; Hayday et al, 2007; Bernstrøm, 2012).

Officers with supervisors trained in showing empathy and promoting resilience are more likely to bounce back after a traumatic incident (Hesketh, 2015; Jury, 2018). However, only 22 per cent of line managers report being trained on supporting individuals to improve wellbeing (Elliott-Davies, 2021).

There is a widely evidenced link between leadership styles, change management models and workforce wellbeing. Organisational change has a negative impact on employee wellbeing if it is imposed from the top down and does not involve the workforce in decision-making (Lewis et al, 2019). Often hierarchies hinder organisations from effectively communicating future aspirations and reasons for change to lower ranks, leaving them feeling they are victims of “change for change’s sake” (Brîône, 2019; Graham, 2019; Hesketh and Cooper, 2016; Police Care, 2019).

### 9.2.5 Occupational culture

Deschênes et al (2018) report that police culture has more influence in determining an officer’s mental wellbeing than their actual work. Police culture is often characterised as “antithetical to promoting wellbeing and resilience” as officers crave “excitement”, celebrate “masculine exploits” and are cynical and pessimistic (Loftus, 2010; Hesketh, 2015). Police culture also discourages help-seeking (Edwards and Kotera, 2020; Johnson, 2016). A 2020 qualitative study of mental health amongst police officers suggested the culture is still one of “masculinity, self-reliance and emotional control” which discourages help-seeking (Edwards and Kotera, 2020; Johnson, 2016). Many with mental health issues fear being labelled as “time wasters”, so seek help outside policing (Edwards and Kotera, 2020; Miller, 2019).

### 9.2.6 Covid-19

Over the last two years the police service has had to deliver “business as usual” while ensuring the public obey the coronavirus restrictions. Consequently, police officers report working harder, doing longer shifts and not taking annual leave (Aitkenhead et al, 2022; Elliott-Davies, 2021). Of officers who tested positive for Covid-19, nearly half say they were exposed to the virus at work, whereas 18 per cent said exposure came from other sources (Elliott-Davies, 2021).

Around a third of officers reported a member of the public, believed to be carrying Covid-19, had purposely threatened to breathe or cough on them over the past six months, while almost a quarter reported experiencing actual attempts at doing so (Elliott-Davies, 2021). More than half of officers reported being physically attacked in the past year, which resulted in 16 per cent requiring medical attention (Elliott-Davies, 2021).

## 9.3. IMPROVING WORKFORCE WELLBEING

### 9.3.1 Existing policies

Traditionally forces addressed high sickness/absence rates by setting targets and imposing disciplinary measures rather than addressing the root causes (Bourn, 1997). This still lingers in recent attendance management policies, in which unreliable attendance bars officers from promotion, overtime, and other opportunities (West Yorkshire Police, 2021; Metropolitan Police, 2014; Durham Police, 2014).

These policies are aimed at those who “play the system”, yet also penalise officers who are genuinely unwell and can encourage both presenteeism and leaveism (Hales, 2018).

Conversely, many forces seek to reduce sickness through having clear and consistent policies and procedures that help create a “positive working environment” (Lincolnshire Police, 2021).

Creating that positive working environment is the aim of the National Police Wellbeing Service, hosted by the College of Policing. The initiative was launched in 2017 to provide access to evidence-based research, share learning and encourage conversations so that “every member of the police service [is] confident that their wellbeing is taken seriously and that they are properly supported by their organisation” (Oscar Kilo, 2021).

The Blue Light Wellbeing Framework was launched in 2017 to provide a standard for emergency services employers and help them understand and invest in prevention, early detection and rehabilitation (Oscar Kilo, 2021). The framework is relatively new so there are inconsistencies and gaps in its application across forces (Coleman, 2018).

Humberside Police has been particularly successful in the area of wellbeing. It aims to create an organisational culture which prioritises “increased self-awareness, prevention, early intervention and appropriate reactive

support” through initiatives including psychological screening, wellbeing training for managers, promoting reflective practice and a therapy dog (Oscar Kilo, 2021). These strategies have been credited with reducing the force’s sickness absence rates. Humberside Police topped the Federation’s 2019 Pay and Morale survey, with 35 per cent of officers complaining of low morale compared to 84.5 per cent five years previously (Young, 2019). Despite the pandemic, morale in 2020 was higher than the national average (Chandler, 2020).

### 9.3.2 What more should be done

Given the scale of health problems and low morale in the police service, we believe that further steps are necessary to better support police officers and staff. This is not just in the interests of police professionals, but it is also in the public interest. There is little point in recruiting tens of thousands of new officers if very quickly they burn out and become undeployable. This is also an important argument against the claim that providing officers and staff with more time for debriefing or training means these officers are abstracted and unavailable for duty. The service needs the people it has on duty to be fit, well and happy at work.

First, given the high levels of trauma within the workforce, all police officers and staff should have access to on-going clinical support tailored to their specific needs. This will not just reduce long-term sickness but will reduce the incidence of presenteeism. Accurate data should be collected on incidence and more must be done to identify those at risk of trauma, not just those in specialist roles.

Second, police officers need more dedicated time to process traumatic experiences. This may be partially addressed by the introduction of protected learning time, but it should also be supported by regular debriefing. The role of frontline supervisors in supporting this is critical.

Finally, it is worth reflecting on the drivers of poor morale. Many of these are linked to outdated technology, poor management practices and a sense that the police are struggling against the odds, with a fraught relationship with society. The best way to improve morale would be to deal with these underlying issues, to ensure that policing has the capabilities to

do what is being asked of it and is organised effectively to do so. In that sense the whole of this report can be seen as an answer to the challenge of improving the wellbeing of the police workforce.

### Recommendations

35. All police officers and staff should be provided with ongoing clinical support throughout their careers. In practical terms this means an annual (physical and mental) health check and appropriate ongoing occupational health support.
36. The College of Policing should develop national standards to address unresolved trauma. This should include the use of regular debriefing sessions. Training in mental resilience should become a core part of both initial police training and continuing professional development. In addition, frontline supervisors should be trained to recognise signs of trauma and support those who are struggling.

## 9.4. CONCLUSION

A healthy, happy and motivated workforce is a strategic capability for policing. Our police officers and staff deserve nothing less. A stressed, anxious and traumatised workforce is not just bad for those individuals, but also means the police service is operating at only a portion of its full strength. Having large numbers of officers who cannot be deployed or who are deployed while seriously unwell is not in the interests of policing or the wider community. There is a real and long-standing problem with the levels of sickness and poor morale within policing. The National Police Wellbeing Service is a step in the right direction, but we must go further. Police officers and staff should be provided with ongoing clinical support, including an annual physical and mental health check. The levels of PTSD in the police workforce are shocking and police officers should also be given the space and support to process exposure to trauma. Facilitating all of this will require effective leadership, and it is to this final capability that we now turn.

# 10. LEADERSHIP

**Summary:** Effective leadership is a critical condition for enabling policing to meet the public safety demands of the future. This chapter describes three problems in relation to modern police leadership: a weak leadership development infrastructure, challenges with the selection of police leaders and evidence of poor wellbeing among senior leaders. To address these problems a new Police Leadership Centre should be established within the College of Policing, with an early focus on improving the professional development of frontline supervisors.

Effective leadership at all levels is a critical condition for enabling policing to meet the public safety demands of the future. There are very many excellent leaders at all levels of the police service, but everyone in a leadership role, whatever their rank, deserves the support and development to be the best they can be.

In this chapter we discuss the nature of police leadership and describe its evolution in recent years. Then we identify three challenges with contemporary police leadership: a lack of development opportunities, problems with the selection and promotion process and finally a lack of support for the wellbeing of senior police leaders. We conclude by making a set of recommendations to strengthen police leadership at all levels.

## 10.1 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF POLICE LEADERSHIP

The traditional mode of police leadership was always one of command. Many of the first Chief Constables were military men. The hierarchical rank structure they developed remains in place almost 200 years later.

Police leaders are in the difficult position of being responsible and accountable for police constables who possess considerable discretionary power (Hough et al, 2016). The traditional “command and control” model of leadership in the police evolved to maintain control despite that constable discretion, to ensure rapid mobilisation in crisis situations and to enhance legitimacy and accountability by making it clear who was to blame if something went wrong (Campbell and Kodz, 2011).

In times of crisis, where rapid responses are critical, police organisations were designed to defer to the highest-ranking leader with the “explicit expectation that the person at the top will be the ‘expert’, will have the answer, and will know what to do” (Herrington and Colvin, 2016, p.10).

The adoption of private sector management techniques into policing from the 1980s onwards to some extent reinforced that top-down leadership model. It emphasised the need to measure performance and to set targets from the top which those lower down the hierarchy were expected to follow (Reiner, 1998; Boyne, 2002). However, speaking at a Police Foundation round table, senior police leaders said too much focus on “delivering performance” hindered reflective and progressive leadership styles and placed too much emphasis on tactical, short-term decision-making over the bigger strategic picture (Hales, 2015).

The College of Policing’s 2015 *Leadership Review* stated that while there was space for “command and control” in policing, such as in public order situations, its “overuse” was “the greatest obstacle to the culture of candour and challenge” it sought to promote (College of Policing, 2015).

In place of ‘transactional leadership’ styles (in which followers obey so not to be sanctioned or to be rewarded) some have advocated for so-called ‘transformational’ styles of police leadership (Mastrofski, 2004). Former New York City Police Commissioner Bill Bratton sums up this stance: “Bureaucrats change processes, leaders change culture. I think of myself as a transformational leader who changes cultures” (Dodd and Stratton, 2011).

In policing, transformational leadership is said to improve communication, establish stronger relationships and encourage a more motivated workforce (Cockroft, 2014). A 2004 UK Home Office survey found police officers whose leaders exercised transformational styles felt empowered to exceed expectations (Campbell and Kodz, 2011).

However, as Davis and Silvestri (2020) argue, transformational leadership has a darker side too. It can make conformity desirable and whistle-blowers or other challengers can be labelled as “whingers or troublemakers” (Alvesson and Spicer, 2012; Collinson 2012; Davis and Silvestri, 2020).



Police leadership styles have moved on somewhat from these top-down models in recent years. Former National Police Chiefs' Council Chair Dame Sara Thornton suggests the adage "think manager think male" is changing, and leaders of both sexes are demonstrating a "collaborative approach" focusing on encouraging others and building "alliances and consensus" (Thornton, 2019).

## 10.2 PROBLEMS IN POLICE LEADERSHIP

### 10.2.1 Promotion and selection

The HMICFRS *Leading Lights* report found widespread dissatisfaction with promotion processes in policing. In particular, it found women and ethnic minorities were less likely to seek promotion, especially at higher ranks, than White men (HMICFRS, 2019). Many senior officers are reluctant to seek promotion outside their force because of a perception of opacity and unfairness. In 2018, 62 per cent of Chief Constables had been deputies in their own forces, suggesting the process favours internal applicants. External candidates who failed the process said their own forces saw them as "already out the building" (NPCC, 2018).

Linked to this there is a chronic lack of competition for Chief Constable positions. In 2015, over half of Chief Constable posts only had one candidate for the job, with two being the national average (Thornton, 2019). Reasons given for this lack of competition were:

- Inadequate preparation for talented officers.
- Perceived financial disincentives.
- Worries about fairness and transparency.
- Concerns about what happens if a Chief Constable's relationship with their Police and Crime Commissioner breaks down.
- Unwillingness to relocate themselves and their families (NPCC, 2018).

Direct Entry schemes have been launched for the superintendent and inspector ranks to bring in high calibre external candidates, with proven leadership skills, to senior roles (Silvestri, 2018; College of Policing, 2020). However, these have not operated without difficulty, as candidates have sometimes been viewed with open hostility by officers who believed their existence devalued their own knowledge gained over years on 'the Job' (Williams, et al, 2021).

### 10.2.2 Developing leaders

The lack of a culture of professional development in policing also translates into a paucity of formalised leadership development. This is particularly the case for frontline supervisors. A 2016 virtual forum on police Sergeants concluded leaders are promoted based on their competence at their current rank, rather than their ability to excel at the next, and are not helped to acquire those skills after promotion (WeCops, 2016). This echoes comments from the *Leadership Review*, which described the Sergeant role as a 'development-free zone' (College of Policing, 2015). Police Now is attempting to change this by launching the Frontline Leadership Programme to help develop the potential of Constables who wish to become Sergeants.<sup>42</sup>

The lack of leadership training and formal development is as true for Superintendents as it is for Sergeants. In a Police Foundation roundtable, a senior police leader commented "existing Superintendents have considerable operational experience but have never been trained to be senior leaders" (Hales, 2015).

A lack of ongoing leadership development even extends to some of those preparing for the highest ranks. In some forces, those tipped for high office are coached extensively to pass the Senior Police National Assessment Centre, yet others receive very little support, which HMICFRS called highly unfair. The Inspectorate concluded that while the College of Policing provided guidance to forces on the criteria candidates should meet, they did not stipulate how they should be selected. While some forces had rigorous internal application processes, in others the Chief Constable's favoured candidate was put forward (HMICFRS, 2015).

### 10.2.3 The wellbeing of police leaders

The dominant idea of the macho, heroic leader can mean police leaders are subject to unrealistic expectations and unsuitable pressures (Mastrofski, 2002). Complex social problems are framed as leadership problems and thus police leaders are burdened by unrealistic expectations that they will "get results" (Davis, 2020).

Police forces are beginning to recognise the risks of poor wellbeing for lower ranking officers and provide help. But this rarely extends to chief officers (HMICFRS, 2019). Bullock and Garland (2018) argue the emphasis placed on 'resilience' within police rhetoric leads to a conception of the chief officer as a "stalwart figure able to cope in face of adversity" and therefore inhibits

<sup>42</sup> See more at <https://www.policenow.org.uk/frontline-leadership-programme/>

them from asking for help or showing emotion. In consequence, chief officers can feel isolated and pressured by unsustainable workloads – with ten per cent registering critical anxiety scores (HMICFRS, 2019).

This pressure on Chief Constables has contributed to a shortening of their average tenure, which has decreased steadily since the 1980s, to an average of 3.65 years. Between 2021 and 2016 female chiefs had a turnover 20 percentage points higher than male colleagues (HMICFRS, 2019). During the 1980s there were 18 chiefs outside the MPS with over a decade's service in that rank. In the 2010s there were five (NPCC, 2018). Although some shortening of tenure can prevent 'staleness', this level of "churn" is unsettling for police forces and risks Chief Constables leaving just as they have got on top of doing the job.

## 10.3 STRENGTHENING POLICE LEADERSHIP

We draw two main conclusions from this review of the challenges facing police leadership. First, while there are very many outstanding leaders in policing, the police service has generally under-invested in the development of its leaders over many years. This is true at almost all levels, but it is particularly true of frontline supervisors. We cannot emphasise enough how vital Sergeants and Inspectors are in promoting effective policing. The relationship between a frontline officer and their supervisor is critical for wellbeing, for promoting a learning culture and for tackling poor norms and unethical conduct. Radically strengthening the leadership development programmes available for frontline supervisors is the key to unlocking many of the problems surveyed in this Review. Senior leaders should also be supported by more programmatic professional development programmes.

The College of Policing is now exploring the idea of a Police Leadership Centre which would have responsibility for developing the police leaders of the future. We support the establishment of such a centre. We think that this Centre should be outward looking, establishing links across sectors and with business and universities around the world. We think it should partly finance itself by offering courses to police leaders internationally, building on the world class reputation of British policing. It should focus in particular on the development of frontline leaders, Sergeants and Inspectors, who in many ways possess the real 'social power' in the police service and who are the key to

improving professional development, wellbeing and conduct.

### Recommendation

37. The College of Policing should establish a Police Leadership Centre which would have the following responsibilities:

- To promote the learning and development of police leaders at all levels, from Sergeants to Chief Constables.
- To provide structured support to promote the wellbeing of police leaders.
- To directly fund police leadership training and professional development throughout the system.
- To ensure that the learning and development opportunities for police leaders meet national standards.
- To focus in its first two years on a development programme for police sergeants, considerably strengthening the support Sergeants receive and increasing the learning time available to them.
- To build on the international reputation of British policing by offering courses for police leaders overseas. The fees from these courses would be reinvested to support the work of the Police Leadership Centre.

Second, promotion and selection processes ought to be reviewed to ensure fairness and transparency. There is a widely perceived opacity as to promotion processes and these would benefit from greater regulation by the College of Policing.

We are particularly concerned about the lack of competition for chief officer posts. The College of Policing ought to review the reasons for this, looking at pension issues, relocation costs and whether potential applicants receive sufficient support. There is also a concern that this problem has got worse since the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs), with a widespread perception taking root that PCCs tend to favour appointing local deputies which puts off external applicants.

## Recommendations

38. The College of Policing should review police leadership selection processes and should explore whether greater national regulation and oversight of these processes would improve fairness, transparency and competition.
39. The appointment process for Chief Constables should be reformed to increase competition for these vital posts. While the Police and Crime Commissioner should continue to make the appointment, they should do so from a short list of candidates drawn up by a national Senior Appointments Board constituted from among the relevant national bodies. That Board would have a responsibility, working with the College of Policing, to actively identify suitable applicants.





# PART IV

# ORGANISATION



# 11. STRUCTURE

**Summary:** The organisational structure of the police service needs radical reform: it does not provide a sound basis for tackling cross-border crime, delivering specialist capabilities or providing value for money. In particular the regional tier of policing should be considerably strengthened such that specialist capabilities and back-office functions are provided at that level. The money saved should be reinvested in policing. There should be a stronger strategic centre, in which the Home Office plays a stronger role in setting the strategic direction for the service. The national public safety landscape should be rationalised such that there are three main national delivery organisations: the **S23**, an expanded College of Policing and the new Crime Prevention Agency.

So far in this report we have argued that we need to generate greater social capacity and new police capabilities to deal with the volume, complexity and diversity of the public safety risks we face. We now turn to how the police service ought to be organised to deliver those capabilities.

The chapter comes in seven parts:

1. We describe how we got to where we are now, offering a brief history of the evolution of police organisation since 1829.
2. We describe the main characteristics of the current system.
3. We make the case for a strong local dimension to policing, with robust mechanisms of local accountability.
4. We argue that the current structure is not able to provide the police capabilities we need effectively or efficiently.
5. We describe six options for change.
6. We call for a stronger strategic centre in policing and describe what that might look like.
7. We conclude with recommendations for reform to the way policing is organised in England and Wales.

## 11.1 HOW WE GOT HERE

Looking back at the history of police organisation in England and Wales we can identify six trends. First, we have seen a gradual decrease in the number of police forces, which fell from 231 in 1888 to 43 in 1974. Since then, the existing structure has remained, although there was an attempt to move to a smaller number of regional forces in 2005. This was ultimately dropped following political opposition and concerns about the equalisation of council taxpayer contributions.

Second, we have seen the gradual formation of what we now call a national police service. Over time the local force structure has been supplemented by a range of national functions: a national police inspectorate was formed in 1856; after the first world war the landmark Desborough Committee saw the establishment of a national pay structure, the Police Federation and a central conference of Chief Constables, alongside an increase in the contribution of national government funding relative to local taxpayer contributions; after the second world war a National Police College was established; and in the 1980s we saw the rise of the Association of Chief Police Officers as a nascent national police headquarters, prior to its abolition in 2015.

Third, as public concern about crime grew over the course of the 20th century the Home Secretary took on an increasingly powerful role in police matters. After the first world war the Home Secretary was given powers to set police pay. From the 1960s onwards operational policy was increasingly shaped by a succession of Home Office circulars.

In the 1990s Michael Howard took the power to set national objectives, targets and codes of practice and to initiate the dismissal of Chief Constables. In the 2000s David Blunkett took powers to suspend Chief Constables, set targets and issue compulsory guidance. After 2010 under Theresa May the Home Office stepped back, expecting the new Police and Crime Commissioners to shape policing policy locally. However, since 2019 the Conservative government has taken a more interventionist stance, including the reintroduction of some national performance metrics with a clear expectation that the government expects forces to focus on these.

Fourth, local police governance has been democratised. During the 19th century there was a major debate as to whether the new police forces should be controlled by the county councils, representing the new democratic power, or by the magistrates, representing the old

feudal system which had controlled policing prior to 1829. The solution found was to create joint standing committees of both. The 1962 Royal Commission led to the introduction of police authorities made up of two thirds councillors and one third magistrates, later replaced with a model of councillors plus independent members. In 2000 the Greater London Authority was created and for the first time the Metropolitan Police Service was made formally accountable to the people of London. In 2012 directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners were introduced with the aim of sharpening the accountability of the police to the public.

Fifth, in the post war period we saw various flirtations with regional organisation within policing. Regional training centres were established, police forces increasingly collaborated to police the motorway network and in the 1960s Regional Crime Squads were introduced to focus on serious and organised crime. Although these were later subsumed into the National Crime Squad they re-emerged in 2009 in the form of Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU).

Finally, the police service has responded to the diversification and increased complexity of police work by establishing a growing number of specialist units, often on a national basis, sometimes led by lead forces and sometimes based in national agencies. These include the Counter Terrorism Network, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and **S23**.

Looking back, it is hard to disagree with TA Critchley's remark in his landmark history of the English and Welsh police that '*No grand design emerges and there is no evidence of adherence to lofty constitutional principles. The system has never been a tidy or logical one.*' (Critchley, 1978, p.xiv).

## 11.2 THE CURRENT STRUCTURE

The way in which policing is currently organised in England and Wales has the following characteristics:

- Most policing functions are delivered through 43 **general purpose** territorial police forces. This contrasts with more segmented or disaggregated systems as exist for example in France, where there is a national police organisation, a *gendarmerie* of military provenance and various municipally funded local police units, or in the United States where there are different police organisations with varying responsibilities at the county, state and federal levels.

- It is a **localist** system in which 92 per cent of police funding is allocated through the local Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) or their equivalents (NAO, 2018). The Home Secretary has backstop powers to intervene as described in the next chapter, but these have rarely been used in practice. The Strategic Policing Requirement sets out some national expectations of PCCs but these lack detail and PCCs are only required to 'have regard' to them. There is no apparent penalty for failing to do this.
- It is a system in which ultimate legal authority rests with two **corporations sole**: the Chief Constable who has direction and control of their officers, and the PCC who holds the budget, appoints and dismisses the Chief Constable and sets a Police and Crime Plan the Chief Constable must follow.
- The system is governed by a **tri-partite system** in which authority is shared between the Chief Constables, the PCCs and the Home Secretary. Accountability and responsibility can be somewhat diffuse in this system, but it is to some extent *diffuse by design*, so to avoid any one set of actors having excessive control over a public service with intrusive powers.
- Specialist and cross border functions have been increasingly brigaded into **an ad hoc patch work of regional and other collaborations** between forces.
- There are **multiple lines of accountability** within the system: Chief Constables are accountable to their PCCs and to some extent to the Home Secretary who represents the national interest; HMICFRS inspects forces on grounds of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy; the Independent Office for Police Conduct exists to independently investigate complaints against police officers and PCCs; the Home Secretary is accountable to parliament.

## 11.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF A STRONG LOCAL DIMENSION IN POLICING

The main benefit of the existing 43 force structure is that it provides a strong local dimension in our policing system. This is important for three reasons. First, visible, engaged and responsive local policing is critical for improving public confidence in the police. There are strong indications that that it was the roll out of

neighbourhood policing in the 2000s that was a key driver for improving public confidence in the following years. It is also no coincidence that public confidence levels have fallen as people have noticed that the police have been less visible (see Chapter 6). If we are to tackle the recent fall in public confidence, we need to make sure policing is anchored in and responsive to local communities. This goes beyond neighbourhood policing and means that more widely police force priorities are reflective of the concerns of local people.

The 43 forces vary considerably in size of course and in some of the larger forces decision-making may be more remote from local communities than in the smaller county forces. Particularly in larger forces there is a strong case for more autonomy for Commanders at what used to be uniformly called the Basic Command Unit level, normally covering a town, city or district. Nevertheless, a system in which 92 per cent of the money flows through a locally elected PCC means policing has to have regard to the views of the local population. We return to the position of PCCs in the next chapter on police governance.

*“the 43 force model ... create[s] the necessary flexibility to enable each to deliver services bespoke to the needs of their communities. This recognises that the public we serve is not one homogenous group for which a ‘one size fits all’ approach will do. The culture in the Merseyside population is markedly different from the culture of say Cumbria or London”. CE 2.02*

The second reason why a strong local dimension is important is the need for policing to increasingly collaborate with other local public services in order to tackle complex public safety problems. There is no solution to problems such as mental health crises and vulnerable children going missing that does not involve improved collaboration between the police, the NHS and local government. To enable such improved collaboration local chief officers or superintendents need the autonomy to make decisions about budgets, deployment of staff and police policies in ways that work in conjunction with the plans of other local partners. Any structure that reduces that local autonomy would make it harder to deal effectively with the complex problems we now face.

Finally, a strong local dimension in policing structure also means there is space for innovation. Chief Constables and PCCs do not need permission to test a new programme or project. They can simply decide to do it. There are plenty of examples of police forces running with an idea and achieving real results, whether

that be in terms of new technological solutions or trialling evidence-based ways of reducing crime.

The current system is less good at capturing learning from local innovation, with information often remaining trapped within local forces. There is also the negative flip side to local variation, which is a lack of consistency. This is important in areas where society expects common standards. We return to how to ensure greater consistency, particularly in the area of professional standards, in the next chapter.

*“Big is not always better. The agility of smaller forces to change direction, shape, focus and innovate has been extremely beneficial to the service as a whole.” CE2.13*

So, any structural reform considered by this Review must ensure that there are clear mechanisms for local people’s views to influence the priorities of the local police. It must also ensure that there is sufficient autonomy for decision makers at the local level that they can work collaboratively with other local services and try out new ideas.

## 11.4 THE CASE FOR CHANGE

Having described the current system and outlined its main benefits, we now turn to its drawbacks. We argue that the structure as currently configured is simply unable to deliver the policing capabilities required in a way that is effective or efficient.

### 11.4.1 Cross border crime

**The 43 force structure struggles to deal with the rising forms of crime that cross force and national borders.** These are crimes in which the victim and the offender do not generally live in the same police force area or even in the same continent. This makes investigating these offences more complex and doing so often requires a degree of specialisation that smaller forces are not able to provide on their own. Some of these cross-border crime types also tend to be less visible to the local public and are therefore less likely to be prioritised in Police and Crime Plans.

For example, fraud is the single biggest crime type affecting people in England and Wales, and yet the amount of police resource dedicated to tackling it locally is tiny. There were five million fraud offences reported in the Crime Survey for England and Wales in the year to June 2021 (ONS, 2021), while just 0.8 per cent of the police workforce is dedicated to tackling economic crime and just 5,000 people are charged annually with fraud offences (Skidmore et al, 2018). Getting on top of

fraud and wider economic crime is critical to making the UK a place in which people want to invest and for the future of the financial services sector.

The number of child sexual abuse material offences increased six-fold between 2014 and 2018. However, charging rates for these offences have fallen over the same period and just one in ten reports leads to a criminal justice outcome (Aitkenhead et al, 2022).

Computer misuse offences increased by 85 per cent in the year to June 2021, partly due to increased online activity during the pandemic. There were 1.8 million such offences in the year to June 2021, and yet just 71 cases (0.2 per cent of those reported) resulted in a charge or summons in the year to March 2021 (ONS 2021, ONS 2021a).

Tackling these forms of crime requires a combination of the following: specialist teams of investigators capable of operating across local, regional and international borders; political and professional leadership that prioritises this work and is accountable for it; a commitment to invest in the technology required; and systems for sharing crime and intelligence data across the whole law enforcement system. The current system of police force organisation does not possess these characteristics.

#### 11.4.2 Specialist capabilities

The model does not support the development of effective specialist capabilities. There are five reasons why it generally makes sense for specialist capabilities to be brigaded at a level higher than a county police force:

- These capabilities tend to have high fixed costs in terms of training and equipment.
- There are learning benefits from concentrating expertise rather than having it spread out and isolated across forces.
- Risk can be pooled at a higher level to help smaller forces deal with infrequent but intensive levels of demand.
- Some of these capabilities do not require an immediate physical presence.
- Public confidence in the police is to some extent dependent on the police managing high risk areas of work in a professional and consistent way. The consequences of mistakes or poor conduct in areas such as firearms or undercover work can be severe both for the individuals directly involved but also for the reputation of policing. This ought to be a strong driver for developing a more consistent national approach and a concentration of specialism in regional centres.

There is evidence that that a number of specialist capabilities are not being effectively delivered through the current structure.

#### Roads policing

Since the birth of the motorcar in the 1890s the police have always played a role in enforcing the rules of the road. In the last decade, however, austerity has hit this area of policing particularly hard (Halkon and Muir, 2022).

The amount of money spent on roads policing fell by 34 per cent in real terms between 2013 and 2019, compared to 6 per cent for all police functions (HMICFRS, 2020). This has led to a significant loss of traffic officers, whose numbers fell by 22 per cent between 2010 and 2014 and by a further 18 per cent between 2015 and 2019 (Home Office, 2020).

Police traffic enforcement has dropped commensurately. The number of Fixed Penalty Notices issued for using mobile phones while behind the wheel fell by 70 per cent between 2011 and 2018 (Green, 2020). Between 2015 and 2018 the number of breathalyser tests carried out in England and Wales dropped by 25 per cent (HMICFRS, 2020).

This has played a role in the stalling of the UK's progress in reducing the numbers of deaths on the roads: the number of people killed on the roads each year has remained more or less constant since 2012 (DfT, 2020). This contrasts with other European countries where the number of road traffic collisions fell by 23 per cent in the last decade (European Commission, 2020).

Some argue that technology has made the work of traffic officers less relevant, but international research shows that a physical police presence on the roads network is one of the most effective way of reducing road deaths (Halkon and Muir, 2022).

One of the reasons for the lack of investment in this area is that it has not tended to be prioritised locally. HMICFRS found that road safety was listed as a priority in only 19 of 43 police and crime plans in 2019 (HMICFRS, 2020).

#### Major crime

As described earlier in this report the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) estimates that there is a national shortfall of 6,851 detectives (NPCC, 2021). In Chapter 7 we identified significant capacity and skills shortages across a range of investigatory specialisms.



One sign of this significant capability gap is the difficulties involved in securing mutual aid to support major crime investigations in smaller forces. For example, we were told by officers within the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) that they struggled to secure mutual aid from other forces requested by Essex police following the discovery of 29 Vietnamese migrants who had died in the back of an articulated lorry. The shortage of detectives, victim identification officers and other skilled personnel, alongside high workloads across the system, meant that forces were unable to provide sufficient mutual support.

The shortage of investigatory skills is one of the factors responsible for the fall in detection rates from 15 per cent in 2015 to 7 per cent in 2021. Providing these investigatory resources at a regional rather than a force level would help smaller forces pool the risk of being faced with intensive but infrequent surges in demand when faced with a major incident.

### Cybercrime

Repeated studies have found that local forces do not have anywhere near enough capability to meet rising demand in the arena of cybercrime (Aitkenhead and Skidmore, forthcoming; HMICFRS, 2019a).

The Inspectorate has concluded that: resourcing for cybercrime teams is short term and lacks strategic planning; there is duplication of work across forces; there is a lack of specialist analysts; there is too little sharing of good practice; and there is a lack of intelligence gathering. Although HMICFRS welcome the switch to regional tasking in this area it has concluded that this is voluntary and not being consistently implemented (HMICFRS, 2019a).

### Economic crime

We have already noted that only 0.8 per cent of the police workforce specialises in economic crime, despite fraud now being the single largest category of crime affecting people in England and Wales. Research by the Police Foundation has found that fraud is not prioritised by local forces, specialist economic crime teams have very limited capacity to take on new work and that most fraud investigation is carried out by generalist officers who do not believe they have the skills to carry out these investigations effectively (Skidmore et al, 2018).

Two recent major reports into fraud policing have called for fraud investigations to be largely carried out by economic crime specialists based in regional units (Skidmore et al, 2018, Mackey 2020). This would facilitate investigation and victim management across force boundaries and it would align work to tackle fraud

with wider work to tackle serious and organised crime through the ROCUs. It would also go some way to address the concerns of the Treasury Committee who recently asked the government to consider making economic crime the responsibility of a single government department and a single law enforcement agency (House of Commons Treasury Committee, 2022).

### 11.4.3 Value for money

The third area where the current structure underperforms is **value for money**. As the 2015 report by the HMIC-initiated National Debate Advisory Group argued there are strong efficiency grounds for specialist capabilities, operational support functions and business support functions being organised at a level higher than that of county forces (National Debate Advisory Group, 2015). This is because of economics of scale in areas like procurement and reductions in duplication.

However, in 2014 HMIC found that just 10 per cent of the savings requirement for police forces was being achieved through collaboration (HMIC 2014). There were also substantial differences between forces, with one force (West Mercia) achieving almost half of its savings through collaboration, while for others such as West Midlands, Merseyside, Sussex and Devon and Cornwall just 1 per cent or less of their savings were being achieved by collaboration (ibid).

The Inspectorate warned that:

*“Collaboration between forces, public and private sector organisations remains patchy, fragmented, overly complex and too slow....With some notable exceptions, the pace, breadth and depth of collaboration remains disappointing.” (HMIC 2014, p.33).*

The potential efficiency gains from increased collaboration and restructuring are illustrated by the example of Police Scotland (Box 11.1). In 2013 Police Scotland replaced the previous eight Scottish forces as a single national police service. It is currently estimated that Police Scotland will achieve £2.2bn in savings in the period up to 2026, which is double the outline business case made at the time of the merger. These savings come to a cost saving of £200m a year, which is 14 per cent of the £1.4bn that was allocated to policing in Scotland the year prior to the merger (Police Scotland, 2020; Audit Scotland, 2012).

It is unlikely that structural reorganisation would yield the same level of savings in England and Wales, simply because police forces here have already banked some of the same types of savings as those made in Scotland, particularly in areas such as estate rationalisation and



### Box 11.1 Police Scotland

Prior to its reform in 2013 there were eight police forces in Scotland along with the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SIPR et al, 2019). In April 2013 they were amalgamated into one police force named Police Scotland.

There were a number of drivers for reform:

- Cuts to the Scottish Government's budget alongside an SNP commitment to sustain officer numbers at 17,234, meant that savings would need to come from organisational reform rather than fewer police officers (Fyfe and Scott, 2013).
- There was a desire to ensure that every area of Scotland had access to specialist services. The centralisation of these functions also assisted with savings as it would cut out the duplication of services (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2019).
- A need for the integration of information systems. The eight forces did not use the same IT systems and amalgamating them into one force would make information sharing easier (Fyfe and Scott, 2013).
- Fyfe and Scott (2013) argue that there was also a political imperative: the SNP could not have been unaware that having a national police service for Scotland might aid the cause of independence.

Police Scotland has 13 territorial divisions, which are supported by national specialist divisions. The Specialist Crime Division (SCD) provides investigative and intelligence functions such as major Crime investigation, public protection, organised crime, counter terrorism, intelligence and safer communities. The Operational Support Division (OSD) provides specialist support functions such as road policing, firearms, public order, air support, marine policing, dogs and mounted branch, as well as emergency and events Planning.

Police Scotland is held to account by the Scottish Police Authority (SPA). Its main functions are to appoint the Chief Constable, allocate funding of Police Scotland and hold the Chief Constable accountable (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2019). Along with the policing and specialist divisions Scotland retained its national forensic service which is also run by the SPA (ibid).

There were controversies in the early years of reform. There was a view that police tactics used in Strathclyde, previously Scotland's largest force covering Glasgow and the surrounding areas, were being exported into areas not used to more aggressive forms of policing. The use of stop and search increased across Scotland, following the reform, with the number of searches increasing in the first year in ten of the policing divisions, the most dramatic being a 474 per cent increase in Fife (Murray, 2015). There was also a greater routine arming of officers, which caused a public backlash (BBC News, 2014).

There was also a view that policing was becoming less present in and responsive to local communities. This may be connected to police station closures and the fact that, due to cuts in civilian staff, police officers were increasingly needed to perform office work (Terpstra and Fyfe, 2015).

There has been a small decrease in the number of people saying the police do a good or excellent job from 61 per cent in 2012/13 to 56 per cent in 2018/19, although the levels have been relatively stable for most of the period since 2013 (Scottish Government, 2020).

The reform has over-performed when it comes to saving money. Compared to a target of saving £1.1bn by 2026, Police Scotland now estimates it will have saved £2.2bn by that date, with an annual cost reduction of £200m (Police Scotland, 2020; Audit Scotland, 2012).

The evaluation of the reform also found that there was a significant improvement in access to specialist services. Interviews carried out in year one of the evaluation showed that responses were perceived to have improved significantly (SIPR, 2019).

Looking to the future, it is worth noting that no major institution or political party in Scotland is proposing to reverse the reform and go back to eight local police forces.

reductions in support staff. All three countries went through an austerity programme and cut costs.

However, significantly more of that £200m a year saving in Scotland has come through back-office rationalisation than in England and Wales, where much of the savings came through a 15 per cent reduction in officer numbers between 2010 and 2018 (NAO, 2018). Officer numbers in Scotland were held constant as part

of a Scottish government manifesto commitment (NAO, 2018).

Even if we assume that a similar reform programme would not save as much money as that north of the border, the savings could still be considerable. To provide an indication, **if an English and Welsh reform achieved just a third of the Scottish savings (5 per cent of its current budget) that would yield £690m annually.**<sup>43</sup>

<sup>43</sup> This is estimated by calculating 5 per cent of the Total Direct Resource Funding received by police forces in 2021/22, including police grant, precept and other specific grants, as set out by the Policing Minister <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CDP-2021-0018/CDP-2021-0018.pdf>

#### 11.4.4 Regional and national functions lack a stable legal and financial foundation

The existing approach of bottom-up voluntary collaborative arrangements has created a patchwork of ad hoc arrangements that lack a stable foundation. Most of these are the result of collaboration agreements under Section 22A of the 2011 Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act.

As HMIC has argued: *'it is concerning that the national picture is becoming increasingly fragmented and complex with extremes in variation to approaches to the collaboration agenda'* (HMIC, 2014, p.94).

Rather than forces collaborating in defined regional groups, forces have multiple collaboration agreements, sometimes with forces on the other side of the country. Forces are also free to pull out of these collaborative arrangements which can put their partners at significant risk, as occurred when West Mercia walked away from its strategic alliance with Warwickshire. Warwickshire was left to essentially rebuild its own force headquarters and secure new collaboration agreements with other forces.

Regional Organised Crime Units are the product of collaboration agreements between local Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs). They lack their own legal foundation which means they cannot employ their own staff. They rely for most of their funding on local forces and are therefore vulnerable to local investment decisions, which complicates business planning.

Finally, important parts of the national policing infrastructure have been funded through the Police Transformation Fund and as such suffers from short term funding allocations, which inhibits their ability to plan and develop. This includes vital programmes such as the Forensic Capability Network, the Modern Slavery Transformation Unit and the Digital Policing Portfolio.

#### 11.4.5 Policing lacks a strong strategic centre

In his book *How to Run a Government* (Barber, 2016) this Review's Chair Sir Michael Barber sets out three roles for the centre in any public service system. This role he calls **stewardship**:

- **Strategy:** someone at the centre (whether the government or an agency delegated this role) should be looking to the future and thinking about how the service can meet future challenges. This involves surveying future technological developments, shifts in global patterns of provision, likely demand and so on.

- **Performance management:** the centre should put in place a means of monitoring the overall performance of the system and have an ability to intervene in areas where performance is poor.
- **Human capital:** the centre needs to ensure that there is the human capital in place, properly regulated, with the required skills and motivation. It takes years to train skilled professionals and so this requires long-term planning and a strategic outlook.

How does our policing system weigh up when assessed against these three metrics?

#### Strategy

Policing lacks a single body responsible for setting the overall strategy for the police service. In the past this strategic function was performed by the Home Office itself, which set out detailed plans for police reform and modernisation, particularly in the 1990s and 2000s. This was supported by ACPO before its abolition in 2015.

Since 2010 there has been an absence of strategic direction in policing:

- With the introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) the Home Office chose to step back, expecting such a strategic direction to emerge from a self-governing system of Chief Constables and PCCs.
- That self-governing system of Chief Constables and PCCs through the National Police Chiefs' Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners lacks a mechanism for making national decisions that are binding on all parties.
- Although there is a Policing Vision document for the service, this is largely aspirational and the centre has few levers to ensure that those aspirations are achieved.
- Although the College of Policing has recently produced a strong piece of work on the future operating environment (College of Policing, 2020), there is no permanent strategic hub responsible for horizon scanning.

#### Performance management

There is a national system of performance management in policing largely because of the role played by HMICFRS. Through its inspections HMICFRS assesses how well forces are performing on grounds of effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy. There is a system in place for intervention, overseen by HMICFRS and backed up by ministerial powers, where police

forces systematically underperform. The Home Office is also now playing more of a performance management role, through the National Crime and Policing Measures that the National Policing Board has set for local forces.

There is however room for considerable improvement in the way performance is monitored and managed from the centre. Too much police data, particularly outside recorded crime, remains 'land locked' on local force systems. Consistent data on mental health incidents for example is not collected across the country and therefore is not available nationally.

The Home Office need to build up a state-of-the-art performance monitoring system that should enable those responsible for system stewardship to have access to close to real time data across key metrics. This would allow for benchmarking, enable systemic learning and facilitate the targeting of resources where intervention may be required. In short, we require a performance monitoring system that is much more agile and up to date, powered by much better data collection, aggregation and analysis.

### Human capital

The College of Policing has the strategic responsibility for nurturing policing's human capital. It does this by setting common professional standards, providing a framework for police education and professional development and supporting the development and dissemination of the corpus of professional knowledge.

However, there are three gaps in the national landscape relating to human capital development:

- There is no central planning function in relation to workforce, as discussed in Chapter 7. Recruitment is in the hand of the 43 forces. The result of this is that major gaps in capability can emerge owing to decisions taken at force level, with no one looking across the whole system. Someone within the system should have responsibility for looking ahead and developing plans to ensure an adequate supply of people to meet the future needs of the service.
- The College of Policing has few powers to ensure that forces cooperate with its initiatives and implement its standards. While standards are articulated through its Authorised Professional Practice officers and Chief Constables can diverge from these where they judge it appropriate to do so. Additionally, where the College initiates a new programme of work it has no way of requiring forces to implement these. We will address these gaps in the next chapter.
- While there is plenty of innovation in policing there is not yet a fully developed system for capturing that

learning and sharing it across the profession. There is an online platform, Knowledge Hub, for sharing practice, but far too often initiatives and the learning from them remain unknown to anyone outside a particular force.

In addition to these *system stewardship* functions (strategic direction, performance management and human capital development) the centre can also play a role in *delivering* highly specialist capabilities. Currently for example national agencies or lead forces deliver the Counter Terrorism Command, Action Fraud, the National Police Air Service and, through the **S23**, investigate and pursue serious and organised crime.

However, there are other areas of specialist capability that would benefit from being delivered by a national organisation. This is far from an exhaustive list but we would highlight the following:

- **Procurement:** the police service could save substantial sums if there were more national procurement of goods and services in areas such as equipment, uniform, vehicles and information technology. Blue Light Commercial has been set up as a relatively new vehicle to do this and was able to lead the way on procuring PPE for officers and staff during the pandemic. However, there is still much more that could be purchased collectively at a reduced cost.
- **Collective intelligence:** as discussed above most police data is owned and managed by local forces and is therefore invisible to the service as a whole. This inhibits the ability of the service to spot emerging crime and incident trends and develop a response. There is also no standing capability to consistently use existing databases such as the Police National Computer and Police National Database to identify risk and target activity. Having a permanent national data centre would mean that emerging patterns could be spotted early, trends identified, problems better understood and existing databases better used to inform activity.
- **Forensics:** the state of the forensic science sector has been repeatedly criticised by both the Forensic Science Regulator and the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee. See Box 11.2 for why we think forensics ought to be viewed as a national capability.

If such capabilities are to be delivered once for the whole country then there ought to be a national organisational platform to deliver them. We discuss the possible options for achieving this in the next section.

## Box 11.2 Forensics

Forensic science involves the application of “scientific methods to the recovery, analysis and interpretation of relevant materials and data in criminal investigations and court proceedings” (House of Lords, 2019) and includes DNA analysis, fingerprint examination, digital or computer forensics, forensic anthropology and ballistics.

Since the abolition of the Home Office funded Forensic Science Service, private companies have been commissioned by police forces to undertake forensic examination or, in most cases, it has been provided by the police themselves.

Oversight for standards is provided by the Forensic Science Regulator but the postholder does not have any statutory enforcement powers to ensure quality standards and compliance across the landscape.

The Regulator highlighted in her latest annual report that in the last six years forensic science has been strained financially, reputationally and with regard to capacity (Tully, 2021), with the system “on a knife-edge”. Digital forensics in particular has “woeful levels of compliance with achieving quality standards”. The ultimate upshot of this is misleading evidence (Smit et al, 2018), long backlogs, innocent people being falsely convicted and criminals escaping justice (Tully, cited in Dodd, 2020).

Fragmented governance, systems, priorities and capabilities across the service (public and private) creates and compounds a number of existing challenges (Muir and Walcott, 2021).

First, the demand for digital forensics is increasing rapidly; it is now key to most crime investigations. Alongside this, the sheer volume of data held on digital devices is ever-growing. This increased demand for forensics has not been matched with increased supply. Approximately £120 million was spent on forensic science in 2008 which dropped to between £50-55 million in 2018 (NAO, 2018). This has contributed to the fragility of the provider market.

Second, because of this reduced spending, human resources are diminishing. Recruiting police officers with both technical and investigatory skills is a difficult task. Existing cuts to training have meant basic forensic procedures are not common knowledge. There is also very little research and development occurring to keep on top of new innovations.

Third, technical resources are sparse and, where they do exist, are often outdated. This is of major concern as the range of devices and data formats requiring examination is increasing, and criminals are becoming more sophisticated. Different providers have different technical capabilities which means the quality of evidence being put before courts is inconsistent. Data is also held in formats that are often incompatible between police forces.

Fourth, gaining consistently high common standards (or ISO accreditation) is increasingly difficult. The Regulator has expressed concerns about private companies being commissioned who do not meet international quality standards.

In contrast with England and Wales, Scotland’s forensic science service is run by the Scottish Police Authority Forensic Services (SPA FA) and has complete independence from Police Scotland. It is built on a vision of “scientific excellence for safer communities... prevent, investigate and detect crime supporting the delivery of justice and keeping Scotland’s communities safe”. It has 500 highly trained and skilled scientists operating from four main laboratory sites and its ‘crime scene-to-court’ model ensures impartiality and independence. Currently in place is an eight-year strategy involving a three-phase plan to improve service delivery (Scottish Police Authority, no date: p10).

SPA’s annual review found good evidence of SPA FA delivering its strategic outcomes by increasing capacity, adding value, maintaining high quality standards and improving capabilities (Scottish Police Authority, 2020).

We urgently require a more strategic approach to forensics in England and Wales. The Transforming Forensics Programme (and the resulting Forensic Capability Network) is striving to tackle these interrelated issues on the basis of voluntary cooperation between forces. However, we believe that the Home Office should go further and establish a national forensic science service for England and Wales (see Recommendation 40).



## Recommendation

40. The Home Office should establish a national forensic science service. This would not necessarily replace existing private providers but would incorporate most in-house provision currently provided by forces. This would put forensic science services on a stable and secure footing. The new service would:

- Carry out national procurement of forensics services where these would benefit from being commissioned once on behalf of the whole service.
- Ensure a consistent approach was taken to meeting international quality standards.
- Carry out horizon scanning and research and development to ensure that forensics capability can keep pace with technological and scientific innovation.
- Provide for a concentration of specialism at the centre, as well as ensuring that expertise and learning is shared more effectively.

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## 11.5 A REALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS AND CAPABILITIES

The analysis above strongly suggests a reallocation of capabilities and functions to different spatial levels would improve efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. Here we set out what that redistribution of functions ought to look like, before in the next section looking at what such a reallocation means for organisational structure. Form should follow function rather than the other way around.

Our proposed reallocation of policing capabilities and functions is set out in Box 11.3.<sup>44</sup> Under this model the local level, currently organised into the 43 forces, should focus on the delivery of local police services: 24/7 response, local crime investigation, neighbourhood policing, safeguarding and offender management.

A large number of other functions and capabilities would be organised at the regional level. These include serious and organised crime related capabilities and uniformed specialisms (dogs, horses, public order etc). They also include both operational support functions such as forensics and contact management, and business support functions such as procurement and HR. Note we do not set out here a defined number of regions, as this is an area where some flexibility and adaptation to local circumstances is required. Our starting point for thinking about this is the existing nine English policing regions and Wales, but it is possible that some of the large metropolitan forces might be categorised as a region. The reallocation of functions would largely not affect the Metropolitan Police Service as it already operates as a regional force.

We should also note that local police forces will almost certainly need to retain some proactive investigative capability to deal with issues like local drug dealers and locally based organised crime groups that may not be prioritised by the regional level. There will need to be detailed work on the precise division of labour within the broad reallocation of functions we have described.

The national level would focus on system stewardship functions (strategy, performance management and human capital development), plus the delivery of some high specialist capabilities such as air support and the national IT databases.

This reallocation of capabilities and functions is justified on the following grounds. First, it builds the specialist capabilities required to tackle burgeoning levels of internet enabled and cross border crime at a scale larger than the county police force. These specialist teams will be better able to operate across force boundaries. They will be led and governed by people who prioritise these areas of work and who are accountable for achieving results in relation to fraud, cybercrime and so forth. Many of these capabilities currently struggle at the local level in the competition for resources with more visible forms of local demand.

Second, it aggregates all police specialisms at a higher level, creating better conditions for learning and improvement and allowing for the creation of centres of expertise. It also enables areas of high risk to be managed in a more consistent fashion by the police service.

<sup>44</sup> Note this approach is informed by the HMIC publication *Reshaping policing for the public: A discussion paper from the advisory group on the national debate on policing in austerity* published in 2015 and written by a National Debate Advisory Group of stakeholders from across the police service <https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/reshaping-policing-for-the-public.pdf>

**Box 11.3 A reallocation of policing functions to achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy**

Local level	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Local crime and harm prevention work led by neighbourhood policing teams, undertaken collaboratively with partners</li> <li>24/7 response</li> <li>Local crime investigation</li> <li>Safeguarding and offender management</li> </ul>	
Regional level	
Specialist capabilities	
<b>Specialist crime investigation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Major crime, economic crime (including fraud), digital investigation and intelligence</li> <li>Serious and organised crime</li> <li>Counter terrorism (under the Counter Terrorism Policing network)</li> </ul>	<b>Specialist uniformed operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Roads</li> <li>Public order</li> <li>Firearms</li> <li>Civil emergencies</li> <li>Dogs</li> <li>Mounted</li> </ul>
Operational support	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contact management</li> <li>Intelligence</li> <li>Criminal justice</li> <li>Forensics</li> <li>Support (professional standards, firearms licensing, communications governance, performance management)</li> </ul>	
Business support	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HR</li> <li>Finance</li> <li>Procurement</li> <li>IT</li> <li>Learning and development</li> <li>Transport</li> <li>Estate</li> <li>Legal</li> </ul>	
National level	
System stewardship	Delivery of national capabilities
<b>Strategic direction</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National leadership</li> <li>Horizon scanning</li> <li>National data centre</li> </ul> <b>Performance management</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inspection</li> <li>Intervention</li> </ul> <b>Human capital development</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Setting common professional standards</li> <li>Educational and qualifications framework</li> <li>Developing and disseminating the knowledge base</li> <li>Workforce planning</li> </ul>	<b>Specialist crime investigation</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Serious and organised crime (including fraud)</li> <li>Counter terrorism</li> </ul> <b>Support functions</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Air support</li> <li>Specialist operational resources</li> <li>IT and national databases</li> <li>Forensics</li> <li>Procurement</li> <li>Mutual aid coordination</li> </ul>

Third, it will be more efficient because it allows for greater economies of scale in areas like procurement, which would be done regionally or nationally rather than locally, and because it strips out unnecessary duplication. Not every local police force should need its own IT or HR department nor should they require uniforms or vehicles that are distinct from their neighbouring force.

Fourth, it creates the opportunity to put the regional serious and organised crime infrastructure on a more stable footing, by locating it within a more robust regional tier with secure funding and clear leadership and governance.

Finally, it builds a stronger strategic centre in policing with a greater ability to set a long-term strategic direction, monitor performance in fulfilling that strategy and developing the people policing will need to meet future demands. It also provides a firmer base for highly specialist capabilities that ought to be provided once for the whole system, whether that by specialist areas of forensics or major components of IT infrastructure.

Having defined in principle where we think these functions should sit, we now turn to the question of what organisational form would best support this allocation of capabilities.

## 11.6 OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

Box 11.5 outlines six options for reform to the organisational structure of the police service in order to best deliver the redistribution of capabilities and functions described above. We use four criteria for assessing the desirability of these options: first, *effectiveness*: will it help the police to deliver the outcomes we want them to achieve? Second, *efficiency*: will organising police capabilities in this way provide better value for money and realise efficiencies that could be invested in frontline policing? Third, *public confidence*: will organising policing in this way improve public confidence in the police? Finally, *deliverability*: how difficult in practical terms will such a reform be to achieve?

We should be clear that we do not believe there is a structural magic bullet to the challenges facing policing. Nor do we believe in structural reform for its own sake. Radical structural reform would inevitably distract the leadership of the service from day-to-day delivery. It might be worth it in the end, but we should not pretend there are no transition costs. Finally, every option has its downsides and in choosing one or another one may have to choose between different desirable objectives. There are some unavoidable trade-offs.

All that said it is our view that the existing structure is poorly designed to help policing deal with the challenges of the 21st century. No change is therefore not an option.

### Option 1. More collaboration

This option is essentially the status quo, although with an additional push by the Home Office to persuade police forces to deliver more collaboratively, using the existing legislative framework.

Under this model cross force collaboration would continue to be a bottom-up patchwork, negotiated according to the needs of particular forces at particular times.

However, it seems unlikely that further exhortation from ministers, without legal direction, will achieve the step change required. Under this model it is almost certain that most of the capabilities that we think would be best delivered regionally would continue to be delivered by local forces. Continuing with the existing laissez-faire approach leaves us with an ad hoc set of collaboration arrangements that can easily be unpicked by any of the parties.

We reject this option of 'one more heaven' because it will not achieve significant change and therefore scores poorly on grounds of efficiency and effectiveness. Its impact on public confidence, as with most of our options, is more ambiguous. Retaining the 43 forces means that the system remains anchored in local priorities. However, it should be said that failure to provide specialist capabilities to an adequate standard might also undermine public confidence, particularly in high-risk areas where the public expect consistency.

### Option 2. Regional lead forces

Under this option the 43 force structure would continue but within each region one force, normally the largest, would become the organisational home for specialist capabilities, operational support and business support functions. This already happens to some extent through some of the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCs), which are delivered on a lead force basis as in the South East and the West Midlands.

This option could improve effectiveness by organising specialisms at a regional level. It could also drive efficiencies if the lead force were to deliver more business and operational support functions to its smaller neighbours.

However, there are two main problems with this model, which mean it scores poorly on deliverability grounds.



One is that not every region has a large metropolitan force surrounded by smaller county neighbours. Some regions like the North West have two large metropolitan forces. Others such as the East Midlands are composed of roughly equally sized county forces.

Another problem is governance. Under such a model it is difficult to develop arrangements which give the smaller forces sufficient voice and weight when relying on a larger neighbour for so much of their capability.

A lead force model may be appropriate for some regions, however, and so while we reject this option, some regions could take forward a version of this under Options 3 and 4 below.

### Option 3. Regional police units

This model is a much more structured system of regional police collaboration. The 43 forces would remain, avoiding the need for structural upheaval, but local forces would be principally focused on delivering local policing services, namely neighbourhood policing, 24/7 response, safeguarding, offender management and local crime investigation. They would do this through more extensive collaboration with other local services as described in Chapter 4.

The Home Office would legislate to create Regional Police Units to deliver most specialist capabilities, business support and operational support functions at the regional level. Cooperation with this process would be mandated, although adequate time would have to be provided for forces to put their plans in place and to rationalise their existing collaborative arrangements.

This option scores relatively well on effectiveness and efficiency because it means specialisms will be concentrated at a more appropriate level, back-office duplication will be reduced and more procurement could be undertaken at a regional or national level, delivering economics of scale.

This option also scores well on deliverability grounds as it does not involve a restructuring of the forces and goes with the grain of existing arrangements.

Finally, this option scores well in terms of its impact on public confidence: the local connection via local forces and Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) is retained, but we would also expect to see improvements in the delivery of specialist services in high volume public facing areas like fraud investigation.

However, a potential downside with this option relates to governance. Both the national government and local Chief Constables and PCCs have a stake in the

success of this regional tier and so any configuration would have to ensure both a degree of national and local accountability.

One model would be to have a board of local PCCs and Chief Constables who would provide much of the funding for the regional tier and would appoint its leadership, set its priorities and so forth. The national interest would be secured by having a stronger Strategic Policing Requirement which would set out much more clearly than at present the national expectation particularly in relation to serious and organised crime.

However, as we have seen the Strategic Policing Requirement does not currently have much bite and even under a revised approach central government may have a legitimate concern that serious and organised crime will not be sufficiently prioritised and resourced. Related to this is a concern that the funding for ROCUs is too unstable, depending on myriad local decisions. To resolve that problem it might be better to separate out the serious and organised crime capabilities, in which there is arguably a stronger national interest, from the other functions (support, uniform specialism etc) which are more properly a concern for local forces. Option 4 describes such an approach.

### Option 4. **\*\*S23\*\***,

**\*\*S23\*\***

Alongside these, local Chief Constables and PCCs would be required to pool their non SOC specialist capabilities, business and operational support functions



into Regional Police Support Units. These units would be funded via pooled local funding and accountable to local Chief Constables and PCCs, whose forces would of course be critically dependent on the quality of provision. The savings made via reduced duplication would be shared locally for reinvestment, although the government may decide to allocate some of the savings to help build up regional SOC capability and to deliver other national priorities.

**\*\*S23\*\***

### Option 5. Regional forces

A more radical approach with a view to maximising the effectiveness and efficiency gains described above would be to merge the 43 police forces into a smaller number of regional forces. This was the plan proposed by then Chief Inspector of Constabulary Sir Denis O'Connor in 2005 and supported by the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke.

In the 2005 *Closing the Gap* report O'Connor argued that:

- The best local unit for policing was at Basic Command Unit (BCU) rather than at force level, given that the BCU is closer to local communities.
- There was a need to develop much better capabilities to tackle serious and organised crime, terrorism and other cross border threats.
- The 'protective services' required to meet these challenges are better developed at a larger scale than most existing police forces. HMIC found that forces with fewer than 4,000-6,000 members of staff struggle to meet the standards required to provide protective services.
- Mergers would release efficiencies of around £250m annually and a net present value of £2.5bn

Off the back of the report Charles Clarke proposed to go from 43 forces to 13.

However, the 2005-06 reforms collapsed for the following reasons:

- There was intense local resistance to what was seen as a centralising measure.
- Council taxes would likely rise for many people because taxpayers' contributions to policing would have to be equalised across a region.
- Unlike in Scotland in 2013, the reforms were not central to the government's political agenda and hence they were dropped quickly following Charles Clarke's (unrelated) resignation as Home Secretary (Brain, 2010).

As with Options 3 and 4 there are strong effectiveness grounds for regional mergers and a full merger programme would no doubt release considerable efficiencies.

However, regional mergers would break the local connection in our current system, by operating across wider geographies and abolishing the Police and Crime Commissioners. As we saw with the Scottish merger, there were certainly complaints about a loss of local responsiveness following police reform and there was a drop in public confidence during the early years of the process (see Box 11.1).

This would not only create a risk of reduced public confidence it might also hamper efforts to achieve greater collaboration between local police forces and local public services. Police regional boundaries would not match the boundaries of other local public services. Although these risks might be mitigated by providing greater managerial autonomy for local police commanders, in the end the locus of authority in a regional force would be at regional not local level. Local commanders would look upwards rather than outwards in terms of command. This is a considerable disadvantage given the need to increase local public service collaboration as described in Chapter 4.

One of the greatest challenges to this option is political deliverability: as in 2005-2007 there will be intense local resistance and any programme would have to involve more money up front to dampen any potential council tax rises. It would also require a government willing to expend political capital on a reform to police structures. There are no signs at present that any major political party is willing to do this.

### Option 6. A national police force

Our final and most radical option is the establishment of single national police forces for England and Wales. A national option was put forward in 1962 by AL Goodhart in his famous dissenting memorandum to the *Final Report of the Royal Commission on the*

*Police.* Countering the likely criticism that such a reform would run against our long-standing policing traditions, Goodhart argued:

*“There is no need to apologise for recommending the establishment of a regionally administered police force under the direction of the Home Secretary, although it has been suggested that such a system would be unconstitutional and un-English. The police constable is an officer of the Crown; he enforces a national law; and his rights, powers and duties, when not statutory, come from the national common law...the recommendation that the final steps should be taken in the interests of efficiency and good government cannot be regarded as a radical or revolutionary proposal.”*

Unlike his colleagues on the Royal Commission, Goodhart recommended a single Royal English and Welsh Police and a Royal Scottish Police. The latter has now of course been introduced in the form of Police Scotland and so to that extent Goodhart was ahead of his time. It is probable that if a national police force were to be introduced south of the border then there would be separate national forces for England and Wales, with policing matters being devolved to the Welsh Senedd, and so we make that assumption in what follows.

As Goodhart argued then there is a strong efficiency case for going to a single national force, because of the reduction in duplication and economies of scale. There is also a strong effectiveness case, as it would enable specialist capabilities to be provided in concentrated locations, whether regionally or nationally as appropriate, and it would provide a simple single national platform for delivering support functions and for tackling cross border crime (Goodhart, 1962).

However, there are three problems with the move. First, there is a real danger of centralisation and a loss of local responsiveness. We note that there was a drop in public confidence in the early years of Police Scotland, which has been linked by observers to a loss of local responsiveness (see Box 11.1). We also note similar signs of a reduction in local responsiveness in other countries that have adopted national or regional force models (see the international case studies on Sweden and Norway below).

These dangers are even greater with a national force than with the regional force model described above. While a single organisation might work for Scotland covering a population of 5.4 million, and conceivably for Wales with a population of 3.1 million, England has a population of 55.9 million. A single organisation to cover a population that large poses a real risk of over centralisation and a reduction in local responsiveness.

As discussed earlier this not only poses a potential risk in terms of public confidence but could also make it harder to promote local public service collaboration which is critical to tackle complex social problems.

As with a regional force model it may be possible to counter this by introducing an element of local accountability. So, for example, a model could be adopted in which the Superintendent for Oxford would be accountable to Oxford City Council for the delivery of a local policing plan. The local authority would agree the local police and crime plan for their area and would be able to use the council tax precept to commission policing services from the BCU Commander.

However, those local commanders would need the requisite autonomy to make decisions and choose priorities that are responsive to local needs. Our concern is that almost inevitably in a single national organisation in which operational authority rests at the centre those commanders would look upwards to their chief officers rather than outwards towards local communities.

Second, there is a deliverability challenge. Such a major upheaval would unquestionably distract the service away from the day job, possibly for a few years as the new system was implemented and bedded in. In the meantime, the public may start to be concerned that the police are not focused sufficiently on basic service delivery.

Third, politically this option would inevitably create significant local opposition and would require any government to expend considerable political capital to bring it about. As AL Goodhart pointed out in his memorandum, a Review of this kind should not make recommendations based purely on grounds of political expediency. Nonetheless we should not be blind to the political reaction that such a proposal would likely engender.

So, a national force would perhaps be more effective in some ways and efficient, but there is a real risk that it would break the local connection that it is at the heart of effective and legitimate policing and that it would distract the system both with political opposition and with a major organisational restructure.

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## 11.7 A STRONGER STRATEGIC CENTRE

Earlier we described which policing functions ought to be delivered at the national level. These can be divided into *system stewardship* functions (ensuring the overall system achieves optimal outcomes) and national *delivery* functions (the delivery of some highly specialist capabilities that it makes sense to deliver once for the whole system).

In Box 11.6 we map out which organisation (if any) currently performs these critical national functions.

The current national landscape is highly fragmented with a number of organisations performing these system stewardship and delivery roles. It is far from ideal to have such a cluttered landscape as this risks poor coordination, inefficient duplication, confused ownership and gaps emerging between institutions. If possible, we should seek to rationalise this landscape. Below we set out how we might do this by 1. developing stronger strategic capabilities for the police service, 2. providing a single home for national policing improvement functions and 3. **\*\*S23\*\***,

### Strategic capabilities

In order for the centre to perform an effective system stewardship role it requires a number of strategic capabilities, some of which are currently lacking. These capabilities include:

- Setting the overall strategic direction for policing.
- Horizon scanning.
- National data analytics.
- Workforce planning.

Responsibility for setting the overall strategic direction for the police service, as a publicly funded, publicly accountable service, should rest with the Home Secretary. The Home Secretary should perform this function in consultation with the other tripartite partners, represented by the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC). The National Policing Board is the main forum where a national strategy for the police service ought to be determined every five years.

In order that this strategic role of the Home Office is strengthened we think there is a strong case for

**\*\*S23\*\***

establishing a new Crime and Policing Strategy Unit within the department to develop the evidence base on which strategic decisions can be taken. This unit would monitor overall system performance, reporting progress back to the National Policing Board. It would also be the most appropriate location for a horizon scanning function, serving all parts of the system including the Crime Prevention Agency and all of the national policing bodies.

There are other strategic capabilities that are better located within a policing body. We argued above that the police service needs a workforce planning function and a national data analytics function. Both of these functions ought to be located within the principal body responsible for national policing improvement. It is to that function that we now turn.

### 11.7.1 National policing improvement

A major flaw with the national policing landscape is that what we call the **national policing improvement function** is disaggregated and lacks powers to drive change.

This function used to be located in the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) which was established in 2007. The NPIA's aims were to support the delivery of effective policing and foster a culture of self-improvement,

The functions of the NPIA included:

- Providing national police IT systems.
- Developing standard processes for recording and sharing data and developing a shared approach to IT.

- Developing common professional standards.
- Improving training, development and leadership.
- Promoting national procurement.
- It also hosted a number of operational support functions such as the Missing Persons Bureau and the Serious Crime Analysis Section.

The NPIA was abolished as part of the coalition government's desire to reduce the number of quangos. The crime related and operational support functions went to the eventual **\*\*S23\*\***, IT went to the Home Office (although part of this has now been taken on by the Police Digital Service), training and standards went to the new College of Policing and national procurement has (latterly) been picked up by Blue Light Commercial, a collaborative vehicle for collective purchasing.

There is a strong case for having a consolidated national home for police improvement:

- The current landscape is highly fragmented which leads to overlapping remits and confused responsibilities.
- This fragmented landscape contributes to a lack of strategic direction from the centre.
- The existing bodies lack powers to make things happen, and such powers would be more strategically exercised if they belonged to a single coherent body responsible for police improvement.

### International case study: Sweden

Prior to its police reform programme Sweden was policed by 21 forces each with a county board which controlled administration and budget decisions. These were overseen by a National Policing Board (NPB) whose job it was to regulate, inspect and support the police forces. A 2012 review found the NPB had limited power to enforce guidelines and ensure consistency, and there were imbalances in the resources and capabilities of different forces. Reform was triggered by a belief that the existing governance system was behind rising crime, particularly in so called "specially crime affected" areas, and a stall in clear-up rates despite increases in officer numbers. It was hoped centralisation would improve efficiency, transform the police force into a learning organisation and increase the quality of the service provided.

In 2015 a single national Swedish police force was created. An oversight body, the Swedish Police Authority, was created by merging the National Police Board and the forensic science services. The force was divided into seven regions (The Local, 2016). Seven police insight boards, made up of elected politicians, replaced the county police boards. Each local area was given a neighbourhood officer responsible for crime prevention and police now make a formal promise to citizens guaranteeing they will give resources to the things that are important to them (Cameron, 2017).

The reform was unpopular with police officers, although public confidence was not affected. Many officers left, meaning there was understaffing, specialist units were broken up to meet the demand for local officers and reorganisation meant a loss of local knowledge. There were complaints that reform took people by surprise and was rushed, and that the budget allocated to it was too small. Budget cuts meant the numbers of lower managers increased while the higher levels were reduced, causing an imbalance in the chain of command. By 2019 a review concluded citizen contact with the police and the service's performance had not improved (Holmberg, 2019).



## International case study: Norway

The Norwegian Police has been reformed multiple times over the last 20 years, with varying degrees of success. Centralisation was attempted in 2002, with 54 districts reduced to 27, which was believed to be good for local citizens and was intended to save hours of administrative work (Holmberg, 2014). In reality many local police leaders and officers found that they had fewer resources.

After the 2011 terror attack by Anders Behring Breivik an inquiry found the police were not trained sufficiently, had weak coordination and communication and lacked leadership (Christenson et al, 2018). There were accusations the police service was not equipped to deal with such emergency scenarios. A commission argued for a more reactive police service focused on core functions. The merging of districts and stations was seen as a way to make more resources available, reduce bureaucracy and reduce response times. The commission also recommended a more knowledge-based approach to policing focused on continual improvement.

In response, further centralisation took place with the 27 districts reduced to 12 (SIPR, 2019). The Norwegian Police Service is now made up of the National Police Directorate, seven specialist agencies and the 12 police districts. Each of these districts is led by a Chief of Police. The police service is accountable to the Ministry of Justice.

Although it is too early to judge the reform's success, surveys indicated officers and partners did not believe reforms had improved public service, and there were reports that larger districts had created further distance from communities (Wijnen, 2019).

There are some specific functions that are not well served within the existing landscape:

- IT: police IT remains poor and fragmented, just as it was in 2004 at the time of the Bichard Report into the Soham murders. The Police Digital Service has the right aims and is committed to making progress but has no powers to promote a common approach.
- Procurement: Much more procurement could be done nationally, as shown by BlueLight Commercial's successful purchase of PPE during the pandemic. This could be extended to many more areas of vehicles, equipment and uniform. It would make sense to have a national procurement function alongside the IT function so that a single agency can grow the new technological capabilities required to keep pace with cybercrime.
- There needs to be a stable basis for developing new policing capabilities to meet the changing demands we have described and this will be done much more effectively nationally rather than on a force-by-force basis.

There are four options for hosting the police improvement function:

1. **\*\*S23\*\***,
2. The College of Policing is expanded to take on the improvement function
3. The NPCC takes on the improvement function
4. A separate agency is created to take on the improvement function

We rule out 3 and 4 on the following grounds:

- The NPCC is the product of a collaboration agreement between the forces and does not exist as a legal entity able to employ staff or spend money in its own right. It is also best seen as part of the governance framework rather than the national delivery framework.
- Founding another agency makes the existing cluttered landscape even more complex.

So, let us now review Options 1 and 2.

### 1. **\*\*S23\*\***,

#### **\*\*S23\*\***,

- **\*\*S23\*\***,
- A police improvement directorate (IT, procurement, core national infrastructure, research and development of new capabilities).
- It could also host some of the strategic capabilities described in box 11.6.

The advantages of this option include:

- **\*\*S23\*\***,

- It is the largest national organisation and therefore in a good position to become essentially the lead institution in policing.
- It would reduce the clutter in the landscape.

The disadvantages include:

- **S23**,
- **S23**,

## 2. The College of Policing is expanded to take on the improvement function

The advantages include:

- Improvement sits comfortably with learning and professional standards.
- **S23**,
- It would bring together all the improvement functions in a single home, which would then have powers to deliver in two critical areas: using its existing (and seldom used) regulatory powers to set national minimum professional standards in high-risk areas where consistency is essential and being given new powers to mandate common standards in relation to IT.
- **S23**,

The disadvantages:

- **S23**,
- **S23**,

functions, it would free the College to pursue a future as College akin to one of the medical colleges. If we gave the College substantial delivery functions in relation to IT and forensics for example it would clearly need to be primarily accountable to the government (and the tripartite partners) rather than to its members.

On the balance of these arguments we believe that Option 2 (expanding the College of Policing to take on these functions) makes most sense:

- It would consolidate the improvement function (and improvement related powers) in one place.
- **S23**,
- Learning, standards and improvement are a better fit.
- It might be possible to 'ring fence' the membership element of the College's role from some of its expanded delivery functions and we would encourage the College and the Home Office to explore this.
- **S23**,  
**S23**,

## Box 11.7 Fraud

As a society we have yet to get a grip on the problem of fraud. Fraud offences made up over 40 per cent of crime in 2021, the most common type of crime experienced by people in England and Wales. Fraud is estimated to cost the UK around £15 billion a year and nearly half of fraud victims say their financial loss has affected their emotional wellbeing (Skidmore et al, 2018). While some frauds result in just a few hundred pounds lost and many victims are compensated by their banks, some victims can lose their life savings and receive no compensation at all.

Despite the scale of fraud and the harm caused the police response to it is extremely limited:

- In the year to March 2021 4.6 million frauds occurred, but only 806,637 of these were reported to Action Fraud, CIFAS or UK Finance.
- Of those 806,637 reports just 3 per cent (24,805) were disseminated by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) to police forces for investigation.
- In the same period just 4,853 fraud cases resulted in a charge or summons, which represents just 0.6 per cent of those recorded that year and just 0.1 per cent of those frauds that took place in that period (Home Office 2021, ONS 2021x).

The term “fraud” covers a wide range of offences, from the misleading door-to-door salesman through to complex City frauds and, increasingly, organised online scams which affect millions of people and inflict great economic cost. Each requires different capabilities, and is most effectively tackled at different levels in our public safety system. At present, not enough is done to prevent fraud and the police struggle with unrealistic expectations of what they can achieve. There is a national reporting system for online frauds, but, through lack of well-placed capacity and capability, it rarely leads to positive outcomes.

The restructuring we are recommending should enable a much more comprehensive approach.

The new Crime Prevention Agency we propose would be able to give priority to working with service providers on measures to prevent online fraud on their platforms. One of the main measures of the success of the Agency would be its ability to bring down fraud volumes.

There will be instances where it is most appropriate for fraud investigations to remain with local forces, such as where the victim and the suspect are in a single police force area. Local forces should also have a responsibility to identify and support vulnerable victims.

Where the fraudulent activity crosses force boundaries and involves organised crime, the new regional units, building on the ROCUs but reporting to the **\*\*S23\*\***, would assume responsibility. Given the volumes of cases, this would also involve some tasking of local forces.

The City of London Police, with its world-renowned expertise in tackling complex fraud, would continue to lead on serious financial sector and commercial fraud, including such cases where they are complex and beyond the capacity of the regional units.

**\*\*S23\*\***,

This structure would, we believe, enable the delivery of a more comprehensive and effective strategy for countering fraud. Within it, there is a question to be resolved about how best to ensure that reports from the public of online fraud were received and collated in such a way as to support well-focused investigative activity, and to build intelligence on fraud networks. At present, this is done by Action Fraud and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, both of which are located in the City of London Police, but with this reconfigured landscape the government would need to consider how best to discharge these functions.

prioritised, and **S23**,

This overall package would have the following advantages:

- It would ensure regional SOC capability was put on a stable financial footing, rather than as at present leaving it subject to decisions made by local forces.
- It would create a national SOC network comparable to the Counter Terrorism Network, with a clear chain of command to ensure SOC assets are directed in a coherent and rational way.
- It would recognise that the centre will always own more of the risk when it comes to SOC, which is less visible to local publics and less likely to be prioritised by local police. If the centre owns most of the risk it should control the assets.

Third, there is a case for some highly specialist crime related capabilities which need to be provided nationally, **S23**.

These are operational crime related functions that police forces are not in a position to deliver. This might include for example a new national forensic science service or national police air support.

Finally, we should note for clarity that we see no case for moving the Counter Terrorism Command out of the Metropolitan Police Service. All of the evidence we have seen during the course of the Review has highlighted that this is one of the most successful components of the national policing landscape. It should therefore remain where it is.

## 11.8 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have argued that the current police service structure does not provide the best organisational platform for delivering the capabilities we set out earlier in this report. It provides a poor basis for organising increasingly important specialist capabilities and for tackling surging levels of cross border crime. It is inefficient and hundreds of millions of pounds could be saved if it were reformed. The existing patchwork of collaboration initiatives does not provide a robust basis for organising cross force policing. Finally, there is a weak strategic centre in policing, meaning that there is lack of strategic direction for the whole system and a fragile organisational basis for delivering important national capabilities.

There are four options for change that would address the main weaknesses of the system by ensuring that specialist and support functions are brigaded at a regional level: Regional Police Units, the **S23**, plus Regional Police Support Units, regional police forces and a national police force. We believe that all four have merit in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, but that regional forces and a single national solution risk centralising power and diluting the connection between policing and local communities.

Of the remaining two options the expanded **S23** approach, combined with Regional Police Support Units, has the considerable advantages of clearer governance and a stronger national model for delivering serious and organised crime capabilities, which would be comparable to the way the Counter Terrorism Network operates.

While this option means the existing 43 forces would remain, we should note that we do not consider 43 to be the right number of forces. It is in many ways an arbitrary figure. We do not rule out future force amalgamations if these would promote effectiveness and efficiency. However, we have taken a 'form follows function' approach, which means we are less concerned with the 'right' number of police forces and more concerned with what capabilities should sit at what geographic levels.

**S23**,

42. The government should legislate to mandate the creation of Regional Police Support Units. These would host most specialist capabilities outside of serious and organised crime, alongside operational and business support functions for forces. These units would be funded by pooling local force budgets and a significant proportion of the savings made would be reinvested in local policing. The units should be accountable to regional boards made up of the local Chief Constables and Police and Crime Commissioners. Local police forces would focus on delivering local policing: neighbourhood policing, 24/7 response, local crime investigation, safeguarding and offender management.

This should be accompanied by a stronger strategic centre to ensure that there is a clearer strategic direction for the police service and that there is a stronger organisational platform for delivering important national capabilities.

## Recommendation

43. The national policing landscape should be rationalised in the following way:

- The Home Secretary should set the national strategic direction for the service, working in partnership with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs' Council through the National Policing Board.
- This strategic role of ministers would be supported by a new Crime and Policing Strategy Unit within the Home Office which would develop the evidence base to inform the national strategy, monitor performance across the system and horizon scan to ensure the system is always thinking ahead.
- There should be three main delivery organisations at the centre: the Crime Prevention Agency, the **\*\*S23\*\***, and the College of Policing.
- **\*\*S23\*\***,
- The College of Policing should be expanded to become the single home for all national policing improvement functions including learning and development, professional standards, developing the evidence base, IT and national procurement. It would also host a national workforce planning function and a data analytics function. The College would have powers to direct Chief Constables in relation to national minimum professional standards, workforce planning and common standards in relation to IT.

# 12. GOVERNANCE

**Summary:** The police governance system must ensure that the police are accountable to the public while remaining independent operational decision makers. The fundamentals of our system (the office of Constable, the operational independence of Chief Constables and the sharing of power between the Home Secretary, Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables) remain the best means of achieving this. Police and Crime Commissioners and directly elected Mayors provide a robust form of local governance and their role should be expanded into other parts of the criminal justice system. The biggest problem with our system of police governance is the lack of any mechanism for making binding national decisions. As a solution to this the Home Secretary should be ready to proactively use her powers to direct Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables in the national interest. The College of Policing should also set binding national minimum professional standards, common standards in relation to IT and mandatory requirements in terms of workplace planning.

The central question in police governance is how the police can be made accountable to the public without being controlled by politicians or overly influenced in their operational decisions by public opinion.

The English and Welsh system of police governance has evolved over the years as a response to this question, essentially seeking to strike a balance between the lawful discretion of police officers on the one hand and the powers of elected politicians on the other. Other sources of accountability have also long existed, in particular the police inspectorate (HMICFRS) and since the Macpherson Report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence the body that is now the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC).

In this section we explore these issues by, first, describing how this complex system of police governance has evolved, second, appraising the current system of police governance (looking both at the individual institutions and at how the system as a whole works), and finally making recommendations for change.

## 12.1 HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE NOW

The three central constitutional building blocks of the English and Welsh system of police governance are the office of Constable, the operational independence of the Chief Constable and the tripartite system.

The **office of Constable** is a common law concept that goes back way before the creation of the first professional police force in 1829 and so it is not defined in a single piece of legislation. It grants police officers an array of powers to prevent, detect and investigate crime

and disorder. Police officers are expected to use their powers “without fear or favour”, free from “improper political interference” and to do so “faithfully according to law”.

Police officers are given training and guidance on the lawful and effective use of their powers and authority but as office holders they have discretion to act or not to act; for example, they cannot be ordered to make an arrest.

Each sworn Constable is an independent legal official and has personal liability for their action or inaction, although the Chief Constable and the force have a level of corporate responsibility.

All police officers, no matter their rank, hold the office of Constable. Out of that common law office of Constable has evolved a further constitutional principle that structures our system of police governance: the **operational independence** of the Chief Constable.

The legal basis of this was set out by Lord Denning in his famous 1968 judgment, where he said:

*“I have no hesitation, however, in holding that, like every constable in the land, he should be, and is, independent of the executive. He is not subject to the orders of the Secretary of State, .... I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable, to enforce the law of the land. He must take steps so to post his men that crimes may be detected; and the honest citizens may go about their affairs in peace. He must decide whether or not suspected persons are to be prosecuted; and, if need be, bring the prosecution or see that it is brought; but in all these things he is not the servant to anyone, save of the law itself. No Minister of the Crown can tell*



*him that he must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he must, or must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone” (R. v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 1968)*

This definition of operational independence has, more or less, persisted to this day, despite efforts by politicians of all parties to push at its boundaries (Brain, 2010).

The **tripartite system** emerges from that understanding of the lawful discretion of the Constable and the operational independence of the Chief Constable. This is a way of sharing authority over policing between operationally independent Chief Constables and local and national elected politicians.

Over many centuries, local ‘Watch Committees’, often consisting of lay magistrates and justices, oversaw the work of parish constables and shire officials charged with keeping the peace. The establishment of county police forces, following the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835, led to more formal oversight, and Watch Committees were empowered to appoint ‘constables to keep the peace’, and also took on a formal, local governance role (Caless and Owens, 2016).

Following the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962, the Police Act 1964 put in place a formal tripartite structure for governing the police comprised of the Home Secretary, Chief Constables and local police authorities. The tripartite arrangements gave the Home Secretary an overall duty to secure an effective police service; made local police authorities responsible for maintaining an effective police force in their area and charged Chief Constables with the direction and control of their officers (Caless and Owens, 2016).

However, almost from the beginning the tripartite system was characterised by the relative weakness of the police authorities, the relative autonomy of Chief Constables and, in response, the increasing power of the Home Secretary.

Police authorities were usually comprised of nine local councillors appointed by the local authorities, five independent members selected following local advertisements and three magistrates from the local area. Over the years they were much criticised for being little known by the public and for their lack of robustness in challenging the police. One Police and Crime Commissioner describes police authorities as “futile” in that they failed to hold the Chief Constable to account but only “okayed” his decisions, while the

Chief Constable in turn only paid “lip service” to them while doing what he or she wanted (Caless and Owens, 2016).

Partly as a response to the weakness of local accountability, the history of policing from the 1964 Act was a process of increasing centralisation, with the Home Office taking greater control over the police, through issuing of policy circulars, tightening controls over senior police appointments, imposing frameworks of centralised performance management, and taking control of funding (Jones and Lister, 2019). By the middle of the 2000s, the government had overseen the introduction of a ‘National Policing Plan’, supported by national objectives, priorities and targets for the police, and the Police Standards Unit to monitor the performance of local forces and intervene in those seen as ‘failing’.

The Police and Magistrates Court Act 1995 and the Police Act 1996 reduced the size of the police authorities and transferred direct management functions and control over budgets from police authorities to Chief Constables. The 1996 Act also enabled the Home Secretary to call on a police authority to require its Chief Constable to retire. Further powers formerly exercised by police authorities were given to the Home Secretary by the Police Act 2002 and Police and Justice Act 2006, including powers to take remedial action where there has been a negative inspection (Home Affairs Select Committee, 2008).

It was in response to these failings that the coalition government elected in 2010 legislated the most radical change to police governance since 1964 with the introduction of directly elected **Police and Crime Commissioners**. The motivation behind the reform was to sharpen the accountability of Chief Constables to directly elected representatives of the public (Caless and Owens, 2016). This would then enable the Home Office to step back from intervening in local policing matters and focus on counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime (see Box 12.1 for a description of the way the current system works).

In the rest of this chapter we review the existing system of police governance. We do this in three parts. First, we examine whether the three constitutional building blocks of the system remain sound. Second, we look at the component institutions of the system in turn. Finally, we examine how the system as a whole operates, in particular the process for making collective decisions.



### **Box 12.1 The role of Police and Crime Commissioners, Chief Constables and Police and Crime Panels**

The Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 abolished police authorities and replaced them with Police and Crime Commissioners everywhere but in the City of London. In the Metropolitan Police area the role of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) was assumed by the Mayor of London and Mayors would later take on the role in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire.

The 2011 Act gave PCCs responsibility for the “totality of policing” within their force area, requiring them to hold the Chief Constable to account for the operational delivery of policing including in relation to the Strategic Policing Requirement published by the Home Secretary.

The Act also established a Police and Crime Panel in each force, made up of co-opted independent members and local councillors, to scrutinise and review the PCC’s key decisions.

The Policing Protocol Order 2011 provides a framework for how the relationship between PCCs, Chief Constables and Police and Crime Panels should operate.

The main responsibilities of the PCC are:

- To set the strategic direction and objectives of the force by issuing a Police and Crime Plan.
- To hold the Chief Constable to account for the performance of the force.
- To set the force budget and the council tax precept.
- To appoint the Chief Constable (except in London where the appointment is made by the Queen on the recommendation of the Home Secretary).
- To remove the Chief Constable subject to a process laid out in the Act.
- To enter into collaboration agreements with other PCCs that improve the efficiency or effectiveness of policing.
- To monitor complaints made against officers and staff.

The main responsibilities of the Chief Constable are:

- To lead the force in a way that is consistent with the attestation made by all Constables and to ensure the force acts impartially.
- To appoint officers and staff.
- To assist the PCC with planning the budget.
- To support the PCC in delivering the Police and Crime Plan.
- To have regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement.
- To explain to the public operational actions.
- To enter into collaboration agreements with other Chief Constables where this will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of policing.
- To remain politically independent of their PCCs.
- To manage complaints against the force.
- To have day to day control of the financial management of the force.

The Police and Crime Panel has powers:

- To veto (outside the Metropolitan Police District), by a two-thirds majority, the level of the PCC’s proposed precept.
- To veto (outside the Metropolitan Police District), by a two-thirds majority, the PCC’s proposed candidate for Chief Constable.
- To ask HMICFRS for a professional view when the PCC intends to dismiss a Chief Constable.
- To review the draft Police and Crime Plan and make recommendations to the PCC who must have regard to them.
- To review the PCC’s Annual Report.
- To require the PCC to attend the Panel to answer questions.
- To appoint an acting Police and Crime Commissioner where the incumbent PCC is incapacitated, resigns or is disqualified.
- To manage complaints against the PCC, except where serious, in which case these are referred to the Independent Office for Police Conduct.

In effect, the legislation means that PCCs define the “what” of policing – what police forces should and should not prioritise, what the public wants, what money is available for various priorities, and what should happen if the police are perceived to be underperforming.

The Chief Constables are responsible for the “how” – how the policing plan is put in place, how money should be spent, how police officers should be managed and led and how the public should be kept informed. (Shannon, 2021).

## 12.2 THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF THE SYSTEM

The common law **office of Constable** is the fundamental basis of the English and Welsh model of policing. The office provides the basis for a model of policing in which Constables enforce the law impartially “without fear or favour” and in which they have the discretion to make appropriate and proportionate judgments regarding the issues in front of them, subject to law, regulation and guidance. These are fundamental and important principles and they have helped make the ‘British model of policing’ one of the most admired around the world. For this reason we believe that the office of Constable ought to remain the basis of our policing system.<sup>45</sup>

The principle of the **operational independence** of Chief Constables is more contested. Few would argue with Lord Denning that a Chief Constable should never be instructed by the Secretary of State as to how to direct their officers or whether to bring a case before the prosecutorial authorities. These are clearly operational matters and politics should be kept out of them. However, as Lord Patten noted in his 1999 report on policing in Northern Ireland:

*“In a democratic society, all public officials must be fully accountable to the institutions of that society for the due performance of their functions, and a chief of police cannot be an exception. No public official, including a chief of police, can be said to be “independent”. Indeed, given the extraordinary powers conferred on the police, it is essential that their exercise is subject to the closest and most effective scrutiny possible.”* (Patten, 1999, p.32).

In his report Patten proposed that instead of ‘operational independence’ the term ‘**operational responsibility**’ should be used instead. This is a subtle but important difference. It means that:

- It is the Chief Constable’s right and duty to take operational decisions and that neither ministers nor PCCs should have the right to direct the Chief Constable in an operational matter.
- But that the Chief Constable’s conduct of all operational matters should be subject to public inquiry or review after the event.

We prefer this formulation of the remit of the Chief Constable.

Finally, some would argue that the **tripartite system** disappeared with the abolition of police authorities and the advent of Police and Crime Commissioners. However, it remains the case that authority within our system of police governance is shared between three parties: the Home Secretary representing the national interest, the Chief Constables representing the operationally responsible leadership of the service and the Police and Crime Commissioners representing the views of local people.

The implicit principle behind this tripartite structure has always been that power ought to be shared between the three parties and that none of those parties should accumulate too much power. That principle of balancing the professional judgement and operational responsibility of Chief Constables, with the views and interests of the public filtered through both national and locally elected representatives, remains essentially sound.

## 12.3 POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONERS

The Police Crime Commissioner (PCC) system has now been in place for a decade and we have been through three rounds of PCC elections. We can therefore come to some conclusions about how well the system is working.

First, the aim of those who created the PCC system was essentially to sharpen the accountability of Chief Constables to the public. We concur with the finding of the Home Affairs Committee that PCCs “have provided greater clarity of leadership for policing” and that they “are increasingly recognised by the public as accountable for the strategic direction of their police force” (Home Affairs Committee, 2016, p.3). Although most members of the public could probably not name their local PCC, nor could most people name their local council leader or even their MP, we agree with the Home Affairs Committee that having a single person accountable for policing policy has made the office more visible and accessible than the old police authority system.

Second, by strengthening local accountability in this way the PCC system has helped to anchor the police service around the demands and concerns of local people. While there are concerns about how well the system is responding to cross border and serious crime (which we have sought to address in Chapter 11), the

<sup>45</sup> The office of Constable does have some negative consequences, such as the fact that police officers found guilty of gross misconduct cannot be dismissed under the standard procedures of UK employment law. This can sometimes mean lengthily misconduct proceedings under the police regulations, which can be frustrating for victims of police misconduct.

PCC model has cemented the strong local dimension to our policing system that is so important for public confidence and for promoting collaboration between the police and other local public services.

Third, the PCC system has, by concentrating authority in one individual's hands, unlocked innovation among those responsible for police governance. One elected person with a budget can 'get things done' in a way that is inevitably harder with a committee structure. This is particularly true for the 'and crime' part of the PCC role, through which PCCs can fund and implement new crime and harm reduction and victim support initiatives (see Loader and Muir, 2016 for some examples).

Finally, it is also worth saying that the worst fears of the critics of the PCC model have not come to pass:

- It has not led to a general 'politicisation of policing'; or at least policing today is no more or less political than it has always been.
- By and large it has not led to PCCs interfering with the operational responsibilities of Chief Constables, or at least no more so than previous forms of police governance.
- It has not led to the election of 'extremist' candidates.

However, there are a number of problems with the way the system operates that ought to be addressed. First, there is the issue of the concentration of power in one person's hands and whether there ought to be further checks and balances introduced into the system. The area where there is most concern is in relation to **the appointment and dismissal of Chief Constables**.

In terms of appointments there has been a notable trend for local Deputy Chief Constables being appointed often without a competitive interview (Shannon, 2021). We addressed this in Chapter 10 by recommending that a national Senior Appointments Board play a stronger role in the appointment process.

The power of the PCC to dismiss the Chief Constable has been the subject of even greater controversy. According to the Home Affairs Committee:

*"The statutory process provides little safeguard, since there is nobody—not the police and crime panel, not the Inspectorate of Constabulary, not even the Home Secretary herself—who can over-rule a commissioner who has set his face to dismissing a chief constable." (Home Affairs Committee, 2013, p.4)*

The Police and Crime Panels have the power to hold a scrutiny meeting when the PCC moves to dismiss the chief constable and to go to HMICFRS to ask for a professional view on the PCC's decision. However, in practice, these checks and balances are weak: the PCC only has to "consider the panel's recommendation". The power of going to HMICFRS for an opinion has only been used once since 2012 and in that case did not ultimately change the outcome (Cooper, 2020).

The concern is that such untrammelled power in the hands of one person has created job insecurity throughout the Chief Constable rank and this in turn has led to increased churn and reduced tenure. According to a paper commissioned by the National Police Chiefs' Council published in 2018 the average tenure of a Chief Constable (excluding the Metropolitan Police Service) is just 3.65 years. Not all of this is due to the PCC system, but it is notable how many Chief Constables retired prior to the last PCC elections.

One way of addressing these concerns is to introduce greater checks and balances into the dismissal process.

### Recommendation

44. The Police and Crime Commissioner should retain the power to dismiss the Chief Constable, but this should be subject to a confirmatory vote of the Police and Crime Panel, requiring a majority of the total membership. The Panel may ask HMICFRS for a review of the Police and Crime Commissioner's decision prior to that confirmatory vote.

Second, there are no mechanisms in place to deal with **PCCs who have lost the confidence of the public as a result of poor conduct**. There is a mechanism for the Police and Crime Panel to suspend the PCC in the event that the PCC receives a prison sentence in excess of two years. However, there is a case for extending this in a way comparable to the recall mechanism for members of parliament.

### Recommendation

45. The Home Secretary should put legislation before parliament to introduce recall referenda for Police and Crime Commissioners. The possibility of a recall referendum would be triggered where the Police and Crime Panel has voted by a two thirds majority to express no confidence in the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) on the following grounds:

- Where the PCC has been sentenced to a custodial prison sentence.
- Where the PCC has been found following an investigation by the Independent Office for Police Conduct to have breached the Nolan Principles on Standards in Public Life.

Following such a vote by the panel there would then be a recall referendum where 10 per cent of the local electorate sign a petition to support one.

Third, there is a need to resolve **the relationship between PCCs and the growing number of directly elected Mayors in England**. We consider that the mayoral model has significant advantages. A Mayor can set common outcomes across a range of public services, bring together joint funding streams and encourage joint working. If we want public services that are capable of tackling complex problems through greater collaboration then a mayoral model provides a strong governance model for achieving this.

It seems likely that Mayors will remain a model for the metropolitan areas while counties continue to be overseen by a mixture of PCCs, local authorities and so on. In that case we need to address the anomaly of some police force areas having both a directly elected Mayor and a PCC. To have both a Mayor and a PCC is unnecessary and dilutes the clarity of accountability.

### Recommendation

46. Where a police force area is coterminous with the jurisdiction of a directly elected Mayor, the Mayor should automatically become the Police and Crime Commissioner for that area. The government should also seek where possible to promote coterminosity between police force areas and the jurisdictional boundaries of city-regional or regional Mayors.

The fourth flaw with the current system is that because Police and Crime Commissioners are 'corporations sole' and are not elected like MPs to seats on a representative body, they have no system for making collective decisions that are binding on all their peers. We address this problem later in this chapter.

Finally, we note that the Home Office's current review of PCCs (see Box 12.2) is exploring whether additional responsibilities should be given to PCCs. In particular, the Home Office is considering whether their role should be extended into the wider criminal justice system. Although it has not been within the scope of this review to consider wider criminal justice matters, we are supportive of PCCs (and their mayoral equivalents) taking on a greater commissioning role within the criminal justice system.

This is because there are elements of the criminal justice system that would benefit from greater local accountability and greater ability to integrate with the work of other local public services (see Lanning, Loader and Muir 2011). This could include for example some youth and adult offender management services. For example, if a local actor such as the PCC held some of the custody budget then this would create a strong financial incentive to prevent people getting into prison in the first place. An obvious next step for extending the PCC role would be to explore whether PCCs could commission youth custody places.

### Recommendation

47. The government should consider extending the remit of Police and Crime Commissioners (and their Mayoral equivalents) to include greater commissioning of wider criminal justice services, particularly youth custody and probation services.

### Box 12.2 The Home Office review into the role of Police and Crime Commissioners.

The Home Office is currently working on a two-part review of the functions of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) which intends to examine improving their visibility, ensuring they are accountable to the public, and whether their remit could be expanded into other areas.

The first part of the review, released in March 2021 recommended:

- Changing the supplementary vote system by which they are elected to first past the post.
- Making sure PCCs provide the public with clear information on their force's performance.
- Mandating the appointment of deputy PCCs to ensure continuity in unforeseen circumstances.
- Making changes to ensure more effective and consistent relationships between PCCs and Chief Constables.
- Potentially transferring fire and rescue authority functions to PCCs in England (Patel, 2021).

Phase two of the review, which is expected to conclude soon, is examining:

- Whether PCCs should be given a bigger role in parts of the criminal justice system including youth justice programmes, parts of the prison estate and (jointly) probation services.
- Whether they have sufficient “tools and levers” to drive and coordinate local activity to reduce crime, combat drugs misuse and tackle antisocial behaviour
- The police and crime panel model, specifically the benefits of independent members, identifying and securing the right skill sets and options to strengthen panel support.
- The existing mechanisms for investigating complaints and allegations against PCCs.
- Considering recall for PCCs for very serious breaches of behaviour.
- How PCCs use data in holding Chief Constables to account for the efficient and effective delivery of policing services (Malthouse, 2021).

## 12.4 THE HOME SECRETARY

The Home Secretary retains significant powers within the policing system, including:

- The power to direct a Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) or Mayor following a negative HMICFRS inspection under Section 40 of the Police Act 1996.
- The power to set the Strategic Policing Requirement, to which PCCs and Chief Constables must have regard.
- The power to recommend that a person be appointed by the monarch as Commissioner of the Metropolis.
- The power to require that the Metropolitan Police Commissioner is suspended and to call upon the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to resign or retire.
- The power to direct that certain policing functions be organised through collaboration agreements.

- The power to issue codes of practice for chief officers.
- The power to give directions to the College of Policing.
- The power to request information from chief officers.
- The power to set police pay and regulate working conditions.

In addition the Home Secretary appoints the Chief Inspector of Constabulary, the Director General of the **\*\*S23\*\***, the Director General of the Independent Office for Police Conduct and the Chair of the College of Policing.

Fundamentally of course, the Home Secretary provides most of the funding for police forces through the police grant.

The 20th century was characterised by greater control of the Home Secretary over policing, partly in response to the perceived weakness of local police accountability and partly in response to the political demands of dealing with rising crime. The 2010s



marked a significant departure from this historic trend. Theresa May as Home Secretary saw Police and Crime Commissioners as the principal figures responsible for holding the police to account. The Home Office consequently ‘stepped back’ and wanted to see policing act as a self-improving system without the need for constant ministerial intervention.

However, as crime started to climb back up the political agenda, the Home Office has increasingly started to reassert itself. In particular as the government has invested in 20,000 additional police officers there has been an emphasis on wanting to see evidence of impact.

A National Policing Board has been brought together to provide greater strategic direction to the police service. In addition the Home Office is now expecting police forces to report back to it on their performance in relation to a set of National Crime and Policing Measures, with an aspiration that these show improvement over a three year period. These cover murder, serious violence, drugs supply and county lines, neighbourhood crime, victim satisfaction and cybercrime.

We believe that central government must play an active system stewardship role in policing, in particular (as articulated in Chapter 11) in setting a strategic direction, ensuring performance is managed well and preparing the police workforce of the future. It should also be ensuring that core national capabilities are put in place to support policing to deal with the public safety challenges of the 21st century, whether these be the IT infrastructure required or the forensic capability upon which the whole system depends.

In Chapter 11 we described what a stronger strategic centre ought to look like in policing and the Home Secretary should play a leading role in putting that stronger centre in place.

## Recommendation

48. The Home Secretary should use her powers to put in place a stronger strategic centre in policing. In particular, she should:

- Through the National Policing Board set out a five-year national strategy for policing.
- Develop the Strategic Policing Requirement into a much more detailed document setting out the nature of the capabilities the government expects regional and local police organisations to put in place to tackle terrorism and serious and organised crime, including fraud.
- Legislate to mandate Police and Crime Commissioners to collaborate in Regional Police Support Units that would provide specialist and support functions for local forces.

## 12.5 HMICFRS

In England and Wales, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) is responsible for assessing and reporting on the efficiency and effectiveness of police forces in relation to operational policing, and has done so since it was founded in 1856. In July 2017, its remit was expanded to include responsibility to assess and report on the efficiency, effectiveness and leadership of the 45 Fire and Rescue services in England (HMICFRS, 2019).

The inspectorate is legally independent from political bodies and the police, and the inspectors are crown servants rather than being civil servants or employees. This independence and the fact that it reports directly to the public, is important in ensuring the objectivity of its reports. Its budget is determined by the government. Under the Police Act 1996 HMICFRS’s annual inspection programme for police forces became subject to the approval of the Home Secretary (HMICFRS, 2019).

HMICFRS makes clear it is not a regulator as it does not have the hard power of intervention, direction and enforcement but only the soft power of its “voice and authority” (HMICFRS, 2019). Tensions between HMICFRS, Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Chief Constables have emerged, in particular, over the resource implications of forces accommodating the PEEL regime. Critics have claimed that HMICFRS makes no allowance for the fact that forces have to make choices between competing priorities.

There have also been criticisms of the inspection regime becoming too onerous. For example, forces are now required to publish an annual 'Force Management Statement' detailing management, resource and performance information (Jones and Lister, 2019). These are intended to aid forces in understanding current and future demand so it can be proactively managed but have been seen by some as another administrative burden (EMPAC, 2019).

In interviews with chief officers, Shannon (2021) found that many resented significant aspects of Inspectorate oversight and half said the Home Secretary used HMICFRS to exert pressure indirectly through instructing it to carry out longer and more frequent inspections. Chief officers reported that HMICFRS contributed to their anxiety and added little to the quality of policing. An Assistant Chief Constable interviewed by Shannon described the relationship between HMICFRS and chief officers as "adversarial" whereas prior to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 it had been "supportive and advisory".

Some submissions to our Call for Evidence called for HMICFRS to be given powers to direct forces to make changes, rather than rely on the discretion of PCCs. Another said HMICFRS "lacked bite" and can easily be ignored by those who do not agree with it (CE2.20).

It is our view that HMICFRS plays a critical role in ensuring that police performance is measured and assessed transparently. The PEEL process is well structured and the clarity with which outcomes are presented on its website contribute significantly to the transparency of policing and its accountability to the public. We do not think there is a need for HMICFRS to take on regulatory powers and that its use of 'soft power' (voice and authority) is sufficient to drive change. We welcome the recent changes to the PEEL regime which aim to make it more proportionate and less onerous on forces, particularly those that are performing well.

There are two areas where we think change ought to be considered. First, it is not altogether clear what the relationship is between the standards set by the College and the standards HMICFRS uses in its inspections. This could be clarified somewhat if, as we argue below, the College were to craft a clear basket of national minimum standards that all forces must follow. If this were the case there would be an important role for HMICFRS in reporting on compliance with those standards.

Second, there is a need for more systemic lesson learning from HMICFRS inspections with the other

national stakeholders. There should be a regular forum through which the lessons emerging from the work of both HMICFRS and the Independent Office for Police Conduct can be discussed with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners, the National Police Chiefs' Council, the College of Policing and the Home Office.

## 12.6 THE INDEPENDENT OFFICE FOR POLICE CONDUCT

The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) oversees the police complaints system in England and Wales. It is independent of the police and the government, although its budget is set by the Home Secretary, who also appoints its Director General. It investigates the most "serious and sensitive cases" including injury or death after police contact, which must be referred automatically to the IOPC. Most complaints are dealt with by the professional standards departments of local forces, although the IOPC can assess the case for a review. In 2020/21 the IOPC received 4,674 referrals from police forces, began 465 investigations and completed 460 (IOPC, 2021).

The IOPC is the latest manifestation of various police complaints bodies and took over the function previously performed by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).

One consistent cause for concern, directed at both the IOPC and the IPCC (Independent Police Complaints Commission), is around the timeliness of investigations. Speaking at a recent Home Affairs Committee Inquiry, a Police Federation representative said while there had been progress, the pace of change was far too slow. He characterised the organisation as being "completely unaccountable" and "shrouded in secrecy", meaning it was not under any pressure to ensure investigations were completed rapidly and transparently. He told the committee that those being investigated felt "treated as though they are guilty" unless the Police Federation could actually prove their innocence from the start (Home Affairs Committee, 2021). Although the purpose of the organisation is specifically not to "punish police officers" (College of Policing, 2017, p.6), studies suggest police officers do feel punished by the length of investigations, the lack of communication from investigators, the lack of awareness of the effects of being investigated and a perception that investigations are weighted against them. Moreover, there is little acknowledgement about the effect of the process on the mental health of those being investigated (McDaniel, 2020).



These same concerns about the length of investigations and poor communication are shared by representatives of the families of victims who have died as a result of police contact. Representatives from INQUEST told the House of Commons inquiry that families bereaved due to police-related deaths are often failed by a system which does not meet their needs or give them the speedy justice they deserve (Home Affairs Committee, 2021).

However, a self-commissioned report states that the IOPC has made progress in reducing the time investigations took (IOPC, 2021). The current Director General Michael Lockwood argues that while there are some “legacy issues” relating to the length of investigations, these are left over from previous iterations of the organisation (Shannon, 2021). Speaking to the Home Affairs Committee in 2021 Nottinghamshire Chief Constable Craig Guildford (whose role includes implementing changes to the police complaints and discipline system) echoed this view. He stated that under the IPCC, the average length of investigation was 12 months, whereas under the new system, the majority were over in eight months, and 90 per cent were concluded within 12 months. He also said the regulations had recently changed so IOPC investigations were now less focused on sanctioning individual officers but rather on addressing systemic issues and seeking to generate and share learning so that mistakes were not repeated (Home Affairs Committee, 2021a).

The IOPC and IPCC before it have also been criticised for being too close to the police. It has been pointed out that 30 per cent of its investigators and 40 per cent of its senior investigators are former police officers. Some accuse the organisation of having “divided loyalties between enforcing the law and protecting their brothers-in-arms from legitimate criticism” (Gould, 2021). It is however common for independent complaints bodies to employ some former members of the service they are overseeing. This is for the simple reason that they understand the way the system works. There is inevitably a balance to strike between having investigators from inside and outside policing.

There has also been a criticism of the fact that so few officers (just 8 per cent found to have a case to answer for gross misconduct actually end up being dismissed (Busby, 2021). However, the IOPC does not make those decisions, which are made by police forces themselves under the misconduct process.

As discussed in Chapter 6 recent attempts to improve transparency by bringing in lay members and legally

qualified chairs may have backfired as these chairs appear more reluctant to dismiss officers (Busby, 2021; Home Affairs Committee 2021).

We welcome the progress made by the IOPC in seeking to conclude investigations more speedily and this progress needs to continue. We also welcome its shift away from a ‘blame’ focus and to more of a ‘learning focus’, with the aim of ensuring that lessons are learned so that the same problems do not reoccur in the future. We do think that more could be done to ensure that the lessons learned from IOPC investigations are considered at a strategic level in the police service. Again, there is a strong case for establishing a regular forum at which the major national bodies can discuss the implications of both IOPC investigations and HMICFRS inspections. In addition the IOPC ought to work with the College of Policing to discuss how learning points from its investigations can get into the hands of police officers so as to inform everyday practice.

### Recommendations

49. The national policing bodies should establish a regular forum to share learning from Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) investigations and HMICFRS inspections and agree actions to ensure that learning is taken forward.
50. The IOPC should work with the College of Policing to look at how lessons learned through IOPC investigations can be turned into learning points and put into the hands of frontline police officers.

## 12.7 THE COLLEGE OF POLICING

In Chapter 11 we set out an expanded role for the College of Policing as the single home for national policing improvement functions. Here we set out the governance implications of these changes. To perform its function effectively the College should possess powers in three areas.

First, the College’s powers to issue ‘codes of practice’ should be strengthened so that it can (with the support of the Home Secretary) issue binding regulations, mandating compliance with a basket of national minimum professional standards. Authorised Professional Practice would remain as guidance to which chief officers must ‘have regard’, but for these minimum standards, compliance would be mandatory. HMICFRS would inspect against these standards at the

relevant points in the PEEL process. These standards would be in areas where risk is high, where the public expect consistency or where the evidence base is so strong that there is no excuse for police forces not to follow the standard.

Second, the College would be given new powers to require compliance with common IT standards across policing, so to ensure interoperability and much more effective sharing of police data. We support the notion of operational independence (or operational responsibility) of Chief Constables but this relates to the direction and control of police officers and should not extend to complete autonomy in relation to IT. Policing needs information systems that work across force boundaries.

Third, the College would have powers to require police forces to cooperate with national recruitment, educational and learning and development programmes and to address emerging skills gaps. So, for example, if a decision is taken nationally to promote direct entry programmes or to create new career pathways for digital forensic examiners or financial investigators, then forces would have to cooperate with these. Operational independence (or, as we prefer, operational responsibility) does not mean the freedom to opt out of workforce programmes that are in the public interest as determined by the National Policing Board.

## 12.8 THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLICE GOVERNANCE

One of the most significant problems with the existing system of police governance is that it lacks formal mechanisms for making collective decisions. The legal entities in the system are the 43 Chief Constables and the 43 Police and Crime commissioners or Mayors. Each of these is a 'corporation sole' and cannot be bound by any collective decision of the others.

The result is a system which, for the purposes of making national decisions, moves at the speed of the slowest passenger. Requiring unanimity to develop shared national capabilities in critical areas is preventing policing from keeping pace with the major transformations we described earlier, not least in terms of technology. The fact that we lack a national forensics capability or a common framework for IT is because the system has tried to develop policy in these areas on a voluntary basis.

The Chief Inspector of Constabulary Sir Tom Winsor has proposed to resolve this by establishing a legally binding decision-making process for policing, which

he has called the 'Network Code'. This should apply to any area of policing where there is a need to make joint decisions and to provide a shared capability. The result is a system for collective decision-making in which majority or qualified majority votes would be binding on all parties.

We consider that such a legally binding agreement would be necessary if we were to retain an essentially 'self-governing' police decision-making system. However, there is an alternative, which does not require establishing a national decision-making body. This is that the Home Secretary takes a much more interventionist approach, using the powers she already possesses in statute to ensure decisions are taken in the best interests of the country. For example, the Home Secretary can require Police and Crime Commissioners to collaborate to provide particular functions jointly, which might be one mechanism for creating a national forensics service.

## 12.9 CONCLUSION

We have argued that there is much that is good in the English and Welsh system of police governance. The fundamental building blocks of the system (the office of Constable, the operational responsibility of Chief Constables and the tripartite system) are essentially sound and should be retained.

Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) have sharpened the accountability of Chief Constables and anchored police forces around local priorities. They are superior to the less visible and powerful police authorities that they replaced and should be considered as the core local anchor in our system of police governance. Nevertheless we think the PCC system requires reform: the power of the PCC to dismiss the Chief Constable ought to be reformed to provide for greater checks and balances and there should be the possibility of a recall referendum if a PCC is convicted of a criminal offence or if they are found to have breached standards of conduct.

We also observe that the mayoral model has the benefit of helping with the integration of public services and we think that more areas should adopt this model. In those cases the Mayor should automatically take on the functions of the PCC.

We think PCCs could in principle play a commissioning role in relation to offender management, which would help to create a more preventative emphasis within the criminal justice system and which could help to improve collaboration between the criminal justice system and other local public services.

We do however believe the time has come for a stronger role for the centre in our system of police governance. In particular the Home Secretary should be ready to intervene and use her powers to ensure binding decisions are taken with regard to policing in the national interest. In addition the College of Policing should be given regulatory powers in relation to professional standards, workforce planning and IT. Much more needs to be done to ensure that systemic lessons are learned from HMICFRS and IOPC findings.

# 13. FUNDING

**Summary:** In this chapter we propose a new funding system for the police service. This would retain the principle that local policing is funded in part by government grant and in part from local revenues. However, it would ensure that the funding system better matched the distribution of functions we have proposed between the local, regional and national levels. It would be designed to ensure that several of the priorities we identify are adequately funded. We also urge the government to attempt again to design and win support for a fairer and more targeted system for allocating the Police Grant among forces.

Although local government structures are outside our terms of reference, we favour the spread of more integrated models, in which the police and other services with a part to play in crime prevention are accountable to a Mayor. On that scenario, we argue for consideration to be given to a single specific government grant to support the crime prevention and harm reduction activities of all the relevant local agencies.

Finally, we review the cost implications of our recommendations and assess them against a framework of public value.

## 13.1 PRINCIPLES

The principles which have informed our approach to this part of the Review are these:

1. The funding of local policing should continue to reflect the shared interest of local communities and central government.
2. The arrangements for funding local forces should be transparent, as fair as can be achieved consistently with a strong element of local discretion, and based on need, and ensure the provision of at least a minimum level of policing provision.
3. Funding should ensure that long-term priorities, such as training and leadership, which represent investments for the future, are not neglected as a result of short-term pressures.
4. National functions should continue to be wholly or largely government-funded, **\*\*S23\*\***.
5. The funding arrangements should provide a timely and reasonably certain basis for business planning, both at force level, and in the national and regional institutions, extending beyond a single year.
6. Funding should support, and not obscure, rigorous assessments of performance and outcomes.

## 13.2 THE EXISTING FUNDING SYSTEM

Plans for government spending are set by regular Spending Reviews (SRs). These Reviews are, in principle, multi-year, in the sense that they make plans for the current financial year and several successors, with revisions as necessary through more limited annual reviews. In practice, political and other considerations (including, most recently, Covid) often intervene, and the planning cycle becomes more irregular.

The conclusions of the most recent SR were published in October 2021. The white paper (HC822 2020/21) indicated that the planned Home Office totals included an extra £540m by 2024/25 to complete the recruitment of the final 8,000 police officers of the promised 20,000 uplift, taking the total number of officers to 148,000 by 2023. It provided Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) with the flexibility to increase funding in each year, with a £10 council tax referendum limit (see below), noting that, if all PCCs took advantage of this, it would raise up to an additional £774m by 2024/25. There was also an indication of new money for crime prevention and to tackle drug misuse (£42m) and, from 2022/23, money laundering and fraud.

As each financial year approaches, the Home Office splits the Departmental planning totals for the following year between the services they support - police, immigration control etc; and within the total for policing, the amounts for the **\*\*S23\*\***, and the centrally funded “arm’s length” bodies (the College of Policing and the Independent Office for

Police Conduct (IOPC) (all of which, save for income generated, are 100 per cent government funded), and for the main Police Grant to forces.

As an indication of the amounts involved, for 2021/22, of the £14.6bn provided for the Home Office, the estimated amounts for policing were £4.7bn for the main police grant, £564m for the **\*\*S23\*\***, £49m for the College and £73m for the IOPC (HM Treasury, 2021).

The amount available for Police Grant is then divided among the 43 police forces in England and Wales, according to a formula which has been applied since 2013/14, and was originally developed in 2006 by the then Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). This is an attempt, based on historic information, some dating from the early 2000s, to weight the different activities undertaken by the police in each area. The original data have never been updated. The formula is simply rolled over from year to year and applied to whatever total sum is available.

The formula is widely believed to be an inadequate reflection of the real relative needs of individual forces. It has been criticised in successive reports by the National Audit Office (NAO) and the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and has been acknowledged by the Home Office to be increasingly detached from the real demands on policing. Following a review, the Home Office consulted about a revised formula in 2015, but it ran into opposition, mainly from parts of the country which would have stood to lose out financially and was abandoned in 2017. In 2018, the PAC returned to the charge, noting that the Department “needed to change the formula, to take account of all the demands on police forces, funding from local taxation, forces’ efficiency, and their financial resilience” (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee, 2018).

There are two other elements of central government support for local policing: a share of the DCLG formula funding for local government as a whole; and a smaller amount for legacy council tax grants.

These three elements come together in the annual Police Grant Report, which is usually published as a provisional settlement towards the end of the financial year and laid before Parliament in final form weeks before the beginning of the financial year to which it relates. Taking 2021/22 as an example, the formal determination, published on 22 February 2021, set out the distribution among the 43 forces of total Police Grant of £8.46bn, of which £4.7bn was the main Home Office grant, £3.6bn from the DCLG formula funding and £0.5bn from legacy council tax grants (Home Office, 2021).

To the government contribution can be added, for each force, a local contribution. Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) are required to agree with their Chief Constable a medium-term financial strategy aligned with their four-year Police and Crime Plan, and an annual budget which meets the statutory requirement in the Local Government Finance Act to achieve a balanced budget. In meeting these requirements, they have discretion to top up the central government grant, with a precept on the council tax revenues for the area. There are rules governing this. Above a certain level, set by the government as a proportion of revenue raised on a band D property, it requires the approval of a local referendum. But the government has, in recent years, been willing to increase the trigger point to allow more local funding, as they did in the example quoted above from the recent white paper.

This increased flexibility was particularly important during the period of austerity, when there was a substantial real terms increase in the local contribution. Between 2015/16 and 2019/20, it increased from £3.1bn to £4.1bn, and as a proportion of total funding from 28 per cent to 35 per cent (ref).

The current funding system for local policing is therefore a hybrid of central and local funding, with the central element including a substantial specific grant from the Department with the strongest interest in policing (Home Office, 2019).

## 13.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REVIEW

The first question for any review from first principles is whether this mixed system of central and local funding makes sense. There are two obvious alternative approaches. The first would be 100 per cent central government funding. Had we been recommending a national police force, this might have been a natural corollary. But the model we favour, with local forces concentrating on local issues amenable to their capabilities, a stronger regional tier and a stronger centre, if anything highlights the shared interest of central and local government in policing, and therefore the case for a mixed funding model, with a significant element of local discretion.

The other possible model would be to treat policing like any other local service, and fund it entirely through the rate support grant mechanism, i.e. to abolish the specific grant. But even with local forces focusing more on the local problems which they are best placed to



deal with, the government's interest in outcomes and professional standards would exceed that in most other locally delivered services. The Home Office is the natural home for that interest; and although, as discussed below, the Police Grant is, at present, ill-fitted to be used as a vehicle for this, it still makes sense to have it.

With local forces even more locally focused than at present, there is, however, a case for further relaxing the restriction on PCCs' and mayors' exercise of discretion to supplement police budgets by precepting on council tax revenues.

### Recommendation

51. The funding of local police forces should continue to be a mixture of central and local contributions. Police and Crime Commissioners and Mayors should have greater discretion to raise further revenues for policing via the precept.

There are however real weaknesses in the existing arrangements. The first is the inadequacy of the funding formula, as noted above, as a distributional mechanism for the Police Grant. This goes beyond the fact that the base data for the formula are out of date. The justification for a specific grant should be that it gives the government an opportunity to secure a measure of fairness between forces, and at least a minimum level of service across the country, to influence priorities, and to mitigate the fact that wealthier areas have more scope for using the precept to increase spending than poorer ones. The present formula does none of these. The existence of local discretion to top up the Police Grant from local sources means that the distribution of spend is never going to be absolutely fair. But there is evidence that some forces do much better from the Police Grant than others. Moreover, there is evidence that the gap between the best and least well provided forces widened during the period of austerity, in part because of the government's decision to reduce the grant evenly across all forces ("damping"), without regard to their historic funding, council tax base or financial resilience (Hales, 2020). That gap is being perpetuated by the mechanistic application of the formula in funding the 20,000 uplift in police officer numbers.

### Recommendation

52. The government should design and win support for a fairer and more intelligent system for allocating Police Grant between forces. Such a system would be based on up-to-date data, revised annually, and (consistent with this review) with a focus on the social factors influencing policing demand as well as crime levels. It would take account of Inspectorate perceptions and findings bearing on the capabilities and financial resilience of individual forces (a source which has become markedly richer in recent years), and of government priorities. It would aim to secure acceptable minimum levels of service in all parts of the country, and be robust enough to avoid or at least mitigate the marked disparities in outcomes which the combination of a mechanistic formula and the exercise of local discretion produced during the period of austerity.

The second significant weakness in existing arrangements is in the funding of the Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCUs). These are, at present, funded by the PCCs and Chief Constables in their region, with a smaller contribution from the Home Office. There is an annual negotiation between the head of each ROCU and the PCCs in the region, an annual budget which isn't settled until the last minute or later, and no certainty at all about funding in later years. The ad hoc nature of the ROCUs' funding has been criticised by the NAO and in successive Inspectorate reports, the most recent of which, published in April 2021, concluded that funding was "the single greatest barrier to ROCUs operating efficiently and effectively", and recommended that the Home Office should lead work to identify a more sustainable funding model (HMICFRS, 2021).

**\*\*S23\*\***

### Recommendation

53. To avoid the kind of protracted negotiation over essentially voluntary arrangements which has bedevilled the Regional Organised Crime Units, the **\*\*S23\*\***,

Third, several of the respondents to our initial Call for Evidence argued that the current funding system was so complex and short-term that it provided a poor basis for longer-term business planning at force level. It is certainly the case that the arrangements are complicated, with multiple sources of funding. The sum available for any individual force in a given financial year becomes known with any precision only a matter of weeks before the money begins to be spent. For future years, in relation to the government contribution, the best police planners have to go on is broad statements in expenditure white papers of the kind quoted above. All this sits uneasily with the PCC's duty to agree a medium-term financial strategy with the Chief Constable.

Others whom we have consulted, well placed from experience to comment, take the view that this is less of an issue than it might appear. In practice, experienced police finance officers have a good sense of how funding from the various sources is likely to stack up, sufficient to enable them to construct the budget. As in local government generally, the ability to hold and draw on reserves and carry funds from one year to another provides more flexibility than exists in central government.

Nevertheless, we think that it is desirable for the government to provide a more reliable guide to future funding. In particular, the implementation of a new funding formula should be done gradually so as to allow for proper financial planning.

### Recommendation

54. In any redesign of the police grant formula, the government should have regard to the need to give Police and Crime Commissioners and Chief Constables good notice of changes, to enable well-informed business planning.

## 13.4 A NEW FUNDING MODEL

The new funding model would therefore be as follows:

1. The organisations responsible at a national level for policing and public safety, **\*\*S23\*\***, and the College of Policing, would be 100 per cent government-funded.
2. **\*\*S23\*\***,
3. The Regional Police Support Units would be placed on a statutory footing but they would be funded from local police force budgets, given that they represent a pooling of existing local capabilities.
4. Local police forces would be funded through a revised formula which more accurately reflected an up-to-date assessment of need, improved incentives and ensured the provision of a minimum level of service.
5. Above that level, there would continue to be discretion for the grant to be topped up by contributions from council tax revenues. The restrictions on the exercise of such discretion could be further relaxed.
6. The overall policing budget would be redesigned to create a number of national ring-fenced funds to ensure that the priorities we have set out in this report are protected. These are set out in Recommendation 55.



## Recommendation

55. A number of earmarked national funds should be established to ensure that the priorities identified in this report are protected. These funds would be:

- A Serious and Organised Crime Fund: all funding dedicated to tackling serious and organised crime, **\*\*S23\*\***,
- A Counter Terrorism Fund: all funding dedicated to tackling terrorism.
- A Crime Prevention Fund: all funding dedicated to crime prevention activity, including the funding for the Crime Prevention Agency and the funding for local Crime Prevention Units.
- A Learning and Development Fund: most funding for police learning and development would be channelled through this fund and disseminated by the College of Policing, which would commission learning and development from police bodies.
- A Technology Fund: to ensure adequate funding for national technology programmes.

There is one further change which would be consistent with our recommendations, but would be hard to implement without significant changes in local government which are beyond our terms of reference. Perhaps the greatest impediment to the prevention of crime and social harm is the weakness of collaboration between the police and the other public agencies with a stake in the issue and enough locus to make a difference. The need for such cooperation is well-established, and serious efforts have been made over many years to create and operate machinery for that purpose. But all too often, whether as a result of austerity or just the pressure of other, seemingly more immediate, demands on resources, these achieve less than they should.

A concerted cross-agency effort to tackle the deep-seated problems in society which the police end up dealing with, frequently beyond their own capabilities, would be greatly assisted if there was a more integrated system of local accountability. As remarked earlier in this report, where elected Mayors also have oversight of the police, there have been moves in this direction. But

a more systematic, integrated approach could provide the political leadership that is badly needed.

Under such an approach, a funding option worth considering would be a government grant specifically directed at cross-agency work to prevent and reduce crime. This would not be easy to design or operate, not least because the government itself tends to be siloed and ill-adapted for the purpose; and the position of the NHS as a significant player organised on a largely national basis would complicate the picture. But the idea, in our view, merits further examination.

## Recommendation

56. We would encourage the development of a more consistent and integrated approach to local government structures in England and Wales. Under such an approach, we would recommend a more detailed examination of the idea of a specific government grant to support cross-agency work to prevent and reduce crime.

## 13.5 THE RESOURCING AND PUBLIC VALUE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS REVIEW

In this final section we offer a broad assessment of the resource implications of the report's recommendations. We also assess them against the public value framework recommended to the government by Sir Michael Barber in his 2017 Review of Public Value (HM Treasury, 2017).

### 13.5.1 Resource implications

This Strategic Review has been charitably funded and carried out with the assistance of a small team of the Police Foundation's staff. Without the resources of a government department it has not been possible for us to fully cost all of our recommendations. But it is possible to outline, with a degree of confidence, their implications for the resources devoted to policing and public safety.

The first, and in some ways most significant, point to make is that the time frame within which we have cast our recommendations is intentionally long, and extends beyond a single expenditure planning period. Some recommendations, we believe, are urgent, and where that is the case we have said so. But elsewhere our purpose has been to set a long-term direction and argue for a shift in focus over the next decade, principally towards prevention and public safety,

which, over time, would have profound implications for resources and how they are used. This is not, however, to say that they would necessarily add significantly to public expenditure, for reasons which are set out below.

The main changes we are recommending, which would have resource implications, are:

1. The creation of the Crime Prevention Agency, and of a ring-fenced Crime Prevention Fund, to fund both the Agency and its regulatory activities and an expanded system of Crime Prevention Units (CPUs) in each police force area. Some of the funding for the latter would come from the existing Violence Reduction Units which would be incorporated into the CPUs.
2. An uplift in community policing, though this is largely about the priority to be given, within existing resources, to community and neighbourhood policing. We envisage more of the already funded extra 20,000 police officers being dedicated to neighbourhood policing to deliver this commitment.
3. The establishment of a dedicated Learning and Development Fund, to be used by the College of Policing to support minimum levels of training for continuous professional development and leadership programmes. This is intended principally as a means of ring-fencing existing funds to give priority to such training, although the improvements to the quality and extent of the learning offer, plus the new Police Leadership Centre, will require additional funds.
4. Improved clinical and occupational health support for police officers.
5. **\*\*S23\*\***


6. A technology uplift for policing through an increased police technology budget, with priorities including the modernisation of the national databases, the delivery of interoperability and a significant investment in digital forensics.
7. Establishing a national forensic science service.

Some of these are, as noted, primarily about priorities within existing resources, and therefore cost neutral. Others would undoubtedly add to cost, but we also set out areas where significant savings could be made. In particular, doing much more procurement nationally would deliver economies of scale in areas like uniform, vehicles and equipment. Most significantly, forming mandated Regional Police Support Units would reduce duplication across local forces in relation to specialist capabilities and support functions. The lesson from the formation of Police Scotland is that significant funds would be saved by such a move over a ten-year period. These savings ought to be invested in delivering the spending priorities highlighted in this report.

At a broader level, the holistic approach to crime prevention and public safety outlined earlier in this report, and in particular the statutory duty to prevent crime would, if implemented, mean that much of the cost of essential preventive measures fell on businesses providing services, especially in the technology and finance sectors. These costs would, of course, need to be taken into account by the government, but there is a strong argument that they would also be business-justified, in terms of reputation and the consequent enhancement in consumer confidence.

### 13.5.2 Impact on public value

Sir Michael Barber's 2017 report to the government *Delivering Better Outcomes for Citizens* (HM Treasury, 2017) set out a public value framework, which has since been adopted by the Treasury as a tool for assessing the capability of public services to turn funding into policy outcomes for citizens. The framework is summarised in the graphic below (reproduced from the report).



The framework is intended for use by government departments and others responsible for public services. In the time and with the resources available, we have not undertaken any formal assessment of that kind. But we have considered, for each of the four pillars, whether, and if so to what extent, this report's recommendations will lead to a stronger policing and public safety system, more capable of delivering public value.

The first pillar (Pursuing Goals) highlights the importance of understanding the organisation's goals, and of ambition in pursuing them. We believe this report's recommendations, if adopted, would bring greater clarity about objectives, by defining the principal goals as being the prevention of crime, the improvement of public safety and the prevention of harm, and through a redefinition of the police role within a wider system in a way that is both ambitious and realistic about the particular contribution the police are equipped to make.

The second pillar (Managing Inputs) draws attention to effective processes for managing resources, the quality of data, benchmarking and cost control. Our recommendations for a revised funding system should contribute to better use of public money, through a better targeted police grant, more responsive to local needs, and active steps to ring-fence funds for priority purposes. The establishment of Regional Police Support Partnerships, delivering shared capabilities and support services at a geographical level where they can be provided more economically should release very significant efficiency savings.

The third pillar (Engaging Users and Citizens) emphasises the importance of legitimacy and engagement with the public. These are issues to which we have given much attention, because winning and retaining legitimacy with the public seems to us to be one of the biggest challenges facing the police. Our recommendations in Chapter 6 are directed towards that end, as is our support for a revival of community policing.

The fourth pillar (Developing System Capacity) is focused on the longterm stewardship of the organisation, building leadership and capability for the future. A recurring theme in this Review has been the challenges which, for all its strengths, the police service faces in the modern world; the need to develop the

relevant capabilities, and for high quality leadership. Our recommendations for an enhanced College of Policing and ring-fenced funding for training and leadership development are relevant to this, as is the proposed redistribution of functions geographically, which should provide an impetus and resources to build skills in areas such as cyber and combatting online crime.

Finally, if our report succeeds in driving down the burgeoning levels of online crime, it will have enabled the creation of substantial public value. Online fraud is estimated to cost business and the public £15bn a year (Skidmore et al, 2018). The economic impact of removing even a proportion of that would be significant. Even more significant, in human terms, would be the benefit if, together, our public safety agencies could prevent much more of the other forms of online criminality, notably child sexual exploitation, the human cost of which is incalculable.

## 13.6 CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have called for a recalibration to the way the police service is funded. We support the principle of a system that is partially locally funded and partially nationally funded. We do however think there is a strong case for reviewing the outdated funding formula that leads to the allocation of Police Grant. The politics of such a move are always treacherous but in principle there is no justification for keeping such a flawed formula as it is. We also think Mayors and Police and Crime Commissioners should have greater flexibility to raise additional funding via the council tax precept.

The redistribution of policing capabilities set out in Chapter 11 of this report also has financial consequences. **\*\*S23\*\***,

The Regional Police Support Units would be locally funded, given that they represent a pooling of local specialist and support functions.

Finally we think that the government should be more active in its use of the funding system to focus resource on strategic priorities, such as those highlighted in this report, including serious and organised crime, technology and learning and development.

# 14. CONCLUSION: A CRITICAL JUNCTURE

We started this report by quoting what Robert Peel told parliament in 1828 as part of his call for a professional police service to be established. Peel was clear that England was undergoing such profound change (a growing population, rising wealth and what he described as "the multiplying development of its energies") that the country had 'outgrown her police institutions'. The old system of the voluntary parish constable and the raising of hue and cry that went back to the Statute of Winchester of 1285 was simply untenable as a basis for public order during the raging tumult of the industrial revolution. Peel concluded that what was required was a "new mode of protection".

It is our assessment in this report that we have reached a similarly critical juncture. In the last year alone there have been a number of events that have tested the relationship between the police and the public. The police have been asked to enforce unprecedented restrictions on civil liberties during the pandemic. They have been challenged over racial disproportionality following the murder of George Floyd. The Metropolitan Police has been rocked by the horrific abduction, rape and murder of Sarah Everard by a serving police officer. Further disgrace came with the conviction of two officers for sharing photographs of murder victims Nicole Smallman and Bibaa Henry.

These events have taken place against a backdrop of longer running tensions and debates about the police use of stop and search, falling crime detection rates and the use of new technologies such as automatic facial recognition. Establishing police legitimacy may be a process of ongoing dialogue, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that we are at a critical point in the conversation.

In this report we have also identified a number of structural trends that have weakened our existing 'mode of protection'. The internet has undermined the traditional criminal justice role of the police, which functioned well where local offenders were committing crimes against local victims in local places. The technological revolution has created an entirely new venue for crime and harm that puts offenders beyond the reach of local police agencies.

Similarly, the impact of humanity on our natural environment is creating unprecedented tumult. We will need to develop new forms of resilience to cope with the kind of large-scale exogenous shocks that are likely to result.

Society is changing radically too, generating new demands and expectations. Social needs have become too complex to be dealt with by single agencies operating in professional silos. The criminal justice system has appeared unable to cope with rising reports of male violence against women and girls and of non-recent sexual abuse. The police have been left struggling both to deal with these new forms of demand and at the same time deliver their traditional service offer.

So how do we promote public safety in these changing conditions? First, the scale and complexity of these challenges mean that the police on their own cannot meet them. Instead, we need to take a much more systemic approach to preventing crime and harm. We need a public safety system as well as a criminal justice system. Such a public safety system should be anchored around a Crime Prevention Agency and backed up by a duty on business to design crime out at source. Locally public services should become much more integrated, so that the police, councils, health providers and others can design preventative services that take a holistic approach to complex needs.

Second, we need to provide the police service with the capabilities it needs to successfully fulfil its mission. We require a police service that is trusted and in which all members of the community have confidence. Almost everyone agrees with that, but if we are to make it a reality it means putting 'legitimacy first' especially when that is in tension with other objectives. It means that the industrial use of stop and search must end. It means developing a culture where bad behaviour is called out and those responsible for gross misconduct removed from policing. It means making neighbourhood policing the fundamental building block of the local police system, rather than a marginal extra.

We need a police service that has the skills and technology to meet the demands of the future. This requires workforce planning to become a

national function so that action can be taken to fill gaps in relational, digital and investigatory skills. We need to develop new career pathways in allied policing professions such as data analytics, financial investigation and digital forensics.

We need radical reform to police learning and development. The quality and delivery of training needs to change so that it is tailored to the individual officer and their aspirations. To transform learning expectations and raise standards, the College of Policing should become responsible for issuing a licence to practice to all police officers. Officers will need to renew their licence every five years, to demonstrate that they are up to date in terms of the knowledge and skills required to carry out their role. And we need to invest much more in the professional development of police leaders, particularly frontline supervisors.

Third, if those capabilities are to be delivered effectively and efficiently the police service requires organisational reform. Local police forces should focus on local policing. Regional police support units should be established that will deliver the vast majority of support functions and specialist capabilities. Serious and organised crime related capabilities should be housed within regional units of an expanded **\*\*S23\*\***

, and more such capabilities should be delivered at a regional level. These reforms would mean the system is better equipped to tackle cross border crime and would improve the delivery of specialist capabilities. They would also save hundreds of millions of pounds that would be reinvested in policing.

There needs to be a much stronger strategic centre in the police service. This means the Home Office taking a more strategic role, with enhanced capabilities. This means consolidating the currently fragmented national policing improvement functions within an expanded College of Policing, with powers to direct Chief Constables in relation to professional standards, IT and workforce planning.

Policing is at a critical juncture. If it does not embrace reform it will likely be overwhelmed by the scale and complexity of the demands coming down the track. But if we take the necessary decisions now the prize will be great: to develop the conditions in which our people can live freely and safely in the 21st century and to renew for our age the promise of the Peelian model, a form of policing that serves rather than oppresses the people and that can continue to be an example to the world in the art of reconciling order with liberty.



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# APPENDIX A – TERMS OF REFERENCE:

## THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE DESCRIBE THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE STRATEGIC REVIEW OF POLICING IN ENGLAND AND WALES.

### Purpose

1. To consider the challenges to public safety the country will face in the 2020s and beyond.
2. To consider what kind of strategic response is required to meet those challenges;
3. To determine what role the public professional police service should play as part of that strategic response.
4. To consider what changes may be required to the police service in order that it can play its part in meeting those challenges, with a view to improving the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of the police.

### In doing so the Review will:

1. Describe the changing nature of crime and the non-crime threats to public safety.
2. Understand the implications of those changes for how both state and non-state actors should respond to better keep people safe.
3. Consider what the mission of the police service should be in the 21st century, with reference to how the police mandate has changed over time and to public attitudes and expectations of the police.
4. Describe the main capabilities the police service will require if it is to meet the mission set for it.
5. Consider what the police workforce of the future will look like and what changes will be required so that police officers and staff have the skills

and knowledge required to deliver the capabilities identified.

6. Consider how the police service ought to be organised at the local, regional and national levels, balancing the need for the police to meet both local and national priorities.
7. Consider how to ensure the police are best held to account at these different levels.
8. Consider the efficiency of the police service and how it ought to be resourced in order to meet the challenges of the 2020s.

### Scope

1. The Review will focus on policing in England and Wales, although it will refer to evidence from Scotland and Northern Ireland and indeed to international evidence.
2. The Review will be strategic in that it will think about the long term challenges facing policing and public safety and will aim to set a strategy for policing that is designed to take it into the 2030s.
3. The Review will consider all of the different elements required to keep the public safe and secure, many of which are not within the control of the police service. It will consider the role of non-state actors, as well as other parts of public service, in achieving the outcomes identified. It will focus on the role and capabilities of policing but understands that policing alone cannot achieve the outcomes sought.

# APPENDIX B – CALL FOR EVIDENCE SUBMISSIONS

## Phase One

ADS

Amy Aeron-Thomas, Vision Zero

John Apter, Chair of the Police Federation of England and Wales

Association of Police and Crime Commissioners

Cambridgeshire Constabulary

Capgemini

Phil Cheatle, right to die campaigner

Andy Cooke, Chief Constable of Merseyside Police

City of London Police

College of Policing

Criminal Justice Alliance

On behalf of the Chief Constable of Cumbria Police

Cressida Dick, Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service

Durham Constabulary

Office of the Durham Police, Crime and Victims' Commissioner

Deputy Chief Constable Claire Parmenter and Police and Crime Commissioner Dafydd Llewellyn of Dyfed Powys Police

On behalf of the Chief Constable of Essex Police

Roger Geffen, Policy Director at Cycling UK

Penelope Gibbs, Director of Transform Justice

John Gilli-Ross, Chairman of the National Association of Police Fire and Crime Panels

Jodie Gosling, shadow chair, safer communities in North Warwickshire Borough Council Labour Group

Paul Griffiths, President of the Police Superintendents Association

On behalf of the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary

Roger Hirst, Police and Crime Commissioner for Essex Police

Robin Hodgkinson, retired Sussex Police Officer and member of Sussex CrimeWatch

Chief Inspector Patrick Holdaway of the National Business Crime Centre

Dr Chloe Holloway of the School of Law at University of Nottingham

Howard League for Penal Reform

Keith Hunter, Police and Crime Commissioner of Humberside Police

Caroline Hynds, a campaigner for Assisted Dying

Martin Jelley, Chief Constable of Warwickshire Police

Arfon Jones, Police and Crime Commissioner for North Wales

Just for Kids Law

Peter Langmead-Jones on behalf of Greater Manchester Police

Edward Leigh of Excogitate Consultancy

Lincolnshire Police

London Fire Brigade

Andy Marsh, Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset Police

On behalf of Darren Martland, the Chief Constable of Cheshire Police

Kevin Moore, Retired Detective Chief Superintendent at Sussex Police

Sue Mountstevens, Police and Crime Commissioner for Avon and Somerset Police

David Munro, Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey Police

National Aids Trust

**\*\*S23\*\***

Joint response from the National Police Chiefs Council leads for Neighbourhood Policing, PCSOs, Social Media & Digital Engagement, Troubled Families and the Public Health Approach to Policing

Prof Carole McCartney, Prof Michael Rowe, Marion Oswald, Dr Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou of Northumbria University, Newcastle

On behalf of the Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner of Northumbria Police

Police and Crime Commissioner Paddy Tipping and Chief Constable Craig Guildford, of Nottinghamshire Police

NPCC Local Policing Co-ordination Committee (LPCC)

Alan Pughsley, Chief Constable of Kent Police

Resolve Anti-Social Behaviour

Chris Rowley, Deputy Chief Constable of Humberside Police

Royal United Services Institute

Inspector John Shuttleworth of Devon and Cornwall Police

Dr Jonathan Smith, Director of Salmon Personal Development

Anthony Stansfeld, Police and Crime Commissioner for Thames Valley Police

South Yorkshire Police and Crime Panel

Desmond Thomas, Associate Lecturer at Solent University

Martyn Underhill, Police and Crime Commissioner for Dorset Police

Jeremy Vaughan, Deputy Chief Constable South Wales Police

On behalf of the Chief Constable of West Mercia Police  
West Midlands Police

West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner  
West Yorkshire Police

Dr Emma Williams of Canterbury Christ Church University, Centre for Policing Research

## Phase Two

Amal Ali, Criminal Justice Alliance

Amy Aeron-Thomas, Action Vision Zero

Avon and Somerset Constabulary

Mark Brown, MA in Criminal Psychology

Councillor Amanda Carter, Shadow Cabinet Member for Community Safety, Leeds City Council

City of London Police

College of Policing

Dr Simon Cooper, University of Essex

Elsa Corry-Roake, Revolving Doors Agency

Cumbria Police

Keith Ditcham and Helena Wood, RUSI

Mary Fraser

Owain Gower

Paul Griffiths, The Police Superintendents' Association

Craig Guildford and Paddy Tipping", Chief Constable and Police and Crime Commissioner at Nottinghamshire Police

Gwent Police

Linda Hindle, The Public Health and Policing Consensus Task Force

IOPC

David Jamieson, West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner

John Gili-Ross, Chairman of the National Association of Police Fire and Crime Panels

Will Kane. Mark43

Kent Police

Leicestershire Police

Lincolnshire Police

Nathan Mathiot, ADS

Merseyside Police

**\*\*S23\*\***

National Police Chiefs Council

North Wales Police

Police Care UK

Sherry Ralph, Chief Operating Officer ICVA

Dr Jonathan Smith, Salmon Personal Development

South Yorkshire Police

South Yorkshire Police and Crime Panel

Louise Sutton

Bill Tillbrook, Thames Valley Police

Thames Valley Police

David Tomlinson, retired Chief Superintendent and staff officer to Her Majesty's Inspector of Constabulary

UNISON

Warwickshire Police

West Yorkshire Police

Vicky Wibberley, Chair Derbyshire Police and Crime Panel

## APPENDIX C – KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWEES

Andy Cooke, Chief Constable Merseyside Police, NPCC lead Crime Operations

Olivia Pinkney, Chief Constable Hampshire Police, NPCC Lead for Local Policing and Children and Young People

Gareth Morgan, Chief Constable Staffordshire Police, NPCC Lead Communications and Director of Strategic Command Course

Neil Basu, Assistant Commissioner Metropolitan Police Service, NPCC Lead for Counter Terrorism

Peter Goodman, Chief Constable Derbyshire Police, NPCC Lead for Cybercrime

Martin Surl, Police and Crime Commissioner for Gloucestershire, APCC Board

Paddy Tipping, Police and Crime Commissioner for Nottinghamshire, APCC Board

Nic Pole, Principle Analyst (Futures), College of Policing

Nina Champion, Director, Criminal Justice Alliance

Suzanne Jacob, Chief Executive, Safe Lives

Anna Edmonson, Head of Policy and Public Affairs, NSPCC

John Hayward-Cripps, Chief Executive of Neighbourhood Watch

Melissa Case, Director General, Policy, Analysis and Communications at Ministry of Justice UK

Martin Griffiths, Clinical Director Violence Reduction Network NHS London and Trauma Surgery Lead Barts Health NHS Trust

Professor Martin Innes, Director of Crime and Security Research Institute and Director of Universities' Police Science Institute

Professor Betsy Stanko, Consultant, public sector analytics and Chair, Ministry of Justice Data, Evidence and Science Board

## APPENDIX D – ADVISORY BOARD

Nick Alston CBE, DL, Former Police and Crime and Commissioner for Essex

Sir Michael Barber, Chair of The Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales

Dee Collins CBE QPM, Former Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police

Nick Dale, Vice President Business Transformation for the UK Justice Sector, CGI

Dr Carlene Firmin MBE, Principal Research Fellow at The International Centre Researching Child Sexual Exploitation, Violence and Trafficking

Michael Fuller QPM, Former Chief Constable of Kent Police

John Graham, Adviser at The Dawes Trust

Inspector Caroline Hay, Inspector in the Metropolitan Police Service

Richard Hobbs, UK Policing Lead at Deloitte

Rt Hon Nick Hurd, Former Minister of State for Policing

Sir Bill Jeffrey KCB, Vice Chair of the Strategic Review, Chair of the Police Foundation

Helen King QPM, Principal of St Anne's College, University of Oxford

Sophie Linden, Deputy Mayor of the Greater London Authority

Stephen Lloyd, Former MP for Eastbourne and Willingdon.

Professor Ian Loader, Professor of Criminology at All Souls College, University of Oxford

Sir Denis O'Connor CBE QPM, Former HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary at HMICFRS

Matthew Polega, Co-founder and Head of Marketing, Mark43

Nick Ross, Broadcaster

Rt Hon Jacqui Smith, Former Home Secretary

Dame Sarah Thornton DBE QPM, Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner at the Office of the Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner

Rt Hon Sir John Wheeler JP DL, Vice Chair of the Police Foundation and former Chair of the Home Affairs Select Committee

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# STRATEGIC REVIEW OF POLICING

IN ENGLAND AND WALES

The world around policing is changing as radically as the world in which Sir Robert Peel founded the Metropolitan Police in 1829. It is in that context that the Police Foundation established the Strategic Review of Policing in England and Wales, chaired by Sir Michael Barber. It is the first independent review of policing for many years and is intended to be as influential as the last Royal Commission on the Police in 1962. This final report from the Review is our attempt to describe what kind of police service we will need to address the challenges of the 21st century.

Cover: [designbysoapbox.com](http://designbysoapbox.com)

Inside pages: [intertype.co.uk](http://intertype.co.uk)

# THE POLICE FOUNDATION

The UK's policing think tank

ISBN: 0 947692 81 9



2016 and 2020 the proportion of people saying they thought the police did a good or excellent job fell from 63% to 55%.

To tackle this crisis of confidence and ensure the police service can meet the challenges of the future, the report calls for radical reform to three broad areas of: police-public relations, skills and training, and organisation.

### Police-public relations

There needs to be an improvement in the relationship between the police and the public. The report includes a series of recommendations including:

- An **increase in visible neighbourhood policing** in every police force.
- **Improved training and support for sergeants and inspectors** so they are equipped to provide stronger supervision, tackle poor conduct and call out bad behaviour.
- **National targets to improve the diversity of the police workforce.** At the current pace of change it will take another 58 years (until 2079) for the police service to achieve a workforce that is representative of England and Wales in terms of ethnicity.

### Skills and Training

Police training needs a complete overhaul so that the police are equipped to take on new forms of crime. 40% of police officers say they had not received necessary training to do their job well. The report includes a series of recommendations to improve this including:

- **Action to tackle a shortage of 6,851 detectives** across the country, including expanded direct entry schemes to attract mid-career applicants from other sectors and a **new pay supplement to attract more officers into investigatory roles.**
- Every officer should be entitled to a **minimum set of hours per year reserved for learning and development.**
- The Home Office should introduce a **Licence to Practice for police officers, administered by the College of Policing.** This should be renewed every five years, subject to an officer demonstrating professional development through achieving relevant qualifications, passing an interview or presenting a portfolio of activities and achievements. Any police officer who fails this assessment could receive further support including mentoring. After successive failures they would have their licence removed and would no longer be able to practice as a police officer.

### Organisation

The way the police service is organised has not changed significantly since the 1960s. Local police forces should focus on local crime, emergency incidents and visible community policing. They are however poorly equipped to tackle surging levels of fraud and cyber crime. It is neither effective nor efficient for every police force to run its own HR, finance and other support functions. The report makes a number of recommendations to reform the way the police service is organised including:

- To tackle surging levels of fraud and cyber crime, the government should introduce a dedicated **Crime Prevention Agency that would be responsible for ensuring crime is designed out at source.** This new Agency would have powers to enforce a new statutory duty on large companies to prevent crime.

- **\*\*S23\*\***,
- The **College of Policing should be reformed and expanded to become a powerful agency for police improvement**. It should have powers to set mandatory professional standards for all police officers, to require police forces to address skills gaps and to require police forces to develop common IT standards so data can be properly shared between forces.
- **Specialist and back office functions, currently largely operating in each of the 43 forces, should be merged into Regional Police Support Units**, which would ensure they were delivered more effectively and would save hundreds of millions of pounds in reduced duplication.

The full details and data underpinning all 56 recommendations can be found in the full report. [https://www.policingreview.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/srpew\\_final\\_report.pdf](https://www.policingreview.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/srpew_final_report.pdf)

A number of meetings with Dr Rick Muir (Police Foundation) and with Sir Michael Barber have been held with workforce coordination committee as the NPCC conducted its strategic assessment of workforce, and the reports are very consistent in terms of identifying critical workforce skills (detectives, digital forensics, cyber and data specialists, and intelligence analysts) as well as more general enablers of service productivity (effective supervision, wellbeing, further emphasis on more empathic relational skills, a focus on prevention). The workforce committee will continue to work together with the Police Foundation as they take forward the implementation of their report and as we prepare the second assessment of our workforce.

But the report will also be of particular interest to a number of NPCC committees (Crime, Criminal Justice, Local Policing, Prevention, DEI, IMORCC and Performance).

[Back to Agenda](#)

### **Session 8 – (Verbal Update only)**

- **Policing Minister**

**Session 9 – (Paper and Plan in the pack)**

- **NPCC Inclusion and Race Equality Programme Revised Plan**
- **Discussion on HMG Response to CRED Report (Verbal discussion only)**

# Chief Constables' Council

## Title: Police Plan of Action on Inclusion and Race

24 March 2022/Session Item: 9

<p><b>Security Classification</b></p> <p>Documents <u>cannot</u> be accepted or ratified without a security classification in compliance with the Government Security Classification (GSC) Policy (Protective Marking has no relevance to FOI):</p> <p><b>OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE</b></p>	
<p><b>Freedom of Information (FOI)</b></p> <p>This document (including attachments and appendices) may be subject to an FOI request and the NPCC FOI Officer &amp; Decision Maker will consult with you on receipt of a request prior to any disclosure. For external Public Authorities in receipt of an FOI, please consult with <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk</a></p>	
<b>Author:</b>	CC Sir David Thompson, DAC Amanda Pearson - Race and Inclusion Programme
<b>Force/Organisation:</b>	NPCC
<b>Date Created:</b>	15/03/22
<b>Coordination Committee:</b>	N/A
<b>Portfolio:</b>	NPCC Vice Chair
<b>Attachments @ para</b>	Plan
<p><b>Information Governance &amp; Security</b></p> <p>In compliance with the Government's Security Policy Framework's (SPF) mandatory requirements, please ensure any onsite printing is supervised, and storage and security of papers are in compliance with the SPF. Dissemination or further distribution of this paper is strictly on a need to know basis and in compliance with other security controls and legislative obligations. If you require any advice, please contact <a href="mailto:npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk">npcc.foi.request@cru.pnn.police.uk</a></p> <p><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/security-policy-framework/hmg-security-policy-framework#risk-management</a></p>	

### 1. Purpose

This paper is to seek Chief Constables approval for the attached plan to be approved as the public facing version of the Race and Inclusion Plan. Following feedback in the consultation the plan has been revised to a new title of **"Race Action Plan: Improving Policing for Black People"**

### 2. Recommendations

2.1 Chief Constables are recommended to:

- Agree the attached plan.
- Grant delegation to the NPCC lead and the College of Policing Chief Executive to finalise the public version of the document for publication in April.

### 3. Update on Progress

The NPCC Race and Inclusion Plan team and the College of Policing have now carried out a period of consultation on the original areas of the Race and Inclusion Plan. Following this work the plan has been revised and is attached. The plan addresses three of the workstreams, given the fourth area was added later to the work. This latter workstream will be developed closely with the newly formed Independent Oversight Board which is finalizing its recruitment.

The plan is being shared ahead of council with the Programme Board and with the Stakeholder Group for the programme. There will be some changes to areas of detail that may be required. There is a new Programme Director and there is a desire to allow a period of assessment on the work. The plan will see language refinement to ensure it is an accessible and attractive document to the public. The government is due to publish its response to The Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities (CRED). It is important this report is assessed against this work.

For this reason, Chief Constables are asked to allow delegation to the NPCC Programme Chair and the Chief Executive of the College of Policing to sign off the final published version within the broad framework of this plan.

It is our intention to publish the final document on the 28<sup>th</sup> April 2022 however this will be reviewed in line with the adaption required.

The ethos of the plan is to allow adaption based on public feedback and so forces will be encouraged to consult Black Communities and their staff on its contents and public feedback will also be invited. A communication and engagement plan will be shared with forces.

We intend significant reports that impact on Black communities to be adopted as part of the programme work. For example, the recent media coverage of Child Q and the Hackney Council Safeguarding review has elevated a focus on strip search which is not specifically addressed in the plan at this stage.

## **5. Recommendations.**

Chief Constables are recommended to:

- a) Agree the attached plan.**
- b) Grant delegation to the NPCC lead and the College of Policing Chief Executive to finalise the public version of the document for publication in April.**

**Sir David Thompson QPM DL**  
**Chief Constable**  
**West Midlands Police.**



# **Race Action Plan: Improving Policing for Black People**

March 2022

Version 1



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## Foreword

In the summer of 2020 nations across the globe were rocked by the outpouring of emotion following the murder of George Floyd. It provided a catalyst for the expression of deep concerns about the social injustice experienced by Black communities. This was the same in the UK. Although this was a wider expression against societal injustice it was about policing.

Policing has a difficult history in its relationships with Black communities. The overt racism many of the Windrush generation experience included policing. The Scarman report, following the 1981 riots across England's major cities, identified the harmful impact of policing on Black Britain.

Stephen Lawrence's murder in London in 1993 and the 1998 Stephen Lawrence Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson were a watershed moments in facing up to racism in policing. The application of institutional racism was a seismic moment in policing's history.

***“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racial stereotyping”***

Much has been done in the intervening years by policing to address racism in the police and society. There has been a stronger focus on neighbourhood policing to bring us closer to issues affecting communities and their involvement and oversight in areas such as protests and stop search. A more robust independent inspection and complaints process to scrutinise the police. A much greater focus on policing being diverse and inclusive. As policing grows as part of the Police Uplift Programme there is a huge focus on building a more representative service.

Despite this, change has not been fast nor significant enough in Black communities. As we have prepared this plan we have heard the views of Black communities and their lived experience of policing. We have listened to the voices of our own Black colleagues about the service they belong to. The challenge for reform, set out by Macpherson, cannot be said to have been unambiguously answered by policing. Many people believe policing to still be institutional racist and have grounds for this view.

We accept that policing still contains racism, discrimination and bias. We are ashamed of those truths, we apologise for them and we are determined to change them. We have much to do secure the confidence of Black people, including our own staff, and improve their experience of policing - and we will. We will be held to account and we welcome scrutiny. We hope that in the future, we will be seen as the institutionally anti-racist organisation we want to be, because we took action and delivered on our promise to change.

That need for change is evident. Policing lags behind almost every part of the public service as an employer of choice for Black people. Confidence levels are much lower and our powers are disproportionately applied to Black communities. In some crimes victimisation rates are higher. Black officers and staff leave policing earlier in their careers than white staff and the fact we have only seen two Black officers reach Chief Constable / Assistant Commissioner Rank in policing's history is a failure.

Chief Constables have decided that they should initiate and own this plan. We need policing to be an actively anti-racist organisation and area taking the steps to achieve this. We need collective action across the entire police service to deliver the changes that we need, which is why we have agreed a national programme of action.

There remains overt racist behaviour in policing that has been highlighted by recent criminal and misconduct proceedings. This will not be tolerated. No-one in policing can be a bystander to such behaviour. However, more is expected than this alone. The majority of police staff would assert they

would not consciously tolerate racism. The challenge for this plan is to create a police service that is anti-racist. Only being 'not racist' is not sufficient. It requires a much more active approach and mind-set.

This has to be a mandate for a service that stands for justice. We know that societal racism to Black communities is much wider than policing. However, policing has a much higher obligation than any other public service with its ability to deprive liberty and use the most intrusive powers. The collective trust of society is critical to a police service built upon consent.

This plan and the work that flows from it is more than just tackling individuals who damage policing by their overt racism or the necessity to recruit more Black staff. It is about looking at how policing works and challenging the policies, procedures, operations and cultures in policing where racism, bias and discrimination exists so we can ensure there is no longer a debate to be had on policing and institutional racism.

This plan starts to set out what we will do. It will iterate as we develop it. Our Independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board will actively challenge this work to ensure it is the best it can be bringing public accountability and informed input.

Signed:



Chief Constable Sir David Thompson QPM DL  
West Midlands Police  
Chief Constables Council, Vice Chair

Signed:



Chief Constable Andy Marsh QPM  
Chief Executive Officer, College of Policing

## Overview

### **Our vision is for a police service that is anti-racist and trusted by Black people**

Black people do not receive a service that is good enough from policing.

Much has been done over the years to tackle racism, discrimination and bias in policing, but it is still the case that Black people have a very different experience of policing than white people.

Black people are more likely to be stopped and searched, subjected to the use of force and experience disproportionate negative outcomes across the criminal justice system. Testimonies abound of Black people, particularly young Black men finding these encounters – particularly stop and search - confrontational, stigmatising and humiliating.<sup>1</sup>

While the policing workforce may be more diverse than it has ever been, Black people continue to be significantly under-represented in policing than they are in society and in other public sector workforces. Black officers and staff are also more likely to have routine performance management issues escalated into formal disciplinary proceedings and there are specific concerns around retention and progression. There have also been disturbing accounts from whistle-blowers of victimisation they endured for calling out the racism and discrimination of colleagues.

Negative disparities and experiences weigh heavily on the police service's reputation both as a protector of the communities it serves and as an employer. They severely damage the trust and confidence of Black people in policing, who are then less likely to call the police for help, less likely to share information, and less likely to work with us. This poses a serious challenge to policing's legitimacy and effectiveness.

We accept that we cannot fully explain let alone justify the extent of these negative disparities. Policing needs to ask itself difficult and uncomfortable questions about why they persist and what is fuelling them.

Racism, bias and discrimination are still present in policing. There is growing awareness across the service that these behaviours can take many forms and operate at different levels:

- At individual level, a person's attitudes and actions can support or perpetuate racism in conscious and unconscious ways. Even people who categorise themselves as non-racist are often exposed to negative racial stereotypes, embedded in our culture that can unwittingly influence their behaviours.
- Interpersonal racism exists when individuals share racist slurs and hateful ideas with each other. When these individuals are colleagues, it creates a permissive environment for racism and a toxic working culture, regardless of whether behaviour is described as "banter" or takes place on WhatsApp rather than in the office.
- At an organisational level, inequitable outcomes can arise for Black and other ethnic minority individuals as a result of policies with discriminatory impact and practices that are guided by engrained cultural biases. These policies and practices do not mention any racial group but they can nevertheless create and compound disadvantage. In this way, the deleterious impact of racism, discrimination and bias can persist even in organisations that have formally disavowed them.
- Racism, discrimination and bias also exist at a wider societal level. There is a large body of evidence that Black and ethnic minority people suffer system-wide disadvantage and poorer

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<sup>1</sup> See for example: Criminal Justice Alliance, "[No Respect: Young BAME men, the police and stop and search](#)", Briefing, 2017

outcomes across health, education, employment and housing. Policing cannot solve these problems but it needs to be alert to the danger of exacerbating them.

Through this Action Plan, Chief Constables and the College of Policing commit to eradicating racism, discrimination and bias in all their guises wherever they exist in policing. We accept that it is not enough to prohibit these behaviours and that everyone in policing needs consciously to commit to understanding and addressing the impact of existing structures, processes, policies and practices. It requires issues of race and racism to be consciously at the front of our minds in policing.

This document represents where policing is in developing that plan. It is a working document that will develop and evolve further based on public feedback and check and challenge from the Independent Scrutiny Oversight Board (ISOB). As it evolves, further iterations of the plan will be shared with the public.

## An Anti-Racist police service

At the heart of this plan is the ambition to transform policing into an anti-racist service, by which we mean a service that consciously strives to provide equal treatment and opportunities for all people on an individual, workplace and organisation level. This requires us to address racial disparities in policing proactively and not to exacerbate those that may exist elsewhere in society and to be continually aware of issues of race and racism.



Achieving this ambition will involve a concerted drive for culture change across the service. At individual and workplace level, officers and staff will need to be equipped with the tools and cultural competency they need to recognise internalised racism and bias on their part and to interrupt these behaviours wherever they see them. As set out in the Plan, these tools will include high quality data to bring to the surface adverse impact in the use of police powers, such as stop and search, taser and – for the first time – traffic stops, as well as guidance and training on understanding and limiting racial disproportionality.

We also commit to training officers and staff to develop a keen awareness of how their every action in tackling crime and keeping people safe affects the confidence of the community. This includes



incorporating Black History, the history of policing's relationship with Black communities and awareness of the consequential individual and community trauma, into the core curriculum for learning and development.

We will ensure officers understand the context they are operating in and to be alert to the potential of their interactions with Black people and communities to evoke intergenerational memories of past traumas. Among those traumas are the inner-city riots of the early 1980s and the catastrophic failings in the 1993 investigation into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence.

Culture change is not just an aspiration - it will be enforced. Officers and staff will need to evidence and demonstrate anti-racist behaviours as a condition for promotion. We will also support forces in putting in place mechanisms to proactively identify and rectify racist behaviours and bias relating to interactions with Black people. We will ensure there is appropriate resource around identifying and investigating racist behaviour in the service and establish zero tolerance for all manifestations of racism.

A major component of culture change must also be the incorporation of Black people's lived experience in policing practice and amplifying the voices of Black colleagues and staff networks.

This Plan commits to ensuring that forces demonstrate that they have adequate representation of Black communities on scrutiny panels and other local accountability mechanisms and to designing a range of engagement methods to ensure that Black voices are heard and responded to. It also pledges to put in place robust infrastructure for staff networks across the force and ensuring that Black people are appropriately represented on selection, promotion and misconduct panels.

At organisational level, achieving an anti-racist police service will entail a careful audit of policies, practices, functions and processes to uncover practices and behaviours which may seemingly appear benign but may inadvertently discriminate against ethnic minority groups. Much of this work will be carried out by the College of Policing and is already underway.

This Plan also sets out how we will work with organisations across the policing landscape and criminal justice system to ensure that these changes have system-wide effect. The police service is the gateway of the criminal justice system and works daily with many other agencies to solve problems and intervene in the lives of people and communities in all sorts of ways. This puts us in a strong position to work with partners in making an important contribution to achieving a society that includes all people on an equal footing.

## **Why are we focussing on Black people and communities?**

The Plan focuses on policing's poor relationship with Black people and communities, which includes people from Black African, Black Caribbean, Black Other, Black British, and Mixed-Black backgrounds. We know that disparities also exist in policing's relationships with other ethnic minorities, including the UK's Asian communities and Gypsies, Roma and Travellers and do not wish to diminish this at all. Evidence is strong, however, that it is among Black people where disparities are by far the widest:

- While there is disparity in the rates of stop search among other ethnic minorities it is at a lower level than with Black people so the stop and search rate is Black people – 54 per 1000, Asian people – 15 per 1000; White people – six per 1000.<sup>2</sup>
- Other ethnic minorities are more likely to consider a career in policing – 4.8 per cent recent recruits from 2020 are Asian compared with 1.5 per cent Black.
- Black people have significantly lower than average rates of confidence in their police force, 64 per cent compared with an average of 74 per cent. Among Black Caribbean people the

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<sup>2</sup> [Stop and search - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](https://ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/) see Stop and search rate per 1,000 by ethnicity

rate is just 54 per cent. Asian people, meanwhile, have higher than average rates of confidence in their police force at 77 per cent.<sup>3</sup>

These factors explain why we are taking urgent, targeted action now to build policing's relationship with Black people and communities specifically. Disparities across other ethnic minorities must, of course, also be addressed through focused and dedicated action, some of which is already underway and supported through wider diversity, equality and inclusion work. Where we find disparities affecting Black people that are also felt by other ethnic groups, we will seek to address the disparity for all ethnic groups.

This Action Plan, with its focus on Black people and communities, is just one part of activity underway in policing to improve the service we provide to under-represented groups. There are many other communities who need to be better served by policing, either because they are under-represented in our workforce or because our engagement with them is not as good as it should be, or both. This wider work continues under Chief Constable Carl Foulkes who leads the NPCC Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Portfolio.

In 2018, the National Police Chiefs' Council published a seven-year Diversity, Equality and Inclusion Strategy (DEI Strategy), which provides dedicated structures and support for improving these relationships.<sup>4</sup> Initiatives under the strategy include a dedicated portfolio for addressing Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities' concerns around bias, discrimination, heavy-handedness and inconsistency in the way they are policed.<sup>5</sup> The portfolio has promoted the provision of sufficient accommodation for Gypsies and Travellers on small properly managed sites with access to health, education and all the services other communities would expect. It has also developed operational guidance on unauthorised encampments and is focussing on the impact of the legislation contained within the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts (PCSC) Bill.

A dedicated portfolio has also been established for tackling hate crime - another key priority of the DEI strategy. The portfolio aims to improve leadership and expertise in this area and recent work has included collaborating with the National Sikh Police Association to launch 'Sikh Guard,' a hate crime reporting portal for the Sikh community.

Alongside our efforts to support greater ethnic diversity in policing, we are also striving to remove barriers faced by people with disabilities or neurodivergence. The NPCC and the College of Policing commissioned a major study into the extent to which forces support these individuals and adopt best practice around workplace adjustments.<sup>6</sup> The study, published in 2021, uncovered some worrying inconsistencies across forces and set wide-ranging recommendations around leadership, effective employee networks, culture and language. The NPCC has committed to delivering the recommendations over the next two years. Our aim is for people with disabilities and neurodivergence find in policing a workplace where they have the support they need to reach their full potential and the confidence to be themselves.

## **Recognising and building on progress to date**

A significant amount of work has been done over the years in policing with the goal of becoming more diverse and inclusive, especially over the past two years since the summer of 2020. The Uplift

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<sup>3</sup> [Confidence in the local police - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](https://ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/)

See Section 3 "By Ethnicity Over Time".

<sup>4</sup> [NPCC Diversity, Equality Inclusion Strategy](#), 2018-2025, published 2018

<sup>5</sup> "Policing by Consent: Understanding and Improving relations between Gypsies, Roma, Travellers and the police", The Traveller Movement

<sup>6</sup> "Discovery report into workplace adjustments", College of Policing, 2021



programme to recruit 20,000 new officers has been used to support a concerted national drive to increase intake of Black and ethnic minority recruits, which has included the introduction new online assessments. This follows the launch in the past decade of new entry routes and fast-tracking programmes that have helped recruit and promote more people from under-represented groups.<sup>7</sup>

We have also put in place mentoring and development programmes to encourage and support applications from Black, Asian and ethnic minority backgrounds for the most senior positions in the service. At local level, police forces have been adopting positive action to diversify recruitment and support progression of under-represented groups. We have delivered a programme of peer support on the attraction and recruitment of under-represented groups, and will deliver another on the progression and promotion of Minority Ethnic and specifically Black officers. This work shares effective practice across forces to support their local activities. Nationally, we have provided forces with clearer legal guidance and using Positive Action and delivered the 'All Together Better' Campaign to promote and explain the benefits of positive action to the wider workforce.

There is now a Code of Ethics for policing that sets expectations for professional standards and behaviour, as well as a Code of Vetting and a Barred List to ensure that those who fail to live up to those standards cannot serve. The national curriculum has been revised to incorporate new competencies, values and behaviours and to cover police ethics, racism and bias issues and the needs of different communities. The curriculum for new entry routes has been updated to cover these issues in far greater depth – as standalone segments and integrated across topics.

On the operational side, there has been a significant and sustained improvement in the way that forces record and investigate hate crime, reflecting the strong commitment among senior police officers to improve the confidence of victims.<sup>8</sup> Stop and search has been opened up to local and national scrutiny. Data on stop and search, including breakdowns of stops by ethnicity are collected and published nationally. Principles for establishing ethnically diverse and independently chaired local scrutiny panels for stop and search have been set out in national guidelines produced by the College of Policing.<sup>9</sup> These guidelines promote the use of Body Worn Video and the adoption by forces of community complaints trigger policies, which set out the volume or nature of complaints about stop and search at which the police must explain its use of the power to scrutiny groups.

More broadly, since 2020, we have provided workshops for forces on how to be more inclusive when designing products and improve participation from underrepresented groups and assess the equality impact of their policies and practices.

Finally, forces have tried out approaches which are featured later in the plan:

- Scrutiny of stop and search using data and analysis and supervisor reviews
- Community engagement using innovation hubs which build trust and confidence by drawing on the lived experience of Black people

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<sup>7</sup> For example, according to the Police Workforce Census, at 31st March 2021, 13.6 % of those recruited to policing via the new Degree Holder Entry Programme (DHEP) were Black, Asian or other ethnic minority, compared to 11.1% from the traditional entry route, the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme.

<sup>8</sup> "[The Macpherson Inquiry 22 years on](#)" - Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, July 2021, para 105105. "The Macpherson report brought about a transformation in the way police recognise racist incidents and deal with racist crimes, and we found a strong commitment from senior police officers to maintain the progress that had been made. This seismic change is one of the most important legacies of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the vital work of those who fought to make sure the inquiry happened."

<sup>9</sup> [Stop and search \(college.police.uk\)](https://college.police.uk)

- Improving police learning by involving the Black community in delivery to new recruits

While all these changes have had a positive impact, they have not, as we know, been truly transformational. There is clearly much more to do to build an inclusive workforce and to address the negative disparities that continue to alienate many members of our Black communities. New national approaches are needed, including rolling out force approaches with promising results, and are what this plan intends to deliver.

## How will this plan deliver change?

This plan builds on the progress that has already been made but also recognises that we urgently need to accelerate the pace of change. What makes this plan different from past interventions is:

- Independent oversight and scrutiny. An Independent Oversight and Scrutiny Board (ISOB), chaired by Barrister Abimbola Johnson, will publicly hold policing to account over its delivery of the plan and its progress on race and diversity.
- The service-wide commitment led from the top for the need for urgent change. This does not mean there is a 'quick' fix to the immense challenges that exist but all chief constables have committed to delivering significant progress as a matter of priority.
- A recognition that while tackling individual and interpersonal racism, we also need to interrogate and challenge organisational policies, systems and processes that create negative disparities for Black people within and interacting with policing.
- The visualisation for the first time of what an anti-racist police should look like to make Black people feel protected, respected and involved across the communities we serve and are represented and supported across our workforce.
- A governance structure that ensures forces will be held to account at a local and national level for delivery against this Plan (**Appendix D**).
- This creation and co-ordination of the delivery of this Plan is being funded with contributions from every police Force across England and Wales into the NPCC. This includes a budget for establishing and running an effective Independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board. Chiefs and PCCs will also fund initiatives within their areas that support delivery of this plan. The College of Policing has also dedicated funding to this plan.

There have been many watershed moments in policing both nationally and globally followed by numerous reports and recommendations for change. This plan marks a commitment from policing in England and Wales to own and drive that change to provide fair and just policing for all – without bias, discrimination or prejudice and to stand up and against racism in all its manifestations.

## How has the Plan been developed?

The Plan has been developed with input from stakeholders both inside and outside of policing. It has been informed by research conducted by the College of policing and by the previous Inspections and Reviews into policing and race. (**Appendix E**)

It has been developed in close partnership between the NPCC and the College of Policing. Chief Constables lead our organisation but the College are critical in ensuring evidence based practice and standards are set to reinforce this work.

Insight work with focus groups and polling was undertaken on core themes in the plan. This identified the need to demonstrate how the plan would deliver: tangible changes; equitable services to Black people; protect Black people from crime and racist behaviour and secure ongoing input from Black people to shape, deliver and scrutinise the Plan.

A joint NPCC/College of Policing central team have co-ordinated the development of this Plan and will work with forces to support delivery of it across England and Wales. This team brought together officers and staff with lived experience together with specialists in programme management, communications, research and analysis.

Chief Constables have led on developing key aspects of the plan including;

- Chief Constable Pam Kelly leading on internal culture and inclusivity
- Chief Constable Lucy D'Orsi leading on use of police powers
- Deputy Chief Constable Claire Parmenter leading on community relations and engagement; and
- Assistant Chief Constable Matt Ward leading on protection from victimisation

Underpinning these four main areas are three 'enabling' drivers of change:

- Performance, data and analysis – access and use of data giving an understanding of adverse impact and driving policy and practice to ensure legitimate use.
  - Communications and stakeholder engagement – to have meaningful engagement in policing and to have a balanced narrative for policing.
  - Research, evidence and evaluation – to have effective practice based on evidence and insight to drive service-wide improvements. This is led by the College of Policing to ensure that all of our actions are guided by evidence-based practice.

We have also consulted with leading figures in this area and wider internal and external organisations including the National Black Police Association; Association of Police and Crime Commissioners; Inclusion and Race stakeholder groups and others. The development of this Plan is an iterative process that will continue to be shaped by the input of stakeholders.

## **How progress and delivery of the Plan will be measured and scrutinised?**

We know that for this Plan to be meaningful, in addition to the actions themselves, it needs to describe how progress will be measured, tracked and reported upon. A performance framework sits alongside the actions, supported by a data strategy that collects, analyses, shares and publishes data to inform and problem solve.

The 2017 Lammy Review of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) representation in the Criminal Justice System highlighted the importance of collecting data for surfacing negative disparities – with the next step being to either explain the disparities or change the practices that contribute to them. This will be the approach we follow as we develop data further to support delivery of the plan. For some areas, policing doesn't currently collect and analyse data in a consistent way, where there are gaps in the data which prevent us applying the 'Lammy test' this plan will strive to close those working with key partners in the Home Office, Office for National Statistics, and other criminal justice partners.

Datasets will include proportionality and fairness in the use of powers, experiences of those who come into contact with the police, treatment of victims and witnesses, public trust and confidence, as well as recruitment, retention, progression and internal misconduct data. We will also explore introducing ethnicity pay gap reporting and other national equality and inclusion data sets. Further details and baselines for existing data are set out in **Appendix B**

The College of Policing sets standards for policing and our intention is to ensure we can create stronger objective standards for work in this area that forces will need to follow. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) use these standards to inspect police forces and will be inspecting forces and national bodies against the themes in this plan. The Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) supports local Police and Crime Commissioners and Mayors to hold Chief Constables to account for delivery against this plan.

Independent scrutiny is crucial to success and the introduction of an Independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board (ISOB), led by the Independent Chair, Barrister Abimbola Johnson, will provide vital external check and challenge on behalf of communities. The ISOB will report publicly on its assessment of progress against the plan and the overall ambition of becoming an anti-racist police service trusted by Black people.

## **Actions to achieve an anti-racist police service.**

### **Work stream 1: Represented: Internal Culture & Inclusivity**

**“A Police service that is representative of Black People and supports its Black officers, staff and volunteers”**

Community and staff feedback was compelling in the need to prioritise creating an anti-racist and inclusive internal culture and eliminating any racial bias, stereotyping, profiling or discrimination from our policies, procedures, processes, and practices that may disproportionately affect Black officers and staff.

In order to achieve this, we must have an organisation that is representative of its communities, which means attracting, welcoming, developing and promoting Black people throughout the organisation. This means identifying and removing barriers to recruitment and progression; we also recognise the need to address disproportionality in our selection, promotion and misconduct processes. Whilst this plan has been developed, NPCC and the College of Policing have been working closely with the Police Uplift Programme to ensure that in its work to recruit 20,000 additional police officers, it is focussed on issues of race and in particular improving the experiences of Black people applying to and becoming part of policing. Specific actions in relation to this are described in this section.

In developing the actions, we have considered findings and recommendations from previous key reviews and Inspections, the themes relevant to this work stream are:

### **Summary of key themes from past reviews:**

**Recruitment, retention and progression:** The restoration of target setting for diversity in policing is one of the most significant recommendations on diversity from the Home Affairs Committee's Macpherson 22 years On Report (HASC 2021). The Committee recommends a centrally set 14% BME national policing workforce target, plus force-level targets on recruitment, retention and progression. The Home Office is urged to set out a strategy for meeting these targets. This reprises and expands the recommendations on targeting from the original Macpherson Report in 1999 (MR 1999). Targets were set in the aftermath of MR 1999 but were dropped in 2010, replaced by PCCs setting their own strategic priorities. According to HASC, targets are needed to address a "lack of focus, consistency and leadership in driving BME recruitment and promotion" and that "much stronger national action is needed."

**Positive action:** HASC recommended that Chief Officers' teams "should be required" to use the positive action tools and held accountable for progress. It encouraged the sharing of best practice and urged forces to do "far more to use the positive action provisions of the Equality Act 2010 to develop targeted recruitment campaigns, mentoring and support". This built on the Committee's 2016-17 recommendations to increase the use of external assessors from a BME background on selection panels and introduce coaching and mentoring for BME officers.

**Training:** Training on awareness of racism and valuing cultural diversity has been a major theme of reviews going back to Macpherson, who recommended an immediate review of racism awareness training and the publication of recognised standards. Twenty-two years on, the HASC 2021 recommendations are similar. It calls for the

**CoP and HO to overhaul diversity and inclusion training and to produce national standards.** The report said training needs to go beyond its current focus on unconscious bias and equip the workforce to identify and challenge structural issues such as disparities in outcomes and experiences. In 2017, the Rt Hon Dame Elish Angiolini's Review of deaths and serious incidents in police custody also called for mandatory, national training on discrimination, encompassing institutional racism and the impact on public confidence of Black deaths in police custody.

**Disciplinary procedures** - Disproportionality in police disciplinary procedures is another source of recurrent concern. Two Home Affairs Select Committee reports and the original Macpherson Report have made recommendations on this, while the NPCC commissioned its own review in 2019 and MOPAC conducted a review of disproportionality in the Metropolitan Police's disciplinary procedures in 2017. The NPCC review found that BME officers were more likely to have low level matters escalated into full-blown disciplinary investigation than their white counterparts. Across reviews, emphasis is placed on the need for proper data capture of what is going on inside PSDs and training for staff in PSDs on diversity and also on de-escalation. To embolden BME officers to report discrimination, the original Macpherson Report called for a code of conduct that would make clear that the use of racist language would almost always result in dismissal.

To achieve an anti-racist organisation, it is not sufficient to just increase representation, it is vital that the wider culture of policing is challenged and changed to eradicate racism at individual, interpersonal and organisational levels, whilst ensuring the culture is inclusive and allows all members of staff to thrive. With that in mind, in addition to the recruitment activity under the Uplift Programme, we commit to the following actions:

## **We commit to:**

### **Tracking the experience of Black officers and staff in policing**

**What** - Through a perception survey the Service will seek to understand the experience of black officers and staff and to identify and address any challenges and disparities it uncovers. The survey will also help measure the effects of implementation of the race action plan on our workforce.

**How** - Over the next 12 months, we will work with an external provider to develop and deliver the first survey. The survey will cover three areas:

#### **Black identity within policing**

Wellbeing and inclusion

Progression opportunities & specialisms (transferring roles - ethnic role selection)

Discipline and conduct

Discrimination (internal and external)

Workforce culture

#### **Supervision/support**

Able to discuss race/ethnicity in workplace

Management

Family/Friends links to policing (links work/home life)

Positive Action Schemes

Awareness/perceptions of force-wide attempts to address discrimination

#### **Identifying with 'The Police**

Community trust and confidence

Perceptions of culture

Identifying with leadership

Retention

Motivation to join

**Why** - This will bridge a gap in knowledge and awareness of the lived experiences of Black officers and staff and inform local implementation of the race action plan by forces and identify further areas for action

**Measured by** – Delivery of the survey and engagement of black officers and staff in completing the survey.

**Assisted by** Police uplift Programme, NBPA and local BPAs, HMICFRS Race thematic Inspection, Forces' PEEL Inspections and College of Policing Peer support

### **Develop all officers' and staff understanding of Black history**

**What-** Through this Programme, the College of Policing have now set Black history as a requirement within the core curriculum, which means that all new recruits and those undertaking college learning and development activities will receive input on Black history and policing's history with Black people and communities. This will be expanded to all those working in policing.

**How-** Over the next 12 months, the College will work with the NPCC Heritage Lead, external providers, internal and external community representatives, to broaden this into an Educational product that Forces will be expected to use to raise awareness across their wider workforce. College of Policing will also build this into the National Police Promotion and Assessment Framework.



**Why** - This will bridge a gap in knowledge and awareness of Black History and in particular, understanding and acknowledging policing's history with Black people and communities, to ensure that staff understand the context within which they are policing, influencing individual and organisational actions, decision and behaviour internally and externally. Better equip staff to have conversations about race and policing.

**Measured by** – Delivery of the product by the College of policing, Forces' utilisation of the product, post-course evaluation.

Cultural Changes measured through: Annual perception survey of Black officers and staff; Force all staff surveys; Recruitment and retention data, Exit data.

**Tracked by** - Annual perception survey of Black officers and staff; Force all staff surveys; Recruitment and retention data, Exit data.

**Assisted by** HMICFRS Race thematic Inspection, Forces' PEEL Inspections and College of Policing Peer Reviews

### **Develop national guidance for forces for involving staff networks and those with lived experience in force decision making.**

**What-** College to develop and roll out in 2022/23 national guidance for the involvement of staff networks and Black staff/officers with lived experience in force decision making processes.

**How-** During quarter 1 and 2 of 2022/23, the College DEI team will hold a series of meetings with working groups (including NBPA, Muslim, Sikh, LGBTQ+, and BAWP) to identify existing examples of good practice and ideas for new practice in actively involving Black officers and staff in force decision making processes. This will include identifying enablers and blockers to progress. Further to these working groups, draft guidance and a support programme will be developed in quarter 3 of 2022/23 to be rolled out across Forces, starting in Later 2022 early 2023.

**Why** – Police force demographics (officers and staff) are often not representative of the communities that they serve and the lived experiences of senior officers and staff in force decision making groups are unlikely to be the same lived experiences as those of the community that the force serves. It is important to have representatives who have those community lived experiences in positions where they can influence force decision making.

**Measured by** – guidance in place, audit of staff and lived experience networks involvement within force decision making groups and evidence of influence of staff/lived experience networks on force decisions.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in career progression incl timeliness, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** - national staff networks, College Black Communities Advisory Committee.

### **Identify national and international anti-racism initiatives that provide guidance and standards that can be adopted by forces.**

**What-** Identify existing national and international initiatives that focus on anti-racism and use these to increase awareness and education in the service

**How-** Develop a directory of nationally and internationally recognised anti-racism initiatives.

**Why** – To support forces in: increasing their awareness and knowledge of matters affecting Black communities, evidence their engagement in being anti-racist organisations, increase the cultural sensitivity of staff and officers and provide opportunities for community engagement.



**Measured by** – Directory of initiatives in place, annual review of forces engagement in initiatives.

**Tracked by** - Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – Black History Month, UN Anti-Racism Campaign. Support through communications campaign.

#### **Learn from organisations that are successful at improving the culture for black employees.**

**What-** Identify, explore and progress partnerships with organisations inside and outside of policing that have demonstrated success in the area of developing internal culture and inclusivity. Identifying learning and practice which can be used by policing to improve the organisational culture for Black officers and staff.

**How-** During 2022/23 the College will work with Black Community groups to identify organisations that are exemplars in creating supportive and developmental cultures for black employees. The College will engage with these exemplar organisations to create a directory of organisations that are willing to partner and support forces in their cultural development, and to create a portfolio of good practice examples and supporting materials for creating an inclusive and supportive culture for staff from black communities.

**Why** - To ensure that policing engages with black communities and organisations with strong black community links, so as to develop forces' organisational culture in innovative and transparent ways. To ensure that policing reflects the society and communities that it serves and that the black communities can be assured of reflective practice in the development of forces organisational culture.

**Measured by** – Delivery of a directory of exemplar organisations and contacts, partnership agreements with exemplar organisations, and a portfolio of good practice guidance and case studies for improving the organisational culture for Black officers and staff.

**Assisted by** CIPD guidelines, HMICFRS Race thematic Inspection.

#### **Develop cultural competency within organisations.**

**What-** Understand current position and further develop levels of cultural competency within organisations, to equip officers and staff at all grades and rank to have conversations with staff and deal with issues about Race.

**How-** Engage with professional groups and the black community to develop a definition of cultural competency for policing. Identify, review and collate examples of good practice in Black community engagement and developing cultural competency of forces. Develop and publicise guidance and case studies in good practice in cultural competency of forces and Black community engagement. Design and develop standards and criteria for assessing cultural competency within forces during 2022-2023.

**Why** – For forces to be inclusive for Black officers and staff and for forces to engage effectively with Black communities, there needs to be cultural competency across all levels within forces.

**Measured by** – case studies and learning materials in place, record of training received by staff in cultural competency, promotion and progression includes requirements for evidencing cultural competency, perception survey to cover cultural competency.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in recruitment processes, career progression incl timeliness & employee retention, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – NPCC and staff networks

### **Roll out of national standards for end-to-end recruitment across forces.**

**What-** National roll out of standard processes for the end-to-end recruitment of officers (including initial sift and post-assessment interview, in addition to the existing national online assessment centre), ensuring all parts of the process are fair and free from bias and do not adversely impact Black candidates.

**How-** The national sift process was developed (including process, guidance materials and IT systems) in 2021/22 and initially launched with two forces in quarter 4 of 2021/22. The roll out of the sift will continue across forces during quarter 1 of 2022/23 and will have been rolled out across all forces by June 2022/23. The outcomes of the sift process will be evaluated by the end of 2022/23.

**Why** – Currently forces do not all adopt a common process. Introducing national standards will ensure equity of opportunity in recruitment of new officers and minimise adverse impact for Black, Asian and minority ethnic potential recruits.

**Measured by** – Reduction in racial disparities within the selection process for new officers.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in career progression incl timeliness, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – Police uplift Programme

### **Highlight areas of policing where Black people are under-represented and understand why.**

**What-** Using mapped data, identify the areas of policing where there is under-representation of Black officers and staff and examine the reasons for those disparities.

**How-** Complete a gap analysis of disparities of Black officer and staff representation across policing areas/capabilities. Carry out research to understand the causes and inform solutions of disparities between Black and white officers and staff within policing specialisms.

**Why** – it is known that for many police specialisms, for example firearms, that black officers and staff are under-represented, but it is not fully understood why this occurs or the interventions required to remove the disparity. This action will improve knowledge of racial disparities within policing and provide information to take action to address those disparities.

**Measured by** – research report and recommendations on the causes and potential solutions to racial disparities across police specialisms.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in recruitment processes, career progression incl timeliness & employee retention, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – externally commissioned and overseen by research and evaluation work stream. Home Office data (ADR) and workforce census.

### **Mentoring and talent management opportunities.**

**What** - Develop mentoring and talent management programmes and a framework for adoption and delivery of those programmes so that they are pro-actively offered to all black officers and staff across Forces.

**How**- Within the next 6 months, the College will develop national guidance on mentoring support for officers and staff from Black, Asian, mixed and multiple ethnic backgrounds. The adoption and delivery of mentoring and coaching by forces will be monitored centrally by NPCC. Wider work will ensure that all those who mentor and/or coach staff across policing are provided with anti-racism awareness and access to materials to increase their cultural competency.

**Why** – Black officers and staff are often not given access to the same opportunities for coaching, mentoring and career progression as white staff and officers and where opportunities are in place they have been culturally developed for white staff and officers rather than embracing wider cultural competencies.

**Measured by** – national guidance on mentoring support for officers and staff from Black, Asian, mixed and multiple ethnic backgrounds in place, guidance adopted and delivered by forces.

**Tracked by** - Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – NPCC and staff networks

### **Transparency and Fairness in career development opportunities**

**What**- To ensure that there is transparency and equity around development opportunities (e.g. training, attachments, acting promotion), offered to black officers and staff; implement a requirement to collect information around progression and record of development opportunities given for all staff.

**How**- Within the next 12 months, the College of Policing will develop standards, guidance and framework for line managers for managing the progression of officers and staff and ensuring no racial disparities in offering development opportunities. Agreed reporting structures in place for an annual analysis of forces' progression, promotion and retention information, and forces' actions to ensure equality of opportunities.

**Why** – Career development opportunities for officers and staff are often determined by ad hoc processes that reinforce existing relationships and cultural disparities. By designing and implementing a framework for reviewing how career development opportunities are offered to staff, we will ensure there is transparency in any disparities and actions can be targeted to remove disparities.

**Measured by** – Standards, guidance and framework for reporting in place for evidencing equality in offering development opportunities. Across force reporting by 2023/24 of any racial disparities in the offer of career development opportunities.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in recruitment processes, career progression incl timeliness & employee retention, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – NPCC and staff networks

**Forces/PCCs to publish information on representation at rank/grade and any pay gaps for Black officers and staff.**

**What-** To provide transparent information across forces on racial representation and disparities across rank, grades and pay.

**How-** NPCC and the College of Policing will develop a reporting template/dashboard to assist Forces/PCCs in ensuring transparency of reporting of any disproportionality in rank/grade and pay gaps of Black officers and staff, so that forces can provide mandatory data returns by 2023/24.

**Why** – it is known that there is under-representation of Black officers and staff across forces and that disparities increase at higher ranks, grades and pay levels. This action will provide transparent information on the extent of disparities and targets for removing those disparities.

**Measured by** – annual reporting and publishing of rank, grade and pay disparity data across Forces.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in recruitment processes, career progression incl timeliness & employee retention, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – HMICFRS inspections.

**Review and update Competency and Values Framework**

**What-** Include DEI content as part of the update of the CVF to reflect current and future expectations of police officers and staff and support behavioural change to reduce and remove disparities for Black officers and staff.

**How-** Scope and commission programme of work through Korn Ferry in 2022, as part of the Promotion and Progression review. The CVF underpins all assessment and selection processes in policing from initial recruitment to promotion to the most senior ranks. Consultation with diversity networks, staff associations and senior stakeholders continues into March 2022. Implementation of revised CVF by quarter 4 2022/23.

**Why** – to ensure the CVF is reflective of current knowledge and research on inclusivity and diversity and to support changes to the promotion and progression process to reduce and remove racial disparities in recruitment and progression.

**Measured by** – updated CVF, reduction in disparities across the promotion and progression process.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in career progression incl timeliness, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Strategic command attendance to reduce racial disparity. Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** Promotion and Progression review and development of the National Centre for Police Leadership

**As part of the assessment for promotion, all candidates will have to evidence and demonstrate anti-racist behaviours.**

**What-** Implement a requirement within the promotion process for all candidates (officers and staff) to demonstrate that they are anti-racist. This will include agreement of a definition of anti-racism and anti-racist behaviours.

**How-** Commission a literature review to provide a definition of anti-racism and anti-racist behaviour, and test that definition with subject matter experts and lived experience groups, so as to provide definitions and examples of anti-racism and anti-racist behaviour within policing and to ensure it does not have unintended consequences on Black officers and staff. Develop guidance and training materials for forces, so that officers and staff can learn, develop and exemplify anti-racist behaviours. CVF and PDR process to be updated to include demonstration of anti-racist behaviours.

**Why** – Being anti-racist is about acting, both as an individual and part of organisations and society, to remove cultures and behaviours than continue to reinforce racial stereotypes and disparities. It is important that officers and staff within the police, acting on behalf of society, are actively anti-racist.

**Measured by** – Agreed definition of anti-racist and anti-racist behaviour, evidence-based guidance and training materials for developing anti-racist behaviours, CVF and PDR process explicitly evidences anti-racist behaviour.

**Tracked by** - Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – externally commissioned and overseen by research and evaluation work stream.

**Review and amend National Policing Curriculum to ensure that the equality and diversity legal content is up to date and covers Black history.**

**What-** Standardising the curriculum content at each level of learning to include awareness of the history of Race and Policing. Ensure all leadership development programmes developed by CoP (including Strategic Command Course, first line supervisor training and other leadership training) have content that covers education about Black history.

**How-** Review of curriculum for PEQF completed in 2021/22. This review will inform development of other curricula in 2022/23 and the development of support packages for education establishments who are teaching the national curriculum.

**Why** – Entry and promotion are key points at which equality and diversity and Black history can be taught to all officers and thereby serve as a foundation for wider interventions by which officers develop the skills and experience that reflect cultural sensitivity.

**Measured by** – updated curricula, support materials for educationalists.

**Tracked by** - Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – Higher Education Establishments.

**Implement an assurance framework for measuring effectiveness of implementation of national curriculum relating to race.**

**What-** Develop and implement an assurance framework that measures the effectiveness of the implementation of the race sections within the national curriculum for police officer training.

**How-** Work with HMICFRS to develop criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the national curriculum in changing attitudes and behaviours relating to race during 2022-2023.

**Why** – While knowledge and understanding are foundations for behavioural change, they do not by themselves ensure changes in attitudes and behaviours. An assurance framework will provide information on the extent to which changes in the curriculum are being enacted through changes in behaviour within operational settings.

**Measured by** – Criteria developed and being used by HMICFRS.

**Tracked by** - Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – HMICFRS

**Provide robust support mechanisms and staff networks across the service.**

**What-** Provide robust support mechanisms for Black officers and staff, within staff networks across the service. Work with those with lived experience, staff networks and associations to provide an infrastructure of support which is co-ordinated centrally.

**How-** Work with forces to identify examples of good practice in staff support networks and develop case studies and support packages for forces to share and learn from each other's experience. Use College's experience in developing Black Communities Advisory Committee to assist force development of similar groups.

**Why** – Inclusivity and the removal of obstacles to engagement and progression is frequently achieved through peer support and role models, who through lived experience can provide practical and emotional support to colleagues who are facing barriers that are new to them. Staff networks are a way by which forces can positively support excluded groups while educating and developing the culture of the wider organisation.

**Measured by** – Portfolio of case studies of best practice in setting-up and developing staff networks. Support programme in place for forces seeking to develop staff networks.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in career progression incl timeliness, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – NPCC support for staff networks and provision of dedicated time to develop networks.

**Develop College of Policing Black Communities Advisory Committee**

**What-** Ensure that Black voices are heard and shape the work of the College of policing. As a priority assess the impact of the Race Action Plan's 'work on Black Officers and Staff through an independent subject matter expert group that is representative of black communities.

**How-** Create a standalone Black Communities Advisory Committee within the College, with membership from those of Black heritage, to advise and challenge the College on policies, procedures and practice. In 2022/23 there will be a specific focus on a review of the Race Action Plan.

**Why** – Within the organisation, Black voices must be heard and shape policy, strategy and systems at an organisational level. The College of Policing, in particular must engage with and value the expertise and lived experience of Black officers and staff, improving transparency and building confidence internally.

**Measured by** – Black Communities Advisory Committee in place and a review of the Race Action Plan completed that identifies outputs, impacts on black officers and staff and follow-on actions and review dates to ensure the ongoing realisation of benefits from the programme.

**Assisted by** – links with ISOB, the stakeholder group and advisory groups and scrutiny panels within forces.

#### **Identify where estates and working environment can cause racial disparities.**

**What-** Identify where estates and working environment disadvantage members of Black Communities and develop guidance/audit tool for forces to eliminate disparities,

**How-** Provide support to Forces to carry out assessment/audit of estate and working practices to eliminate any racial disparities caused by the working environment, e.g. reviewing uniform requirements, accessibility and standards of dedicated spaces/prayer rooms.

**Why** – Working practices and estates evolve over time and often become custom and practice that changes very slowly. Since many working practices/estates will not have been reviewed for many years, there may be inherent features that disadvantage specific groups and acts as a barrier to inclusivity.

**Measured by** – Guidance and estate/working practice audit toolkit in place, review of forces' adoption of toolkit and changes to estate/working practice.

**Tracked by** - Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – Equality Impact Assessments.

#### **Revision of policy and guidance for workplace adjustments and flexible working to remove disparities for Black officers and staff.**

**What-** Revision of workplace adjustments and flexible working guidance to assist specifically with intersectionality issues for Black and minority ethnic officers, e.g. with dyslexia or caring responsibilities.

**How-** College to scope a programme of work, including commissioned research, to understand how working environments and working practices can lead to inequalities for Black officers and staff, and identify interventions that can be applied through workplace adjustments and flexible working arrangements to remove those disparities.. During Quarter 4, 2022/23we will launch new national guidance.

**Why** – Black officers and staff can experience racism because of assumptions made that are that are incorrectly attributed to race, e.g. dyslexia for a Black person may be diagnosed later than for a member of a white community as it is misinterpreted as an issue of language or intelligence.

**Measured by** – Recommendations and action plan in place in forces for Workplace adjustments/flexible working for removing disparities for Black officers and staff.



**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in career progression incl timeliness, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – Force HR and DEI leads and Staff networks

**Develop a national DEI standard for policing with an initial focus on race.**

**What-** The College is reviewing existing DEI standards frameworks that are used by and available to forces. The review will determine next steps – to create a standalone new standard for policing or to adapt existing standards to enable benchmarking with other sectors.

**How-** We identified ‘looked for areas’ that are the baseline expected DEI requirements for all forces. In 2022/23 the team will build on this to provide self-assessment tools for forces and provide implementation support. It is anticipated that HMICFRS will begin inspections from 2023/24

**Why** – national standards provide a common measure by which all forces can compare their progress in DEI, identify any disparities and take action to change or explain. A common approach also enables knowledge sharing and learning from emerging practice. Standards provide transparency for communities about forces’ commitment to DEI and culture change.

**Measured by** – HMICFRS inspection of progress against standards.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in career progression incl timeliness, identifying and closing the ethnicity pay gap (new data requirement). Perception survey findings (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** – NPCC for ensuring adoption and mandate for implementation of national standards.

**A fair and equitable Misconduct and Complaints (M&C) process which does not disproportionately affect Black officers.**

**What** - Ensure there is appropriate representation/involvement of Black officers within the investigation and decision-making process in Professional Standards Departments and that independent chairs of misconduct hearings and panel members are appropriately diverse and culturally competent, as well as being equipped to influence outcomes.

All forces will publish M&C outcomes and provide a narrative to explain any identified race disparity together with clear plans to take action to reduce disparity.

**How-** Within the next 9 months, the NPCC and the College of Policing will develop guidance for forces on recruitment and training for Professional Standards Departments and further develop guidance for Forces on recruitment and training for Misconduct and Discipline Panels. Forces will be required to undertake an annual review of Professional Standards Departments, reporting on ethnicity of subjects of investigations, ethnicity of PSD staff, outcomes/decisions of investigations by ethnic group, and recruitment and training of PSD staff.

**Why** – Staff within Professional Standards Departments may not be very diverse ethnically which may have an adverse impact on decisions within PSD.

In addition, Misconduct and Complaint panels are often not representative of the cases that they hear and may not have received training in cultural aspects of the case that they hear. These measures are designed to identify any adverse impact and then to take steps to address disparity and increase the cultural competence of the panels.

**Measured by** – Record and review of ethnicity of PSDs, the ethnicity of cases that they investigate and any racial disparity in decisions made. Guidance in place for recruitment and training of M&C panels, annual review against agreed data standards of all M&C panels held. Reduction in race disparity in Misconduct and complaints measured against a data standard for outcomes from M&C panels within an Annual Data Requirement. Review and action by forces on M&C outcomes data.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in race disparity in Misconduct and complaints measured against a data standard for outcomes from M&C panels within an Annual Data Requirement.

**Assisted by** – NPCC, HMICFRS, Independent Chairs of Misconduct Panels and Home Office publication of M&C outcomes data within ADR.

**A fair and equitable procedure for dealing with grievances which does not disproportionately affect Black officers and staff.**

**What** - Ensure there is appropriate representation/involvement of Black officers within the grievance procedures including decision making and outcomes. This will include appropriate training for those supporting the process.

All forces will be encouraged to gather data on grievances and outcomes and publish these with a narrative to explain any identified race disparity together with clear plans to take action to reduce disparity.

**How**- The NPCC and the College of Policing will develop guidance for forces to ensure that processes for dealing with grievances is available and appropriate. This will include access for HR professionals to advice around cultural diversity and the impact that may have on individuals.

Staff associations will be involved in reviewing grievances at a strategic level.

Forces must demonstrate they have implemented guidance, involved staff associations and will report on outcomes.

**Why** – As reviews and recommendations are published the programme identifies learning and incorporates it into the action plan. This action reflects an action identified which has been assessed against the Race Action Plan and has now been incorporated into outcomes and deliverables for the programmes.

It is recommended that forces take a position of zero tolerance and embed this through messaging, guidance, training and ongoing support for police officers to proactively and robustly challenge using the grievance process.

**Measured by** – Record and review of the ethnicity of grievance cases and any racial disparity in decisions made. Guidance in place grievance procedures and training of HR advisors involved in the process. Reduction in race disparity in grievance processes measured against a data standard for outcomes.

**Assisted by** – NPCC, Collage of Policing, staff associations and HR Business Partners.

**Protection for officers and staff in challenging and reporting improper conduct – (Whistle blowing)**

**What** - Ensure there is a clear process that is understood by all. That officers and staff understand their responsibility to report, challenge or take action against the inappropriate conduct of colleagues.

**How**- Ensure adequacy of training and guidance on the requirements of officers and staff to report, challenge and take action. Ensure this is clearly communicated and understanding is checked and monitored.

Forces will be asked to ensure those investigating allegations of improper conduct are adequately detached and independent to avoid potential conflicts of interest and to build confidence in the process.

Those who report, challenge and take action will be protected from victimisation and should not be treated unfairly, will be protected against discriminatory or retaliatory action.

NPCC and Collage of policing will support forces to implement their bespoke plans and provide guidance as required.

**Why** – As reviews and recommendations are published the programme identifies learning and incorporates it into the action plan. This action reflects an action identified which has been assessed against the Race Action Plan and has now been incorporated into outcomes and deliverables for the programmes.

Protection for officers and staff when reporting wrongdoing is essential in building the trust and confidence of our officers and staff.

**Measured by** – A measurement tool will need to be developed.

**Assisted by** – NPCC, College of Policing, staff associations, HR Business Partners and Senior Leaders.

## **Case Study**

### **Internal Culture & Inclusivity**

#### ***Piloting a behavioural approach to culture change***

*In the College of Policing, we have been working with University College London to use their behaviour change methodology to identify effective interventions to improve the progression of officers from Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic backgrounds.*

*Previously much of the work in policing has tended to focus on individuals from under-represented groups rather than the wider population within policing. This new work focuses on the role of the supervisor.*

*The initial scoping suggested a connection between current police leadership/supervisory behaviours and the underrepresentation of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic officers in specialisms and more senior ranks of the service. The scoping went further and suggested that the lack of direct, proactive and supportive behaviours from leaders/supervisors was a strong contributory factor in poor retention and progression of BAME officers and staff.*

*By focusing work on the target behaviours needed from our leaders/supervisors we can identify a clear range of interventions to develop. We can support our leaders to demonstrate the desired behaviours that support all officers/staff to develop and progress, the barriers, the influences on the behaviours and what interventions would look like which tackle these issues.*

*Drawing on evidence we have distilled the potential range of interventions down to five key themes. The potential interventions are grouped under the following headings:*

**Education and development** – programmes on racism, allyship & effective supervisory skills

**Storytelling** - Real stories told by officers, senior staff and experts on experiences of leadership, impact of micro-aggressions/ racism in the workplace and ways to tackle it

**Promotion processes** - Mandatory evidence as part of promotions process of being anti-racist and inclusive

**External scrutiny** - thematic inspection on the quality of supervision, publication of results of promotion process by ethnicity

**Reflective practice** - for supervisors to receive feedback and reflect on their ability to manage inappropriate behaviour in the workplace; peer support for supervisors to share experiences of managing racism and other discriminatory behaviour in the workplace.

The work has already influenced the development of our new supervisory guidelines and development programmes. Over the course of the next year we will introduce these into all aspects of our work with supervisors.

## **Internal Culture & Inclusivity – Case Study 2**

### **Metropolitan Police Service - Reaching out to London's communities**

To help recruit candidates from diverse backgrounds to join the Met, they have recently expanded their Outreach teams, with teams now in every BCU (Basic Command Unit).

Outreach officers and staff working within outreach are helping to build confidence in communities where historically trust has been low; informing people about the opportunities available within policing, inspiring people to be the change they want to see; and supporting them in actively applying to join the Met as officers.

Each BCU has an outreach lead, who co-ordinates activity to effectively engage with communities. Outreach workers make the initial contact with potential candidates, inform and inspire them, with the ultimate aim for them to submit an application form. Once people have submitted an application form, they then go through the recruitment selection process.

The Met's outreach teams describe their reasons for wanting to be outreach workers as wanting to impact on historic negative legacies of the Met and a belief this can be done by engaging, inviting and sharing the Met family with communities that represent London. They believe that if the workforce represents London then the Met will transform for the better.

The team held four outreach and recruitment events during Black History Month 2021. The events took place in Thornton Heath, Finsbury Park, Lewisham and Tottenham – areas with a high population of residents from under-represented groups, with a particular focus on Black communities.

Historically, trust and confidence in the Met is lowest amongst Black communities, which explains the need to reach out, talk to people and have sometimes difficult conversations about the Met's history and actively listen to their concerns.

## **Case Study 3**

### **Metropolitan Police Service - Community led recruit training**

As Metropolitan Police recruits complete their initial training a key milestone is a strong community centred approach to learning. The Met recognises that positive community engagement leads to better outcomes for both the public and the police and this training gives recruits the opportunity to contextualise their learning, interact with their communities, and experience both the complexities and rewards that this brings.

The probationer journey for all recruits now incorporates all of these elements - ensuring that London's communities are part of Met recruit training. Every new officer now has the opportunity to hear directly from community members about their lived experience of topics important to the Met and communities across London.

*The timing of this training ensures officers have enough operational exposure and the opportunity to consider how these community experiences relate to their own policing experiences to date. It also allows officers to reflect on their personal policing style and approach.*

*Recruits and community leaders have found the learning invaluable. Feedback from recruits and community leaders has highlighted that the opportunity to listen to the stories of people who were the victims of crime, which at times were hard to listen to, appealed to their sense of sympathy and affected them on a personal level.*

*Over the course of the three days, they hear the perspectives of victims, community leaders, and police leadership which provided a holistic view of modern policing. They believe this perspective is critical in becoming an effective police officer.*

*Community leaders strongly believe all new recruits and community members should take part in this event. Described as a real eye opener as well as educational for both community members and new recruits and "It is an event that shines a completely different light on police and if you attend you will not leave the same"*

## **Work stream 2: Respected – Use of Powers<sup>10</sup>**

### **“A police service that is fair, respectful and equitable in its actions towards Black People”**

We are entrusted with legislative powers on behalf of the public and as such, we must ensure that they are used in a legal, fair and proportionate way to secure trust from all communities. We know there is racial bias and discrimination in the application of our powers for Black people, particularly young Black men. We hear the specific concerns around stop and search (including Section 60 and intimate searches), use of Force (including the use of handcuffs), and specifically the use of Taser. Our work will seek to evaluate and understand how police use powers in these areas and ultimately reduce the harmful impact they continue to have on Black communities. It will consider where racial inequality in the application of police powers is amplified through intersectionality, with a particular focus on age and gender.

Use of Powers is a broad term that could include a significant amount of policing activity. In setting the focus of this work, we have made a conscious decision to focus on specific powers: Stop and Search, Use of Force, Use of Taser and s163 Road Traffic Act Stops. This focus will enable policing to deliver targeted, tangible advancements in the areas that have been repeatedly identified as requiring reform. As this work develops with greater structure around the collation and publication of data on police powers, it is anticipated that this workstream will iterate as further areas of concern, are brought into focus.

There is no place in policing for people who misuse the powers they are entrusted with. We will use all available options to remove those who do so and undermine public confidence. This hurts us all. We will be transparent with the public in how we identify and deal with those cases.

An anti-racist organisation takes action to eliminate any racial bias, stereotypes, profiling or discrimination in our actions with the public. It takes care not to exacerbate racial disparities that exist elsewhere in society, approaching disparities in our actions as problems of themselves regardless of the causes, because of the impact on Black people.

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<sup>10</sup> Within this action plan the term "Use of Powers" refers to: Use of Taser, Stop & Search, Use of Force, S.163; Road Traffic Act 1988

We will do everything in our power to overhaul systems, processes and procedures that drive bias, discrimination and racism in how we operate.

We expect police leaders to understand and care about their responsibilities to create an environment and culture in which police powers are used appropriately and proportionately when keeping the public safe. Leaders must create and welcome scrutiny of the use and impact of police powers within the communities they serve.

Our intention is to remove bias, discrimination and racism from the use of police powers. Where disparities remain, we will explain why and set out what we believe can be done.

This will ensure we achieve the following areas of the outcome framework:

- Minimising any harms we inadvertently cause, because of their differential impact on Black People
- Approaching racial disparities in our actions as problems in themselves regardless of their causes because of their impact on Black people.
- Treating Black people as individuals and taking account of their needs vulnerabilities experiences and circumstances such as trauma
- Eliminating any race discrimination in our actions

In developing the actions, we have considered findings and recommendations from previous key reviews and Inspections, the themes relevant to this work stream are:

**Summary of key themes from past reviews:**

**Accountable leadership** – Reviews emphasise that the diversity in policing agenda needs to be led by someone senior, independent and with the power to hold forces to account. This could be achieved either with the Home Secretary themselves assuming a leadership role (HASC 2021) or through an appointee of the Home Secretary, independent of policing (HASC 2016-17).

**Racial disparities in the use of police powers** such as stop and search and restraint have overtaken the response to hate crime as the dominant cause of concern in recent reviews of race and operational policing.

**Stop and search looms largest.** Reviews accept the value of stop and search as a crime fighting tool with recommendations centring on how its use is monitored and scrutinised. HASC 2021 and the Commission on Racial and Ethnic Disparities 2021 (CRED 2021) call for national targets on the quality, range and granularity of data recorded on stop and search. According to HASC 2021, there is still “far too great a disparity in the detail and consistency by which the tactic is monitored and recorded across all forces” and recommendations from MR 1999 are still outstanding. HASC also calls for forces fully to harness the potential of body worn video and stresses, along with CRED 2021 on the need for scrutiny to be both internal and external

**Wider disparities that exist throughout a wide range of police activities**, including taser use, use of restraint... The Lammy Review 2017 called on the criminal justice system to adopt an “explain or change” approach to disparities, whereby if an agency “cannot provide an evidence-based explanation for apparent disparities between ethnic groups then reforms should be introduced to address those disparities.” The review called for this to be adopted by all institutions within the criminal justice system. HASC 2021 recommends that policing adopts this approach.

**We commit to:**

**Transparency and Accountability** – Ensuring the public can see, understand, compare and question how Police are using and monitoring powers during interactions with Black people.

**What** - Within the next 12 months, the College of Policing and NPCC will work with the Home Office to ensure that data recording requirements\* have been set for those aspects of policing where racial disparity



in use of powers is known or believed to occur. This will include setting standards and requirements on the collection, analysis and publication of data on use of powers in a nationally consistent way. Forces will be asked to publish consistent datasets, which will be subject to public scrutiny. Policing will leverage the capabilities of HMICFRS to assess national and local progress in this area through inclusion in the annual Force Management Statements to ensure the results of this analysis are closely linked to strategic planning processes in every Force.

**How** – The NPCC will work with the Home Office, ONS and PMCC to review what data recording requirements are, agreeing appropriate terminology with race equality groups and defining what will be recorded and whether they are legal requirements. This will set out who should publish the data, format of data publication and guidance on scrutiny procedures. It will set requirements for data analysis responsibilities, how results will be assessed, and interventions identified. The College of Policing and NPCC will identify any additional central information required to enable assessment and evaluation of data. Specificity requirements should reflect the full context of the use of powers (e.g. types of stop searches, demographic of subjects including more granular reporting on race, locations and timing). These standards will include a requirement for Forces to confirm mechanisms for pro-active monitoring of the use of these police powers at individual and organisational levels in order to identify and eliminate racist behaviour and/or policies and procedures. This will include adherence to standards set by the College of Policing around the use of body worn videos, community scrutiny, data collection and pro-active analysis.

**Why** - Black people continue to be subjected to the disproportionate use of Police powers. The 2017 Lammy Review highlighted the importance of collecting data for surfacing negative disparities, putting the onus on Police Forces to explain or reform. Data needs to be published in a consistent way to inform public debate, local comparison and accountability for how police powers are used. This work is needed to inform national strategies and guidance by promoting a common acceptance of what this new evidence base is telling us about the use of police powers across England and Wales.

**Measured by** - Delivery of national data standards – Forces' compliance with those standards, Force Management Statements and HMICFRS inspections.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in the use of police powers.

Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people's confidence in police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

**Assisted by**- HMICFRS race thematic Inspection and PEEL Inspections of Forces, design and collation of Force Management Statements. NPCC Performance and Data Co-ordinating Committee. Office for National statistics (ONS). NPCC Hub. Home Office in setting Annual Data Requirements and if necessary, NPCC recommendations for amendments to legislation. PCCs – engagement and publication of Force data to communities

\*Data will be considered more broadly than written records, and includes sources such as Body Worn Camera footage.

### **Transparency – Policing will identify whether disproportionality against Black people is present in the application of s163 of the Road Traffic Act to conduct traffic stops.**

**What** – Within the next 12 months, the NPCC and College of Policing will provide a National framework and guidance for Forces to collect, analyse and publish data around how powers are used under the Road Traffic Act to stop vehicles, and ensure this is available for scrutiny at local and national levels.

**How**- The College of Policing and NPCC will work with the Home Office, DfT, DVLA and other agencies to identify a denominator for assessing racial disproportionality in the use of this power. The College of Polic-



ing will review and evaluate previous Force pilots on the collection and analysis of this data, providing recommendations to the NPCC lead. NPCC lead to consult with Forces and ensure the perspectives of Black people are considered within the development of the framework and associated guidance.

**Why** – This is a repeated recommendation in previous reports and Inspections into policing and race. Feedback from the community is that Black drivers are more likely to be stopped by police. In the absence of consistent data collection and analysis across policing, we cannot currently identify whether disparities exist in the use of this power to address them in accordance with the Lammy recommendation. Collecting and publishing the data consistently is critical to moving forwards. Evaluation and evidence-based action will then be possible.

**Measured by** – NPCC and CoP delivery of National framework and Guidance, Forces' implementation of this. Reduction in any racial disparity identified

**Tracked by** - Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people's confidence in police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

**Assisted by** – Home Office in any legislative changes and/or Annual Data Requirements. HMICFRS is Race Thematic Inspection and Forces' PEEL assessments. College of Policing Peer Reviews. PCCs in publication of Force data. DVLA re driver data.

#### **Legitimacy – Equipping Individuals to use their powers in the way that enhances police legitimacy in Black communities.**

**What** – Over the next 9 months the College of Policing and NPCC leads will work with Forces to establish a procedural value framework that goes beyond the lawfulness and focuses on fairness and respect in the use of police powers.

**How** – A number of Forces\* are undertaking trials, pilots or experiments to assess officer conduct and behaviour using procedural justice frameworks, looking more at how the officers behave, their communication and levels of empathy with the person subjected to the use of power. Forces are using these to facilitate reflective practice with officers and identify trends at team and/or geographic levels. Evidence and Evaluation advisors from the College of Policing will apply rigour and consistency to ensure the approach is central to the curriculum and authorised professional practice.

**Why** – Monitoring and scrutiny has previously focussed on the lawfulness of the application of powers, with limited examination of how the encounter was managed, the communication style, conduct and behaviour of the officer involved. Treating people with respect, in a fair and just way is key to police legitimacy. The trauma of being stopped and searched, for example, can have a lasting impact on an individual, particularly on a vulnerable or young person. Officers can mitigate against this in their behaviour and conduct – explaining actions and decisions, showing empathy with the person stopped, and ending the encounter in a positive way. By reviewing encounters using a procedural justice framework, supervisors, peers and community scrutiny groups can assist officers with reflective practice and further develop their skills, giving officers confidence to use their powers effectively and the community confidence in the way police powers are being used.

**Measured by** – Delivery of the Evaluation product by the College of Policing. Delivery of Best practice guidance to Forces by College of Policing and NPCC. Amendments to APP where applicable.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in the Use of Force.

Reduction in Use of Force arising from Stop and Search encounter (new data requirement).

Increase in use of de-escalation, negating the need for use of powers (new data requirement).

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people’s confidence in Police Use of Powers (new data requirement)

Police Staff survey – confidence of officers in the effective/appropriate use of stop and search powers.

**Assisted by** – Community Scrutiny Groups – individual and organisational feedback, communication with wider community. HMICFRS race thematic Inspection and annual Force PEEL Inspections (Legitimacy). College of Policing Peer Reviews. IOPC learning recommendations, tracking implementation. Home Office – annual data requirement. CSEW – expanding questions to cover fair and just police use of powers and increasing numbers of Black respondents.

\*West Midlands Police –Use of Force, Essex Police – stop and search, Dorset Police – stop and search

### **Legitimacy – Leaders: Equipping police leaders to make informed decisions about Use of Police Powers in their Forces and Local Police Areas.**

**What** – Within the next 12 months, the College of Policing and the NPCC will amend the police National Decision Making Model to ensure it includes consideration of the impact on individual and community trauma of decisions and actions, particularly for those from the Black community given the context of Black people’s experience of policing. NPCC will also work with Forces to identify Best Practice in developing ‘corporate memory’ around significant events impacting community trauma.

**How** – College of Policing will work with NPCC leads to amend the approach to decision making to ensure individual and community impact is included and signposted sufficiently. We will ensure that leaders are making decisions against the backdrop of the historical impact of policing on Black communities in particular, at National and local levels. This links to actions under work stream one around educating officers around Black history and enhancing their understanding of the use of powers and the trauma for individuals and communities associated with this as part of the curriculum changes. Within College led learning and development, leaders’ decision making will be tested against this amended National Decision-making model.

**Why** – Decision making models in policing have focussed on information available within the context of the law, and the effectiveness of tactical options to meet the operational objective. We must be confident that these decision are made against the historical and current context of policing, particularly for Black people, so that leaders make decisions on the Use of Powers in their areas, weighing up the likelihood of operational effectiveness with the impact on individuals, their families and the wider community. Equipped with this, Leaders will take responsibility for setting the approach to Use of Powers in their areas, communicating effectively to their teams why, where, and how powers are to be used, ensuring they too are aware of the wider context, and community impact. This ensures individual officers can confidently make decisions on the use of Powers in alignment with the strategy set for that area, and without detriment to people from Black communities.

**Measured by** – Delivery of the amended National Decision Making Model by the College of Policing. Delivery of Review of all College of Policing training and accreditation to ensure amended NDM is being utilised and assessed in decision making. Increase in use of broader tactics to tackle crime problems.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparities in the Use of Powers

Reduction in Use of Force arising from Stop and Search encounter (new data requirement).

Increase in use of de-escalation, negating the need for use of powers (new data requirement).

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people’s confidence in Police Use of Powers (new data requirement)

Staff survey –increased confidence in decision making, increased confidence in appropriate/effective use of Powers, increased confidence in senior leaders.

**Assisted by** - College of Policing Peer Reviews and Quality assurance of Force Accreditation. HMICFRS race thematic Inspection and Force Annual PEEL Inspections. IOPC learning recommendations, tracking implementation. Changes to CSEW.

**Accountability – A consistent policy approach to Stop and Search and effective community scrutiny of Police Use of Stop & Search**

**What** – Within the next 6 months, the NPCC and College of Policing will ensure that all Forces have effective community scrutiny of the use of Stop and Search in their areas. We will use existing data to inform and strengthen the authorised professional practice in relation to reasonable grounds for stop and search, particularly in relation to drugs, and to ensure searches of children are sufficiently on safeguarding requirements.

**How** – The College of Policing and NPCC will work with Forces to ensure they have implemented the recommendations within the Stop and Search Authorised Professional Practice for Community Scrutiny Panels and reduce inconsistencies in the grounds to search where drug use is suspected through developing existing national guidance. Guidance will also be reviewed to ensure sufficient focus on the safeguarding needs of children and follow up actions that need to be considered. Forces will be provided with a framework to assess the effectiveness of their panels, which includes ensuring they are representative of those subjected to disproportionate stop and search, have independent chairs, access to stop and search records and body worn video, are presented with consistent data and analysis, are trained, and are supported in communicating the impact of their scrutiny to the wider community. This includes scrutiny of officer actions and the policies and strategies on the use of stop and search for the Force and local policing areas. It includes Use of Section 60 at individual and organisational levels, as well as the use of intimate searches.

**Why** – Black people are more likely to be stopped and searched. That disproportionality is likely to be amplified for some people as a result of other protected characteristics. Effective community scrutiny can change how stop and searched is used at an individual and organisational level. It can provide learning opportunities for policing to improve practices and reduce racial disparity, and reassurance to communities that there is accountability to the public for use of these powers.

**Measured by** – College of Policing and NPCC delivery of the assessment framework. Analysis of framework completion.

Analysis of racial disparity compared with adoption of nationally consistent policy decisions.

Feedback from Community Scrutiny Panels.

Changes in Policy or practice adopted as a consequence of CSP intervention.

Polling – Increase in Public awareness of CSP role and impact.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in Use of stop and search. Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people's confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

Police Staff survey – confidence of officers in the effective/appropriate use of stop and search powers.

**Assisted by** – HMIFRS race thematic and Force Annual PEEL Inspections, College of Policing Peer reviews, IOPC learning recommendations tracking implementation, PCC and Police Authority support, engagement and publication of information on CSPs and their impact.

**Legitimacy – Understand the nature, causes and consequences of racial disparities in the police use of Taser.**

**What** – We will publish the results of an independent programme of research that explores the causes of racial disparities in the police use of Taser.

**How** – Over the next 12 months, the College of Policing and NPCC will fund the delivery of this independent research programme by a consortium of UK universities, and which is being overseen by an independent academic advisory panel. The research will take us beyond overly-simplistic explanations, and explore the extent to which racial disparities in Taser use can be explained, at a micro level, by the way police officers interact with members of the public and, at a macro level, by the way police workload and deployment decisions intersect with wider social inequalities.

**Why** – Home Office data for England & Wales shows that, in 2019/20, Taser was used on a higher proportion of Black people than were other types of force (i.e, 34% compared to 27%). The Home Office also estimated that the rate of Taser use was eight times higher for Black people than it was for White people (when compared to the 2011 Census). Disparities in the Use of Powers have been identified which policing has not explained nor addressed sufficiently to meet the Lammy recommendation. This has a disproportionate effect on Black people and communities and must be addressed to build confidence that these powers are being used in a just and fair way.

**Measured by** – Delivery and publication of the Taser research findings, recommendations and implementation across Policing. Co-ordinated by the NPCC and College of Policing.  
Delivery of changes to national policing curriculum and guidance in relation to Use of these Powers.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in Use of Taser

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people’s confidence in Police Use of Powers (new data requirement)

Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people’s confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

**Assisted by** – Independent Oversight Board for Taser research.

**Legitimacy – Using the best available evidence to develop and implement a package of reforms to ensure the use of police powers is effective in protecting the public, and do not have an adverse impact on Black people**

**What** – Over the next 2 years, the College of Policing and NPCC will conduct an assessment of the Use of Powers, examining the impact on community confidence and public safety to inform the future use of these powers in policing.

**How** – This work will carry out a cost, risk and benefit impact analysis on the powers identified whilst considering the breadth of powers available to policing in law. The study will assess the strength of evidence relating to their specific contribution to public safety and public confidence, in particular the impact on Black people and communities.

**Why** – The police has not been successful in either justifying why there are racial disparities in its use of powers, or taking action to reduce them. This means the police has not fulfilled the recommendation in the Lammy review to ‘explain or reform’. The police must ensure it uses its powers only when it is lawful, necessary, and proportionate to do so – and in ways that are fair, respectful, and just – if it is to secure the confidence of Black people. To make informed decisions about whether, when and how to use its powers – or take an alternative course of action – the police must assess their effectiveness alongside their impact communities.

**Measured by** – Delivery and publication of research into the Use of Force, Stop and Search (including section 60), Taser and Vehicle stops.

Delivery of changes to national policing curriculum and guidance in relation to Use of these Powers.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in Use of Taser

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people’s confidence in Police Use of Powers (new data requirement)

Police Staff survey – confidence of officers in the effective/appropriate use of stop and search powers.

Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people’s confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

**Assisted by** – College of Policing Academic Reviews.

**Legitimacy – Providing officers with the skills and knowledge required to prevent disproportionate use of powers on Black people.**

**What** – The College of Policing and NPCC will ensure that Forces implement Use of Powers training in accordance with the new national curriculum which includes key elements on de-escalation, effective communications, stereotype threat, procedural justice, disproportionality and history of policing and Black communities.

**How** – The new Personal safety training curriculum has been developed and evaluation of its use in the first few Forces is underway and will be rolled out across all Force over the next 9 months. College of Policing and NPCC lead will ensure this includes evaluating the impact on frequency and severity Force is used in interactions with Black people, with the intention of reducing the need to use Force. Forces are including those most likely to be disproportionately subjected to Use of Powers, in the development and delivery of training to officers, providing insight and local context to inform officers’ decision making – NPCC and the College of Policing will support them with advice and guidance on evaluation approaches and share best practice in these.

**Why** – Police Use of Powers training needs to be broader than the legal and technical aspects of Use of Powers. Whilst the Use of Power may be technically and legally correct, it could still have a traumatic and damaging effect on the individual and/or communities, which outweighs the effectiveness of the Use of that Power. Officers and staff should be equipped with the knowledge select the tactical option best fitted to the circumstances. De-escalation is a key skill which could be employed by principal officer in the encounter and/or by one of their peers – giving them the confidence to intervene should they assess an opportunity to prevent a situation escalating to unnecessary use of power.

**Measured by** – College of Policing delivery of the Curriculum and evaluation of new training.

NPCC and College of Policing dissemination of Best practice to Forces

Community participation in design and delivery of training – community feedback.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in Use of Force. Reduction in racial disparity in Use of stop and search

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people’s confidence in Police Use of Powers (new data requirement)

Police Staff survey – confidence of officers in the effective/appropriate use of stop and search powers.

**Assisted by** – HMICFRS race thematic Inspection and annual Force PEEL Inspections. College of Policing Peer Reviews. PCC’s public engagement and publication of Use of Powers data.

**Openness and Transparency – Creating digital opportunities for people to review, rate and influence how Police Powers are used in their areas.**

**What** – Over the next 18 months, the College of Policing will support Forces by testing innovative ways of sharing information and gathering feedback from the public on their interactions with police following the use of police powers.

**How** - Build upon the experiences and innovation of individual Forces, College of policing providing evidence and evaluation support, working with NPCC and Forces to identify funding sources to support and linking in with NPCC Science and technology lead. This will link with work stream 3 'Involved' to identify and use opportunities for Black people's voices to shape these digital innovations.

**Why** – The processes around Use of Powers have not kept pace with technology and societal changes. With low levels of trust in policing amongst Black people mean they are less likely to make a formal complaint about officer conduct. We need to explore other ways of providing information, seeking and acting on feedback.

**Measured by** – Delivery and publication of pilots by Forces, delivery of evaluation and sharing of best practice by the College of Policing.

**Tracked by** - Reduction in racial disparity in Use of stop and search

Reduction in repeat stop and searches, especially for young people (new data requirement).

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people's confidence in Police Use of Powers (new data requirement)

Staff survey – officers' confidence in effective and appropriate use of powers.

**Assisted by** – HMICFRS race thematic and annual PEEL Inspections – identifying Best and emerging practice, College of Policing Peer Reviews, PCCs re engagement and innovation with communities, Home Office re potential Round Table – technology and innovation in Use of Powers, Innovation Hubs (Work stream 3), NPCC Science and Technology lead.

**Case Study - Use of Powers: Stop and Search**

**Dorset Police – RCT (Randomised Control Trial)**

**Transparency –**

**Ensuring the public can see, understand, compare and question how Police are using their powers on Black people.**

**Police leaders being open about where disparities exist and how they are tackling them.**

**Background:** Dorset Police currently has the highest level of racial disproportionality by resident population in the use of Stop and Search, as shown by Home Office published annual league tables. Data from the Census and Dorset police tells us that Black people are 20 times more likely to be searched than white people in Dorset.

These stark disparities have led to widespread concern and condemnation, including from the Criminal Justice Alliance (CJA), and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) is holding the force to account to explain and reduce this disparity.

The use of police 'stop and search' powers often polarise society. Some argue that Stop and Search can have such a detrimental effect on both individuals stopped, and communities, that it shouldn't be used.



Questions are raised as to whether stop search is really such an effective policing power in reducing harm in violent hotspots, that unintended consequences of racial disparity can be tolerated? In locations categorised as 'low-harm', could data be used proactively to encourage minimising use of Stop and Search in order to reduce the disparity for Black people?

**What has happened so far:** The Police and Crime Commissioner for Dorset, supported by HMICFRS, has formally challenged the Chief Constable for Dorset police to explain and/or reform practices to reduce this ratio.

We should empower officers to stop and think before conducting a search and consider the unintended outcomes. If an officer considers the potential outcomes and reviews whether that search is proportionate or not, this could reduce the disparities we see.

Officers taking part in a year-long pilot have personal issue body-worn video (BWV) that must be switched on during any police-initiated contact with the public, including stop and search encounters.

The pilot uses a method employed by Essex Police of dip-sampling BWV records and reviewing the encounter applying a Procedural Justice scoring matrix to assess quality of interactions and take learning and make improvements.

This is included within Dorset operational briefings to make sure officers are clear in linking application of police interventions to protecting communities and individuals from harm.

Dorset police are also working with Independent Advisory Groups (IAGs) to review BWV encounters alongside police supervisors to ensure independent and external scrutiny.

The force is also reviewing the impact on public confidence from RCT and the procedural justice impact on people who are stop and searched, as well as developing easy-to-use systems to encourage feedback.

**Measures and impact** – The importance of police legitimacy is arguably at the heart of UK policing by consent and explicitly referenced within the CRED and HMICFRS PEEL inspection reports.

This pilot's aims are (but not limited to): Prevent harm, reduce crime, and divert young people away from criminal justice outcomes. Improve training to officers with practical skills to interact with communities.

Improve legitimacy and accountability of stop search through use of body-worn video. Use data in a responsible and informed way to develop and publish ethnicity data to improve understanding and information gathering and reduce opportunities for misunderstanding and misuse.

Evaluate the impact on children and young people who are stopped and searched in terms of subsequent safeguarding concerns.

**Next steps** – Dorset will deliver a year-long trial with which Chief Officer oversight. Senior officers within local policing areas (LPAs) have been briefed and provided support and commitment with access to their staff.

Progress will be reported via the quarterly disproportionality board and tactical direction and accountability will be through force monthly strategic tasking boards. Operational weekly meetings will be coordinated by the project lead with representation from Neighbourhood Police Team Inspectors providing feedback, problems, and a review of the data.

## **Case Study – Use of Force**

### **West Midlands Police: Use of force supervisor reviews**



**The issue:** Data insight tools show that West Midlands Police consistently and significantly uses disproportionately more force, particularly higher levels of force such as Taser, baton strikes and incapacitant spray, on Black males compared to white and Asian males.

**What has the Force done to date:** In 2020, to better understand how and why higher levels of force were being used, West Midlands Police introduced mandatory reflective learning reviews for individual uses of force in certain circumstances. These reviews were triggered whenever a use of force involved the use of Taser; incapacitant spray; baton strikes; a subject under the age of 10; or a subject who received a significant injury. Supervisors would be automatically notified by email and be required to watch the relevant body worn video footage, complete a written assessment using a standard scoring matrix and then conduct a structured discussion with the relevant officer to debrief the incident. 500 frontline supervisors were given reflective practice training, which encouraged them to use the debriefs to identify both good and bad practice – recognising both those officers who had demonstrated exceptional uses of force, as well as identifying minor or major learning opportunities for others.

To date over 3,000 reflective learning conversations have been conducted following trigger reviews, with only a small percentage identified as requiring reflective learning. On one occasion a review resulted in a referral to professional standards. All relevant organisational learning is routinely shared with personal safety instructors and included within the personal safety training curriculum for all officers.

The reviews have started to deliver change. The latest data shows that, although there has been an overall increase in total recorded use of force (consistent with the end of the Covid lockdown) there has also been a significant downward trend on force used against Black people, particularly the use of Taser, incapacitant spray and baton strikes. However, use of force is still being used disproportionately against Black people.

In March 2021, a more in-depth study was undertaken of 80 dip sampled use of force incidents, to check the quality of the original supervisor reviews and to explore, in greater detail, the differences in the use of force against Black males compared to non-Black males. A police officer review panel assessed how well the officer using force had followed the national decision model, used tactical communications to de-escalate the situation, applied post-incident aftercare and shown empathy. The panel concluded that officers consistently demonstrated poorer performance when using force against Black males compared to non-Black males, particularly in relation to displays of empathy.

**Next Steps:** - West Midlands Police is working with an academic partner to evaluate the supervisor reviews to develop a more robust assessment matrix, based on international best practice. The criteria for a review will be amended in the near future to a single trigger of all uses of force on Black males aged 18-34. This will allow for greater analysis and insight, to better understand disproportionality. Work is also ongoing with communities to develop a better understanding of cultural awareness, empathy and aftercare amongst frontline officers.

## **Work stream 3: Involved – Community Engagement and Relations**

### **“A police service that routinely involves Black People in its governance”**

An anti-racist police service should be actively seeking ways to ensure Black people are involved in shaping and scrutinising the policing service nationally and locally. Policing should be making clear the opportunities to be involved in key decision-making at different stages. This requires policing to use approaches to meet their need. Black people should be involved in oversight of police activity where they are most disadvantaged by how they work.

Police forces should also be clear about how people can make complaints and/or express their disaffection with a policing service and there should be standard expectations around the response to those.

We have heard from many Black people that we are starting from a position of mistrust and for there to be meaningful change, we have to acknowledge and apologise for past wrongdoing and the harm caused. We know that this has to be authentic and supported by actions to make lasting improvements. We want to work with the ISOB Chair and her board to explore how we can do best do this, as this is clearly an area where we don't have the answers.

It is our responsibility to find ways to make it attractive for Black people to be involved in policing, considering how we recognise and reward this. We know that lots of forces are trying innovative approaches, we will support the evaluation of these so we can create a better understanding of what works.

In developing the actions, we have considered findings and recommendations from previous key reviews and Inspections, the themes relevant to this work stream are:

#### **Summary of key themes from past reviews:**

**Community engagement and public confidence** HASC expressed surprise at the lack of force-level public confidence data and recommended that this should be monitored routinely. It said that rebuilding public confidence needed to be part of the race and inclusion plan. The Commission for racial and ethnic disparities also called for greater public scrutiny at local level of force activity with more governance around this while the Angiolini Review said there needed to be greater involvement of BAME people in design of guidance and training.

#### **We commit to:**

**Evidence capture, piloting & development of practice - *Improve the quality of community engagement between police and Black communities by producing and providing forces with a set of evaluated practice models, toolkits and a knowledge bank.***

**What** - The NPCC and College of Policing have completed a 'call for evidence' from Neighbourhood Police Teams and Equality Diversity and Inclusion Departments to gather best practice examples of how policing is engaging specifically with Black communities.

We will identify, pilot and evaluate place-based initiatives which aim to increase the levels of trust and confidence in Policing experienced by Black communities. Examples of best practice will be further developed in consultation with key stakeholders, most specifically we will ask for input from our Black communities, recognising that communities are wide ranging in demographics and perspectives.

**How** - The NPCC and College of Policing have reviewed 32 potential case studies where policing has engaged with diverse communities and identified 10 further examples specifically relating to Black communities.

Working closely with Black communities and other key stakeholders, a select number of forces will be identified to pilot the most promising initiatives. The College of Policing will evaluate the effectiveness of the initiatives and offer ideas for improvement where required. Examples of evaluated initiatives will then be shared nationally with all forces to be embedded into day to day policing.

Review and consider the questions in the Crime Survey for England & Wales to ensure that there are sufficient areas relating to trust and confidence (fairness & justice) within Black People. Increase participation in the crime survey amongst Black communities.

**Why?** - Police need to improve the trust and confidence of Black communities. By ensuring that all Black people have trusted platforms to voice opinions, this will build positive future relationships with policing.

Police will work with Black communities to further develop current initiatives and seek to co-create new opportunities where police will listen and take account of specific needs and concerns. To achieve this, police must have viable Black community engagement initiatives proactively and as a matter of course.

**Measured by:** Initiatives must have clearly defined objectives and outcomes. However, it must be acknowledged that positive outcomes such as changes in the trust and confidence of Black Communities in policing, may not be immediately evident or truly measurable in the short-term. It will take time to measure how well specific community engagement initiatives have worked to help build the trust and confidence of Black communities.

Take up and usage of the practice models by Force

National public confidence surveys – (e.g. British Crime survey of England & Wales)

Local public confidence surveys (e.g. Police led – local community groups, Stakeholder led, Independent Think tanks etc.)

College of Policing - evaluation of co-created community engagement initiatives.

**Tracked by** - Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people's confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people's confidence & trust in Police (new data requirement).

**Assisted by:** Black Communities, National Black Police Association, Independent Advisory Groups, Force Scrutiny Groups

**Understanding the effects of community trauma on Black communities - Explore different approaches to police engagement with Black people and communities in England and Wales. Examine the body of evidence that exists regarding the impact of community trauma on trust and confidence. Explore different approaches to police engagement with Black people and communities in England and Wales and develop methods for reconciliation.**

**What** - The College of Policing has conducted research to explore different approaches to police engagement with Black people and communities in England and Wales. By examining the evidence base on the use of a community or collective trauma framed approach, this may inform how the police better understand and engage with Black communities to build trust and confidence in policing across England and Wales.

**How** - A rapid evidence assessment (REA) has been undertaken to explore an emerging body of evidence relating to community trauma.

The aim of the initiative is to provide evaluated and evidence-based options that can be trialled and developed with Black and ethnic minority communities in order to improve the quality of police engagement. The REA sought to address the following research questions:

What approaches using a community/collective trauma focus, improve police engagement with Black people and communities?

What are the effective elements of community trauma interventions?

What needs to be in place for the approach to work?

17 studies have been identified as relevant to the research questions and form the basis of the findings set out in this research.

NPCC and the College of Policing will now explore future opportunities for impact on policy and procedure for police forces. Pilots focused on collective trauma and reconciliation will be co-developed with Black Communities in selected forces to improve relations and engage with seldom heard voices from Black communities.

This will be achieved with Black communities via community collaboration from the inception of any initiatives. It is important to make use of existing relationships with community organisations community leaders and established stakeholders.

Police must engage with diverse representation from the community so that a range of views and issues are heard and addressed. We want to provide new methods for seldom heard voices to be included within our decision making. Black communities are not all the same and will have different needs.

Finally, there is a need for sustained ongoing community engagement activities – not just one-off projects. Longevity and ‘buy in’ from all parties is essential.

**Why** -Reconciliation and community healing approaches to police engagement with Black communities could provide a useful over-arching framework for re-designing community engagement methods and practice.

Community events and forums are important in generating open and mutual dialogue between the police and the Black community. While formalised police training may help, training alone is unlikely to generate the changes necessary to mend relationships between police and Black communities. Through dialogue with the Black communities using new innovative approaches, Police need to also learn about and understand the culture, history and harms experienced.

**Measured by** -The College of Policing will embed evaluations into the design of new interventions that measure the implementation, delivery and short, medium and long-term outcomes.

However, it must be acknowledged that positive outcomes such as changes in the trust and confidence of Black Communities in policing, may not be immediately evident or truly measurable in the short-term. It will take time to measure how well specific community engagement initiatives have worked to help build the trust and confidence of Black communities.

**Tracked by** - Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people’s confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people’s confidence & trust in Police (new data requirement).  
HMICFRS inspection findings.

**Assisted by** - College of Policing, HMICFRS Race thematic Inspection and PEEL Inspections of Forces. OPCCs – engagement and publication of Force reports to communities, new methods of consultation and measurement of satisfaction with the service received by Black communities

**Bringing policing closer to the Black community – *Work with Black people and external partners to design engagement methods that ensure Black voices are heard. Engage with and learn from other organisations. Explore, develop and trial mechanisms that build positive relationships between with Black people and policing.***

**What** – The College of policing and the NPCC have identified two potential mechanisms to support the commitment made by Chief Constables to address engagement between the police and Black communities and improve the experiences and perceptions of Black people interacting with the police service.

The community engagement work stream seeks to collaborate with external sectors which have organisational expertise with links to relevant partnerships and networks and which can speak with experience and knowledge and without fear or favour on issues of engagement with Black communities. Those organisations which will also have a deep understanding of an evidence-based approach and delivering change at a structural level, will be surveyed to assist the police service in the design and delivery of engagement methods at local and national level.

The NPCC and College of Policing will use Innovation Hubs as a method of engagement, created to address the significant trust and confidence deficit between the police and Black people. The method intends to ensure that the lived experience of Black communities is understood, to break down barriers that hinder police and Black community relationships, embed direct Black community involvement in a consistent and effective manner and ensure the opinions of Black people and communities are voiced, taken into account and that they have the opportunity to proactively influence police processes and police strategic decision making.

We will set national standards for the role of schools' officers to ensure their actions take a child-centred approach, promote trust and legitimacy and do not exacerbate existing racial disparities in school. This will involve building on existing research through a force-led pilot.

**How** – The objective is to work at a national level with key external organisations, who can evaluate progress and assess the development and implementation of methods of community engagement and objectively provide guidance upon whether engagement mechanisms are anti-racist and trusted by Black communities.

The opportunity for a national level panel with external partner membership will be assessed and evaluated for the potential for relevant organisations to shape the thinking, design and development of new processes and learning content in the area of community engagement and relationships with Black communities.

The vision is for Innovation Hubs to be utilised within every Force area, adopting national standards as designed and developed by the Action Plan following independent evaluation, assessment, and piloting. The attendance and engagement of Black people and representatives of Black community voices will be prioritised. Attendees will co-produce recommendations which will result in a published report, thereby promoting transparency, police accountability and making the opinions of Black people visible. Each police force will be expected to implement the recommendations or explain why it hasn't.

Two Innovation Hubs have been piloted in London. A more detailed London focussed evaluation be conducted through surveys and a small number of interviews, this will be led by Academia and the College of Policing

"Schools officers" will be a method for developing positive relationships with Young Black People. The specific action is to ensure any work to develop national policy (outside of the programme) is cognisant of the impact on Black children. The programme is linking with the Children & Young Person (C&YP) portfolio and the Youth Endowment Fund to explore the opportunity to pilot a "Schools Officer" scheme. The college of policing will assist in evaluating any agreed pilot scheme being led by the C&YP portfolio.

**Why** – It is vital that the Police service has good relations with the public. It is recognised that this is a particularly acute issue with Black people and that Black communities must have trust and confidence in policing to enable the Police to keep people safe and tackle crime.

Whilst the Police service has a number of established governance structures such as IAGs and scrutiny panels which afford communities opportunities to address policing matters, they are not universally diverse and representative. As such existing governance mechanisms may not have the capability to deliver transformative change in terms of specifically building better relationships with Black people. Reconciliation and community healing approaches to police engagement with Black communities could provide a useful over-arching framework for re-designing community engagement. Community events and forums are important in generating open and mutual dialogue between the police and the Black community.

**Measured by** – Survey responses will indicate the level the police are taking account of the things that matter. Evaluations of IH's will measure Satisfaction levels of Black people who come into contact with the police, indicating their needs were listened to and appropriate action was taken.

Early results from an independent evaluation in respect of a pilot Innovation Hub which took place on 25.02.2022 indicate that post the event, trust and confidence levels increased, as well as positive and encouraging signs that attendees would consider becoming part of police governance structures.

Interventions must have clearly defined objectives and outcomes measures. However, it must be acknowledged that positive outcomes (such as changes in public confidence in police) may not be immediately measurable in the short-term, as it will take time to generate long-term changes in confidence in police and improvement in the nature of relationships between the police and the Black community.

**Tracked by** - Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people's confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police.

Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people's confidence & trust in Police (new data requirement).

**Assisted by**- College of Policing, Academia Evaluation, HMICFRS Race thematic Inspection and PEEL Inspections of Forces. OPCCs – engagement and publication of Force reports to communities. New methods of consultation and measurement of satisfaction with the service received by Black communities

**Listening to Black Communities - Assess whether current formal arrangements (such as IAGs and Scrutiny Panels) enable Black people to have a voice into policing. Ensure forces demonstrate proportional representation from Black Communities within established formal scrutiny mechanisms to shape and influence policing issues.**

**What** - The College of Policing and NPCC are working to understand how forces are utilising Independent Advisory Groups (IAG's) and Scrutiny Panels. Importantly they will assess how proportionally representative Black communities are within this network. Mapping out how, where and what influence Black People can have on Policing at a local, Force and National level. Ensuring these groups are known and accessible to Black People.

**How** - A research steering group from the NPCC, College of Policing, National Association of Independent Advisory Groups and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners have recently concluded a call for practice for community engagement with Black communities. Building upon recent work conducted by the Criminal Justice Alliance, a survey to Police and Crime Commissioners and Force leads will request data to assess the demographic membership profile of constituted IAGs and similar bodies and how members and chairs are elected and/or appointed.

Additionally, the findings will provide the basis for updating the College of Policing IAG guidance (2015) and assess the general value and effectiveness of IAGs and scrutiny panels at a local/force level. The findings will support recommendations, where appropriate, on the feasibility of a National Association of IAGs.

**Why** - Increased engagement from Black communities within police governance structures such as Independent Advisory Groups and other associated scrutiny panels is key to building better trust and confidence. By ensuring easily accessible opportunities for Black communities to be actively involved in the scrutiny of police practice is vitally important. Black people must be able to confidently challenge their local forces with the most representative and influential voices from within their communities. The fair representation of Black communities within established police governance mechanisms will increase transparency and begin to build future trust and confidence in policing.

**Measured by** - Increased representation from Black Communities via IAGs and Scrutiny Groups.



**Tracked by** - Public confidence measures - Increase in Black people's confidence police (CSEW) & trust in local police. Public Attitude Survey – increased Black people's confidence & trust in Police (new data requirement).

Increased representation from Black Communities via IAGs and Scrutiny Groups (new data requirement).

**Assisted by** - HMICFRS race thematic Inspection and PEEL Inspections of Forces. PCCs – engagement and publication of Force reports to communities. National Association of Independent Advisory Groups.

### **Case study 1**

#### **West Midlands Police: Barriers to Bridges**

*Barriers to Bridges is the first ever police 'artist in residency' in the UK. It came about thanks to the opportunity provided by Coventry City of Culture 2021, and presented an opportunity to do things differently.*

*West Midlands were especially interested in how art and culture could play a role in developing a new dialogue with and for young people, the local community and the police, and help to develop a mutual understanding and build bridges.*

*It involved the artist, Kay Rufai, immersing themselves in the worlds of West Midlands Police and Coventry based black and Asian young people over a series of months; observing, asking questions and prompting discussion that would then inform a piece of art on the following brief:*

#### **The issue:**

- *Disconnect between police and young people – some (especially black and Asian) young people don't feel they can or don't want to speak to the police.*
- *This is based on negative perceptions/stereotypes of police, founded from their own direct experiences.*
- *Police perceptions/stereotypes can impact on how the Police interact with young people.*
- *Their perceptions impact on how they interact with the police.*
- *This impacts directly on legitimacy, and can mean that after an incident they are reluctant to tell the Police what's happened.*
- *Need to build positive more relationships = trust.*

#### **Brief:**

- *Kay was asked to explore perceptions and experiences, and depict artistically.*
- *Identify what the causes and barriers are.*
- *How can his art develop a dialogue?*
- *Aim to build mutual understanding and empathy.*

*As a result of his time spent with young people and police, Kay produced a series of photo storyboards and films that explored the experiences, thoughts and feelings of both police and young people. He especially asked police how they would respond to what the young people involved in the project were saying.*

*He found experiences based deeply in feelings of bias and stereotyping. The art has begun to build insight and empathy for all parties, but is part of an ongoing piece of work to gather further reflection and feedback on what has been learnt and what we might do differently as a result. This work will be used to ask challenging questions of staff about unconscious bias and to reflect on how this might impact our practice. It will lead to further work around how the force can go about police business in a way that minimises trauma and demonstrates thoughtfulness and empathy.*

*It is also acting as a springboard for further activity that will continue an open and honest dialogue about the issues raised, leading to deeper development. For instance, we are seeking to invite some of the young people to come and speak directly to Firearms officers about their experiences and the impact it has had on their lives.*



*This has all come about because of 'a piece of art' – the young people involved would never have chosen to engage with the police before the residency (and many refused to take part due to the project's associations with the police), but because of this project some of their perceptions have shifted. We hope to see this continue as we work to build further bridges.*

## **Case study 2**

### **Metropolitan Police Service (and now National) – Innovation Hubs**

**Background** - Innovation Hubs (IHs) are a method of engagement, created to address the significant trust and confidence deficit between the police and Black people. The method intends to ensure that the lived experience of Black communities is understood, to break down barriers that hinder police and Black community relationships, embed direct Black community involvement in a consistent and effective manner and ensure the opinions of Black people and communities are voiced, considered and that they can proactively influence police processes and police strategic decision making

**What has happened so far** - The first pilot IH held on 29.01.2022 at the Victoria Centre, Westminster, London was led by Dr Angela Herbert, MBE, selected for her extensive experience in driving social change, involvement with initiatives focused upon improving relationships between Black communities and the police and her ability to engage individuals and groups with a cynical perception of the police service. The session was attended 33 community members, almost all who were people of colour. 50% of delegates were aged 16-35 years. Delegates were selected by Dr Herbert, using her knowledge around local demographics so as to ensure that both critical and younger generation voices were heard.

Dr Herbert was asked by Commander Heydari to host an IH to identify practical solutions to address two specific questions regarding the under-representation of Black communities within Met governance structures and how the Met could improve levels of trust amongst the Black communities of London. Attendees received a delegate pack in advance of the meeting which outlined expectations from them, including drafting formal recommendations and ideas about what implementation looked like which would be used to develop a report. To support the IH method as mechanism for transformative change, delegates were empowered to see themselves as change makers as opposed to simply participants owing to key factors unique to IHs, namely that a report would be published and shared with senior police so that practical recommendations would be implemented where possible, together with the creation of an action timeline to include dates for publication of the report and a reconvened meeting between Commander Heydari, police representatives and delegates.

Preliminary findings from an independent evaluation of a second pilot IH, held on 25.02.2022 at New Scotland Yard, indicate that post the event, trust and confidence levels increased, as well as encouraging signs that attendees would consider becoming part of police governance structures

**Next Steps** - To ensure national standard IHs within each Force area, as developed by the Action Plan following independent evaluation, assessment, and piloting. Each police force will be expected to implement the recommendations of Black community delegates or explain why it hasn't.

## Work stream 4: Protected – Protection against victimisation

### “A police service that protects Black people from crime, and seeks justice for Black victims”

We heard from Black people that they want to have confidence that policing is there for them when they need it and will provide an improved service to black victims of crime, vulnerable people and those seeking help from policing and our partners to address local problems of crime and disorder, particularly those affecting young people. That we will actively pursue those intent on causing harm to Black people, tackling serious violence and hate crime effectively, and taking clearer action against far-right extremism and racist violence. That includes improving the quality and the outcomes of investigations for Black people.

This is a vital area of the plan. Our intent is to develop this section of the plan directly with the ISOB when it is in place and it will be released at the next stage of this plan’s development.

In developing the actions, we will consider the findings and recommendations from previous key reviews and Inspections, the themes relevant to this work stream are:

#### **Summary of key themes from past reviews:**

**Hate crime:** HASC called for a national strategy on policing online hate crime including identifying skills, training & digital infrastructure needs. The original Macpherson report had a major focus on hate crime, with recommendations that included the production of guidelines on handling on victims and witnesses, especially in relation to racist incidents and training of family liaison officers to include racism awareness and cultural diversity

#### **Protected Work stream Outcomes:**

- **Making sure Black People are, and feel safer**  
**Reducing Black victimisation, especially of hate crime and serious youth violence**
- **Reducing the harms cause by the crime and disorder experienced by Black people, particularly by the most vulnerable**
- **Treating Black victims and witnesses better, understanding their needs and vulnerabilities**
- **Improving the quality and outcome of our investigations for Black victims**
- **Taking clearer action to tackle far-right extremism and racist violence**
- **Improving how we prevent, and respond to, the crime and disorder concerns of Black communities, particularly of young people**
- **Helping Black communities to address local crime and disorder problems**
- **Actively supporting services that make a difference to Black people's lives, and reduce the need for us to be involved later on**

Within this work stream there will be actions relating to:

- Investigation of Black people's cases effectively and professionally
- Protection of Black people's wellbeing in custody
- Equality of service for Black people relating to dealing with missing persons
- Understanding impact of mental health issues on interactions between Black people and the police

**Indicators for work stream 4– Protection Against Victimisation**

- Increase in level of satisfaction with police experience of race hate crime
- Reduction in justice outcomes gap by ethnicity

**Race Action Plan: Improving Policing for Black People, March 2022**

## Appendix A

### Glossary

**Racism:** a belief or doctrine that inherent differences among the various human racial groups determine cultural or individual achievement, usually involving the idea that one's own race is superior and has the right to dominate others or that a particular racial group is inferior to the others.

**Institutional racism:** also known as **systemic racism**, is a form of racism that is embedded in the laws and regulations of a society or an organization. It manifests as discrimination in areas such as criminal justice, employment, housing, health care, education, and political representation.

**Internalised:** racism lies within individuals. This type of racism comprises our private beliefs and biases about race and racism, influenced by our culture. This can take many different forms including: prejudice towards others of a different race; internalized oppression—the negative beliefs about oneself by people of colour; or internalised privilege—beliefs about superiority or entitlement by white people.

**Interpersonal:** racism (personally mediated) occurs between individuals. This is the bias that occurs when individuals interact with others and their personal racial beliefs affect their public interactions. Institutional racism occurs within institutions and systems of power. This refers to the unfair policies and discriminatory practices of particular institutions (schools, workplaces, etc.) that routinely produce racially inequitable outcomes for people of colour and advantages for white people. Individuals within institutions take on the power of the institution when they reinforce racial inequities.

**Structural:** racism is racial bias among institutions and across society. This involves the cumulative and compounding effects of an array of societal factors, including the history, culture, ideology and interactions of institutions and policies that systematically privilege white people and disadvantage people of colour.

**Discrimination:** the unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people, especially on the grounds of race, age, sex, or disability.

**Bias:** a particular tendency, trend, inclination, feeling, or opinion, especially one that is preconceived or unreasoned:  
unreasonably hostile feelings or opinions about a social group;

**Prejudice:** an unfavourable opinion or feeling formed beforehand or without knowledge, thought, or reason

**Unconscious bias:** Unconscious (or implicit) bias is a term that describes the associations we hold, outside our conscious awareness and control. Unconscious bias affects everyone. Unconscious bias is triggered by our brain automatically making quick judgments and assessments.

**Disparity:** a noticeable and usually significant difference or dissimilarity

**Racial disparity:** is defined as existing in the criminal justice system when "the proportion of a racial/ethnic group within the control of the system is greater than the proportion of such groups in the general population."

**Disproportionality:** refers to a group's representation in a particular category that exceeds expectations for that group, or differs substantially from the representation of others in that category.

**ACC** – Assistant Chief Constable  
**ADR** – Annual Data Requirement  
**AP for SCC** – Assessment Process for Strategic Command Course  
**APCC** – Association of Police and Crime Commissioners  
**APP** - Authorised Professional Practice  
**BCU** – Basic Command Unit  
**ARC** – Assessment and Recognition of Competency  
**BAWP** – British Association for Women in Policing  
**BTP** – British Transport Police  
**BWV** – Body worn video  
**CC** - Chief Constable  
**CID** – Crime Investigation Department  
**CPD** – Continuing Professional Development  
**CPS** – Crown Prosecution Service  
**CSEW** – Crime Survey for England and Wales  
**CVF** – Competency and Values Framework  
**DC** – Detective Constable  
**DCC** - Deputy Chief Constable  
**DCI** – Detective Chief Inspector  
**DCS** – Detective Chief Superintendent  
**DEI** – Diversity, Equality and Inclusion  
**DI** – Detective Inspector  
**DMI** – Digital Media Investigator  
**DS** – Detective Sergeant  
**DSI** – Detective Superintendent  
**EHRC** – Equalities and Human Rights Commission  
**EIA** – Equality Impact Assessment  
**HASC** – Home Affairs Select Committee  
**HMICFRS** – Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services  
**HO** – Home Office  
**IAG** – Independent Advisory Group  
**ICIDP** – Initial Crime Investigation Department Programme  
**IOPC** – Independent Office for Police Conduct  
**IPLDP** – Initial Police Learning and Development Programme  
**IPP** – Intelligence Professionalisation Programme  
**ISOB** - Independent Scrutiny and Oversight Board  
**M&C** – Misconduct and complaints  
**MoD** – Ministry of Defence  
**MPS** – Metropolitan Police Service  
**NBPA** – National Black Police Association  
**\*\*S23\*\***  
**NIE** – National Investigators' Examination  
**NPC** – National Policing Curriculum  
**NPCC** – National Police Chiefs' Council  
**NPPF** – National Police Promotion Framework  
**PDR** – Professional Development Review  
**PC** – Police Constable  
**PCC** – Police and Crime Commissioner  
**PCDA** – Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship  
**PCSC** - Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts (Bill)  
**PCSO** – Police Community Support Officer  
**PDR** – Professional Development Review  
**PEQF** – Police Education and Qualifications Framework  
**PFEW** – Police Federation of England and Wales  
**PIP** – Professionalising Investigation Programme  
**PNC** – Police National Computer  
**PND** – Police National Database  
**PSD** – Professional Standards Department  
**PSNI** – Police Service of Northern Ireland  
**PUP** – Police Uplift Programme  
**RAC** – Recruit Assessment Centre  
**S(enior) PNAC** – Senior Police National Assessment Centre  
**SCC** – Strategic Command Course  
**SLDP** – Senior Leadership Development Programme  
**SR** – Specialist Roles  
**T/DC** – Trainee Detective Constable

## **Appendix B**

### **Data approach / current data & information**

There are 3 clear areas of work the data & performance enabling work stream:-

#### **Data Transparency**

Data & Information Strategy to be developed for the improvement of policing data publication in relation to Race & Inclusion:

- Data Vision / Data Strategy
- National data overview – gap analysis
- Data Collection Plan
- Recommendations for Data gaps to be addressed
- Improve existing data publication opportunities – i.e. Police.uk publications

#### **Data Improvement & Opportunity**

Work across policing to improve the consistency of data capture, application and use of data & information relating to Race & Inclusion

- Recommendations for Data capture gaps to be closed via Home Office Requirements and the mechanisms available, ADR, CSEW
- Identify existing inconsistencies in the application and use of data, for example proportionality calculations.
- Address identified issues with current data use and application this could be through the use of Authorised Professional Practise, changes in mandatory publications or alternative routes.

#### **Monitoring & Scrutiny**

- Data & information to monitor the programme impact for internal purposes – i.e. work stream leaders, data to support the outcomes framework, linked work with the College Of Policing
- Data & information to allow external scrutiny of the programme

Represented Outcomes		Tracking & Success Indicators
	Eliminating any racial bias, stereotyping profiling or discrimination from our policies procedures and practices	Perception survey**, recruiting, retention & wellbeing data by ethnicity
	Approaching racial disparities in the police as problems in themselves regardless of their causes because of their impact on out Black officers staff and volunteers	Internal procedural justice for example misconduct and grievance - professional standards data*
	Making sure Black people are Encouraged and well prepared to apply for police roles	Perception survey** / career progression* / attrition rate by ethnicity
	Making sure Black people Submit good applications	Recruitment process data* / Career progression incl timeliness & attrition / rank & representation data / ethnicity pay gap*
	Making sure Black people Are not disadvantaged in the process	Career progression incl timeliness & attrition / rank & representation data / ethnicity pay gap*
	Making sure Black people: Are assessed fairly	Career progression incl timeliness & attrition / rank & representation data / ethnicity pay gap* New recruits survey**
	Making sure Black people are: Are able to develop and progress including to the most senior levels	SCC application and success rate / Career progression incl timeliness*
	Making sure Black people: have their individual needs met	Perception survey**, Black officers and staff assaults data
	Making sure Black people are: listened to and have influence	Perception survey** / career progression */ attrition rate by ethnicity
Respected Outcomes		Tracking & Success Indicators
	Eliminating any racial bias stereotyping profiling or discrimination in our actions	Monitor compliance to national data standards for data & transparency* track racial disparity in use of powers: stop & search, use of force incl Taser, traffic stops* Track racial disparity in Arrest / RUI / outcome data *
	Treating black people as individuals and taking account of their needs vulnerabilities experiences and circumstances such as trauma	Track racial disparity in use of powers: stop & search, use of force incl Taser, traffic stops* Track racial disparity in Arrest / RUI / outcome data * CSEW respect & fair treatment questions Monitor compliance to national data standards for data & transparency*
	Approaching racial disparities in our actions as problems in themselves regardless of their causes because of their impact on Black people	Track racial disparity in use of powers: stop & search, use of force incl Taser, traffic stops* - including individual officer interaction by ethnicity Track racial disparity in Arrest / RUI / outcome data * CJ racial disparity data incl First time entrants Monitor compliance to national data standards for data & transparency*
	Minimising any harms we inadvertently cause because of their differential impact on Black People	to be determined
	Reducing the risk of criminalising Black people by ensuring they benefit from early action prevention and diversion	Out of court disposals and alternate diversionary CJ pathways* Track racial disparity in Arrest / RUI / outcome data *
Involved Outcomes		Tracking & Success Indicators
	Apologising for the long lasting effects of problems in Policing on Black communities	CSEW public confidence by ethnicity - specific focus on Black respondents
	Understanding the frustrations of Black people about the slow speed of change	Community engagement feedback capture*
	Responding to community trauma and reconciling Police/Community divisions	CSEW public confidence by ethnicity - specific focus on Black respondents / Community & public engagement feedback capture*
	Involving Black People in our oversight and scrutiny processes proactively and as a matter of course	IAG and scrutiny panel by ethnicity* / Community & public engagement feedback capture*
	Making sure Black people: Can influence our decisions at different stages in the process	IAG and scrutiny panel by ethnicity* / Community & public engagement feedback capture*
	Making sure Black people: are able to voice their opinions to which we listen and take account	IAG and scrutiny panel by ethnicity* / Community & public engagement feedback capture*
	Making sure Black people: receive timely and meaningful information about our decisions and how we reached them	Community & public engagement feedback capture / Victim satisfaction by ethnicity*
	Making sure Black people: have opportunities to review our decisions and have appropriate means of redress	Public complaints and dissatisfaction / Community & public engagement feedback capture*
	Making sure Black people: are treated with dignity and respect	Public complaints and dissatisfaction / Community & public engagement feedback capture* / IAG and scrutiny panel by ethnicity*
Protected Outcomes		Diagnostic Indicators
	Making sure Black People are, and feel safer	CSEW public confidence & feelings of safety
	Reducing Black victimisation, especially of hate crime and serious youth violence	Police recorded crime - Race related hate incidents and crime, violence crime rates by ethnicity by age category. CSEW - victim rates for violence and hate crime by ethnicity
	Reducing the harms caused by the crime and disorder experienced by Black People, particularly by the most vulnerable	Police recorded crime - Race related hate incidents and crime, violence crime rates by ethnicity by age category. CSEW - victim rates for violence and hate crime by ethnicity
	Treating Black victims and witnesses better, understanding their needs and vulnerabilities	Home Office victim satisfaction by ethnicity*
	Improving the quality and outcome of our investigations for Black victims	Track racial disparity in police recorded crime outcomes / CJ outcomes
	Taking clearer action to tackle far-right extremism and racist violence	to be determined
	Improving how we prevent, and respond to, the crime and disorder concerns of Black communities, particularly of young people	Crime harm index, vulnerability and deprivation monitoring alongside ONS community data to identify and reduce disparity*
	Helping Black communities to address local crime and disorder problems	Crime harm index, vulnerability and deprivation monitoring alongside ONS community data to identify and reduce disparity*
	Actively supporting services that make a difference to Black people's lives, and reduce the need for us to be involved later on	to be determined
*potential new dataset yet to be agreed		
**new metric agreed		



## Sample current data & information (publicly available)

### Police workforce:

Police workforce - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures ([ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk](https://ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk))


#### Percentage and number of people in the police workforce, by ethnicity and role

Ethnicity ↕	Police Officer		Police Staff		Community Support Officer		Designated Officer	
	% ↕	Number of staff ↕ (FTE)	% ↕	Number of staff ↕ (FTE)	% ↕	Number of staff ↕ (FTE)	% ↕	Number of staff ↕ (FTE)
Asian	3.1	3,884	3.5	2,249	4.7	417	3.2	153
Black	1.3	1,586	2.1	1,355	2.9	255	2.7	129
Mixed	2.2	2,711	1.2	772	1.5	133	1.7	80
White	92.7	116,536	92.5	59,264	89.7	8,024	91.7	4,399
Other including Chinese	0.8	993	0.6	408	1.2	111	0.8	39
Unknown	N/A *	3,400	N/A *	3,154	N/A *	240	N/A *	330

#### Percentage and number of police officers (FTE) by ethnicity and rank (2007 and 2020)

Rank ↕	Asian				Black				Mixed			
	% ↕ 2007	Number ↕ 2007	% ↕ 2020	Number ↕ 2020	% ↕ 2007	Number ↕ 2007	% ↕ 2020	Number ↕ 2020	% ↕ 2007	Number ↕ 2007	% ↕ 2020	Number ↕ 2020
Chief Officer	2.0	4	1.5	3	0.5	1	0.0	0	1.0	2	0.5	1
Chief Superintendent	1.3	6	2.0	6	0.6	3	1.3	4	0.6	3	2.3	7
Superintendent	1.0	10	1.7	15	0.8	8	1.0	9	0.5	5	1.8	16
Chief Inspector	1.0	18	1.8	31	0.5	10	0.7	12	1.2	22	1.5	25
Inspector	1.0	72	2.3	128	0.5	36	0.7	38	0.7	49	1.6	91
Sergeant	1.1	235	2.2	412	0.8	179	0.8	151	0.7	162	1.6	288
Constable	1.6	1,766	3.3	3,289	1.0	1,113	1.4	1,373	1.1	1,176	2.3	2,283

#### Percentage of police officers from ethnic minority groups (excluding White minorities) by rank over time




## Public confidence:

[Confidence in the local police - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/ethnicity-facts-figures/service.gov.uk)

- in the year ending March 2020, 74% of people aged 16 and over in England and Wales said they had confidence in their local police
- in every year shown, a lower percentage of Black Caribbean people had confidence in their local police than White British people
- in the 3 years from April 2017 to March 2020, a higher percentage of people in the Asian, White, and Other ethnic groups had confidence in their local police than Black people
- Black confidence level 64%


Percentage of people aged 16 and over who had confidence in their local police, by ethnicity over time



## Stop & search:

[www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-procedures-stop-and-search-and-arrests-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2021/police-powers-and-procedures-stop-and-search-and-arrests-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2021](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-powers-and-procedures-stop-and-search-and-arrests-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2021/police-powers-and-procedures-stop-and-search-and-arrests-england-and-wales-year-ending-31-march-2021)

### Proportion of stop and searches by self-defined ethnic group, England and Wales and the MPS area, year ending March 2021




Males aged 15-34 from a Black, Asian or other minority ethnic background account for 32% of stop and search in the year ending March 2021, despite only comprising 2.6% of the population. The highest rate of stop and search was for males aged 15-19 who belong to a Black, Asian or other minority ethnic group, who were searched at a rate of 208 per 1,000 people, a rate 3.0 times higher than White people of the same age group. For males from a Black, Asian or other minority ethnic group, only those aged under 10, or over 54, account for a lower proportion of stop and search than their proportion of the population. However, for females from a Black, Asian or other minority ethnic group, all age groups accounted for a lower proportion of total stop and search than their proportion of the population.

## Arrests

### Arrests - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures ([ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk](https://ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk))

- there were 671,126 arrests between April 2018 and March 2019, almost 5,000 fewer arrests than the previous year
- Black people were over 3 times as likely to be arrested as White people – there were 32 arrests for every 1,000 Black people, and 10 arrests for every 1,000 White people
- overall, men were 6 times as likely to be arrested as women – there were 21 arrests for every 1,000 men, and 3 arrests for every 1,000 women
- Black men were over 3 times as likely to be arrested than White men – there were 60 arrests for every 1,000 Black men, and 17 arrests for every 1,000 White men
- figures for the 2 years to March 2019 don't include Lancashire police force as they were unable to provide data

Title: Arrest rate per 1,000 people by ethnicity. Location: England and Wales. Time period: April 2018 to March 2019. Source: Police powers and procedures, England and Wales year ending March 2019 | Ethnicity Facts and Figures GOV.UK




## Prosecutions and convictions

[Prosecutions and convictions - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk)


By ethnicity of defendant over time, this data shows that:

- from 2009 to 2017, the conviction ratio (the percentage of defendants convicted out of all those prosecuted) increased for all ethnic groups, from 79.8% in 2009 to 83.7% in 2017
- however, the total number of prosecutions and convictions where ethnicity was known has decreased over the same period – prosecutions fell from 362,000 in 2009 to 211,000 in 2017 (around 42% fewer), while convictions fell from 281,000 in 2009 to 177,000 in 2017 (around 37% fewer)
- in 2017, White offenders had the highest conviction ratio, at 85.3%
- in 2017, the conviction ratio for offenders from the Other (including Chinese) group was 81.1% - for Asian offenders it was 80.3% in 2017 and the conviction ratios for the Black and Mixed ethnic groups were 78.8% and 79% respectively

Conviction ratio by ethnicity of defendant over time



**Conviction ratio by ethnicity and age group of defendant in 2017**




## Reoffending

[Reoffending - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](https://ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk)

The data shows that, in the year ending March 2018:

- Black offenders had the highest reoffending rate (32.7%)
- offenders in the Other (including Mixed) ethnic group had the lowest reoffending rate (20.9%) – they also committed the fewest re-offenses per person (3.32)
- White offenders committed the most re-offenses per person (4.17)


**Percentage of offenders who reoffended by ethnicity**




## Victims of crime

[Victims of crime - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](https://ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk)

Percentage of people aged 16 years and over who said they were victims of crime, by ethnicity over time



Percentage of people aged 16 years and over who said they were victims of crime, by ethnicity and gender



The data shows that:

- men from Mixed ethnic backgrounds (21%) were more likely to be victims of crime than men from any other ethnic group
- women from mixed ethnic backgrounds (19%) were more likely to be victims of crime than White women (14%)
- differences between men and women in other ethnic groups are not reliable



## Appendix C

### Referenced documents summary

Criminal Justice Alliance,

["No Respect: Young BAME men, the police and stop and search"](#), Briefing, 2017

[Stop and search - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](#)

Stop and search rate per 1,000 by ethnicity

[Confidence in the local police - GOV.UK Ethnicity facts and figures \(ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk\)](#) See Section 3 "By Ethnicity Over Time".

[NPCC Diversity, Equality Inclusion Strategy](#), 2018-2025, published 2018

"Policing by Consent: Understanding and Improving relations between Gypsies, Roma, Travellers and the police", The Traveller Movement <https://wp-main.travellermovement.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Policing-by-Consent-Report-long.pdf>

"Discovery report into workplace adjustments", College of Policing, 2021



[Discovery report into workplace adjustments \(college.police.uk\)](#)

[The Macpherson Inquiry 22 years on](#) - Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, July 2021, para 105105. "The Macpherson report brought about a transformation in the way police recognise racist incidents and deal with racist crimes, and we found a strong commitment from senior police officers to maintain the progress that had been made. This seismic change is one of the most important legacies of the Stephen Lawrence Inquiry and the vital work of those who fought to make sure the inquiry happened."

[Stop and search \(college.police.uk\)](#)

## Appendix D

### Programme structure and governance structure



### **Programme Board**

CC David Thompson QPM – NPCC  
CEO Andy Marsh QPM – College of Policing  
DAC Amanda Pearson – Programme Lead  
Garry Forsyth – DEI Lead  
Rachel Tuffin OBE - College of Policing  
CC Pam Kelly – Gwent Police - **NPCC Lead Internal Culture & Inclusivity Lead**  
DCC Clare Parmenter Dyfed Powys - **NPCC Lead Community Relations & Engagement**  
CC Lucy D’Orsi – BTP - **NPCC Lead Use of Powers** – Work stream Lead  
ACC Matt Ward – Work stream Lead  
Liz Unwin – Programme Manager  
Natasha Bolton – Programme Communications Lead  
Karen Turrell – Programme Support Officer  
Marc Jones – APCC Chair  
Richard Denham - APCC  
Alison Lowe - Equality, Diversity and Human Rights Lead at the APCC  
John Campion - West Mercia Police and Crime Commissioner, joint leads for Equality Diversity and Human Rights with Alison Lowe  
ACC Kerrin Wilson – Lincolnshire Police  
Neil Basu - Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations in the Met / NPCC lead for Counter Terrorism Policing  
Helen Ball - MPS Assistant Commissioner for Professionalism  
Karen Lancaster – Home Office  
Michael Cordy – Home Office  
Rachel Watson – Home Office  
Harriet MacKinley – Home Office  
Daniel Wilkins – Home Office  
Jo Farrar - MoJ  
Johanna Keech-Jowers - Divisional Director, Diversity, Inclusion and Wellbeing at Ministry of Justice UK  
Wendy Williams - HMIC  
Sal Naseem - IOPC  
Andy George - NBPA  
Abimbola Johnson – ISOB Chair  
Alison Heydari – Critical friend  
Phillip Cain – Critical friend  
Tyron Joyce – Critical friend  
Bernie O’Reilly - CoP

### **Stakeholder Group**

NPCC  
College of Policing  
LGBTQ+ lead for Northumbria  
Inclusion and Diversity Manager Lancashire Constabulary  
West Midlands Police  
Hampshire Police  
Home Office  
NBPA  
Hate Crime officer, Herts  
Police Supers Association  
Police Federation  
Met police  
City of London Police  
Thames Valley Police  
Inclusion and Diversity Manager Lancashire Constabulary  
Cumbria Police

## Appendix E

**1999** [The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. Macpherson's recommendations](#)

**2015** [Equality, diversity and inclusion in the civil service. National](#) **Audit Office**

**2016** [Removing Barriers: race, ethnicity and employment. Scottish Government \(2016\)](#)

**2016** [Healing a divided Britain](#)

**2016-17** [House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Police diversity First Report of Session 2016–17](#)

**2017** [The Lammy Report](#)

**2017** [Addressing the barriers to BAME employee career progression to the top CIPD](#)

**2017** [McGregor-Smith Review – Race in the Workplace](#)

**2017** [Report of the Independent Review of Deaths and Serious Incidents in Police Custody - Angiolini Review](#)

**2018** [Code of practice for stop and search in Scotland: six-month review](#)

**2018** [Windrush Lessons Learned Review](#)

**2020** [Ethnic Diversity Enriching Business Leadership – The Parker Review Report](#)

**2021** [Commission on Race and Ethnic Disparities](#) – *Recommendations not yet accepted by HM Government*

**2021** [The Macpherson Report: Twenty-two years on](#)

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## **Session 10 – (Verbal Update only)**

- **Sir Tom Winsor - HMICFRS**